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22979.579095
Casajus (J Econ Theory 178, 2018, 105–123) provides a characterization of the class of positively weighted Shapley value for …nite games from an in…nite universe of players via three properties: e¢ ciency, the null player out property, and superweak differential marginality. The latter requires two players’payoffs to change in the same direction whenever only their joint productivity changes, that is, their individual productivities stay the same. Strengthening this property into (weak) differential marginality yields a characterization of the Shapley value. We suggest a relaxation of superweak differential marginality into two subproperties: (i) hyperweak differential marginality and (ii) superweak differential marginality for in…nite subdomains. The former (i) only rules out changes in the opposite direction. The latter (ii) requires changes in the same direction for players within certain in…nite subuniverses. Together with e¢ ciency and the null player out property, these properties characterize the class of weighted Shapley values.
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43018.579177
In this paper, I distinguish and compare three kinds of logical expressivism. The first, reminiscent of attitude expressivism in meta-ethics, holds that logic is expressive in that logical vocabulary serves to express attitudes. For instance, traditional attitude expressivism about negation, going back to the work of Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Huw Price and others, holds that not expresses disbelief. The second kind of logical expressivism, reminiscent of deflationism about truth and championed by Robert Brandom, holds that logic is expressive in that logical vocabulary serves to make explicit—typically, by expressing them as contents of assertions—the commitments that are implicit in our discursive practices. For instance, content expressivism about the conditional holds that if expresses as content commitment to the goodness of certain inferential moves. The third kind of logical expressivism, and the one I will be arguing for, holds that, in a sense, logic is expressive in both ways: logical vocabulary serves to make explicit commitments to expressions of attitudes.
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44491.579208
In a system with identity, quotation, and an axiom predicate, a classical extension of the system yields a falsity. The result illustrates a novel form of instability in classical logic. Notably, the phenomenon arises without vocabulary such as ’true’ or ’provable’. Conservative extensions are safe expansions: They add expressive resources while proving the same theorems (or at most, terminological variants thereof). Conservative extensions are foundational for major developments, including the Lowenheim-Skolem theorems, precise comparisons of proof-theoretic strength (Simpson 2009), and the understanding of reflection principles in arithmetic and set theory (Feferman 1962). The purpose here is not to question these developments, but rather to advise caution for the future. Some extensions that appear quite conservative end up not being so. In a system with identity, quotation, and a metalinguistic singular term, a purely syntactic predicate for axioms can create instability under an innocent-looking extension.
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44513.579222
It is known that some diagonal arguments, when formalized, do not demonstrate the impossibility of the diagonal object, but instead reveal a breakdown in definability or encoding. For example, in a formal setting, Richard’s paradox does not yield a contradiction; it instead reflects that one of the relevant sets is ill-defined. (For elaboration and other examples, see Simmons 1993, Chapter 2.) This invites the possibility that other diagonal arguments may reflect similar anomalies. The diagonal argument against a universal p.r. function is considered in this light. The impetus is an algorithm which appears to satisfy all standard criteria for being p.r. while simulating the computation of fi(i, n) for any index i of a binary p.r. function. The paper does not attempt to explain why this construction apparently survives the usual diagonal objection, but presents it in a form precise enough to support that analysis.
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107454.579236
In logic and philosophy of logic, “formalization” covers a broad range of interrelated issues: some philosophers hold that logical systems are means to formalize theories and reasoning (Dutilh Novaes 2012), others seek to formalize semantical by syntactical systems (Carnap 1942/43), ask whether logical languages are formalizations of natural languages (Stokhof 2018), teach undergraduates to formalize arguments using elementary logic, debate how to formalize notions such as moral obligation (Hansson 2018), or develop formalizations of belief change processes (Rott 2001). This variety goes hand in hand with an equally broad range of general views about what logic and its role in philosophy is or should be – whether, for example, logic is first of all a tool for reasoning (Dutilh Novaes 2012), a mathematical theory of certain formal structures which can be used to model philosophically interesting phenomena (Hansson 2018; Sagi 2020a; Stokhof 2018), or a theory that studies inferential relations in natural language and enables us to show that certain ordinary-language arguments are valid (Peregrin/Svoboda 2017), to name just a few. More or less implicitly, these approaches contain views on what the target phenomena of formalizing are (languages, arguments, …), what kind of relation formalizations have to it (model, tool, …) and whether formalizing is an integral part of logic or an application of it.
