1. 93363.674808
    Since its introduction, multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA), or “neural decoding”, has 8 transformed the field of cognitive neuroscience. Underlying its influence is a crucial inference, 9 which we call the Decoder’s Dictum: if information can be decoded from patterns of neural activity, then this provides strong evidence about what information those patterns represent. Although the Dictum is a widely held and well-motivated principle in decoding research, it has received scant philosophical attention. We critically evaluate the Dictum, arguing that it is false: decodability is a poor guide for revealing the content of neural representations. However, we also suggest how the Dictum can be improved on, in order to better justify inferences about neural representation using MVPA.
    Found 1 day, 1 hour ago on PhilSci Archive
  2. 222839.67486
    This is a phenomenological description of what is happening when we experience the death of another that interprets surviving or living on after such death by employing the term event. This term of art from phenomenology and hermeneutics is used to describe a disruptive and transformative experience of singularity. I maintain that the death of the other is an experience of an event because such death is unpredictable or without a horizon of expectation, excessive or without any principle of sufficient reason, and transformative or a death of the world itself.
    Found 2 days, 13 hours ago on Journal of Applied Hermeneutics
  3. 231980.674879
    I am teaching Introduction to Neuroscience this spring semester and am using An Introduction to Brain and Behavior 5th edition by Kolb et al as the textbook (this is the book the biology program decided to adopt). …
    Found 2 days, 16 hours ago on Richard Brown's blog
  4. 259329.674895
    Brute weak necessities Posted on Monday, 20 Mar 2017 The two-dimensionalist account of a posteriori (metaphysical) necessity can be motivated by two observations. First, all good examples of a posteriori necessities follow a priori from non-modal truths. …
    Found 3 days ago on wo's weblog
  5. 331741.67491
    Does time pass? A-theorists say it does; B theorists disagree. However both sides of the debate generally agree that it at least appears to us as though time passes, with B theorists standardly taking the passage of time to be some kind of cognitive illusion. This paper rejects the idea that temporal passage forms part of our conscious representation of the world. I consider a range of explanatory strategies for the aspects of our temporal experience generally taken to be passage-like—which I term ‘temporal qualia’—, and defend a reductionist account, according to which our temporal qualia are nothing more than our generally veridical experience of change, motion, succession, and other such features of the world well studied by empirical psychology. As such, I argue that our experience of time is neither illusory nor corresponds to temporal passage, and show that reductionism about temporal qualia is both continuous with and well supported by empirical work on time perception.
    Found 3 days, 20 hours ago on PhilPapers
  6. 518835.674925
    Last week, I wrote about a problem that arises if you wish to aggregate the credal judgments of a group of agents when one or more of those agents has incoherent credences. I focussed on the case of two agents, Adila and Benoit, who have credence functions $c_A$ and $c_B$, respectively. …
    Found 6 days ago on M-Phi
  7. 519169.67494
    Thomas Polger and Lawrence Shapiro, The Multiple Realization Book (OUP, 2016) In The Multiple Realization Book we articulate an account of multiple realization that is based on the idea that the “job description” for multiple realization is to be incompatible with brain-based theories of the mind and therefore to strongly favor functionalist and other realization-based theories. …
    Found 6 days ago on The Brains Blog
  8. 553791.674956
    In our view, behavior is to be understood as influenced by a number of different control systems. We shall focus in particular on what we will call the habit system, the desire system, and the planning system. These three systems are of crucial importance for determining almost all of our choices, addictive and otherwise. It seems likely that the first two of these systems are shared with other animals, but that the planning system is peculiar to humans. By describing these three systems, we aim to provide a framework that will clarify the mechanisms of addiction and the loss of control they involve.
