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4407379.715765
According to classical utilitarianism, well-being consists in pleasure or happiness, the good consists in the sum of well-being, and moral rightness consists in maximizing the good. Leibniz was perhaps the first to formulate this doctrine. Bentham made it widely known. For a long time, however, the second, summing part lacked any clear foundation. John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, and Richard Hare all gave arguments for utilitarianism, but they took this summing part for granted. It was John Harsanyi who finally presented compelling arguments for this controversial part of the utilitarian doctrine.
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4417615.715828
Scientists do not merely choose to accept fully formed theories, they also have to decide which models to work on before they are fully developed and tested. Since decisive empirical evidence in favour of a model will not yet have been gathered, other criteria must play determining roles. I examine the case of modern high-energy physics where the experimental context that once favoured the pursuit of beautiful, simple, and general theories now favours the pursuit of models that are ad hoc, narrow in scope, and complex; in short, ugly models. The lack of new discoveries since the Higgs boson, together with the unlikeliness of a new higher energy collider, has left searches for new physics conceptually and empirically wide open. Physicists must make use of the experiment at hand while also creatively exploring alternatives that have not yet been explored. This encourages the pursuit of models that have at least one of two key features: i) they take radically novel approaches, or ii) are easily testable. I present three models, neutralino dark matter, the relaxion, and repulsive gravity, and show that even if they do exhibit traditional epistemic virtues, they are nonetheless pursuitworthy. I argue that experimental context strongly determines pursuitworthiness and I lay out the conditions under which experiment encourages the pursuit of ugly models.
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4441606.715842
[Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Juliana
Bidadanure and David Axelsen replaces the
former entry
on this topic by the previous author.]
Egalitarianism is a school of thought in contemporary political
philosophy that treats equality as the chief value of a just political
system. Simply put, egalitarians argue for equality. They
have a presumption in favor of social arrangements that advance
equality, and they treat deviations from equality as prima
facie suspect. They recommend a far greater degree of equality
than we currently have, and they do so for distinctly egalitarian
reasons.
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4527705.715853
Probabilities play an essential role in the prediction and explanation of events and thus feature prominently in well-confirmed scientific theories. However, such probabilities are frequently described as subjective, epistemic, or both. This prompts a well-known puzzle: how could scientific posits that predict and explain human-independent events essentially involve agents or knowers? I argue that the puzzle can be resolved by acknowledging that although such probabilities are non-fundamental, they may still be ontic and objective. To this end I describe dynamical mechanisms that are responsible for the convergence of probability distributions for chaotic systems, and apply an account of emergence developed elsewhere. I suggest that this analysis will generalise and claim that, consequently, a great many of the probabilities in science should be characterised in the same terms. Along the way I’ll defend a particular definition of chaos that suits the emergence analysis.
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4527725.715862
Suppose we observe many emeralds which are all green. This observation usually provides good evidence that all emeralds are green. However, the emeralds we have observed are also all grue, which means that they are either green and already observed or blue and not yet observed. We usually do not think that our observation provides good evidence that all emeralds are grue. Why? I argue that if we are in the best case for inductive reasoning, we have reason to assign low probability to the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue before seeing any evidence. My argument appeals to random sampling and the observation-independence of green, understood as probabilistic independence of whether emeralds are green and when they are observed.
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4527744.715871
While there has been much discussion of whether AI systems could function as moral agents or acquire sentience, there has been very little discussion of whether AI systems could have free will. I sketch a framework for thinking about this question, inspired by Daniel Dennett’s work. I argue that, to determine whether an AI system has free will, we should not look for some mysterious property, expect its underlying algorithms to be indeterministic, or ask whether the system is unpredictable. Rather, we should simply ask whether we have good explanatory reasons to view the system as an intentional agent, with the capacity for choice between alternative possibilities and control over the resulting actions. If the answer is “yes”, then the system counts as having free will in a pragmatic and diagnostically useful sense.
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4527770.715881
trices. The main aim is to construct a system of Nmatrices by substituting standard sets by quasets. Since QST is a conservative extension of ZFA (the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Atoms), it is possible to obtain generalized Nmatrices (Q-Nmatrices). Since the original formulation of QST is not completely adequate for the developments we advance here, some possible amendments to the theory are also considered. One of the most interesting traits of such an extension is the existence of complementary quasets which admit elements with undetermined membership. Such elements can be interpreted as quantum systems in superposed states. We also present a relationship of QST with the theory of Rough Sets RST, which grants the existence of models for QST formed by rough sets. Some consequences of the given formalism for the relation of logical consequence are also analysed.
