1. 44795.461709
    The issue of independent evidence is of central importance to hypothesis testing in evolutionary biology. Suppose you wanted to test the hypothesis that long fur is an adaptation to cold climate and short fur is an adaptation to warm climate. You look at 20 hour species; 10 live in a cold climate and have long fur, and 10 live in a warm climate and have short fur. Is there any reason to think that the data do not confirm the adaptive hypothesis? One worry is that the species in each group resemble each other merely because they inherited their fur length from a common ancestor of the group (and that the temperatures experienced by ancestors and descendants are similar). This influence of ancestor on descendant is often called phylogenetic inertia (e.g., see Harvey and l’ngel 1991).
    Found 12 hours, 26 minutes ago on Elliott Sober's site
  2. 44857.461792
    There are many reasons for objecting to quantifying the ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of criminal law as a percentage probability. They are divided into ethical and policy reasons, on the one hand, and reasons arising from the nature of logical probabilities, on the other. It is argued that these reasons are substantial and suggest that the criminal standard of proof should not be given a precise number. But those reasons do not rule out a minimal imprecise number. ‘Well above 80%’ is suggested as a standard, implying that any attempt by a prosecutor or jury to take the ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ standard to be 80% or less should be ruled out as a matter of law.
    Found 12 hours, 27 minutes ago on James Franklin's site
  3. 77884.461821
    The aim of the paper is to understand what is involved in the claim that a mental state in general and love in particular, is based on reasons. Love, like many other mental states, can be evaluated in various ways: it can be considered appropriate, deserved, enriching, perverse, destructive etc. but this does not mean that love is based on reasons. In this paper I present and defend a test that a mental state has to satisfy if it is to count as based on reasons. This test will be used to construct a new argument in favour of Frankfurt's position that love is not based on reasons.
    Found 21 hours, 38 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  4. 93906.461837
    The slogan ‘Evidence of evidence is evidence’ may sound plausible, but what it means is far from clear. It has often been applied to connect evidence in the current situation to evidence in another situation. The relevant link between situations may be diachronic (White 2006: 538): is present evidence of past or future evidence of something present evidence of that thing? Alternatively, the link may be interpersonal (Feldman 2007: 208): is evidence for me of evidence for you of something evidence for me of that thing? Such interperspectival links have been discussed because they can destabilize inter-perspectival disagreements. In their own right they have become the topic of a lively recent debate (Fitelson 2012, Feldman 2014, Roche 2014, Tal and Comesaña 2014).
    Found 1 day, 2 hours ago on Timothy Williamson's site
  5. 97217.461854
    Reputation monitoring and the punishment of cheats are thought to be crucial to the viability and maintenance of human cooperation in large groups of non-kin. However, since the cost of policing moral norms must fall to those in the group, policing is itself a public good subject to exploitation by free riders. Recently, it has been suggested that belief in supernatural monitoring and punishment may discourage individuals from violating established moral norms and so facilitate human cooperation. Here we use cross-cultural survey data from a global sample of 87 countries to show that beliefs about two related sources of supernatural monitoring and punishment — God and the afterlife — independently predict respondents' assessment of the justifiability of a range of moral transgressions. This relationship holds even after controlling for frequency of religious participation, country of origin, religious denomination and level of education. As well as corroborating experimental work, our findings suggest that, across cultural and religious backgrounds, beliefs about the permissibility of moral transgressions are tied to beliefs about supernatural monitoring and punishment, supporting arguments that these beliefs may be important promoters of cooperation in human groups. © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
    Found 1 day, 3 hours ago on Pierrick Bourrat's site
  6. 211813.46187
    We Explore Consequences of the View That to Know a Proposition Your Rational Credence in the Proposition Must Exceed a Certain Threshold. In Other Words, to Know Something You Must Have Evidence That Makes Rational a High Credence in It. We Relate Such a Threshold View to Dorr Et Al.’S (Philosophical Studies 170(2):277–287, 2014) Argument Against the Principle They Call Fair Coins: ‘‘If You Know a Coin Won’T Land Tails, Then You Know It Won’T Be Flipped.’’ They Argue for Rejecting Fair Coins Because It Leads to a Pervasive Skepticism About Knowledge of the Future. We Argue That the Threshold View of Evidence and Knowledge Gives Independent Grounds to Reject Fair Coins.
