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35263.832617
W.D. Hamilton in 1975 wrote a book chapter that constitutes his most extensive comments on human cooperation. In it he flagged the “tribal facies of social behavior” as the problem to be solved. He was well aware of the difficulty of extending his theory of inclusive fitness to the tribal scale. He mentions the idea that cultural processes might be responsible but expresses skepticism that culture could act against genetic fitness imperatives and sought genetic answers to the puzzle. We have explored the potential of culture to generate the stable variation necessary for selection at the level of tribes and other large human groups. We have modeled three forms of cultural group selection, and reviewed the ample empirical evidence that all three forms are important in humans. The reward and punishment systems in human societies can also create social selection on genes underlying human behavior. One of the critical factors in cultural evolution is that it can be faster than genetic evolution. Here we provide a simple model that illustrates why this is important to the evolution of the tribal facies.
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53233.832737
I confess that, when I allow myself to think about it, I am amazed that I understand so little about what it is we philosophers do. I believe I can distinguish good philosophical work from bad—I can recognize when philosophy is done well—but I do not have a clear understanding of what it is that I am recognizing, and when I try actually to say what our discipline does, my remarks turn out to be naive and crude, more like the groping efforts of a beginning student than like the contributions of an advanced scholar to the field. …
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140982.832746
This paper investigates the epistemological problem of understanding the formative principles of living organisms, proposing that such knowledge requires a non-discursive mode of cognition. Revisiting the philosophies of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Rudolf Steiner, the study explores an alternative method of understanding life—not through mechanistic models or speculative vitalism, but through what is termed “intellectual intuition.” It is demonstrated how Goethe’s concept of the Urpflanze and Steiner’s interpretation enable a mental reconstruction of organic development as a lawful, self-generating process. Drawing parallels with Fichte’s notion of self-awareness through productive cognition, the paper argues that organisms can be known through a productive act of thinking in which the generative principle of life is intellectually intuited. This yields a scientifically grounded, though non-empirical, mode of “empirical vitalism,” in which the organism’s entelechy—its vital laws and force—can be observed through active, intuitive cognition. The study suggests that such a methodology could offer a viable epistemic and metaphysical framework to overcome the limitations of both reductionist biology and speculative vitalism.
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292197.83276
| The boundary problem in normative democratic theory is the problem of who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision-making. The boundary problem is at the heart of many pressing political issues, including voting rights of resident aliens in their host countries and of expats in their home countries, the legitimacy of border regimes, the justi!ability of global democracy, and the democratic representation of future generations. The two most popular answers to the boundary problem are the
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304754.832767
This paper deals with a rather wide range of topics, each one of which probably deserves (at least) a monograph-length study of its own, and for each one of which there is an extensive literature. There is no way that one can do justice to all of that in the span of a single paper. Now that may be a good reason not to try to do so, but rather to stick with one issue, one view. However, sometimes it can be useful to take a broad perspective, treat a variety of questions and observationsas making up a single subject matter, one that can be approached from various angles. Sure, that does result in a lack of detail, but one may hope that one makes good for that by showing connections that otherwisewould go unnoticed. This paper is written in that spirit.
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309299.832776
Wouldn’t it be great if Democrats prioritized a drastic increase in American productivity, thereby deprioritizing safetyism, wokeness, and redistribution? That’s definitely my view, so I’m delighted that Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson (henceforth KT) have written a whole book — Abundance sans subtitle — defending that position. …
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312265.832781
Very short summary: In this essay, I discuss Gerald Gaus’s argument about the possibility of moral reconciliation in diverse societies. Like Gaus, I use an agent-based model to explore the conditions under which convergence toward a single social rule happens. …
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398711.832786
Spears and Geruso’s After the Spike: Population, Progress, and the Case for People releases today! In Part 1 of my review, I explained why we should be worried about below-replacement global fertility and subsequent depopulation. …
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400164.832791
Anyone engaging with the history and philosophy of pseudoscience, particularly the demarcation problem, will quickly land on Karl Popper and the campaign of the Vienna Circle of logical positivists against irrational metaphysics. The demarcation problem – how to identify the hallmarks of a serious and universal science-pseudoscience distinction – began with demarcating science from metaphysical fraud and dilettantism. Not much is known, however, about the Circle’s attitude towards typical pseudoscientific activities like parapsychology and psychic phenomena, spiritualism, psychoanalysis, and the social role and responsibility of scientific philosophy with regard to fringe and pseudoscientific endeavors. This paper provides the first systematic approach to the early history of the demarcation problem, with a special focus on logical positivism, which is supposed to be the standard-bearer of a rational, socially engaged but fallible scientific philosophy in demented times. As it turns out, most logical positivists were not just interested in pseudoscience as skeptical experimenters, but viewed it as holding various values, merits, and promises that they even imagined to be compatible with their empiricist and scientific world conception.
