Philosophical Progresshttp://www.philosophicalprogress.org/2018-10-21T23:59:00ZArticles and blog posts found on 21 October 20182018-10-21T23:59:00Z2018-10-21T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2018-10-21://<b>Adam Morton: <a href="http://www.fernieroad.ca/a/PAPERS/Morton%20(2018)%20Could%20it%20be%20a%20Conditional.pdf">Could It Be a Conditional?</a></b> (pdf, 1111 words)<br /> <div>Chris Tweedt proposes that there is no independent concept of contrastive knowledge. He allows that we can meaningfully and in fact helpfully say that a person knows that p rather than q. But this is shorthand for something that can be said in a more traditional way as that the person knows that if p or q then p. I have two worries about this line. First, I do not know how to understand the conditional here. And second, I suspect that the suggested interpretation takes away the motive for using a contrastive idiom in the first place.</div><br /> <b>Ariel Rubinstein, Asher Wolinsky: <a href="http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/RW.pdf">Biased Preferences Equilibrium</a></b> (pdf, 4193 words)<br /> <div>We discuss economic environments in which individual choice sets are fixed and the level of a certain parameter that systematically biases the preferences of all agents is determined endogenously to achieve equilibrium. Our equilibrium concept, Biased Preferences Equilibrium, is reminiscent of competitive equilibrium: agents’ choice sets and their preferences are independent of the behavior of other agents, the combined choices have to satisfy overall feasibility constraints and the endogenous adjustment of the equilibrating preference parameter is analogous to the equilibrating price adjustment. The concept is applied to a number of economic examples.</div><br /> <b>Clara Bradley: <a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15169/1/nonequivalence%20einstein%20and%20lorentz.pdf">The Non-Equivalence of Einstein and Lorentz</a></b> (pdf, 7908 words)<br /> <div>In this paper, I give a counterexample to a claim made in Norton (2008) that empirically equivalent theories can often be regarded as theoretically equivalent by treating one as having surplus structure, thereby overcoming the problem of underdetermination of theory choice. The case I present is that of Lorentz's ether theory and Einstein's theory of special relativity. I argue that Norton's suggestion that surplus structure is present in Lorentz's theory in the form of the ether state of rest is based on a misunderstanding of the role that the ether plays in Lorentz's theory, and that in general, consideration of the conceptual framework in which a theory is embedded is vital to understanding the relationship between different theories.</div><br /> <b>Noel Swanson: <a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15174/1/Swanson_Algebraic%20CPT.pdf">Deciphering the Algebraic CPT Theorem</a></b> (pdf, 22949 words)<br /> <div>The CPT theorem states that any causal, Lorentz-invariant, thermodynamically well-behaved quantum field theory must also be invariant under a reflection symmetry that reverses the direction of time (T), flips spatial parity (P), and conjugates charge (C). Although its physical basis remains obscure, CPT symmetry appears to be necessary in order to unify quantum mechanics with relativity. This paper attempts to decipher the physical reasoning behind proofs of the CPT theorem in algebraic quantum field theory. Ultimately, CPT symmetry is linked to a systematic reversal of the C -algebraic Lie product that encodes the generating relationship between observables and symmetries. In any physically reasonable relativistic quantum field theory it is always possible to systematically reverse this generating relationship while preserving the dynamics, spectra, and localization properties of physical systems. Rather than the product of three separate reflections, CPT symmetry is revealed to be a single global reflection of the theory’s state space.</div><br /> <b>Rodolfo Gambini, Luis Pedro Garc´ıa-Pintos, Jorge Pullin: <a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15167/1/singleworldinterpretationV14.pdf">A single-world consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics from fundamental time and length uncertainties</a></b> (pdf, 9214 words)<br /> <div>Within ordinary —unitary— quantum mechanics there exist global protocols that allow to verify that no definite event —an outcome to which a probability can be associated— occurs. Instead, states that start in a coherent superposition over possible outcomes always remain as a superposition. We show that, when taking into account fundamental errors in measuring length and time intervals, that have been put forward as a consequence of a conjunction of quantum mechanical and general relativity arguments, there are instances in which such global protocols