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4614715.715889
Organ sale – for example, allowing or encouraging consenting
adults to become living kidney donors in return for money – has
been proposed as a possible solution to the seemingly chronic shortage
of organs for transplantation. Many people however regard this idea as
abhorrent and argue both that the practice would be unethical and that
it should be banned. This entry outlines some of the different
possible kinds of organ sale, briefly states the case in favour, and
then examines the main arguments against.
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4643055.715898
This paper concerns the question of which collections of general relativistic space-times are deterministic relative to which definitions. We begin by considering a series of three definitions of increasing strength due to Belot (1995). The strongest of these definitions is particularly interesting for spacetime theories because it involves an asymmetry condition called “rigidity” that has been studied previously in a different context (Geroch 1969; Halvorson and Manchak 2022; Dewar 2024). We go on to explore other (stronger) asymmetry conditions that give rise to other (stronger) forms of determinism. We introduce a number of definitions of this type and clarify the relationships between them and the three considered by Belot. We go on to show that there are collections of general relativistic spacetimes that satisfy much stronger forms of determinism than previously known. We also highlight a number of open questions.
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4643075.715907
Determinism is the thesis that the past determines the future, but eorts to dene it precisely have exposed deep methodological disagreements. Standard possible-worlds formulations of determinism presuppose an "agreement" relation between worlds, but this relation can be understood in multiple ways none of which is particularly clear. We critically examine the proliferation of denitions of determinism in the recent literature, arguing that these denitions fail to deliver clear verdicts about actual scientic theories. We advocate a return to a formal approach, in the logical tradition of Carnap, that treats determinism as a property of scientic theories, rather than an elusive metaphysical doctrine. We highlight two key distinctions: (1) the dierence between qualitative and "full" determinism, as emphasized in recent discussions of physics and metaphysics, and (2) the distinction between weak and strong formal conditions on the uniqueness of world extensions. We argue that dening determinism in terms of metaphysical notions such as haecceities is unhelpful, whereas rigorous formal criteria such as Belot's D1 and D3 oer a tractable and scientically relevant account. By clarifying what it means for a theory to be deterministic, we set the stage for a fruitful interaction between physics and metaphysics.
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4643096.715916
The idea that the universe is governed by laws of nature has precursors from ancient times, but the view that it is a or even the primary - or even the primary - aim of science to discover these laws only became established during the 16th and 17th century when it replaced the then prevalent Aristotelian conception of science. The most prominent promoters and developers of the new view were Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. Descartes, in Le Monde dreamed of an elegant mathematical theory that specified laws that describe the motions of matter and Newton in his Principia went a long way towards realizing this dream.
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4643119.71593
This paper considers the mundane ways in which AI is being incorporated into scientific practice today, and particularly the extent to which AI is used to automate tasks perceived to be boring, “mere routine” and inconvenient to researchers. We label such uses as instances of “Convenience AI” — that is situations where AI is applied with the primary intention to increase speed and minimize human effort. We outline how attributions of convenience to AI applications involve three key characteristics: (i) an emphasis on speed and ease of action, (ii) a comparative element, as well as (iii) a subject-dependent and subjective quality. Using examples from medical science and development economics, we highlight epistemic benefits, complications, and drawbacks of Convenience AI along these three dimensions. While the pursuit of convenience through AI can save precious time and resources as well as give rise to novel forms of inquiry, our analysis underscores how the uncritical adoption of Convenience AI for the sake of shortcutting human labour may also weaken the evidential foundations of science and generate inertia in how research is planned, set-up and conducted, with potentially damaging implications for the knowledge being produced. Critically, we argue that the consistent association of Convenience AI with the goals of productivity, efficiency, and ease, as often promoted also by companies targeting the research market for AI applications, can lower critical scrutiny of research processes and shift focus away from appreciating their broader epistemic and social implications.
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4643918.715941
People are often surprisingly hostile to the very idea of moral optimizing, presumably because it’s more gratifying to simply act on vibes and emotional appeal (or they don’t want to be on the hook for moral verdicts that go against their personal interests). …
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4759989.71595
A. I guess because I'm exploring the format in some of my own writing. Q. A. It's not ready to show to anyone. In fact the project is more notional than actual—a few notes in a plain text file, which I peek at from time to time. …
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4808113.715958
Two problems are investigated. Why is it that in his solutions to logical problems, Boole’s logical/numerical operations can be difficult to pin down, and why did his late manuscript attempt to get rid of division by zero fall short of that goal? It is suggested that the former is due to different readings that he gives to the operations according to the stage of the solution routine, and the latter is due to a strict confinement to equational reasoning.