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485152.832797
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My point is simple: knowledge is knowledge. Where it comes from doesn’t matter to its epistemic status. What matters is whether it deserves to be believed. The scientific revolution has provided a general approach – systematic inquiry into the independent evidential basis of claims (e.g. …
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571695.832803
David Suzuki is an 89-year-old Canadian geneticist, science broadcaster and environmental activist. In this interview he says some things that I’ve come to agree with. • ‘It’s too late’: David Suzuki says the fight against climate change is lost, iPolitics, 2 July 2025. …
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655048.832808
Apparently, Italy requires residents to secure a medical certificate before joining a gym, sports club, or other source of regular physical exercise. This is (very loosely) estimated to prevent a few deaths per year from sudden cardiac events but at a net cost of thousands of QALYs lost due to exercise deterrence. …
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657994.832813
In the last NYRB, Kwame Anthony Appiah reviewed two recent books about translation. One is by Damion Searls, whose Tractatus I criticized in this space, provoked in part by his complaint about philosophers as translators of philosophy. …
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659357.832818
In philosophy of science, the pseudosciences (like cryptozoology, homeopathy, Flat-Earth Theory, anti-vaccination activism, etc.) have been treated mainly negatively. They are viewed not simply as false, but even dangerous, since they try to mimic our best scientific theories, thus gaining respect and trust from the public, without the appropriate credentials. As a result, philosophers have traditionally put considerable effort into demarcating genuine sciences and scientific theories from pseudoscience. Since these general attempts at demarcation have repeatedly been shown to break down, the present paper takes a different and somewhat more positive approach to the study of pseudoscience. My main point is not that we should embrace and accept the pseudosciences as they are, but rather that there are indeed valuable and important lessons inherent in the study of pseudoscience and the different sections of the paper list at least six of them. By showing, through numerous examples, how (the study of) pseudoscience can teach us something about science, ourselves, and society, it makes the case that as philosophers, we should devote more time and energy to engaging with such beliefs and theories to help remedy their harmful effects.
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744327.832826
How badly would it suck to die because a person who could have saved your life (along with the lives of four others tied to the train tracks beside you) preferred “allowing” to “doing”? A second was just about to save you when they realized that the side track—where just one person awaited as collateral damage—later loops back, turning the purportedly-collateral damage into an instrumental killing. …
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745747.832831
Scenarios and pathways, as defined and used in the “SSP-RCP scenario framework”, are key in last decade’s climate change research and in the latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In this framework, Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) consist of a limited set of alternative socioeconomic futures, that are both represented in short qualitative narratives and with quantitative projections of key drivers. One important use of the computationally derived SSP-scenarios is to do mitigation analysis and present a “manageable” set of options to decision-makers. However, all SSPs and derivatively SSP-scenarios in this framework assume a globally growing economy into 2100. This, in practice, amounts to a value-laden restriction of the space of solutions to be presented to decision-makers, falling short of IPCC’s general mandate of being “policy-relevant and yet policy-neutral, never policy-prescriptive”. Yet, the Global Economic Growth Assumption (GEGA) could be challenged and in practice is challenged by post-growth scholars.