no longer allow to distinguish whether the state is in a superposition or not. All predictions become identical as if one of the outcomes occurs, with probability determined by the state. We use this as a criteria to define events, as put forward in the Montevideo Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. We analyze in detail the occurrence of events in the paradigmatic case of a particle in a superposition of two different locations. We argue that our approach provides a consistent (C) single-world (S) picture of the universe, thus allowing an economical way out of the limitations imposed by a recent theorem by Frauchiger and Renner showing that having a self-consistent single-world description of the universe is incompatible with quantum theory. In fact, the main observation of this paper may be stated as follows: If quantum mechanics is extended to include gravitational effects to a QG theory, then QG, S, and C are satisfied.</div><br /> <b>Sara Green, Michael R. Dietrich, Sabina Leonelli, Rachel A. Ankeny: <a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15172/1/August%20Krogh%20preprint.pdf">‘Extreme’ Organisms and the Problem of Generalization: Interpreting the Krogh Principle</a></b> (pdf, 11382 words)<br /> <div>Many biologists appeal to the so-called Krogh principle when justifying their choice of experimental organisms. The principle states that “for a large number of problems there will be some animal of choice, or a few such animals, on which it can be most conveniently studied”. Despite its popularity, the principle is often critiqued for implying unwarranted generalizations from optimal models. We argue that the Krogh principle should be interpreted in relation to the historical and scientific contexts in which it has been developed and used. We interpret the Krogh Principle as a heuristic, i.e., as a recommendation to approach biological problems through organisms where a specific trait or physiological mechanism is expected to be most distinctively displayed or most experimentally accessible. We designate these organisms “Krogh organisms.” We clarify the differences between uses of model organisms and non-standard Krogh organisms. Among these is the use of Krogh organisms as “negative models” in biomedical research, where organisms are chosen for their <i>dissimilarity</i> to human physiology. Importantly, the representational scope of Krogh organisms and the generalizability of their characteristics are not fixed or assumed but explored through experimental studies. Research on Krogh organisms is steeped in the comparative method characteristic of zoology and comparative physiology, in which studies of biological variation produce insights into general physiological constraints. Accordingly, we conclude that the Krogh principle exemplifies the advantages of studying biological variation as a strategy to produce generalizable insights.</div><br /> <b>Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Cyrille Imbert: <a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15171/1/2018_03_01_Explaining_collaboration=PSA=V91_online=Philsci_Archiv.pdf">Explaining Scientific Collaboration: a General Functional Account</a></b> (pdf, 4798 words)<br /> <div>For two centuries, collaborative research has become increasingly widespread. Various explanations of this trend have been proposed. Here, we offer a novel functional explanation of it. It differs from accounts like that of Wray (2002) by the precise socio-epistemic mechanism that grounds the beneficialness of collaboration. Boyer-Kassem and Imbert (2015) show how minor differences in the step-efficiency of collaborative groups can make them much more successful in particular configurations. We investigate this model further, derive robust social patterns concerning the general successfulness of collaborative groups, and argue that these patterns can be used to defend a general functional account.</div><br /> Articles and blog posts found on 20 October 20182018-10-20T23:59:00Z2018-10-20T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2018-10-20://<b>Alex Gregory: <a href="https://alsnotepad.com/DesRat.pdf">Why do Desires Rationalize Actions?</a></b> (pdf, 9451 words)<br /> <div>I begin the paper by outlining one classic argument for the guise of the good: that we must think that desires represent their objects favourably in order to explain why they can make actions rational (Quinn 1995; Stampe 1987). But what exactly is the conclusion of this argument? Many have recently formulated the guise of the good as the view that desires are akin to perceptual appearances of the good (Stampe 1987; Oddie 2005; Tenenbaum 2007). But I argue that this view fails to capitalize on the above argument, and that the argument is better understood as favouring a view on which desires are belief-like states. I finish by addressing some countervailing claims made by Avery Archer (2016).