1. 9623.06168
    This paper analyzes the connection between normative commitment and turnover intentions of Turkish bank employees, in Ankara, Turkey. Research methodology was comprised from the quantitative research method utilizing one structured survey instrument consisting of 14 items (five for descriptive and nine for inferential statistics). A survey was carried out in a cross-sectional time-frame study manner and the study that involved 130 participants was performed within five different private banks’ employees in Ankara, Turkey. The normative commitment and intention to leave were first analyzed for reliability. A
    Found 2 hours, 40 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  2. 9631.061989
    In this article I will desc ribe the m ain elem ents of the N orwegian press’s moral confrontation with the G overnment Pen sion Fund’s ethical investment mana gement when it was in an introductory phase in early 2005 , with special emph asis on one newspap er, Stavanger Aftenblad. The press criticized the fund’s fresh investment profile and intended exclusionary practice before it had really started in earnest. Then I will focus on how the press’s unilateral criticism of the fund’s investment practice at the time overshadowed a discussion of any defects in the ethical principles for investment. And I will focus on the press’s lack of distinguishing between information and sensation. In conclusion I point out that in 2006 the press has abandoned its critical stance from 2005 and has now a tendency to idealize the fund’s exclusionary practice and the underlying principles.
    Found 2 hours, 40 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  3. 9637.062033
    The paper seeks to explore the recognition of importance of education to the development of a nation, as a means of poverty eradication which is regarded as the most important goal of human development. Ironically, in the time past in Nigeria, education delivery has suffered major setbacks ranging from inadequate frameworks policy, project duplication, gross inefficiency and corruption. In view of this and many others, the United Nations, comprising of Nigeria and other 188 members, in year 2000, in a meeting widely referred to as Millennium Summit in the United States of America, came up with the idea of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) especially for developing countries, for the purpose of poverty eradication, hunger reduction and education promotion for all (Mohammed, (2006). It is a shocking paradox that a significant proportion of Nigeria population is poor despite its enormous wealth as Adejuwon and Tijani (2012) argued. Therefore, this paper, through historical exploration, examines those issues that arose since the commencement of
    Found 2 hours, 40 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  4. 9642.062062
    Lack of consent is valorized within popular culture to the point that sexual assault has become a spectator sport and creepshot entertainment on social media. Indeed, the valorization of nonconsensual sex has reached the extreme where sex with unconscious girls, especially accompanied by photographs as trophies, has become a goal of some boys and men. In an official trailer for the film Pitch Perfect 2 (2015), Rebel Wilson’s character “Fat Amy” is shown dancing at a campus party when the boy she is dancing with asks if she wants to have sex later. She says “no,” but then gives him a suggestive wink. He looks confused and asks whether that means no or yes since she said “no,” but then winked. She responds “absolutely not,” and then winks again, suggesting that she doesn’t mean what she said. What message does this send? When girls say “no,” they really mean “yes”? Certainly, Amy’s “no” is open for interpretation. In 2010 at Yale, fraternity brothers marched around the freshman dorms chanting, “No means yes, yes means anal” (Thomson-DeVeaux). Their interpretation of “no” and “yes” is clear.
    Found 2 hours, 40 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  5. 46629.062091
    Chapter 5 of Idealism and Christian Theology is “Edwardsian Idealism, Imago Dei, and Contemporary Theology” by Joshua Farris. This is an interesting article that directly and constructively addresses one of the central theological issues raised by metaphysical idealism of the Berkeley/Edwards variety. …
    Found 12 hours, 57 minutes ago on The Prosblogion
  6. 104952.062159
    The fourth chapter of Idealism and Christian Theology is “Berkeley, Realism, Idealism, and Creation” by Keith Yandell. This is an interesting paper on Berkeley which, unless I missed something, did not turn out to be about Christian theology at all. …
    Found 1 day, 5 hours ago on The Prosblogion
  7. 147976.062204
    Renal disease is an ongoing and growing problem around the world and in Turkey. Almost %5 of health expenditures are about kidney patients in Turkey. The amount of patients is increasing every day although the donation rates are not increasing in the same speed. The governments are applying different regimes for closing the gap between supply and demand on kidney. These systems are not accurate to close this gap. Main classification of these techniques is opt - in and opt - out regimes. The cost of dialysis for every patient is higher than the cost of transplantation. The transplanted patient lives 22 years whether dialysis patient lives 14 years. Transplantation is cost –effective than dialysis. It is an obligation to decrease the number of patients in the waiting list. In 2014 there are almost 60.000 kidney disease patients in Turkey and 29.000 of them are ESRD patients.