    Found 2 days, 10 hours ago on Daniel Rothschild's site
  7. 215340.461885
    Aafira and Halim are both 90% confident that it will be sunny tomorrow. Aafira bases her credence on her observation of the weather today and her past experience of the weather on days that follow days like today — around nine out of ten of them have been sunny. Halim bases his credence on wishful thinking — he just really likes the sun. Aafira, it seems, is justified in her credence, while Halim is not. Just as one of your full or categorical beliefs might be justified if it is based on visual perception under good conditions, or on memories of recent important events, or on testimony from experts, so might one of your credences be; and just as one of your full beliefs might be unjustified if it is based on wishful thinking, or biased stereotypical associations, or testimony from ideologically driven news outlets, so might your credences be. In this paper, we seek an account of justified credence — in particular, we seek necessary and sufficient conditions for a credence to be justified. Our account will be reliabilist.
    Found 2 days, 11 hours ago on Richard Pettigrew's site
  8. 215943.4619
    By Aris Spanos One of R. A. Fisher’s (17 February 1890 — 29 July 1962) most re­markable, but least recognized, achievement was to initiate the recast­ing of statistical induction. Fisher (1922) pioneered modern frequentist statistics as a model-based approach to statistical induction anchored on the notion of a statistical model, formalized by: Mθ(x)={f(x;θ); θ∈Θ}; x∈Rn ;Θ⊂Rm; m < n; (1) where the distribution of the sample f(x;θ) ‘encapsulates’ the proba­bilistic information in the statistical model. …
    Found 2 days, 11 hours ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  9. 280471.461916
    Some proponents of ‘experimental philosophy’ criticize philosophers’ use of thought experiments on the basis of evidence that the verdicts vary with truth-independent factors. However, their data concern the verdicts of philosophically untrained subjects. According to the expertise defence, what matters are the verdicts of trained philosophers, who are more likely to pay careful attention to the details of the scenario and track their relevance. In a recent paper, Jonathan Weinberg and others reply to the expertise defence that there is no evidence for such expertise. I reply to them in this paper, arguing that they have misconstrued the dialectical situation. Since they have produced no evidence that philosophical training is less efficacious for thought experimentation than for other cognitive tasks for which they acknowledge that it produces genuine expertise, such as informal argumentation, they have produced no evidence for treating the former more sceptically than the latter.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on Tamler Sommers's site
  10. 283996.461931
    Before the development of quantum mechanics, most of the philosophical discussion of probability focused on statistical probabilities. Philosophers of science have a particular interest in statistical probabilities because they play an important role in the testing and confirmation of theories, and they played a central role in the statistical mechanics of Boltzmann and Gibbs developed in the 18th century. Since the introduction of quantum mechanics, however, much of the philosophical attention has become focused on the interpretation of chances. These are the probabilities assigned to particular events (the detection of a photon at a certain location on a photographic plate, or the registration of the result of a spin experiment on a particular electron) by applications of the Born Rule. The appearance of chances in quantum mechanics marked the first time that probabilities made an explicit appearance in a fundamental theory. They raise new kinds of ontological questions. Unlike statistical probabilities (which pertain to classes of events), chances are single-case probabilities. And unlike credences (which represent the epistemic states of believers), chances purport to represent features of the physical world.
    Found 3 days, 6 hours ago on Jenann Ismael's site
  11. 360721.461946
    This paper examines a constellation of ethical and editorial issues that have arisen since philosophers started to conduct, submit and publish empirical research. These issues encompass concerns over responsible authorship, fair treatment of human subjects, ethicality of experimental procedures, availability of data, unselective reporting and publishability of research findings. This study aims to assess whether the philosophical community has as yet successfully addressed such issues. To do so, the instructions for authors, submission process and published research papers of 29 main journals in philosophy have been considered and analyzed. In light of the evidence reported here, it is argued that the philosophical community has as yet failed to properly tackle such issues. The paper also delivers some recommendations for authors, reviewers and editors in the field.
    Found 4 days, 4 hours ago on PhilPapers
  12. 364420.461961
    One of the most discussed articles in the theory of knowledge is Edmund Gettier’s article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, published in 1963. In this article Gettier undermined the view that knowledge is justified true belief. I think that Gettier’s analysis has consequences not only for the question what knowledge is but also for our idea of truth. In this paper I argue that an analysis in the sense of Gettier shows that a statement can be both true and not true at the same time.
    Found 4 days, 5 hours ago on PhilPapers
  13. 364605.461975
    While recent discussions of contextualism have mostly focused on other issues, some influential early statements of contextualism emphasized the possibility for contextualism to provide an alternative both to coherentism and to traditional versions of foundationalism. In this essay, I will pick up on this strand of contextualist thought and argue that contextualist versions of foundationalism promise to solve some problems that their non-contextualist cousins cannot. In particular, I will argue that adopting contextualist versions of foundationalism can let us reconcile Bayesian accounts of belief updating with a version of the holist claim that all beliefs are defeasible.