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4808133.715972
Ancient formulations of the distinction between continuous and separative hypotheticals, made by Peripatetics working under Stoic influence, can be vague and confusing. Perhaps the clearest expositor of the matter was Galen. We review his account, provide two formal articulations of it, verify their equivalence, and show that for what we call ‘simple’ hypotheticals, the formal line of demarcation is independent of whether or not modality is taken into account.
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4816083.715985
Following the lead of heterogeneous and invariably brilliant thinkers as Thucydides, Arnold J. Toynbee, Winston Churchill, Carl Sagan, Philip K. Dick, and Niall Ferguson, I consider a virtual history – or an alternative Everettian branch of the universal wavefunction – in which the ancient materialism and atomism of Epicurus (and heliocentrism of Aristarchus, for good measure) have prevailed over the (Neo) Platonist-Aristotelian religious-military complex. Such a historical swerve (pun fully intended) would have removed the unhealthy obsession with mind-body dualism and dialectics, which crippled much of the European thought throughout the last millennium. It is at least open to serious questioning whether quasireligious totalitarian ideologies could have arisen and brought about so much death, suffering and pain in this virtual history as they did in our actual history.
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4816102.715995
There’s a certain mindset that some people have when they think about fundamental physics and the world of middle-sized dry goods. The mindset is that the middle-sized stuff is somehow “less real” than the stuff that physics describes — elementary particles, quantum fields, etc. There are quite a few philosophers, and some scientists, who hold this view with great conviction, and whose research is driven by a desire to validate it. There are other people who have a completely different attitude about reductionism: they see it as the enemy of the good and beautiful, and as a force to be stopped. The worries of the anti-reductionists do seem to be well-motivated. If, for example, your wife is nothing more than some quantum fields in a certain state, then why vouchsafe her your eternal and undying love? More generally, is the existence of trees, horses, or our own children nothing more than a convenient fiction that biology or religion has tricked us into believing? If physics shows that these things are not fully real, how should we then live?
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4816123.716003
It has been argued that non-epistemic values have legitimate roles to play in the classification of psychiatric disorders. Such a value-laden view on psychiatric classification raises questions about the extent to which expert disagreements over psychiatric classification are fueled by disagreements over value judgments and the extent to which these disagreements could be resolved. This paper addresses these questions by arguing for two theses. First, a major source of disagreements about psychiatric classification is factual and concerns what social consequences a classification decision will have. This type of disagreement can be addressed by empirical research, although obtaining and evaluating relevant empirical evidence often requires interdisciplinary collaboration.
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4816142.716012
The Hard Problem of consciousness—explaining why and how physical processes are accompanied by subjective experience—remains one of the most challenging puzzles in modern thought. Rather than attempting to resolve this issue outright, in this paper I explore whether empirical science can be broadened to incorporate consciousness as a fundamental degree of freedom. Drawing on Russellian monism and revisiting the historical “relegation problem” (the systematic sidelining of consciousness by the scientific revolution), I propose an extension of quantum mechanics by augmenting the Hilbert space with a “consciousness dimension.” This framework provides a basis for reinterpreting psi phenomena (e.g., telepathy, precognition) as natural outcomes of quantum nonlocality and suggests that advanced non– human intelligence (NHI) technology might interface with a quantum–conscious substrate.
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4845380.716021
The Aristotelian corpus (corpus aristotelicum) is the
collection of the extant works transmitted under the name of Aristotle
along with its organizational features, such as its ordering, internal
textual divisions (into books and chapters) and titles. It has evolved
over time: Aristotelian treatises have sometimes been lost and
sometimes recovered, “spurious” works now regarded as
inauthentic have joined the collection while scribes and scholars were
attempting to organize its massive amount of text in various ways. The
texts it includes are highly technical treatises that were not
originally intended for publication and first circulated within
Aristotle’s philosophical circle only, Aristotle distinguishes
them from his “exoteric” works (Pol.
1278b30; EE 1217b22,
1218b34) which were meant for a wider audience.
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4845394.71603
The uses of the word “ideology” are so divergent as to
make it doubtful that there is any conceptual unity to the term. It
may refer to a comprehensive worldview, a legitimating discourse, a
partisan political doctrine, culture, false beliefs that help support
illegitimate power, beliefs that reinforce group identity, or
mystification. It is often used pejoratively, but just as often it is
a purely descriptive term. When authors criticize ideology, they may
be criticizing complicity with injustice, confirmation bias,
illusions, self-serving justifications, or dogmatism. When authors
identify ideology, they may locate it in forms of consciousness,
propositional attitudes, culture, institutions, discourses, social
conventions, or material rituals.