</div><br /> <b>Alex Gregory: <a href="https://alsnotepad.com/DisWBIEE.pdf">Disability and Well-Being</a></b> (pdf, 5565 words)<br /> <div>This entry discusses the relationship between disability and wellbeing. Disabilities are commonly thought to be unfortunate, but whether this is true is unclear, and if it is true, it is unclear why it is true. The entry first explains the disability paradox, which is the apparent discrepancy between the level of wellbeing that disabled people self-report, and the level of wellbeing that nondisabled people predict disabled people to have. It then turns to an argument that disabilities must be bad, because it is wrong to cause them in others. Sections 4 and 5 discuss whether disabilities might be intrinsically bad or even bad by definition. The final section turns to discuss the claim that to whatever extent disabilities are bad, this is not because disabilities themselves are harmful because only because society discriminates against people with disabilities.</div><br /> <b>Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, Cory Wright: <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-pluralist/">Pluralist Theories of Truth</a></b> (html, 12614 words)<br /> <div>The plausibility of theories of truth has often been observed to vary, sometimes extensively, across different domains or regions of discourse. Because of this variance, the problems internal to each such theory become salient as they overgeneralize. A natural suggestion is therefore that not all (declarative) sentences in all domains are true in exactly the same way. Sentences in mathematics, morals, comedy, chemistry, politics, and gastronomy may be true in different ways, if and when they are ever true. ‘Pluralism about truth’ names the thesis that there is more than one way of being true.</div><br /> Articles and blog posts found on 19 October 20182018-10-19T23:59:00Z2018-10-19T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2018-10-19://<b>David Sedley: <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/diodorus-cronus/">Diodorus Cronus</a></b> (html, 3365 words)<br /> <div>Diodorus was a pioneering logician, and the most celebrated member of the Dialectical School of the 4<sup>th</sup>–3<sup>rd</sup> c. BCE. His contributions to logic—in particular, definitions of modal terms and the criteria for a sound conditional—are covered in the article on the Dialectical School (see also Section 2 of the entry on fatalism). The present article adds a conspectus of Diodorus’s other ideas. His use of paradox is at least as prominent in our ancient sources about him as are those constructive contributions to logical theory.</div><br /> <b>Elizabeth Barnes: <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5464e92fe4b0e15e6096812e/t/5bc8e44141920262e78c6a98/1539892291226/MetaphysicalVaguenessWithoutVagueObjects.pdf">Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague Objects</a></b> (pdf, 2452 words)<br /> <div>Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams have developed a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy, via which they defend the theoretical legitimacy of vague objects. In this paper, we argue that while the Barnes-Williams theory supplies a viable account of genuine metaphysical vagueness, it cannot underwrite an account of genuinely vague objects. First we clarify the distinction between these two key theses. Then we argue that the Barnes-Williams theory of metaphysical vagueness not only fails to deliver genuinely vague objects, it in fact provides grounds for rejecting them.</div><br /> <b>James Owen Weatherall: <a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15166/1/theoretical%20equivalence.pdf">Theoretical Equivalence in Physics</a></b> (pdf, 13321 words)<br /> <div>I review the philosophical literature on the question of when two physical theories are equivalent. This includes a discussion of empirical equivalence, which is often taken to be necessary, and sometimes taken to be sufficient, for theoretical equivalence; and “interpretational” equivalence, which is the idea that two theories are equivalent just in case they have the same interpretation. It also includes a discussion of several formal notions of equivalence that have been considered in the recent philosophical literature, including (generalized) definitional equivalence and categorical equivalence. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the relationship between equivalence and duality.