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830851.832836
Very short summary: This essay provides an account in favor of a progressive consumption tax, in light of the efficiency and fairness issues that affect the more common progressive income tax. I argue that the progressive consumption tax not only avoids the standard incentive problem but also responds to Hayek’s critique of the unfairness of progressive taxation. …
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910851.832841
I’m a non-conformist, but not a reflexive contrarian. My chief goal is to enjoy every day of my life, and my non-conformism is only a means to that end. But what a means it is! By the power of non-conformism, I weasel out of hours of daily drudgery. …
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918496.832846
Behavioral innovativeness—the propensity of an individual organism or higher group to innovate—is frequently invoked as a measurable trait allowing for cross-species comparisons. Individuals or species are often regarded as more innovative or less innovative than others, implying that we can rank order the degree of innovativeness along a single dimension. This paper defends a novel multidimensional understanding of behavioral innovativeness in which innovativeness can be modulated with respect to the generation and capitalization of opportunities, as well as the effectiveness and depth of the innovative behaviors. Besides innovation being multidimensional, it is also multilevel. Here we show how innovativeness at one level (such as the species level) does not automatically translate to innovativeness at another (such as the organism level) and discuss why this matters for cross-species comparisons.
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918596.832851
Our fine arts were developed, their types and uses were established, in times very different from the present...But the amazing growth of our techniques, the adaptability and precision they have attained, the ideas and habits they are creating, make it a certainty that profound changes are impending in the ancient craft of the Beautiful. In all the arts there is a physical component which can no longer be considered or treated as it used to be, which cannot remain unaffected by our modern knowledge and power…We must expect great innovations to transform the entire technique of the arts, thereby affecting artistic invention itself and perhaps even bringing about an amazing change in our very notion of art. (Valéry 1964 [1928], 225) The passage describes a moment in the history of art in the West in the 20th century characterized by the introduction of new artistic technologies of production and reproduction such as photography. The passage serves as the epigraph to Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” in which he contends that the analyses necessitated by the condition described by Paul Valery compels us to “brush aside a number of outmoded concepts, such as creativity and genius, eternal value and mystery…” (Benjamin 1969[1936]).
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1089903.832857
It was a particularly cruel heckling. Ketel Marte, a star baseball player for the Arizona Diamondbacks, was brought to tears by a heckler who shouted derogatory comments about Marte’s late mother, Elpidia Valdez, who died in a car crash in 2017. …
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1153508.832862
The puzzle of aphantasia concerns how individuals reporting no visual imagery perform more-or-less normally on tasks presumed to depend on it [1]. In his splendid recent review in TiCS, Zeman [2] canvasses four ‘cognitive explanations’: (i) differences in description; (ii) ‘faulty introspection’; (iii) “unconscious or ‘sub-personal’ imagery”; and (iv) total lack of imagery. Difficulties beset all four. To make progress, we must recognize that imagery is a complex and multidimensional capacity and that aphantasia commonly reflects partial imagery loss with selective sparing. Specifically, I propose that aphantasia often involves a lack of visual-object imagery (explaining subjective reports and objective correlates) but selectively spared spatial imagery (explaining Some researchers have suggested that aphantasics may have failed to follow instructions or engage imagery [7]. This is unconvincing. In studies of galvanic skin responses, trials were excluded in which subjects failed to demonstrate ‘proper reading and comprehension’ of the frightening stories. Thus, it remains a mystery why spontaneous imagery did not emerge [6]. Similarly, in studies of pupillary light responses, aphantasics showed a characteristic in-task correlation between pupil and stimulus set size, indicating that they were not “‘refusing’ to actively participate…due to…a belief that they are unable to imagine” [5]. Aphantasics also do voluntarily form images in other tasks despite a lack of incentives [8].