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4897165.716038
As always, please ‘like’ this post via the heart below and restack it on notes if you get something out of it. It’s the best way to help others find my work. Of course, the very best way to support my work is with a paid subscription. …
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4904016.716047
Many philosophers and linguists agree that there are two kinds of conversational implicatures: there are not only the well-known paradigm examples of conversational implicatures that are not entailed by the sentences that are used to bring them about; there are also less-often discussed conversational implicatures that are entailed by the sentences in question. In this paper, I take a closer look by examining classical candidates as well as novel contenders for entailed conversational implicatures. I argue that one might rightly classify some of these cases as conversational implicatures but show that doing so has so far unnoticed consequences.
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4931565.716056
I’m giving a talk next Friday, March 14th, at 9 am Pacific Daylight time here in California. You’re all invited! (Note that Daylight Savings Time starts March 9th, so do your calculations carefully if you do them before then.) …
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4976698.716065
In the previous post, I offered a criticism of defining logical consequence by means of proofs. A more precise way to put my criticism would be:
Logical consequence is equally well defined by (i) tree-proofs or by (ii) Fitch-proofs. …
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4978380.716074
In A New Logic, a New Information Measure, and a New Information-Based Approach to Interpreting Quantum Mechanics [13], David Ellerman argues that the essence of the mathematics of quantum mechanics is the linearized Hilbert space version of the mathematics of partitions. In his article, Ellerman lays out the key mathematical concepts involved in the progression from logic, to logical information, to quantum theory—of distinctions versus indistinctions, definiteness versus indefiniteness, or distinguishability versus indistinguishability, which he argues run throughout the mathematics of quantum mechanics.
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4982330.716084
We furnish a core-logical development of the Gödel numbering framework that allows metamathematicians to attain limitative results about arithmetical truth without incorporating a genuine truth predicate into the language in a way that would lead to semantic closure. We show how Tarski’s celebrated theorem on the arithmetical undefinability of arithmetical truth can be established using only core logic in both the object language and the metalanguage. We do so at a high level of abstraction, by augmenting the usual first-order language of arithmetic with a primitive predicate Tr and then showing how it cannot be a truth predicate for the augmented language. McGee established an important result about consistent theories that are in the language of arithmetic augmented by such a “truth predicate” Tr and that use Gödel numbering to refer to expressions of the augmented language. Given the nature of his sought result, he was forced to use classical reasoning at the meta level. He did so, however, on the additional and tacit presupposition that the arithmetical theories in question (in the object language) would be closed under classical logic. That left open the dialectical possibility that a constructivist (or intuitionist) could claim not to be discomfited by the results, even if they were to “give a pass” on the unavoidably classical reasoning at the meta level. In this study we “constructivize” McGee’s result, by presuming only core logic for the object language. This shows that the perplexity induced by McGee’s result will confront the constructivist (or intuitionist) as well.
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4982351.716094
Berry’s Paradox, like Russell’s Paradox, is a ‘paradox’ in name only. It differs from genuine logico-semantic paradoxes such as the Liar Paradox, Grelling’s Paradox, the Postcard Paradox, Yablo’s Paradox, the Knower Paradox, Prior’s Intensional Paradoxes, and their ilk. These latter arise from semantic closure. Their genuine paradoxicality manifests itself as the non-normalizability of the formal proofs or disproofs associated with them. The Russell, the Berry, and the Burali-Forti ‘paradoxes’, by contrast, simply reveal the straightforward inconsistency of their respective existential claims—that the Russell set exists; that the Berry number exists; and that the ordinal of the well-ordering of all ordinals exists. The disproofs of these existential claims are in free logic and are in normal form. They show that certain complex singular terms do not—indeed, cannot—denote. All this counsels reconsideration of Ramsey’s famous division of paradoxes and contradictions into his Group A and Group B. The proof-theoretic criterion of genuine paradoxicality formally explicates an informal and occasionally confused notion. The criterion should be allowed to reform our intuitions about what makes for genuine paradoxicality, as opposed to straightforward (albeit surprising) inconsistency.
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4986360.716103
There are two main accounts of ψ being a logical consequence of ϕ:
Inferentialist: there is a proof from ϕ to ψ
Model theoretic: every model of ϕ is a model of ψ. Both suffer from a related problem. On inferentialism, the problem is that there are many different concepts of proof all of which yield an equivalent relation of between ϕ and ψ. …