</div><br /> <b>Richard Bett: <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/timon-phlius/">Timon of Phlius</a></b> (html, 5135 words)<br /> <div>Timon (c. 320–230 BCE) was the younger contemporary and leading disciple of Pyrrho of Elis. Unlike Pyrrho, he wrote numerous poems and prose works; fragments of and reports on some of these have survived, by far the largest number (more than sixty) being from the <i>Silloi</i> (<i>Lampoons)</i>. Several of these works were devoted to, or at least included, laudatory descriptions of Pyrrho and his philosophy; the <i>Silloi</i> appears to have contained some passages in this vein, but consisted largely of satirical thumbnail sketches of a wide range of other philosophers, all of whom, in Timon’s estimation, failed wholly or partly to achieve the ideal outlook exemplified by Pyrrho.</div><br /> <b>Zachary Davis, Anthony Steinbock: <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scheler/">Max Scheler</a></b> (html, 15883 words)<br /> <div>At the time of his death, Max Ferdinand Scheler was one of the most prominent German intellectuals and most sought after philosophers of his time. A pioneer in the development of phenomenology in the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Scheler broke new ground in many areas of philosophy and established himself as perhaps the most creative of the early phenomenologists. Relative to the attention his work received and the attention his contemporaries now enjoy, interest in Scheler’s work and thought has waned considerably. This decrease in attention is in part due to the suppression of Scheler’s work by the Nazis from 1933 to 1945, a suppression stemming from his Jewish heritage and outspoken denunciation of fascism and National Socialism.</div><br /> Articles and blog posts found on 18 October 20182018-10-18T23:59:00Z2018-10-18T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2018-10-18://<b>: <a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15162/1/species_PSA.pdf">Species as Models</a></b> (pdf, 4911 words)<br /> <div>This paper argues that biological species should be construed as abstract models, rather than biological or even tangible entities. Various (phenetic, cladistic, biological etc.) species concepts are defined as set-theoretic models of formal theories, and their logical connections are illustrated. In this view organisms relate to a species not as instantiations, members, or mereological parts, but rather as phenomena to be represented by the model/species. This sheds new light on the long-standing problems of species and suggests their connection to broader philosophical topics such as model selection, scientific representation, and scientific realism.</div><br /> <b>Ardourel Vincent, Anouk Barberousse, Cyrille Imbert: <a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15165/1/Draf_PSA2018_Ardourel_Barberousse_Imbert.pdf">Inferential power, formalisms, and scientific models</a></b> (pdf, 4662 words)<br /> <div>Scientific models need to be investigated if they are to provide valuable information about the systems they represent. Surprisingly, the epistemological question of what enables this investigation has hardly been investigated. Even authors who consider the inferential role of models as central, like Hughes (1997) or Bueno and Colyvan (2011), content themselves with claiming that models contain <i>mathematical resources</i> that provide <i>inferential power</i>. We claim that these notions require further analysis and argue that mathematical formalisms contribute to this inferential role. We characterize formalisms, illustrate how they extend our mathematical resources, and highlight how distinct formalisms offer various inferential affordances.</div><br /> <b>Marco F.H. Schmidt, Hannes Rakoczy: <a href="https://www.psych.uni-goettingen.de/de/development/pdfs/schmidtrakoczy2018normativity/">Developing an understanding of normativity</a></b> (pdf, 9723 words)<br /> <div>The capacity for <i>cognition</i> allows human and nonhuman animals to navigate the physical world effectively and adaptively. For instance, animals can estimate distances, memorize events, track objects in space, detect regularities, discriminate between small sets of objects exactly and between large sets approximately, and make causal inferences. Thus, over the last decades, developmental and comparative research have gained more and more insights into the development of human and nonhuman thinking about the natural world including its entities, regularities, and causal structure (Baillargeon and Carey 2012; Call and Tomasello 2005; Rakoczy 2014; Tomasello 2014).