1. 315430.897721
    Consider this Thomistic-style doctrine: God’s believing that a contingent entity x exists is the cause of x’s existing. Let B be God’s believing that I exist. Then, either B exists in all possible worlds or B exists in all and only the worlds where I exist. …
    Found 3 days, 15 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  2. 546043.897789
    It wasn't just the positivists who thought there was a tight connection between meaning and truth in the case of a priori propositions: However, it seems to me that nevertheless one ingredient of this wrong theory of mathematical truth [i.e. …
    Found 6 days, 7 hours ago on Tristan Haze's blog
  3. 595882.897827
    It is widely believed that the semantic contents of some linguistic and mental representations are determined by factors independent of a person’s bodily makeup. Arguments derived from Hilary Putnam’s seminal Twin Earth thought experiment have been especially influential in establishing that belief. I claim that there is a neglected version of the mind-body relation which undermines those arguments and also excludes the possibility of zombies. It has been neglected because it is counterintuitive but I show that it can nonetheless be intelligibly worked out in detail and all obvious objections met. This suggests that we may be faced with a choice between embracing a counterintuitive interpretation of the mind-body relation or accepting that a currently very promising theory in cognitive science, Prediction Error Minimization, faces a fundamental problem. Furthermore, blocking that threat entails that any physicalist/materialst theory of mind is freed from the spectre of zombie worlds. The proposal also makes the ideas of personal teleportation of mind uploading more plausible.
    Found 6 days, 21 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  4. 768946.897867
    There are four modal paradigms in ancient philosophy: the frequency interpretation of modality, the model of possibility as a potency, the model of antecedent necessities and possibilities with respect to a certain moment of time (diachronic modalities), and the model of possibility as non-contradictoriness. None of these conceptions, which were well known to early medieval thinkers through the works of Boethius, was based on the idea of modality as involving reference to simultaneous alternatives. This new paradigm was introduced into Western thought in early twelfth-century discussions influenced by Augustine’s theological conception of God as acting by choice between alternative histories.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  5. 818620.897897
    I argue that there is an important similarity between causation and grounding. In particular I argue that, just as there is a type of scientific explanation that appeals to causal mechanisms—causal-mechanical explanation—there is a type of metaphysical explanation that appeals to grounding mechanisms—grounding-mechanical explanation. The upshot is that the role that grounding mechanisms play in certain metaphysical explanations mirrors the role that causal mechanisms play in certain scientific explanations. In this light, it becomes clear that grounding-mechanical explanations make crucial contributions to the evaluation of a variety of important philosophical theses, including priority monism and physicalism.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  6. 933888.897922
    An odd dissensus between confident metaphysicians and neo-pragmatist antimetaphysicians pervades early twenty-first century analytic philosophy. Each faction is convinced their side has won the day, but both are mistaken about the philosophical legacy of the twentieth century. More historical awareness is needed to overcome the current dissensus. Lewis and his possible-world system are lionised by metaphysicians; Quine’s pragmatist scruples about heavy-duty metaphysics inspire anti-metaphysicians. But Lewis developed his system under the influence of his teacher Quine, inheriting from him his empiricism, his physicalism, his meta-ontology, and, I will show in this paper, also his Humeanism. Using published as well as never-before-seen unpublished sources, I will make apparent that both heavy-duty metaphysicians and neo-pragmatist anti-metaphysicians are wrong about the roles Quine and Lewis played in the development of twentieth-century philosophy. The two are much more alike than is commonly supposed, and Quine much more instrumental to the pedigree of current metaphysics.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  7. 980884.897946
    On a sunny Saturday afternoon, Socrates is walking through the streets of Western Heights, a small town in the country of New Zealand. Feeling rather hungry, he decides to visit a café for food and coffee. As he is about to enter, he bumps into his old friend Greg, the owner of the café.