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218111.579251
It was a particularly cruel heckling. Ketel Marte, a star baseball player for the Arizona Diamondbacks, was brought to tears by a heckler who shouted derogatory comments about Marte’s late mother, Elpidia Valdez, who died in a car crash in 2017. …
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565045.579263
In recent years, there has been heightened interest in (at least) two threads regarding geometrical aspects of spacetime theories. On the one hand, physicists have explored a richer space of relativistic spacetime structures than that of general relativity, in which the conditions both of torsion-freeness and of metric compatibility are relaxed—this has led to the study of so-called ‘metricaffine theories’ of gravitation, on which see e.g. Hehl et al. (1995) for a masterly review. On the other hand, physicists have been increasingly interested in securing a rigorous and fully general understanding of the non-relativistic limit of general relativity—this has to novel version of Newtonian physics, potentially with spacetime torsion (‘Type II’ Newton–Cartan theory—see Hansen et al. (2022) for a systematic overview).
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752307.579271
When we count, we often count fractions, too. We contend that fractional counting involves partial entities, which are merely possible parts of entities of the counted kind. The size of these possible parts is measured with respect to the size of a possible member of that kind. Therefore, partialhood is mereomodal, and the logical form of fractional counting claims includes mereological predicates, modal operators, and a measurement functor. Different varieties of modality and forms of measurement are involved, depending on the kinds of entities to be counted and the context. The mereomodal account validates the idea that fractional counting is a way of counting by identity, in continuity with logic-based accounts of non-fractional counting, albeit more complex than them. Such an account also explains why some kinds of entities are not involved in partialhood and cannot be fractionally counted, while others only have marginal involvement in these phenomena. In the last part, we discuss some difficult cases and show that an integrity condition for partial entities is required in the logical form of some fractional counting claims.
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847672.579279
The present review discusses the literature on how and when social category information and individuating information influence people’s implicit judgments of other individuals who belong to existing (i.e., known) social groups. After providing some foundational information, we discuss several key principles that emerge from this literature: (a) individuating information moderates stereotype-based biases in implicit (i.e., indirectly measured) person perception, (b) individuating information usually exerts small to no effects on attitude-based biases in implicit person perception, (c) individuating information influences explicit (i.e., directly measured) person perception more than implicit person perception, (d) social category information affects implicit person perception more than it affects explicit person perception, and (e) the ability of other variables to moderate the effects of individuating information on stereotype- and attitude-based biases in implicit person perception varies. Within the discussion of each of these key points, relevant research questions that remain unaddressed in the literature are presented. Finally, we discuss both theoretical and practical implications of the principles discussed in this review.
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1140842.57929
As just mentioned, the Knowledge Account is a very influential view of ignorance. Recently, however, it has come under attack. Pritchard (2021a, 2021b) has offered several counterexamples that suggest ignorance has a normative dimension, which the Knowledge Account cannot easily capture (see also Meylan , 2024). Let us point out that we present these counterexamples because one of our objectives in this article is to consolidate the (possibly refutable) intuitions underlying them, using empirical data. So, here are Pritchard’s three counterexamples: First, in Pritchard’s view, it is quite unfitting to attribute ignorance of a fact to individuals when this fact cannot possibly be known. For instance, it does not sound fully appropriate to claim that “prehistorians are ignorant of whether Homo sapiens sapiens were tying their hair up.” We would rather say that they simply do not know this, or that they simply have no belief about this.