</div><br /> <b>Marina Proft, Hannes Rakoczy: <a href="https://www.psych.uni-goettingen.de/de/development/pdfs/proft-rakoczy-2018-1">The ontogeny of intent- based normative judgments</a></b> (pdf, 12837 words)<br /> <div>When evaluating norm transgressions, children begin to show some sensitivity to the agent’s intentionality around preschool age. However, the specific developmental trajectories of different forms of such intent- based judgments and their cognitive underpinnings are still largely unclear. The current studies, therefore, systematically investigated the development of intent- based normative judgments as a function of two crucial factors: (a) the type of the agent’s mental state underlying a normative transgression, and (b) the type of norm transgressed (moral versus conventional). In Study 1, 5- and 7- year- old children as well as adults were presented with vignettes in which an agent transgressed either a moral or a conventional norm. Crucially, she did so either intentionally, accidentally (not intentionally at all) or unknowingly (intentionally, yet based on a false belief regarding the outcome). The results revealed two asymmetries in children’s intent- based judgments. First, all age groups showed greater sensitivity to mental state information for moral compared to conventional transgressions. Second, children’s (but not adults’) normative judgments were more sensitive to the agent’s intention than to her belief. Two subsequent studies investigated this asymmetry in children more closely and found evidence that it is based on performance factors: children are able in principle to take into account an agent’s false belief in much the same way as her intentions, yet do not make belief- based judgments in many existing tasks (like that of Study 1) due to their inferential complexity. Taken together, these findings contribute to a more systematic understanding of the development of intent- based normative judgment.</div><br /> <b>Remco Heesen: <a href="https://remcoheesen.files.wordpress.com/2018/10/heesen-rewards-and-reproducibility.pdf">Why the Reward Structure of Science Makes Reproducibility Problems Inevitable</a></b> (pdf, 5801 words)<br /> <div>Recent philosophical work has praised the reward structure of science, while recent empirical work has shown that many scientific results may not be reproducible. I argue that the reward structure of science incentivizes scientists to focus on speed and impact at the expense of the reproducibility of their work, thus contributing to the so-called reproducibility crisis. I use a rational choice model to identify a set of sufficient conditions for this problem to arise, and I argue that these conditions plausibly apply to a wide range of research situations. Currently proposed solutions will not fully address this problem. Philosophical commentators should temper their optimism about the reward structure of science.</div><br /> <b>Robert J. Hartman: <a href="https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=6304006&aid=HARIFA-3v1">Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck</a></b> (pdf, 10557 words)<br /> <div>Martin Luther affirms his theological position by saying “Here I stand. I can do no other.” Supposing that Luther’s claim is true, he lacks alternative possibilities at the moment of choice. Even so, many libertarians have the intuition that he is morally responsible for his action. One way to make sense of this intuition is to assert that Luther’s action is indirectly free, because his action inherits its freedom and moral responsibility from earlier actions when he had alternative possibilities and those earlier directly free actions formed him into the kind of person who must refrain from recanting. Surprisingly, libertarians have not developed a full account of indirectly free actions. I provide a more developed account. First, I explain the metaphysical nature of indirectly free actions such as Luther’s. Second, I examine the kind of metaphysical and epistemic connections that must occur between past directly free actions and the indirectly free action. Third, I argue that an attractive way to understand the kind of derivative moral responsibility at issue involves affirming the existence of resultant moral luck.</div><br /> <b>Eric Schliesser's blog: <a href="http://digressionsnimpressions.typepad.com/digressionsimpressions/2018/10/huxley-on-teleology.html">Huxley on Wider Teleology.</a></b> (html, 1482 words)<br /> <div>Nevertheless it is necessary to remember that there is a wider Teleology, which is not touched by the doctrine of Evolution, but is actually based upon the fundamental proposition of Evolution. That proposition is, that the whole world, living and not living, is the result of the mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of the forces possessed by the molecules of which the primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed. &hellip;</div><br /> Articles and blog posts found on 17 October 20182018-10-17T23:59:00Z2018-10-17T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2018-10-17://<b>Brian Leiter: <a href="https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/2018-07/UPDATED%20CV%20NETHANEL%20LIPSHITZ.pdf">Nethanel Lipshitz</a></b> (pdf, 2346 words)<br /> <div>Many strands of modern moral and political philosophy rely on the idea of <i>basic equality</i>, the idea that all human beings are equal in “moral status” and deserve equal consideration of their interests. Some