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37605.459908
Transitivity, Simplification, and Contraposition are intuitively compelling. Although Antecedent Strengthening may seem less attractive at first, close attention to the full range of data reveals that it too has considerable appeal. An adequate theory of conditionals should account for these facts. The strict theory of conditionals does so by validating the four inferences. It says that natural language conditionals are necessitated material conditionals: A B is true if and only if A B is true throughout a set of accessible worlds. As a result, it validates many classical inferences, including Transitivity, Simplification, Contraposition, and Antecedent Strengthening. In what follows I will refer to these as the strict inferences.
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37648.460126
What is it for philosophy to make progress? While various putative forms of philosophical progress have been explored in some depth, this overarching question is rarely addressed explicitly, perhaps because it has been assumed to be intractable or unlikely to have a single, unified answer. In this paper, we aim to show that the question is tractable, that it does admit of a single, unified answer, and that one such answer is plausible. This answer is, roughly, that philosophical progress consists in putting people in a position to increase their understanding, where ‘increased understanding’ is a matter of better representing the network of dependence relations between phenomena. After identifying four desiderata for an account of philosophical progress, we argue that our account meets the desiderata in a particularly satisfying way. Among other things, the account explains how various other achievements, such as philosophical arguments, counterexamples, and distinctions, may contribute to progress. Finally, we consider the implications of our account for the pressing and contentious question of how much progress has been made in philosophy.
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37672.460145
Knowledge, like other things of value, can be faked. According to Hawley (2011), know-how is harder to fake than knowledge-that, given that merely apparent propositional knowledge is in general more resilient to our attempts at successful detection than are corresponding attempts to fake know-how. While Hawley’s reasoning for a kind of detection resilience asymmetry between know-how and know-that looks initially plausible, it should ultimately be resisted. In showing why, we outline different ways in which know-how can be faked even when a given performance is successful; and in doing so, we distinguish how know-how can be faked (no less than know-that) via upstream and downstream indicators of its presence, and within each of these categories, we’ll distinguish (in connection with detection resilience) both faking symptoms and (various kinds of) criteria. The unappreciated resilience of faked knowledge-how to successful detection highlights a largely overlooked dimension of social-epistemic risk – risk we face not just in our capacity as recipients of testimony, but in our capacity as both (would-be) apprentices and clients of knowledge-how.
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95455.460158
Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean states that each moral virtue stands opposed to two types of vice: one of excess and one of deficiency, respectively. Critics claim that some virtues—like honesty, fair-mindedness, and patience—are counterexamples to Aristotle’s doctrine. Here, I develop a generalizable strategy to defend the doctrine of the mean against such counterexamples. I argue that not only is the doctrine of the mean defensible, but taking it seriously also allows us to gain substantial insight into particular virtues. Failure to take the doctrine seriously, moreover, exposes us to the risk of mistaking certain vices for virtues.
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95479.460172
Accusations of bias provide a way to rationally dismiss a person’s opinion. Only a philosopher would think that philosophers should rule. Consequently, we should hold with suspicion Plato’s arguments suggesting that the rightful leader will be a philosopher. Attributions of bias are as common as accusations of bias. A coin, a voting system, a thermometer, a media outlet, a person, and a society may all exhibit bias. Sometimes a bias may be a good thing. The visual system has a bias to resolve ambiguous data in a way that produces true beliefs in our environment.
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207913.460186
Indexical beliefs pose a special problem for standard theories of bayesian updating. Sometimes we are uncertain about our location in time and space. How are we to update our beliefs in situations like these? In a stepwise fashion, I develop a constraint on the dynamics of indexical belief. As an application, the suggested constraint is brought to bear on the Sleeping Beauty problem.
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207941.46021
The relation between chance and actuality gives rise to the following puzzle. On the one hand, it may be a chancy matter what will actually happen. On the other hand, standard semantics for ‘actually’ imply that sentences beginning with ‘actually’ are never contingent. In order to elucidate this puzzle, a kind of objective semantic indeterminacy will be defended: in a chancy world, it may be a chancy matter which proposition is expressed by sentences containing ‘actually’. As an application, this thesis is brought to bear on certain counterexamples to the Principal Principle recently proposed by Hawthorne & Lasonen-Aarnio.