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on Brent Silby's site
  8. 1007112.897973
    J. D. Hamkins and M. Kikuchi, “The inclusion relations of the countable models of set theory are all isomorphic.” (manuscript under review)   Citation arχiv @ARTICLE{HamkinsKikuchi:The-inclusion-relations-of-the-countable-models-of-set-theory-are-all-isomorphic, author = {Joel David Hamkins and Makoto Kikuchi}, title = {The inclusion relations of the countable models of set theory are all isomorphic}, journal = {}, editor = {}, year = {}, volume = {}, number = {}, pages = {}, month = {}, doi = {}, note = {manuscript under review}, eprint = {1704.04480}, archivePrefix = {arXiv}, primaryClass = {math.LO}, url = {http://jdh.hamkins.org/inclusion-relations-are-all-isomorphic}, abstract = {}, keywords = {}, source = {}, } Abstract. …
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on Joel David Hamkins's blog
  9. 1046285.898001
    In our ASSC20 symposium, “Does unconscious perception really exist?”, the four of us asked some difficult questions about the purported phenomenon of unconscious perception, disagreeing on a number of points. This disagreement reflected the objective of the symposium: not only to come together to discuss a single topic of keen interest to the ASSC community, but to do so in a way that would fairly and comprehensively represent the heterogeneity of ideas, opinions, and evidence that exists concerning this contentious topic. The crux of this controversy rests in no small part on disagreement about what is meant by the terms of the debate and how to determine empirically whether a state is unconscious or not.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Ned Block's site
  10. 1220798.898043
    This paper presents a systematic approach for analyzing and explaining the nature of social groups. I argue against prominent views that attempt to unify all social groups or to divide them into simple typologies. Instead I argue that social groups are enormously diverse, but show how we can investigate their natures nonetheless. I analyze social groups from a bottom-up perspective, constructing profiles of the metaphysical features of groups of specific kinds. We can characterize any given kind of social group with four complementary profiles: its “construction profile,” its “extra essentials” profile, its “anchor” profile, and its “accident” profile. Together these provide a framework for understanding the nature of groups, help classify and categorize groups, and shed light on group agency.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Brian Epstein's site
  11. 1270083.898079
    In his discussion of the four causes, Aristotle claims that ‘the hypotheses are material causes of the conclusion’ (Physics 2. 3, Metaphysics Δ 2). This claim has puzzled commentators since antiquity. It is usually taken to mean that the premisses of any deduction are material causes of the conclusion. By contrast, I argue that the claim does not apply to deductions in general but only to scientific demonstrations. For Aristotle, the theorems of a given science are composites consisting of the indemonstrable premisses from which they are demonstrated. Accordingly, these premisses are elements, and hence material causes, of the theorems. In this way, Aristotle’s claim can be shown to be well-motivated and illuminating.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Marko Malink's site
  12. 1287821.898115
    Fatalism is the thesis that human acts occur by necessity and hence are unfree. Theological fatalism is the thesis that infallible foreknowledge of a human act makes the act necessary and hence unfree. If there is a being who knows the entire future infallibly, then no human act is free. Fatalism seems to be entailed by infallible foreknowledge by the following informal line of reasoning: For any future act you will perform, if some being infallibly believed in the past that the act would occur, there is nothing you can do now about the fact that he believed what he believed since nobody has any control over past events; nor can you make him mistaken in his belief, given that he is infallible.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  13. 1352980.898143
    Chapter 10 of Idealism and Christian Theology is “Idealism and Participating in the Body of Christ” by James Arcadi. This article is very clearly written and handles both philosophy and theology well. …
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on The Prosblogion
  14. 1461077.898205
    We provide a sufficient frame-theoretic condition for a super-bi-intuitionistic logic to have Maksimova’s variable separation property. We conclude that bi-intuitionistic logic enjoys the property. Furthermore, we offer an algebraic characterization of the super-bi-intuitionistic logics with Maksimova’s property.
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on The Australasian Journal of Logic
  15. 1461133.89824
    A theorem from Archimedes on the area of a circle is proved in a setting where some inconsistency is permissible, by using paraconsistent reasoning. The new proof emphasizes that the famous method of exhaustion gives approximations of areas closer than any consistent quantity. This is equivalent to the classical theorem in a classical context, but not in a context where it is possible that there are inconsistent infinitesimals. The area of the circle is taken ‘up to inconsistency’. The fact that the core of Archimedes’s proof still works in a weaker logic is evidence that the integral calculus and analysis more generally are still practicable even in the event of inconsistency.