philosophers assume that basic equality could be true only if in some descriptive sense all human beings really are equal, that is, only if there is some morally significant feature all human beings have equally. This quickly leads to skepticism, as there seem to be no interesting feature or property that all human beings have equally. I argue, on the contrary, that basic equality could be defended even if they are not descriptively equal. My defense of basic equality, which I dub “the respect view”, consists of two theses: (1) Regardless of whether human beings are descriptively equal, we ought to not treat any human being with disrespect. (2) If two individuals deserve respect, to treat one’s interests as less important than another’s is disrespectful to the one whose interests are treated as less important. Together, these theses support a novel defense of basic equality, one that takes seriously the observation that human beings are very different from another.</div><br /> <b>Carl Huffman: <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pythagoras/">Pythagoras</a></b> (html, 18460 words)<br /> <div>Pythagoras, one of the most famous and controversial ancient Greek philosophers, lived from ca. 570 to ca. 490 BCE. He spent his early years on the island of Samos, off the coast of modern Turkey. At the age of forty, however, he emigrated to the city of Croton in southern Italy and most of his philosophical activity occurred there. Pythagoras wrote nothing, nor were there any detailed accounts of his thought written by contemporaries. By the first centuries BCE, moreover, it became fashionable to present Pythagoras in a largely unhistorical fashion as a semi-divine figure, who originated all that was true in the Greek philosophical tradition, including many of Plato’s and Aristotle’s mature ideas.</div><br /> <b>David Sedley: <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lucretius/">Lucretius</a></b> (html, 7921 words)<br /> <div>Titus Lucretius Carus (died mid to late 50s BCE) was an Epicurean poet of the late Roman republican era. His six-book Latin hexameter poem <i>De rerum natura</i> (<i>DRN</i> for short), variously translated <i>On the nature of things</i> and <i>On the nature of the universe</i>, survives virtually intact, although it is disputed whether he lived to put the finishing touches to it. As well as being a pioneering figure in the history of philosophical poetry, Lucretius has come to be our primary source of information on Epicurean physics, the official topic of his poem. Among numerous other Epicurean doctrines, the atomic ‘swerve’ is known to us mainly from Lucretius’ account of it.</div><br /> <b>Feraz Azhar, David I. Kaiser: <a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15158/1/azhar+kaiser_18_vAccepted.pdf">Flows into inflation: An effective field theory approach</a></b> (pdf, 22048 words)<br /> <div>We analyze the flow into inflation for generic “single-clock” systems, by combining an effective field theory approach with a dynamical-systems analysis. In this approach, we construct an expansion for the potential-like term in the effective action as a function of time, rather than specifying a particular functional dependence on a scalar field. We may then identify fixed points in the effective phase space for such systems, order-by-order, as various constraints are placed on the M th time derivative of the potential-like function. For relatively simple systems, we find significant probability for the background spacetime to flow into an inflationary state, and for inflation to persist for at least 60 efolds. Moreover, for systems that are compatible with single-scalar-field realizations, we find a single, universal functional form for the effective potential, V (φ), which is similar to the well-studied potential for power-law inflation. We discuss the compatibility of such dynamical systems with observational constraints.</div><br /> <b>Floris Roelofsen: <a href="https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/Tc5NjlhY/article.pdf">Semantic theories of questions</a></b> (pdf, 9362 words)<br /> <div>Summary This survey article discusses two basic issues that semantic theories of questions face. The first is how to conceptualise and formally represent the semantic content of questions. This issue arises in particular because the standard truth-conditional notion of meaning, which has been fruitful in the analysis of declarative statements, is not applicable to questions. The second issue is how questions, when embedded in a declarative statement (e.g., in Bill wonders who called ) contribute to the truth-conditional content of that statement. Several ways in which these issues have been addressed in the literature are discussed and compared.