    Found 6 days, 9 hours ago on David Papineau's site
  9. 620037.674975
    Can we maintain that purple seems composed of red and blue without giving up the impenetrability of the red and blue parts that compose it? Brentano thinks we can. Purple, according to him, is a chessboard of red and blue tiles which, although individually too small to be perceived, are together indistinctly perceived within the purple. After a presentation of Brentano’s solution, we raise two objections to it. First, Brentano’s solution commits him to unperceivable intentional objects (the chessboard’s tiles). Second, his chessboard account fails in the end to explain the phenomenal spatial continuity of compound colours. We then sketch an alternative account, which, while holding fast to the phenomenal compoundedness of the purple and to the impenetrability of component colours, avoids introducing inaccessible intentional objects and compromising on the continuity of the purple. According to our proposal, instead of being indistinctly perceived spatial parts of the purple, red and blue are distinctly perceived non-spatial parts of it.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  10. 778013.674991
    Thomas Polger and Lawrence Shapiro, The Multiple Realization Book (OUP, 2016) In our first post we explained how we came to write The Multiple Realization Book, we articulated our general approach, and we set out our criteria for multiple realization. …
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on The Brains Blog
  11. 858508.675006
    My paper Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments Against Physicalism, which was a product of the online consciousness conference, directly grew out of blog discussions I had around here shortly after I started this blog in May of 2007 (which, by the way, I just noticed, means that the 10 year anniversary of Philosophy Sucks! …
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Richard Brown's blog
  12. 864773.675021
    Thomas Polger and Lawrence Shapiro, The Multiple Realization Book (OUP, 2016) First, we’d like to thank John Schwenkler for giving us the opportunity to talk about The Multiple Realization Book (OUP 2016) on Brains. …
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on The Brains Blog
  13. 1072756.675037
    A great strength of the analytic tradition in philosophy (I count myself among it) is its affiliation with the mathematical logic of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Gödel, and Tarski: all graduate students are forced to learn its basics, and soon come to discipline their thoughts to fit its structures. This makes for a lingua franca, an admirable prevailing level of clarity and rigor, and interdisciplinary permeability with cognate fields sharing this affiliation. These all contribute to the continuing growth and dynamism of the global analytic-philosophical research community, which shows no sign of losing steam. But mathematical logic is not theory-neutral. Its characteristic use of truth as the fundamental analysans for validity and entailment reflects its origins as a tool for representing the discourse of the natural sciences, which aim at the truth from ‘outside’ their subject-matter. And—though this would conflict with the ‘unity of science’ (Carnap 1928/1927, Oppenheim and Putnam 1958) characteristically embraced by the analytic tradition—perhaps the discourse of the ‘human’ sciences is fundamentally different.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Benj Hellie's site
  14. 1143344.675051
    Human behavior is frequently described both in abstract, general terms and in concrete, specific terms. We asked whether these two ways of framing equivalent behaviors shift the inferences people make about the biological and psychological bases of those behaviors. In five experiments, we manipulated whether behaviors are presented concretely (i.e. with reference to a specific person, instantiated in the particular context of that person’s life) or abstractly (i.e. with reference to a category of people or behaviors across generalized contexts). People judged concretely framed behaviors to be less biologically based and, on some dimensions, more psychologically based than the same behaviors framed in the abstract. These findings held true for both mental disorders (Experiments 1 and 2) and everyday behaviors (Experiments 4 and 5) and yielded downstream consequences for the perceived efficacy of disorder treatments (Experiment 3). Implications for science educators, students of science, and members of the lay public are discussed.
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Joshua Knobe's site
  15. 1271514.675066
    Party scene from Second Life In 1993, Julian Dibbell wrote an article in The Village Voice describing the world’s first virtual rape. It took place in a virtual world called LambdaMOO, which still exists to this day. …
    Found 2 weeks ago on John Danaher's blog
  16. 1304318.675084
    While there is substantial agreement that these are among the central points Moore wanted to make in Principia Ethica, there is substantial disagreement about what Moore was thinking of when he spoke of the naturalistic fallacy. There is also substantial disagreement about whether his claims about the naturalistic fallacy – whatever it may be -- deserve to be taken seriously. Some praise Moore’s discussion extravagantly; others dismiss it as a contemptible mess. In spite of these significant differences of opinion, commentators agree that arguments concerning the naturalistic fallacy played a big role in 20th Century Anglophone moral philosophy.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on Fred Feldman's site
  17. 1370282.6751
    Conceiving of fictional characters as types allows us to reconcile intuitions of sameness and difference about characters such as Batman that appear in different fictional worlds. Sameness occurs at the type level while difference occurs at the token level. Yet, the claim that fictional characters are types raises three main issues. Firstly, types seem to be eternal forms whereas fictional characters seem to be the outcome of a process of creation. Secondly, the tokens of a type are concrete particulars in the actual world whereas the alleged tokens of a fictional character are concrete particulars in a fictional world. Thirdly, many fictional characters, unlike Batman, only appear in one work of fiction, and therefore one can wonder whether it does make sense to treat them as types. The main aim of this paper is to address these issues in order to defend a creationist account of fictional characters as types.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  18. 1550187.675124
    Grounding contingentism is the doctrine according to which grounds are not guaranteed to necessitate what they ground. In this paper I will argue that the most plausible version of contingentism (which I will label ‘serious contingentism’) is incompatible with the idea that the grounding relation is transitive, unless either ‘priority monism’ or ‘contrastivism’ are assumed.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  19. 1557500.675139
    The past decade has witnessed a growing awareness of conceptual and methodological hurdles within psychology and neuroscience that must be addressed for taxonomic and explanatory progress in understanding psychological functions to be possible. In this paper, I evaluate several recent knowledge-building initiatives aimed at overcoming these obstacles. I argue that while each initiative offers important insights about how to facilitate taxonomic and explanatory progress in psychology and neuroscience, only a “coordinated pluralism” that incorporates positive aspects of each initiative will have the potential for success.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  20. 1564177.675158