    Found 1 day, 17 hours ago on PhilPapers
  8. 148068.06224
    This study deals with the influence of materialism on fashion involvement and of fashion involvement on mavenism, purchase decision involvement and recreational involvement. The data were collected via face-to-face survey method. The surveys were administered through convenience sampling method to generation X and Y members separately. Structural equation modeling was used to test generation X and Y models. At the end of the study, it was seen that generation Y are more materialist, involved in fashion and recreational shopping, and share their views of fashion products with others more. In addition, it was found out that the centrality materialism of generation X do not have any significant influence on their fashion involvement and their fashion involvement does not have any significant influence on their recreational shopping involvement whereas the success materialism of generation Y members do not have significant influence on fashion involvement.
    Found 1 day, 17 hours ago on PhilPapers
  9. 213444.06227
    Hybrid logics are logics that result by adding further expressive power to ordinary modal logic. The most basic hybrid logic is obtained by adding so-called nominals which are propositional symbols of a new sort, each being true at exactly one possible world. The history of hybrid logic goes back to Arthur N. Prior’s work in the 1960s.
    Found 2 days, 11 hours ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  10. 215032.062299
    This chapter starts from a puzzle. Realism about X is often glossed as the idea that Xs are mind independent: Xs exist, and have their nature, independently of our beliefs, interests, attitudes, or other mental states. Xs are, in a sense ‘out there’, getting on with it independently of our mental life. If this is right, how should we understand realism about cognitive science? Mental processes and states are not mind independent: they don’t take place independently of our beliefs, interests, attitudes, or other mental states. Hence, it seems that we cannot be realists about them. Nevertheless, in line with other areas of philosophy of science, there seems scope for asking the realist question about the posits of cognitive science even if those posits make up our mental life. But unless we state realism differently, there is no way to sensibly ask the realist question about cognitive science. In this paper, I explore the right way to state realism about cognitive science. I introduce three different types of mind dependence and evaluate their merit to stating realism about cognitive science.
    Found 2 days, 11 hours ago on Mark Sprevak's site
  11. 215553.062336
    Synthetic organs could change the way we regard our own natural organs. Although they would themselves be initially owned by the company that produces them, they would become ours when they were transplanted into the body. Even if they could not be bought and sold on the free market, the fact that they are functionally and materially equivalent to natural organs could lead to an attitude of commodification. Is that a problem?
    Found 2 days, 11 hours ago on PhilPapers
  12. 263781.062371
    Explanation has played myriad roles in truthmaker theory. The notion of explanation is sometimes thought to give content to the very idea of truthmaking, and is sometimes used as a weapon to undermine the entire point of truthmaker theory. I argue that the notion of explanation is dialectically useless in truthmaker theory: while it’s true that truthmaking offers a form of explanation, this claim is theoretically unilluminating, and leaves truthmaker theorists vulnerable to various kinds of attack. I advocate an alternative approach to truthmaker theory that downplays the role of explanation, and show how it releases the enterprise from a variety of problematic commitments that have troubled truthmaker theorists. The “ontology-first” approach to truthmaking that I advocate not only restores the initial impulse behind truthmaking, but also has a number of theoretical advantages. Most prominently, it dodges the infamous problem of negative existentials, and lessens truthmaker theory’s dependence on contentious intuitive judgments about both explanation and truthmaking.
    Found 3 days, 1 hour ago on PhilPapers
  13. 263810.062387
    In this paper, I raise a problem for standard precisifications of The Relational Analysis. The problem I raise involves so–called ‘counterfactual’ attitude verbs, such as ‘wish’. In short, the trouble is this: there are true attitude reports ‘S wishes that P’ but there is no suitable referent for the term ‘that P’. The problematic reports illustrate that the content of a subject’s wish is intimately related to the content of their beliefs. I capture this fact by moving to a framework in which ‘wish’ relates subjects to sets of pairs of worlds, or paired propositions, rather than — as is standardly assumed — sets of worlds. Although other types of counter-factual attitude reports, e.g. those involving ‘imagine’, may be similarly problematic, at this stage it is unclear whether they can be handled the same way.
    Found 3 days, 1 hour ago on PhilPapers
  14. 271184.062402
    What’s the evidential impact of learning that something is a mystery? To answer this question, we first explicate the notion of a mystery in terms of unexplainability. After distinguishing different ways in which something can be unexplainable, we develop a test to evaluate the evidential impact of two distinct types of unexplainables: symmetrical and a- symmetrical unexplainables. We argue that only a-symmetrical unexplainables have evidential impact. We finally clarify how our explication of mysteries as unexplainables complements existing accounts of abduction and contributes to the literature on the mystery of consciousness.
    Found 3 days, 3 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  15. 277890.062418
    Today’s virtual colloquium paper is “Skeptical Theism and Practical Reasoning” by Timothy Perrine. Perrine is a graduate student at Indiana University, where he is finishing his dissertation “Epistemic Value and Accurate Representation.” He works primarily in epistemology and philosophy of religion while dabbing in other fields. …
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on The Prosblogion
  16. 379091.062449
    This paper argues that applying ideas from (especially) general relativity can support interesting theses about death and its harm advanced by Roy Sorensen. In particular, if we look at our own personal time through the lens of certain relativistic spacetimes, we find coherent models for some apparently very counter-intuitive lives, but lives whose possibility can nonetheless shed light on whence death gets its harm and that could, for all we currently know, be actual.