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1140870.579301
Conceptual engineering is the practice of revising concepts to improve how people talk and think. Its ability to improve talk and thought ultimately hinges on the successful dissemination of desired conceptual changes. Unfortunately, the field has been slow to develop methods to directly test what barriers stand in the way of propagation and what methods will most effectively propagate desired conceptual change. In order to test such questions, this paper introduces the masked time-lagged method. The masked time-lagged method tests people’s concepts at a later time than the intervention without participant’s knowledge, allowing us to measure conceptual revision in action. Using a masked time-lagged design on a content internalist framework, we attempted to revise planet and dinosaur in online participants to match experts’ concepts. We successfully revised planet but not dinosaur, demonstrating some of the difficulties conceptual engineers face. Nonetheless, this paper provides conceptual engineers, regardless of framework, with the tools to tackle questions related to implementation empirically and head-on.
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1159671.579309
The paper studies class theory over the logic HYPE recently introduced by Hannes Leitgeb. We formulate suitable abstraction principles and show their consistency by displaying a class of fixed-point (term) models. By adapting a classical result by Brady, we show their inconsistency with standard extensionality principles, as well as the incompatibility of our semantics with weak extensionality principles introduced in the literature. We then formulate our version of weak extensionality (appropriate to the behaviour of the conditional in HYPE) and show its consistency with one of the abstraction principles previously introduced. We conclude with observations and examples supporting the claim that, although arithmetical axioms over HYPE are as strong as classical arithmetical axioms, the behaviour of classes over HYPE is akin to the one displayed by classes in other nonclassical class theories.
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1159692.579317
The paper studies classical, type-free theories of truth and determinateness. Recently, Volker Halbach and Kentaro Fujimoto proposed a novel approach to classical determinate truth, in which determinateness is axiomatized by a primitive predicate. In the paper we propose a different strategy to develop theories of classical determinate truth in Halbach and Fujimoto’s sense featuring a defined determinateness predicate. This puts our theories of classical determinate truth in continuity with a standard approach to determinateness by authors such as Feferman and Reinhardt. The theories entail all principles of Fujimoto and Halbach’s theories, and are proof-theoretically equivalent to Halbach and Fujimoto’s CD . They will be shown to be logically equivalent to a class of natural theories of truth, the classical closures of Kripke-Feferman truth. The analysis of the proposed theories will also provide new insights on Fujimoto and Halbach’s theories: we show that the latter cannot prove most of the axioms of the classical closures of Kripke-Feferman truth. This entails that, unlike what happens in our theories of truth and determinateness, Fujimoto and Halbach’s inner theories – the sentences living under two layers of truth – cannot be closed under standard logical rules of inference.
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1338483.579324
I suggest a unified account of conditional oughts and of contrastive reasons. The core of the account is an explanation of facts about conditional oughts in terms of facts about contrastive reasons, and a reduction of contrastive reasons to non-contrastive reasons. In rejecting contrastivism about reasons, the account is consistent with orthodoxy about reasons. Moreover, it extends a standard view of how oughts and reasons are related to one another, and it makes sense of important and explanatorily recalcitrant phenomena. To the extent to which the account involves an explanation of facts about conditional oughts, it does not directly compete with semantic analyses of statements about conditional oughts. However, as I indicate in passing, the account coheres well with an important type of such analyses, while it is inconsistent with others.
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1392283.579332
Recently Chiao and his collaborators proposed a novel scalar electric Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect [Phys. Rev. A 107, 042209 (2023)]. They claimed that a quantum system inside a Faraday cage with a time varying but spatially uniform scalar potential acquires an AB phase, resulting in observable energy level shifts. This comment argues that their analysis is flawed: a spatially uniform scalar potential inside the cage, despite external variations, can be gauged away without altering gauge-invariant observables, such as energy differences, thus invalidating their claim. A possible explanation of this seemingly puzzling result is also given.