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1177613.832867
Scientists decide to perform an experiment based on the expectation that their efforts will bear fruit. While assessing such expectations belongs to the everyday work of practicing scientists, we have a limited understanding of the epistemological principles underlying such assessments. Here I argue that we should delineate a “context of pursuit” for experiments. The rational pursuit of experiments, like the pursuit of theories, is governed by distinct epistemic and pragmatic considerations that concern epistemic gain, likelihood of success, and feasibility. A key question that arises is: what exactly is being evaluated when we assess experimental pursuits? I argue that, beyond the research questions an experiment aims to address, we must also assess the concrete experimental facilities and activities involved, because (1) there are often multiple ways to address a research question, (2) pursuitworthy experiments typically address a combination of research questions, and (3) experimental pursuitworthiness can be boosted by past experimental successes. My claims are supported by a look into ongoing debates about future particle colliders.
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1177636.832873
The question of which scientific ideas are worth pursuing is a fundamental challenge in science, particularly in fields where the stakes are high, and resources are limited. When the research is also time-sensitive, then the challenge becomes even greater. Philosophers of science have analyzed the pursuitworthiness of science from multiple perspectives, on topics ranging from whether there is a logic of pursuit (Feyerabend 1975; Shaw 2022), whether scientific standards ought to be relaxed in times of “fast science” (Friedman and Šešelja 2023; Stegenga 2024) as well as the role of criticism in evaluating scientific pursuits (DiMarco and Khalifa 2022).
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1177661.832882
This article revisits Taurek’s famous question: Should the greater number be saved in situations of resource scarcity? At the heart of this debate lies a central issue in normative ethics—whether numerical superiority can constitute a moral pro tanto reason. Engaging with this question helps to illuminate core principles of normative theory. Welfarismmin presents a pro-number position. The article first outlines Taurek’s original argument. It then examines non-welfarist responses and explains why they remain unsatisfactory. Finally, it identifies the main shortcomings of the hybrid welfarismmin approach and suggests a possible alternative for more adequately addressing the Taurek problem.
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1251029.832889
Tarot is widely disdained as a way of finding things out. Critics claim it is bunk or—worse— a wretched scam. This disdain misunderstands both tarot and the activity of finding thing out. I argue that tarot is an excellent tool for inquiry. It initiates and structures percipient conversation and contemplation about important, challenging, and deep topics. It galvanises creative attention, especially towards inward-looking, introspective inquiry and openminded, collaborative inquiry with others. Tarot can cultivate virtues like epistemic playfulness and cognitive dexterity.
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1262621.832896
Very short summary: This is a two-part essay on the crisis of contemporary liberalism. I argue that this crisis reflects the growing influence of a conception of the political as a praxis that is beyond human rationality and reason. …
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1490007.832902
▼ AbStrACt Since the early days of its professionalization, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the history of science has been seen as a bridge between the natural sciences and the humanities. However, only one aspect of this triadic nexus, the relations between the history of science and the natural sciences, has been extensively discussed. The other aspect, the relations between the history of science and the humanities, has been less commented upon. With this paper I hope to make a small step towards redressing this imbalance, by discussing the relationships between the history of science and two other humanistic disciplines that have been historically and institutionally associated with it: the philosophy of science and general history. I argue that both of these relationships are marked by the characteristics of an unrequited friendship: on the one hand, historians of science have ignored, for the most part, calls for collaboration from their philosopher colleagues; and, on the other hand, historians specializing in other branches of history have been rather indifferent, again for the most part, to the efforts of historians of science to understand science as a historical phenomenon.
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1530025.832907
Imagine living in a society where most people (at least in the privileged classes) regularly participate in perpetuating a moral atrocity—slavery, say, or factory farming; any practice you’re deeply appalled by will do. …
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1733141.832912
Synthetic media generators, such as DALL-E, and synthetic media artifacts, such as deepfakes, undermine our fundamental epistemic standards and practices. Yet, the nature of their epistemic threat remains elusive. After all, fictional or distorted representations of reality are as old as photography. We argue that the novel epistemic threat of synthetic media is that, for the first time, synthetic media tools afford ordinary computer users the practicable possibility to cheaply and effortlessly create and widely share fictional worlds indistinguishable from the real world or credible representations of it. We further argue that a synthetic media artifact is epistemically malignant in a given media context for a person acquainted with the context when the person is misled to confuse the version of the world depicted in it with the real world in an epistemically or morally significant way.