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210886.460226
If you have questions about this document contact ResearchSupport@kent.ac.uk. Please include the URL of the record in KAR. If you believe that your, or a third party's rights have been compromised through this document please see our Take Down policy (available from https://www.kent.ac.uk/guides/kar-the-kent-academic-repository#policies).
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211042.460243
Here are some things we know about conflicts around the world in April 2024. On 7 October 2023 Hamas killed over 1200 people in Israel and took more than 240 hostage. In response Israel launched an assault on Gaza that has killed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians and displaced millions. Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine continue; since 2022 Russia has repeatedly ignored international humanitarian law, tortured and murdered civilians, and destroyed basic infrastructure in civilian areas. Civil war continues in Sudan, and the country faces imminent famine. Approximately 25 million people in Sudan need humanitarian assistance.
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220011.460256
This is the guest post by Bran Haig on July 12, 2019 in response to the “abandon statistical significance” editorial in The American Statistician (TAS) by Wasserstein, Schirm, and Lazar (WSL 2019). In the post it is referred to as ASAII with a note added once we learned that it is actually not a continuation of the 2016 ASA policy statement. …
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220498.460272
There continues to be significant confusion about the goals, scope and nature of modelling practice in neuroeconomics. This paper aims to dispel some such confusion by using one of the most recent critiques of neuroeconomic modelling as a foil. The paper argues for two claims. First, currently, for at least some economic model of choice behaviour, the benefits derivable from neurally-informing an economic model do not involve special tractability costs. Second, modelling in neuroeconomics is best understood within Marr’s three-level of analysis framework and in light of a co-evolutionary research ideology. The first claim is established by elucidating the relationship between the tractability of a model, its descriptive accuracy, and its number of variables. The second claim relies on an explanation of what it can take to neurally-inform an economic model of choice behaviour.
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224045.460286
A year ago, I wrote a post lamenting the lack of “cross-camp” engagement in philosophy, and highlighting the challenges I’d most like to see addressed (by non-consequentialists, opponents of effective altruism, and proponents of “neutrality” in population ethics). …
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268746.460299
International regulation of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) is increasingly conceived as an exercise in risk management. This requires a shared approach for assessing the risks of AWS. This paper presents a structured approach to risk assessment and regulation for AWS, adapting a qualitative framework inspired by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It examines the interactions among key risk factors—determinants, drivers, and types—to evaluate the risk magnitude of AWS and establish risk tolerance thresholds through a risk matrix informed by background knowledge of event likelihood and severity. Further, it proposes a methodology to assess community risk appetite, emphasizing that such assessments and resulting tolerance levels should be determined through deliberation in a multistakeholder forum. The paper highlights the complexities of applying risk-based regulations to AWS internationally, particularly the challenge of defining a global community for risk assessment and regulatory legitimization.
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278855.460311
We extend a result by Gallow concerning the impossibility of following two epistemic masters, so that it covers a larger class of pooling methods. We also investigate a few ways of avoiding the issue, such as using nonconvex pooling methods, employing the notion of imperfect trust or moving to higher-order probability spaces. Along the way we suggest a conceptual issue with the conditions used by Gallow: whenever two experts are considered, whether we can trust one of them is decided by the features of the other!
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326524.460325
Limited aggregationists argue that when deciding between competing claims to aid we are sometimes required and sometimes forbidden from aggregating weaker claims to outweigh stronger claims. Joe Horton presents a ‘fatal dilemma’ for these views. Views that land on the First Horn of his dilemma suggest that a previously losing group strengthened by fewer and weaker claims can be more choice-worthy than the previously winning group strengthened by more and stronger claims. Views that land on the Second Horn suggest that combining two losing groups together and two winning groups together can turn the losing groups into the winning groups and the winning groups into the losing groups. This paper demonstrates that the ‘fatal dilemma’ is neither fatal nor a dilemma. The First Horn is devastating but avoidable and the Second Horn is unavoidable but not devastating. Nevertheless, Horton’s argument does help to narrow down the acceptable range of views.