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1392355.57934
It is widely accepted that Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics was one of Wittgenstein’s earliest and longest-lasting influences. Wittgenstein cited Principles in the Tractatus and also considered using a quotation from Hertz’s introduction as the motto for the Philosophical Investigations. 1
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1519361.579348
A confession: at any given moment, I am liable to know the amount of money in my savings account, my uber rating, my Wordle scores from the last five days, and my h-index on Google scholar. For at least three months after publication, and probably more like six, I would be able to tell you the goodreads rating of my latest book. …
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1664569.579356
Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. In the present paper, we introduce an equal impact power index for this class of voting games and provide an axiomatic characterization. This power index is based on equal weight for every partition, equal weight for every winning coalition in a partition, and equal weight for each player in a winning coalition. Since some of the axioms we develop are conditioned on the power impact of losing coalitions becoming winning in a partition, our characterization heavily depends on a new result showing the existence of such elementary transitions between plurality voting games in terms of single embedded winning coalitions. The axioms restrict then the impact of such elementary transitions on the power of different types of players.
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2080915.579364
Metafiction is the phenomenon by which we often talk about fictions. Traditionally, metafiction has been understood as the mirror image of fictional truth, or truth in fiction. This paper argues that this paradigm is too narrow. It is shown that we routinely use metafiction to talk about fiction in ways that do not track what is fictionally true. The paper provides a way of understanding this kind of metafiction. It argues that audiences keep track of information conveyed by narrators independently of what is fictionally true, and it shows how metafiction can be understood as aimed at representing such information.
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2229791.579372
This post is a sequel to an earlier discussion of close reading, though it should be self-contained, if closely read. Let’s begin with points of convergence. Like Jonathan Kramnick, John Guillory posits close reading as a skill or technê, a form of acquired know-how or expertise. …
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2258086.57938
This paper offers a critical analysis of Ding and Liu’s (2022) contribution to the ongoing debate stemming from Machery et al.’s (2004) experimental investigation of Kripke’s Gödel Case. Machery et al . test referential intuitions on proper names among laypeople from American and Chinese backgrounds and contend that their results challenge Kripke’s refutation of descriptivism. Ding and Liu argue that descriptions in Gödel-style scenarios are ambiguous between a brute-fact and a social-fact interpretation, and Machery et al. overlook the latter. Building upon this ambiguity, Ding and Liu conduct several studies, maintaining that the results reveal that Machery et al. misclassify some descriptivist answers as causal-historical. If that is the case, the challenge that experimental philosophy poses to Kripke’s refutation of descriptivism is even more substantial than Machery et al.
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2258194.579388
Phil Dowe’s Conserved Quantity Theory (CQT) is based on the following theses: (a) CQT is the result of an empirical analysis and not a conceptual one, (b) CQT is metaphysically contingent, and (c) CQT is refutable. I argue, on the one hand, that theses (a), (b), and (c) are not only problematic in themselves, but also they are incompatible with each other and, on the other, that the choice of these theses is explained by the particular position that the author embraces regarding the relationship between metaphysics and physics.
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2258279.579396
There is no doubt that slurs harm . They do so by denigrating their targets, by putting them down, by marginalizing them . This is why in many legislations around the world, the use of slurs has been banned or penalized . But should all uses of slurs be banned? Many uses of slurs seem to be non-derogatory and to have beneficial effects . However, such uses are double-faceted: as both armchair reflection and experimental studies have shown, they are able to produce harm as well . In this paper, I approach the broad question of whether all non-derogatory uses of slurs should be banned . I first present the main uses of slurs that have been considered to be non-derogatory and recent reactions to those . The upshot of this survey is that uses of slurs that have been considered non-derogatory do, in fact, produce harm . I also flag what various authors have recommended in relation to the issue of banning such uses . Against this background, I engage with a recent view put forward by Alba Moreno Zurita and Eduardo Pérez-Navarro, who urge extreme caution with respect to any uses of slurs, due to their potential to normalize derogation . After presenting their view and their main argument, I raise an objection related to their treatment of neutral uses of slurs . I end with pointing out that, while their endeavour has merit in that it pushes the discussion further, it raises certain issues —of both an empirical and a normative nature— that need to be addressed .