    Found 4 days, 9 hours ago on PhilPapers
  17. 379170.062477
    A common view relating compositional semantics and the objects of assertion holds the following: Sentences φ and ψ expresses the same proposition (in a context) iff φ and ψ have the same modal profile (in context). Following Dummett (1973), Evans (1979), and Lewis (1980), Stanley (1997) argues that this view is fundamentally mistaken (and thus blocks Kripke’s modal objection to descriptivism). According to Dummett, we must distinguish the semantic contribution a sentence makes to more complex expressions in which it occurs from its assertoric content. Stojni´c (this volume) insists that views which distinguish the roles of content and semantic value must nevertheless ensure a tight connection between the two. But, she contends, there is a crucial disanalogy between the views that follow Lewis and the views that follow Dummett. Stanley’s Dummettian view is argued to contain a fatal flaw: On such views, there is no way to secure an appropriate connection between semantic value and a theoretically motivated notion of assertoric content. I will review the background issues from Dummett, Evans, Lewis, and Stanley, and provide a principled way of bridging the gap between semantic value and a theoretically motivated notion of assertoric content.
    Found 4 days, 9 hours ago on PhilPapers
  18. 381512.062492
    I argue that explanations of doxastic transparency which go via an appeal to an aim or norm of belief are problematic. I offer a new explanation which appeals to a biological function of our mechanisms for belief production. I begin by characterizing the phenomenon, and then move to the teleological and normative accounts of belief, advertised by their proponents as able to give an explanation of it. I argue that, at the very least, both accounts face serious difficulties in this endeavour. These difficulties are a function of seeking an explanation of transparency at the agential level, either with the subject aiming at truth, or being guided by a norm of truth. I adopt a motivational account of belief, one which severs the connection between belief and truth, and supplement this with an account of actual world beliefs. My alternative explanation is found at the sub-intentional, non-agential level, secured by biology. This explanation casts transparency not as related to the nature of deliberation over what to believe, but rather as contingently characterizing the beliefs of some believers, namely those with a particular biological history. My explanation thus parts company with what has come before along two dimensions: it moves away from transparency being something related to the agent’s aims or commitments, and it understands it as a contingent phenomenon. I close by considering an objection to my view—that transparency must not be understood as a contingent phenomenon—and a nearby alternative position which avoids this consequence. I respond to this objection and give reasons not to endorse the nearby alternative. I conclude that my explanation does not face the difficulties of those offered by teleologists and normativists, and, that by moving away from agential explanations, and casting transparency as contingent, we can provide a successful explanation of it.
    Found 4 days, 9 hours ago on Ema Sullivan-Bissett's site
  19. 390804.062515
    Pardon the indulgence, but let me begin with some autobiography. When, in the summer of 2009, I first read the influential papers of Fine (2001) and Rosen (2010) on ground, my immediate impression was that they were onto something. The concept of ground they presented seemed intuitive and familiar, and at the same time useful in framing a number of philosophical debates. In particular, it struck me that some of the questions in metaphysics I was thinking about at the time were well articulated as questions about what grounds what, so I started thinking about them in those terms.
    Found 4 days, 12 hours ago on Shamik Dasgupta's site
  20. 393201.062546
    God is alive, angels are alive, people are alive, dogs are alive, worms are alive and trees are alive. What is it that makes them all be alive, while the Milky Way, the Sun, Etna, a car, a Roomba, and an electron are not? …
    Found 4 days, 13 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  21. 393203.062579
    Deontology is true. A finite being could not have the kind of dignity that deontology ascribes to human beings. So, human beings are infinite. (1-2) If human beings are infinite, they are infinite synchronically or diachronically. …
    Found 4 days, 13 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  22. 475358.062614
    Since its introduction, multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA), or “neural decoding”, has 8 transformed the field of cognitive neuroscience. Underlying its influence is a crucial inference, 9 which we call the Decoder’s Dictum: if information can be decoded from patterns of neural activity, then this provides strong evidence about what information those patterns represent. Although the Dictum is a widely held and well-motivated principle in decoding research, it has received scant philosophical attention. We critically evaluate the Dictum, arguing that it is false: decodability is a poor guide for revealing the content of neural representations. However, we also suggest how the Dictum can be improved on, in order to better justify inferences about neural representation using MVPA.