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on The Australasian Journal of Logic
  16. 1461259.898267
    Circular definitions have primarily been studied in revision theory in the classical scheme. I present systems of circular definitions in the Strong Kleene and supervaluation schemes and provide complete proof systems for them. One class of definitions, the intrinsic definitions, naturally arises in both schemes. I survey some of the features of this class of definitions.
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on The Australasian Journal of Logic
  17. 1525887.898295
    If $M$ is a model of ZFC set theory, let $I$ be the definable cut of its ordinals, the collection of ordinals that are below an ordinal $\delta$ of $M$ that is definable in $M$ without parameters. This would include all the ordinals of $M$, if the definable ordinals happen to be unbounded in $M$, but one can also construct examples where the definable cut is bounded in $M$. …
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on Joel David Hamkins's blog
  18. 1567097.89833
    I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of (sensory awareness relations to) peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on Susanna Schellenberg's site
  19. 1918656.898368
    Chapter 8 of Idealism and Christian Theology is “Jonathan Edwards, Idealism, and Christology” by Oliver Crisp. This is the second of the two previously published essays, having appeared in another edited volume in 2011. …
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on The Prosblogion
  20. 1972062.898406
    In his book Beyond Art, Dominic McIver Lopes presents a multitude of arguments about main problems in the philosophy of art but centred on the problem of defining what is art and what is a work of art . He argues for “buck passing” theory of art . According to this theory, the task is passed to philosophical theories which, first, have to find necessary and sufficient conditions, or at least, some non-trivial conditions what makes each kind of art exactly that kind of art . It has a form: “X is a work of art if and only if X is a work of K, where K is an art” . Lopes offers support for his theory through many arguments around problems of aesthetic appreciation, aesthetic properties, value, appreciative kinds and practices, media used in various artforms, etc . He tries to show that theory is more viable and more informative than its competitors . I present and critically assess some of the claims from the book; it seems that, according to a form of the theory, we can do without the concept of “art” altogether .
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  21. 2012622.898453
    This paper employs a case study from the history of neuroscience—brain reward function—to scrutinize the inductive argument for the so-called ‘Heuristic Identity Theory’ (HIT). The case fails to support HIT, illustrating why other case studies previously thought to provide empirical support for HIT also fold under scrutiny. After distinguishing two different ways of understanding the types of identity claims presupposed by HIT and considering other conceptual problems, we conclude that HIT is not an alternative to the traditional identity theory so much as a relabeling of previously discussed strategies for mechanistic discovery.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  22. 2145448.898477
    In this paper, I will give an argument for what I call pannormism, the view according to which if x instantiates a metaphysically basic normative property F, then whatever grounds the being of x also instantiates F. In slogan form: if there is normativity, there is normativity all the way down. Such pannormism is in many ways analogous to panpsychism, and my discussion also contains an important lesson for panpsychism, a way to avoid its so-called combination problem. In section 1, I present the argument; in section 2, I discuss its conclusion.
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  23. 2267117.898498
    A binary relation R is said to be wellfounded on a domain if and only if every nonempty subset of that domain has an R-minimal element; equivalently, iff every descending R chain is finite. A proper parthood relation can be non-wellfounded in various ways; here are three: (i) gunk: for all x there is a y such that y is a proper part of x; (ii) bounded infinite descent: there is an infinite chain of distinct proper parts ?! > ?2 > ?! > ⋯ which (after infinitely many steps) terminates in a smallest element y; (iii) loops: there are x and y such that x is a proper part of y and y is a proper part of x.