    Found 4 days, 5 hours ago on PhilPapers
  14. 372317.461989
    Anti-Intellectualists about know-how, following Ryle (1949), hold that knowing how to do something is simply having the ability to do it. With qualifications, I defend this traditional view. The central motivation is drawn from observations about what is involved in learning to do something. Two sorts of ability are distinguished and the thesis is defended against putative counterexamples.
    Found 4 days, 7 hours ago on Ephraim Glick's site
  15. 372384.462003
    One of the central goals of Propositions is to argue that propositions exist. My plan for the following is to explore the options for Merricks’ opponents (let’s just call them ‘nominalists’). I’m not sure whether, in the end, they have any entirely satisfactory strategy, but the discussion will still be of some interest. At least I hope to achieve some clarification of the initial arguments of the book and to prompt Merricks to elaborate on a few issues. Before continuing, I should say that I found many other challenging arguments throughout the book as well as much to agree with. I focus on the first chapter due to its foundational status with respect to the rest of the book, but every chapter is well worth careful thought and discussion.
    Found 4 days, 7 hours ago on Ephraim Glick's site
  16. 373015.462017
    According to the hierarchy of models (HoM) account of scientific experimentation developed by Patrick Suppes and elaborated by Deborah Mayo, theoretical considerations about the phenomena of interest are involved in an experiment through theoretical models that in turn relate to experimental data through data models, via the linkage of experimental models. In this paper, I dispute the HoM account in the context of present-day high-energy physics (HEP) experiments. I argue that even though the HoM account aims to characterize experimentation as a model-based activity, it does not involve a modeling concept for the process of data acquisition and thus fails to provide a model-based characterization of the theory-experiment relationship underlying this process. In order to characterize the foregoing relationship, I propose the concept of a model of data acquisition and illustrate it in the case of the ATLAS experiment at CERN’s Large Hadron Collider, where the Higgs boson was discovered in 2012. I show that the process of data acquisition in the ATLAS experiment is performed according to a model of data acquisition that specifies and organizes the experimental procedures necessary to select the data according to a predetermined set of selection criteria. I also point out that this data acquisition model is theory-laden, in the sense that the underlying data selection criteria are determined in accordance with the testable predictions of the theoretical models that the ATLAS experiment is aimed to test. I take the foregoing theory-ladenness to indicate that the relationship between the procedures of the ATLAS experiment and the theoretical models of the phenomena of interest is first established, prior to the formation of data models, through the data acquisition model of the experiment, thus not requiring the intermediary of other types of models as suggested by the HoM account. I therefore conclude that in the context of HEP experiments, the HoM account does not consistently extend to the process of data acquisition so as to include models of data acquisition.
    Found 4 days, 7 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  17. 374117.462032
    Formal learning theory is the mathematical embodiment of a normative epistemology. It deals with the question of how an agent should use observations about her environment to arrive at correct and informative conclusions. Philosophers such as Putnam, Glymour and Kelly have developed learning theory as a normative framework for scientific reasoning and inductive inference. Terminology. Cognitive science and related fields typically use the term “learning” for the process of gaining information through observation— hence the name “learning theory”. To most cognitive scientists, the term “learning theory” suggests the empirical study of human and animal learning stemming from the behaviourist paradigm in psychology.
    Found 4 days, 7 hours ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  18. 374413.462046
    The Born’s rule to interpret the square of wave function as the probability to get a specific value in measurement has been accepted as a postulate in foundations of quantum mechanics. Although there have been so many attempts at deriving this rule theoretically using different approaches such as frequency operator approach, many-world theory, Bayesian probability and envariance, literature shows that arguments in each of these methods are circular. In view of absence of a convincing theoretical proof, recently some researchers have carried out experiments to validate the rule up-to maximum possible accuracy using multi-order interference (Sinha et al, Science, 329, 418 [2010]). But, a convincing analytical proof of Born’s rule will make us understand the basic process responsible for exact square dependency of probability on wave function. In this paper, by generalizing the method of calculating probability in common experience into quantum mechanics, we prove the Born’s rule for statistical interpretation of wave function.