</div><br /> <b>Alexander Pruss's Blog: <a href="http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2018/10/yet-another-infinite-hat-guessing-story.html">Yet another infinite hat-guessing story</a></b> (html, 310 words)<br /> <div>Suppose first a countably infinite line of blindfolded people standing on tiles numbered 0,1,2,…, with the ones on a tile whose number is divisible by 10 having a red hat, and the others having blue hats. &hellip;</div><br /> <b>D. G. Mayo's blog: <a href="https://errorstatistics.com/2018/10/16/tour-guide-mementos-excursion-1-tour-i-of-how-to-get-beyond-the-statistics-wars/">Tour Guide Mementos (Excursion 1, Tour I of How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars)</a></b> (html, 1737 words)<br /> <div>. Tour guides in your travels jot down Mementos and Keepsakes from each Tour[i]. Their scribblings, which may at times include details, at other times just a word or two, may be modified through the Tour, and in response to questions from travelers (so please check back). &hellip;</div><br /> <b>Eric Schliesser's blog: <a href="http://digressionsnimpressions.typepad.com/digressionsimpressions/2018/10/omelasrevealing-the-souls-of-readers.html">Omelas, Dotson, and Revealing the Souls of Readers</a></b> (html, 1230 words)<br /> <div>Perhaps it would be best if you imagined it as your own fancy bids, assuming it will rise to the occasion, for certainly I cannot suit you all. For instance, how about technology? I think that there would be no cars or helicopters in and above the streets; this follows from the fact that the people of Omelas are happy people. &hellip;</div><br /> Articles and blog posts found on 16 October 20182018-10-16T23:59:00Z2018-10-16T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2018-10-16://<b>Colin Jakob Rittberg, Fenner Stanley Tanswell, Jean Paul Van Bendegem: <a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15133/1/Epistemic%20Injustice%20in%20Mathematics%20(to%20appear).pdf">Epistemic Injustice in Mathematics</a></b> (pdf, 16041 words)<br /> <div>We investigate how <i>epistemic injustice</i> can manifest itself in mathematical practices. We do this as both a social epistemological and virtue-theoretic investigation of mathematical practices. We delineate the concept both positively – we show that a certain type of folk theorem can be a source of epistemic injustice in mathematics – and negatively by exploring cases where the obstacles to participation in a mathematical practice do not amount to epistemic injustice. Having explored what epistemic injustice in mathematics can amount to, we use the concept to highlight a potential danger of intellectual enculturation.</div><br /> <b>Garrath Williams: <a href="http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/86057/1/Williams_2017_Rationality_and_Judgment_English_version_15Oct2018.pdf">Responsibility, Rationality and Judgment</a></b> (pdf, 16600 words)<br /> <div>This chapter examines the philosophical grounds for linking responsibility with capacities to reason and to judge in the light of moral considerations. It discusses five different accounts that connect responsibility and rationality, the work of: Susan Wolf, R Jay Wallace, the jointly authored work of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Angela M Smith, and Pamela Hieronymi. Through these authors’ contributions, the chapter argues that the notion of rational ability is central to understanding and justifying practices of responsibility. Although there has been clear progress in debates about this connection, however, understanding the notion of rational or moral ability still poses profound challenges. One reason for this is suggested: such abilities may have constitutive connections with practices of holding responsible and of taking responsibility – connections that have yet to be fully explored in the literature.</div><br /> <b>New APPS: <a href="http://www.newappsblog.com/2018/10/more-on-facebook-and-mental-health-privacy.html">More on Facebook and Mental Health Privacy</a></b> (html, 1232 words)<br /> <div>« Capitalism's Headache | Main 16 October 2018 More on Facebook and Mental Health Privacy By Gordon Hull It’s not news that Facebook generates a lot of privacy concerns. But it’s nonetheless worth keeping up a little, just to indicate how seriously we need to be concerned about the connection between Facebook and data analytics. &hellip;</div><br /> <b>Alexander Pruss's Blog: <a href="http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2018/10/we-need-social-epistemology.html">We need social epistemology</a></b> (html, 370 words)<br /> <div>Consider forty rational people each individually keeping track of the ethnicities and virtue/vice of the people they interact with and hear about (admittedly, one wonders why a rational person would do that!). &hellip;</div><br /> Articles and blog posts found on 15 October 20182018-10-15T23:59:00Z2018-10-15T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2018-10-15://<b>Bruno