    Found 3 weeks, 5 days ago on Aaron J Cotnoir's site
  24. 2272487.898519
    TRANSITIVITY: Conscious mental states are mental states we are aware of in some way. W-TRANSPARENCY: For at least one conscious state M, it is impossible to: (a) TRANSPARENCY-DIRECT: Stand in a direct awareness relation to M, or; (b) TRANSPARENCY-DE RE: Stand in a de re awareness relation to M, or; (c) TRANSPARENCY-INT: Stand in an introspective awareness relation to M, His basic claim, then, is that there is no way of making precise the statement of transitivity above in such a way as to render it consistent with the weak version of transparency that he thinks should count as a truism or platitude. …
    Found 3 weeks, 5 days ago on Richard Brown's blog
  25. 2501318.898541
    Chapter 6 of Idealism and Christian Theology is “On the Corruption of the Body: A Theological Argument for Metaphysical Idealism” by S. Mark Hamilton. This is easily the best essay in the collection so far, and the most directly focused on the central issues the volume purports to address. …
    Found 4 weeks ago on The Prosblogion
  26. 2609644.898616
    The capacity for “mindreading” is understood in philosophy of mind and cognitive science as the capacity to represent, reason about, and respond to others’ mental states. Essentially the same capacity is also known as “folk psychology”, “Theory of Mind”, and “mentalizing”. An example of everyday mindreading: you notice that Tom’s fright embarrassed Mary and surprised Bill, who had believed that Tom wanted to try everything. Mindreading is of crucial importance for our social life: our ability to predict, explain, and/or coordinate with others’ actions on countless occasions crucially relies on representing their mental states.
    Found 1 month ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  27. 2666112.898645
    Possible worlds have found many applications in contemporary philosophy: from theories of possibility and necessity, to accounts of conditionals, to theories of mental and linguistic content, to understanding supervenience relationships, to theories of properties and propositions, among many other applications. Almost as soon as possible worlds started to be used in formal theories in logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and elsewhere, theorists started to wonder whether impossible worlds should be postulated as well. To take just one example, possible-worlds theories of mental content associate sets of worlds with beliefs (or perhaps entire belief systems): the content of a belief is (or is represented by) the set of possible worlds where that belief is true. But what should we say about beliefs that cannot possibly be true: false logical or mathematical beliefs, for example, or beliefs in metaphysical impossibilities? It would be natural to represent these beliefs with sets of impossible worlds. If James thinks that 87 is a prime number, the set of worlds associated with his beliefs includes worlds where 87 is prime, for example. If Jane is undecided about the principle of excluded middle, her belief worlds should include some at which the principle is correct and some where it is incorrect. And so on.
    Found 1 month ago on Daniel Nolan's site
  28. 2724875.89868
    Truth values have been put to quite different uses in philosophy and logic, being characterized, for example, as: primitive abstract objects denoted by sentences in natural and formal languages, abstract entities hypostatized as the equivalence classes of sentences, what is aimed at in judgements, values indicating the degree of truth of sentences, entities that can be used to explain the vagueness of concepts, values that are preserved in valid inferences, values that convey information concerning a given proposition. Depending on their particular use, truth values have been treated as unanalyzed, as defined, as unstructured, or as structured entities.
    Found 1 month ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  29. 2788802.898701
    Chapter 5 of Idealism and Christian Theology is “Edwardsian Idealism, Imago Dei, and Contemporary Theology” by Joshua Farris. This is an interesting article that directly and constructively addresses one of the central theological issues raised by metaphysical idealism of the Berkeley/Edwards variety. …
    Found 1 month ago on The Prosblogion
  30. 2957205.898728
    This chapter starts from a puzzle. Realism about X is often glossed as the idea that Xs are mind independent: Xs exist, and have their nature, independently of our beliefs, interests, attitudes, or other mental states. Xs are, in a sense ‘out there’, getting on with it independently of our mental life. If this is right, how should we understand realism about cognitive science? Mental processes and states are not mind independent: they don’t take place independently of our beliefs, interests, attitudes, or other mental states. Hence, it seems that we cannot be realists about them. Nevertheless, in line with other areas of philosophy of science, there seems scope for asking the realist question about the posits of cognitive science even if those posits make up our mental life. But unless we state realism differently, there is no way to sensibly ask the realist question about cognitive science. In this paper, I explore the right way to state realism about cognitive science. I introduce three different types of mind dependence and evaluate their merit to stating realism about cognitive science.
    Found 1 month ago on Mark Sprevak's site