    Let me tell you about the game Buckets of fish. This is a two-player game played with finitely many buckets in a line on the beach, each containing a finite number of fish. There is also a large supply of additional fish available nearby, fresh off the boats. …
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on Joel David Hamkins's blog
  21. 1780940.675172
    Rationality (1964), Jonathan Bennett’s first book, was published when he was thirty-four years old, and it exhibits the intensity of a young philosopher who is quite sure he sees a way to cut through a forest of dubious, ideology-ridden, squishy philosophy of mind and set a few things straight. Since the terrain he was scouting and clarifying was the same terrain that I was then embarking on, with similar ambitions, I read his book when it first came out through the dust and smoke of my own earliestflefl'orts to conquer these topics. The result, I confess, was that 1 simultaneously misread, underestimated, and covertly absorbed much of what he was on about and then proceeded to reinvent some of his wheels in my own work without realizing it until years later. First let me lay out what Bennett took himself to have done in Rationality, say why that was such a good idea, and then go on to consider why, nevertheless, his book has not had the influence it might have had. Iwas not the only explorer of this territory who chose to find other paths to Bennett’s destination, but here we all are, and a review of his book may con- solidate the gains.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Daniel Dennett's site
  22. 1782062.675187
    We could imagine critters whose perceptual system works as follows: When they have an object in their visual field, instead of the perceptual system delivering the presence of a dog, it delivers something like: dog:0.93, coyote:0.03, wolf:0.03, deer:0.01. …
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  23. 1876815.675202
    The account of experience sketched below is one to which I was led by a reflection on empirical thinking and, more specifically, on empirical reasoning and empirical dialectic. Sometimes when we reason—for example, when we are proving an arithmetical claim—our reasoning is independent of the experiences we undergo as we reason. The contents of our claims as well as the legitimacy of our inferential moves—including the introduction of new terms through definitions—do not depend on our concurrent experiences. They do not depend on things we happen to be seeing or hearing or touching or tasting or smelling as we reason. At other times, this is not so: our reasonings at these times do depend on the experiences we undergo as we reason. For example, the content and legitimacy of a claim we make during a stretch of reasoning can depend on our tactile experiences as we make that claim (e.g., the claim “this ball is hot” made of a ball one is holding). For another example, the legitimacy of a term we introduce through an ostensive definition (e.g., “call that color ‘yellow’”) can depend on our visual experience when we issue the definition. It is thus plain that our reasonings do sometimes depend on our experiences. It is not plain, however, what the character of this dependence is. Indeed, the character of the dependence has often been grossly misconceived, with detrimental consequences for our conception of empirical rationality and, especially, theoretical empirical reason. The account of experience sketched below appealed to me because it helps make sense of empirical reasoning and it illuminates thereby empirical rationality and the workings of theoretical empirical reason.
    Found 3 weeks ago on Anil Gupta's site
  24. 1897360.675219
    via Google Scholar I became aware of a forthcoming paper in Philosophical Studies by Sascha Benjamin Fink on Phenomenal Imagery, Introspection, and Indeterminacy. The paper is interesting and addresses issues raised in my Myth of Phenomenological Overflow paper so I thought I would jot down some thoughts in response. …
    Found 3 weeks ago on Richard Brown's blog
  25. 2232395.675234
    First, [Brown] cites my 1990 discussion piece “How Cartesian dualism might have been true”, in which I argued that creatures who live in simulated environments with separated simulated cognitive processes would endorse Cartesian dualism. …
    Found 3 weeks, 4 days ago on Richard Brown's blog
  26. 2372752.675249
    Many philosophers have argued that you should only assert what you know to be the case (e.g. Williamson 1996). If you don't know that P is true, you shouldn't go around saying that P is true. Furthermore, to assert what you don't know isn't just bad manners; it violates a constitutive norm, fundamental to what assertion is. …
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on The Splintered Mind
  27. 2372753.675266
    Reading my two previous posts, you might complain that perceiving and remembering require concepts, ideas, or even thoughts, which are basically representations, and plants don’t have those, so they don’t perceive or remember. …
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on The Brains Blog
  28. 2414965.675281
    Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend (e.g. Clark 2011; Clark & Chalmers 1998; Wilson 2000, 2004; Menary 2006) has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas, and in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: i.e., the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on PhilPapers
  29. 2422799.675295
    Models play a central role in contemporary science. Scientists construct models of atoms, elementary particles, polymers, populations, genetic trees, economies, rational decisions, aeroplanes, earthquakes, forest fires, irrigation systems, and the world’s climate – there is hardly a domain of inquiry without models. Models are essential for the acquisition and organisation of scientific knowledge. We often study a model to discover features of the thing it stands for. How does this work? The answer is that a model can instruct us about the nature of its subject matter if it represents the selected part or aspect of the world that we investigate. So if we want to understand how models allow us to learn about the world, we have to come to understand how they represent.
    Found 4 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  30. 2515515.67531
    The argument against mind-­‐body identity theory in Naming and Necessity is directed against a theory advocated in Place (1956), Smart (1963), Lewis (1966), and Armstrong (1968). Their psycho-­‐physical identity theory attempted to vindicate the reality of mental processes by identifying pains, sensations, and consciousness itself with brain states and processes. It arose in reaction to phenomenalism and behaviorism, the latter in both its scientific form, illustrated by B.F. Skinner, and its philosophical or “logical” form, illustrated by Gilbert Ryle. Early versions didn’t specify which brain states and processes were identical with pain states, sensation states, or consciousness. That was a job for neuroscientists. The philosophical job was to defeat conceptual objections to the possibility that any such identification could be correct and to articulate the explanatory advantages of incorporating the mental into physical science.
    Found 4 weeks, 1 day ago on Scott Soames's site