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2258300.579404
Over the past decade, there has been a growing interest in dual character concepts (DCCs) . These concepts are defined by their internal structures, which consist of two distinct dimensions: a descriptive and an independent normative dimension . However, a more in-depth exploration of their internal structures is still needed . This article examines the internal structure of one DCC that has garnered significant attention in the literature, scientist . First, I analyze the components of the different dimensions of this concept . Second, I explore the interaction between these two dimensions . To do so, I investigate scientist in the enTenTen20 corpus using Sketch Engine, focusing on the expressions “good scientist” and “true scientist”, as the literature suggests they interact more directly with the descriptive and normative dimensions, respectively . The findings from this investigation offer valuable insights for studying other DCCs, as the results suggest, among others, the following key points: first, that the complexity of the two dimensions of scientist is greater than previously recognized; and second, contrary to what is agreed, both the descriptive and the normative dimension interact with “good” and “true,” which implies that both expressions can be used to make the two types of normative evaluation proper of DCCs .
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2592449.579413
The dialogical stance on meaning in the Lorenzen-Lorenz tradition is dynamic, as it is based on interaction between players, and contextual, as meaning depends on the set of rules adopted for the dialogical justification of claims including those implicit in linguistic practice. Grasping the meaning of an expression or an action amounts to identifying the rationale behind our verbal and behavioural practices. This knowledge is informed by the collective intelligence embodied within public criticism Different aspects of meaning are made explicit within the game rules: particle rules for the meaning of logical constants, the Socratic rule for non-logical constants and structural rules that set contextual meaning by shaping the development of a play. The level of plays is governed by these meaning-determining rules, and validity (or proof) is built from the plays. The result is a framework that grounds language and logic in the dynamics of dialogical meaning, and which has proven fruitful for studying frameworks for the logical analysis of language, modern and ancient.
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2778178.579421
Two recent, prominent theorems—the “no-go theorem for observer-independent facts” and the “Local Friendliness no-go theorem”—employ so-called extended Wigner’s friend scenarios to try to impose novel, non-trivial constraints on the possible nature of physical reality. While the former is argued to entail that there can be no theory in which the results of Wigner and his friend can both be considered objective, the latter is said to place on reality stronger constraints than the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems. Here, I conduct a thorough analysis of these theorems and show that they suffer from a list of shortcomings that question their validity and limit their strength. I conclude that the “no-go theorem for observer-independent facts” and the “Local Friendliness no-go theorem” fail to impose significant constraints on the nature of physical reality.
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2829879.579428
Some of our conditional knowledge is counterepistemic: it is knowledge of an indicative conditional whose antecedent is false. Counterepistemic knowledge ascriptions give rise to puzzles—and in particular, to systematic violations of factivity. I critically examine propositionalist explanations, including contextualist and descriptivist accounts, and argue that they ultimately fail to accommodate the non-triviality and consistency of counterepistemic knowledge ascriptions. Instead, I propose a non-propositional theory drawing on ideas from the literatures on belief revision and on conversational update. On the positive account, counterepistemic knowledge is not reducible to knowledge of propositions, and knowledge states are more than relations to facts known. Besides distinguishing a live class of epistemic alternatives, a knowledge state also orders the possibilities it eliminates.
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2890055.579438
This is a stand-alone essay, but if you’re curious you can read Part 1, Against Feet Revisited. 1. Timothy Steele’s book All the Fun’s in How You Say a Thing aims to offer “an explanation of English meter,” especially iambic pentameter. …
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2951152.579446
Since Meyer and Dunn showed that the rule γ is admissible in E, relevantists have produced new proofs of the admissibility of γ for an ever more expansive list of relevant logics. We show in this paper that this is not cause to think that this is the norm; rather γ fails to be admissible in a wide variety of relevant logics. As an upshot, we suggest that the proper view of γ-admissibility is as a coherence criterion, and thus as a selection criterion for logical theory choice.
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3002320.579453
“Degenerate Case” Dialetheism
Motivation: trouble with even the most sophisticated and beautiful gappy approaches e.g. Kripke - the ‘not true’ and samesaying. Priest’s view really is better in a way. A resting place. …