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332805.460337
This paper has two parts: Part I discusses a problem concerning subjective probabilities. Part II outlines a partial solution to the problem, mainly by defending a kind of “transparency” thesis concerning knowledge of one’s own judgments. Part I will primarily be of interest to those who take seriously the notion of subjective probability. (This need not imply that it is the most important notion, but rather just that it is worthwhile.) Part II will appeal primarily to those interested in knowledge about one’s own mental states. But hopefully, those who are attracted to Part I will be drawn into Part II as well, given that latter bears on the problem from the former. Indeed, the main message will be that the theory of subjective probability can benefit substantially by adopting a transparency view of self-knowledge.
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384273.460349
Epistemology has taken a zetetic turn from the study of belief towards the study of inquiry. Several decades ago, theories of bounded rationality took a procedural turn from attitudes towards the processes of inquiry that produce them. What is the relationship between the zetetic and procedural turns? In this paper, I argue that we should treat the zetetic turn in epistemology as part of a broader procedural turn in the study of bounded rationality. I use this claim to motivate and clarify the zetetic turn in epistemology, as well as to reveal the need for a second zetetic turn within practical philosophy.
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557414.460362
This is an original manuscript of an article published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2339470. John Maier’s Options and Agency is an excellent book. It is brimming with insights and original ideas; in just about 160 pages of text, it provides the reader with an entirely novel perspective on different issues in metaphysics, semantics, and the philosophy of action. It is lucidly written and a joy to read. While we disagree with some core points (to be elaborated below), we highly recommend the book to anyone interested in agency, modality, and the intersection between the two. Maier voices an attractive ambition: we should work towards a philosophy of agency that emphasises the possible and the future, not a philosophy of action that privileges the actual and the past. To understand agency, Maier argues, we must start from the plurality of options that agents face at every stage of their lives. These options are practically indispensable, analytically irreducible, and key to explaining how human (and perhaps also other) beings can have free will.
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566276.460374
In a July 19, 2019 post I discussed The New England Journal of Medicine’s response to Wasserstein’s (2019) call for journals to change their guidelines in reaction to the “abandon significance” drive. …
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615210.460391
Issues of reliability are claiming center-stage in the epistemology of machine learning. This paper unifies different branches in the literature and points to promising research directions, whilst also providing an accessible introduction to key concepts in statistics and machine learning – as far as they are concerned with reliability.
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615239.460403
The current literature on norms of inquiry features two families of norms: norms that focus on an inquirer’s ignorance and norms that focus on the question’s soundness. I argue that, given a factive conception of ignorance, it’s possible to derive a soundness-style norm from a version of the ignorance norm. A crucial lemma in the argument is that just as one can only be ignorant of a proposition if the proposition is true, so one can only be ignorant with respect to a question if the question is sound.
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693303.460416
On June 1, 2019, I posted portions of an article [i],“There is Still a Place for Significance Testing in Clinical Trials,” in Clinical Trials responding to the 2019 call to abandon significance. I reblog it here. …
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735714.460433
Let “phenomenal dogmatism” be the thesis that some experiences provide some beliefs with immediate justification, and do so purely in virtue of their phenomenal character. A basic question-mark looms over phenomenal dogmatism: Why should the fact that a person is visited by some phenomenal feel suggest the likely truth of a belief? In this paper, I press this challenge, arguing that perceptually justified beliefs are justified not purely by perceptual experiences’ phenomenology, but also because we have justified second-order background beliefs to the effect that the occurrence of certain perceptual experiences is indicative of the likely truth of certain corresponding beliefs. To bring this out, I contrast “perceptual dogmatism” with “moral dogmatism”: the thesis that some emotional experiences provide some moral beliefs with immediate justification, and do so purely in virtue of their phenomenal character. I argue that moral dogmatism is much less antecedently appealing, precisely because the counterpart second-order beliefs here are much less plausible.