    Found 5 days, 12 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  23. 475385.062661
    Brian Loar [1976] observed that communicative success with singular terms requires more than correct referent assignment. For communicative success to be achieved the audience must assign the right referent in the right way. Loar, and others since, took this to motivate Fregean accounts of the semantics of singular terms. Ray Buchanan [2014] has recently responded, maintaining that although Loar is correct to claim that communicative success with singular terms requires more than correct referent assignment, this is compatible with direct reference approaches, as long as one also endorses independently motivated Gricean view of communicative intentions. This paper argues that Buchanan's Gricean view cannot account for the full range of Loar cases. In doing so it aims to explicate the structure of Loar's cases and thus clarify the conditions a theory must meet in order to adequately meet Loar's challenge.
    Found 5 days, 12 hours ago on PhilPapers
  24. 492082.062701
    According to their broadly Fregean, essentialist theory of concepts, the moral fixed points are conceptual truths in virtue of the semantic relation of satisfaction necessarily obtaining among the essences of the involved constituent concepts. That is, in the case of moral conceptual truths (i.e., “X is F”) the essence of the moral property the predicate F picks out necessarily satisfies the essence of the subject X and applies to its substantive content. It could not be the case, metaphysically speaking, that something is X but not F (i.e., torturing of kids for fun but not pro tanto wrong).
    Found 5 days, 16 hours ago on Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
  25. 497305.062737
    Yesterday Ryan Mandelbaum, at Gizmodo, posted a decidedly tongue-in-cheek piece about whether or not the universe is a computer simulation. (The piece was filed under the category “LOL.”) The immediate impetus for Mandelbaum’s piece was an blog post by Sabine Hossenfelder, a physicist who will likely be familiar to regulars here in the nerdosphere. …
    Found 5 days, 18 hours ago on Scott Aaronson's blog
  26. 543500.06277
    Consider the crucible of character theodicy, that we are permitted by God to meet with great evils in order to form a character with virtues like courage and sacrificial love whose significant exercise requires significant evils. …
    Found 6 days, 6 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  27. 595808.062799
    Samuel Scheffler has recently argued that the value of our most important activities depends on the Afterlife: the continued existence of the human species in future generations. The argument begins with a speculative psychological hypothesis: that we would lose interest in most things if we believed that our species was about to go extinct (e.g. through general infertility of the current generation). I argue that even if we accept this hypothesis, it wouldn't follow that the Afterlife is a condition for the value of our activities. For many of our most important activities, the imminent extinction of the species would not affect the properties that make them worth pursuing. I go on to propose an alternative way of thinking about Scheffler’s hypothesis, showing that it reflects psychic trauma on the part of those who are aware that they are the last generation of the species.
    Found 6 days, 21 hours ago on R. Jay Wallace's site
  28. 595824.062831
    One of the many rich and interesting themes in Gary Watson’s very impressive body of philosophical work is the idea that moral responsibility involves a distinctive kind of interpersonal address. There is a characteristic practice of addressing moral standards to other agents that is associated with at least one prominent form of responsibility, and this practice can help us to understand both the nature of moral requirements and the conditions of responsible moral agency.
    Found 6 days, 21 hours ago on R. Jay Wallace's site
  29. 595846.062882
    The View from Here looks at a range of retrospective attitudes that humans take toward things that have happened in the past. Some tendency to react emotionally toward past occurrences, I contend, is an ineluctable concomitant of investment in the ongoing world of value. Thus to value or cherish someone or something is, inter alia, to be disposed not only to anxiety when it is threatened and to satisfaction when it fares well, but also to sadness or distress when it is damaged or destroyed. The book focuses primarily on two extreme forms of retrospective attitude that stand in opposition to each other, which I call all-in regret and unconditional affirmation. I suggest that the second of these distinctive attitudes is characteristic of attachment: the kind of emotional investment in persons and projects that typically gives our lives meaning and personal significance. To be attached in this way is, I suggest, to be prone to affirming unconditionally both the objects of one’s attachments and the historical conditions of their existence, in ways that preclude all-in regret about those very things. The upshot is that we can be committed, in virtue of our attachments, to affirming past decisions that may have been unjustified at the time when they were taken, and even monstrous historical conditions that cannot possibly be thought to be worthy of being affirmed.
    Found 6 days, 21 hours ago on R. Jay Wallace's site
  30. 598274.062918
    Kant famously claims that being is “obviously not a real predicate” (KrV, A 598/B 626) , i.e. a determination or a property of a thing. As Frege similarly states that existence is not a first-level predicate of objects but a second-level predicate of concepts, it is not surprising that the two philosophers have been compared on this point. Indeed, Jonathan Bennett speaks of the “Kant-Frege view”, according to which Frege first gave solid logical foundations for Kant’s claim (Bennett 1974, 62–5, 231). To my mind, although there is some truth to the Kant-Frege view, there is a fundamental disparity between Kant’s and Frege’s conceptions of existence that far outweighs their similarities.
    Found 6 days, 22 hours ago on PhilPapers