    Found 4 days, 8 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  19. 735330.462061
    The petition against Donald Trump’s ‘state visit’ to the United Kingdom has gathered over 1.8 million signatories. (I am one of them). Of particular concern to many of these signatories has been Trump’s ‘Muslim ban’, and its perceived infringement of international human rights law. …
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Justice Everywhere
  20. 735333.462078
    Reliabilism about justified belief comes in two varieties: process reliabilism and indicator reliabilism. According to process reliabilism, a belief is justified if it is formed by a process that is likely to produce truths; according to indicator reliabilism, a belief is justified if it likely to be true given the ground on which the belief is based. …
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on M-Phi
  21. 735337.462094
    Intervenionist decision theory without interventions Posted on Saturday, 11 Feb 2017 Causal models are a useful tool for reasoning about causal relations. Meek and Glymour 1994 suggested that they also provide new resources to formulate causal decision theory. …
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on wo's weblog
  22. 1099863.462108
    Overarching surveys of the history of philosophy often leave the impression that philosophical skepticism—roughly, the position that nothing can be known—had many adherents in the Ancient and Hellenistic Periods, disappeared completely as a topic of intellectual interest during the Middle Ages, and returned as a viable position in the Renaissance and Early Modern Periods. As a survey, this is quite understandable, since no thinker from the Middle Ages professed an active allegiance to a systematic philosophical skepticism. But a closer examination of Medieval Philosophy shows that despite skepticism’s disappearance as an overt philosophical movement, it continued to swirl in the thoughts of many of the best philosophers of the period.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  23. 1140508.462122
    Conciliationism holds that in cases of peer disagreement the two peers should move to a credence somewhere between their individual credences. In a recent post I presented a toy model of error of reasoning on which conciliationism was in general false. …
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  24. 1226816.462137
    Let suppose that Alice and Bob are interested in the truth of some proposition Q. They both assign a prior probability of 1/2 to Q, and all the first-order evidence regarding Q is shared between them. …
    Found 2 weeks ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  25. 1273076.462152
    . Here’s the follow-up post to the one I reblogged on Feb 3. When they sought to subject Uri Geller to the scrutiny of scientists, magicians had to be brought in because only they were sufficiently trained to spot the subtle sleight of hand shifts by which the magician tricks by misdirection. …
    Found 2 weeks ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  26. 1273493.46217
    One response to the problems of logical omniscience in epistemic logic is to extend the space of classically possible worlds to include impossible worlds. It is natural to think that essentially the same basic line of response can be applied to our standard probabilistic models of partial belief, for which the parallel problem of probabilistic coherence (which implies a kind of logical omniscience) also arises. In this paper, I note that there is a problem with the inclusion of impossible worlds into our probabilistic models. Most of the propositions which can be constructed from possible and impossible worlds are in an important sense inexpressible; whereas the probabilistic model seems committed to saying that agents in general have at least as many attitudes towards inexpressible propositions as they do towards expressible propositions. Since it is reasonable to think that (at least most of) our attitudes are expressible, a model with such commitments looks problematic.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Edward Elliott's site
  27. 1337969.462187
    Lewis-Skyrms signaling games (Lewis 1969; Skyrms 2010) have been studied under a variety of low-rationality learning dynamics (Barrett 2006; Barrett and Zollman 2009; Huttegger, Skyrms, Smead, and Zollman 2010; Huttegger, Skyrms, Tarres, and Wagner 2014; Huttegger, Skyrms, and Zollman 2014). Reinforcement dynamics are stable but slow and prone to evolving suboptimal signaling conventions. A low-inertia trial-and-error dynamical like win-stay/lose-randomize is fast and reliable at finding perfect signaling conventions but unstable in the context of noise or agent error. Here we consider a low-rationality hybrid of reinforcement and win-stay/lose-randomize learning that exhibits the virtues of both. This hybrid dynamics is reliable, stable, and exceptionally fast.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on Jeffrey A. Barrett's site
  28. 1375290.462202
    Aafira and Halim are both 90% confident that it will be sunny tomorrow. Aafira bases her credence on her observation of the weather today and her past experience of the weather on days that follow days like today -- around nine out of ten of them have been sunny. …
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on M-Phi
  29. 1396946.462217
    This chapter examines some aspects of the influence of the sorites paradox in psychology. Section 1 starts out with a brief discussion of the analysis of slippery slope arguments in the psychology of reasoning, to introduce the relevance of probabilistic considerations in that domain. We then devote most of this chapter to the analysis in psychophysics and in the psychology of concepts of the complex relationship between discrimination and categorization for items that differ very little. Section 2 emphasizes the centrality of probabilistic modeling to represent the way in which small differences between stimuli affect decisions of membership under a common category. Section 3 focuses on experimental data concerning unordered transitions between prototypes, then section 4 looks at data concerning ordered transitions between prototypes (dynamic sorites).
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on Paul Egré's site
  30. 1497876.462232
    We consider how an epistemic network might self-assemble from the ritualization of the individual decisions of simple heterogeneous agents. In such evolved social networks, inquirers may be significantly more successful than they could be investigating nature on their own. The evolved network may also dramatically lower the epistemic risk faced by even the most talented inquirers. We consider networks that self-assemble in the context of both perfect and imperfect communication and compare the behavior of inquirers in each. This provides a step in bringing together two new and developing research programs, the theory of self-assembling games and the theory of network epistemology.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on Jeffrey A. Barrett's site