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743196.460444
In 2005, I debated my then-colleague Larry Iannaccone on the economics of religion. The turnout — around 300 people at GMU back when it was clearly a commuter school — surprised me and totally shocked Larry. …
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788653.460457
Maximize Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) is a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty. It says that we ought to handle moral uncertainty in the way that Expected Value Theory (EVT) handles descriptive uncertainty. MEC inherits from EVT the problem of fanaticism. Roughly, a decision theory is fanatical when it requires our decision-making to be dominated by low-probability, high-payo options. Proponents of MEC have o ered two main lines of response. The rst is that MEC should simply import whatever are the best solutions to fanaticism on o er in decision theory. The second is to propose statistical normalization as a novel solution on behalf of MEC. This paper argues that the rst response is open to serious doubt and that the second response fails. As a result, MEC appears signi cantly less plausible when compared to competing accounts of decision-making under moral uncertainty, which are not fanatical.
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798043.460469
Within the context of general relativity, Leibnizian metaphysics seems to demand that worlds are “maximal” with respect to a variety of space-time properties (Geroch 1970; Earman 1995). Here, we explore maximal worlds with respect to the “Heraclitus” asymmetry property which demands that of no pair of spacetime events have the same structure (Manchak and Barrett 2023). First, we show that Heraclitus-maximal worlds exist and that every Heraclitus world is contained in some Heraclitus-maximal world. This amounts to a type of compatibility between the Leibnizian and Heraclitian demands. Next, we consider the notion of “observationally indistinguishable” worlds (Glymour 1972, 1977; Malament 1977). We know that, modulo modest assumptions, any world is observationally indistinguishable from some other (non-isomorphic) world (Manchak 2009). But here we show a way out of this general epistemic predicament: if attention is restricted to Heraclitus-maximal worlds, then worlds are observationally indistinguishable if and only if they are isomorphic. Finally, we show a sense in which cosmic underdetermination can still arise for individual observers even if the Leibnizian and Heraclitian demands are met.
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895013.460481
To a large extent, the evidential base of claims in the philosophy of science has switched from thought experiments to case studies. We argue that abandoning thought experiments was a wrong turn, since they can effectively complement case studies. We make our argument via an analogy with the relationship between experiments and observations within science. Just as experiments and ‘natural’ observations can together evidence claims in science, each mitigating the downsides of the other, so too can thought experiments and case studies be mutually supporting. After presenting the main argument, we look at potential concerns about thought experiments, suggesting that a judiciously applied mixed-methods approach can overcome them.
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897734.460493
It turns out I’ve blogged rather a lot of philosophy over the years! I like to find ways to categorize and refer back to the more valuable of those old posts, so they aren’t entirely lost to the ages. …
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1067308.460505
On explanationist accounts of genealogical debunking, roughly, a belief is debunked when its explanation is not suitably related to its content. We argue that explanationism cannot accommodate cases in which beliefs are explained by factors unrelated to their contents but are nonetheless independently justified. Justification-specific versions of explanationism face an iteration of the problem. The best account of debunking is a probabilistic account according to which subject S’s justification J for their belief that P is debunked when S learns that J is no more likely to be true on the hypothesis that P than on the hypothesis that ¬P . The probabilistic criterion is fully general, applying not only to cases where the learned undercutting defeater is a proposition about our beliefs or other mental states but to any case of undercutting defeat, providing the grounds for a debunking argument against the existence of a special, metacognitive debunking principle.
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1134951.460517
Almost everyone believes that freedom from deprivation should have significant weight in specifying what justice between generations requires. Some theorists hold that it should always trump other distributive concerns. Other theorists hold that it should have some but not lexical priority. I argue instead that freedom from deprivation should have lexical priority in some cases, yet weighted priority in others. More specifically, I defend semi-strong sufficientarianism. This view posits a deprivation threshold at which people are free from deprivation, and an affluence threshold at which people can live an affluent life, even though their lives may be even further improved beyond that point. I argue that freedom from deprivation in one generation lexically outweighs providing affluence in another generation; in all other cases, freedom from deprivation does not have lexical priority.