Whittle: <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/560ee28ee4b095574c3903eb/t/5bc26425f9619a73606f2667/1539466278180/ontological+pluralism+and+notational+variance.pdf">Ontological Pluralism and Notational Variance</a></b> (pdf, 5912 words)<br /> <div>Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways to exist. It is a position with deep roots in the history of philosophy. For example, Aristotle seemed to endorse it when he said that ‘there are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’’. Although the view fell out of favour, there has recently been a resurgence of interest, sparked by defences from Kris McDaniel [2009, 2010a, 2010b] and Jason Turner [2010, 2012]. Indeed, while the position may still have relatively few adherents in quite these terms, the influential Fregean approach to higher-order quantification—according to which this is over ‘concepts’ rather than objects— would seem to be an instance of it. In contemporary presentations, the view is stated in terms of fundamental languages. That is, languages whose expressions ‘carve nature at the joints’, or whose meanings are natural in the sense of Lewis [1983, 1986]. Thus stated, it is the claim that such languages have more than one type of quantification, ranging over different domains. For example, ∃a ranging over abstract objects, and ∃c ranging over concrete ones.</div><br /> <b>Bruno Whittle: <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/560ee28ee4b095574c3903eb/t/5bc2638bc83025dddf2b3f39/1539466124019/truth+and+generalized+quantification.pdf">Truth and Generalized Quantification</a></b> (pdf, 7784 words)<br /> <div>Kripke [1975] gives a formal theory of truth based on Kleene’s strong evaluation scheme. It is probably the most important and influential that has yet been given—at least since Tarski. However, it has been argued that this theory has a problem with generalized quantifiers such as All(φ, ψ), i.e. all φs are ψ, or Most(φ, ψ). Specifically, it has been argued that such quantifiers preclude the existence of just the sort of language that Kripke aims to deliver, that is, one that contains its own truth predicate. In this paper I solve the problem by showing how Kleene’s strong scheme, and Kripke’s theory that is based on it, can in a natural way be extended to accommodate the full range of generalized quantifiers.</div><br /> <b>Justice Everywhere: <a href="http://justice-everywhere.org/distribution/ethics-of-self-driving-cars/">On the Ethics of Self-Driving Cars: An Interview with Johannes Himmelreich</a></b> (html, 1590 words)<br /> <div>My colleague at Stanford’s Center for Ethics in Society, Johannes Himmelreich, is a philosopher who investigates agency and responsibility in contexts of collective collaboration and technological augmentation. &hellip;</div><br /> <b>Alexander Pruss's Blog: <a href="http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2018/10/a-simple-reductive-theory-of.html">A simple reductive theory of consciousness</a></b> (html, 273 words)<br /> <div>I think it is possible for one mind to have multiple spheres of consciousness. One kind of case is diachronic: there need be no unity of consciousness between my awareness at t1 and my awareness at t2. &hellip;</div><br /> <b>Eric Schliesser's blog: <a href="http://digressionsnimpressions.typepad.com/digressionsimpressions/2018/10/invisible-cities.html">Invisible Cities</a></b> (html, 1155 words)<br /> <div>In Eudoxia, which spreads both upward and down, with winding alleys, steps, dead ends, hovels, a carpet is preserved in which you can observe the city's true form. At first sight nothing seems to resemble Eudoxia less than the design of that carpet, laid out in symmetrical motives whose patterns are repeated along straight and circular lines, interwoven with brilliantly colored spires, in a repetition that can be followed throughout the whole woof. &hellip;</div><br /> <b>John Danaher's blog: <a href="http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com/2018/10/robots-and-expanding-moral-circle.html">Robots and the Expanding Moral Circle</a></b> (html, 1863 words)<br /> <div> (I appear in this video from 15:49-25:51)  [The following is, roughly, the text of a speech I delivered to the Trinity College, Dublin Historical Society on the 10th October 2018 (which you can watch in the video above from 15:49 - 25:51). &hellip;</div><br /> <b>Peter Smith's blog: <a href="https://www.logicmatters.net/2018/10/14/category-theory-page-updated/">Category theory page updated</a></b> (html, 159 words)<br /> <div>I’m not really keeping abreast with what’s available on elementary category theory right now — who would have thought that revising an elementary logic text would be so all-consuming? (Maybe it is one of those cheering features of, erm, mature years … you can only think about one thing at a time.) &hellip;</div><br />