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3483420.143675
The puzzle of aphantasia concerns how individuals reporting no visual imagery perform more-or-less normally on tasks presumed to depend on it [1]. In his splendid review, Zeman [2] canvasses four “cognitive explanations”: (i) differences in description; (ii) “faulty introspection”; (iii) “unconscious or ‘sub-personal’ imagery”; and (iv) total lack of imagery. Difficulties beset all four. To make progress, we must recognize that imagery is a complex and multi-dimensional capacity and that aphantasia typically reflects partial imagery loss with selective sparing. Specifically, I propose that aphantasia commonly involves a lack of visual-object imagery (explaining subjective reports and objective correlates) but selectively spared spatial imagery (explaining preserved task performance) [3,4].
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3509922.143828
One challenge to relationism in general relativity is that the metric field is underdetermined by the stress-energy tensor. This is manifested in the existence of distinct vacuum solutions to Einstein’s field equations. In this paper, I reformulate the problem of underdetermination as a problem from vacuum solutions. I call this the vacuum challenge and identify the gravitational degrees of freedom (associated with the Weyl tensor) as the “source” of the challenge. The Weyl tensor allows for gravitational effects that something outside of a system exerts on the system. I provide a relationist response to the vacuum challenge.
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3509945.143839
This article offers a critical engagement with Jurgen Renn’s historio-graphical approach, with particular focus on The Evolution of Knowledge and The Einsteinian Revolution (co-authored with Hanoch Gutfreund). It explores how Renn reinterprets Albert Einstein’s contributions to modern physics, especially special and general relativity, not primarily as the product of individual insight, but as emergent from broader epistemic structures and long-term knowledge systems. The discussion centers on key concepts such as “challenging objects,” “epistemic matrices,” “mental models,” and “borderline problems,” and situates Renn’s framework within broader debates involving Thomas Kuhn, Ludwik Fleck, and Mara Beller. While recognizing the historiographical strengths of Renn’s structuralist approach, the article raises questions about its implications for understanding individual agency, conceptual creativity, and the philosophical dimensions of scientific change. The paper contends that a balanced account of scientific innovation must preserve both the historical embeddedness of knowledge and the originality of conceptual breakthroughs.
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3509966.143848
This paper examines the role of perspectivism in Relational Quantum Mechanics, situating it within the broader landscape of quantum interpretations and the scientific realism debate. We argue that, while interpretations such as QBism embrace strong forms of perspectivism, Relational Quantum Mechanics adopts a “soft” perspectivism, limiting the observer’s role to selecting experimental contexts without compromising its realist framework. We also explore the historical roots of Relational Quantum Mechanics, showing that relational ideas in the works of Bohr and other pioneers similarly avoided strong perspectivist commitments. By analyzing both contemporary and historical perspectives, we argue that Relational Quantum Mechanics offers a minimalist yet robust relational interpretation, distinct from more subjectivist approaches.
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3509987.143856
In a small book entitled Ondes et Mouvements [1], published in February 1926, Louis de Broglie described the wave, now known as the de Broglie wave, as a modulation or beating effect of undulatory form induced in the structure of the particle by the failure of simultaneity. Considered in this way, the de Broglie wave is neither ontologically distinct, nor in any way separate, from the particle, but like the Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction is a distortion in the structure of the particle itself. So understood, the de Broglie wave is a physically real phenomenon, capable of describing for the particle, a well-de…ned and physically realistic trajectory. In comparison, and as I argue in this paper, the wave functions that emerge as solutions to the Schrödinger and Klein-Gordon equations are better regarded as mathematical constructs, albeit constructs of signi…cant utility, identifying the wave number and frequency that the particle would have at each point of space if it were in fact at that point of space. A particular concern of this paper will be to show that the de Broglie wave would emerge as such a distortion of structure in certain sonic quasiparticles proposed in the context of analogue gravity for the purpose of simulating the Lorentz transformation.
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3510010.143864
Philosophical discussion of the Two-Envelope Paradox has suffered from a lack of formal precision. I discuss various versions of the paradoxical argument using modern probability theory, which helps to make diagnoses that are simpler, more insightful, and provably correct. Paradoxical arguments are revealed to be fallacious for one of three reasons: (1) the argument makes a formal mistake such as an equivocation fallacy; (2) the argument disregards relevant uncertainty about or variability in a unit of measurement; (3) the argument uses an invalid decision rule. I improve upon various existing diagnoses and discuss what kind of philosophical and decision-theoretic import the paradox has.
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3510032.143872
Noether’s first theorem demonstrates that continuous symmetries give rise to conserved quantities (under appropriate conditions). This fact tempts many to hold that symmetry principles explain conservation laws. Yet there is a puzzle: the derivation goes both ways. So why does symmetry explain conservation when the derivation is bidirectional? Lange (2007, 2009) provides an answer: symmetry principles are meta-laws, and meta-laws explain first-order laws just as first-order laws explain facts. Using a “non-standard” Lagrangian, Smith (2008) claims that conservation of angular momentum can hold without rotational symmetry, providing a counter-example to Lange. In this paper, I show that Smith’s non-standard Lagrangian fails to serve as a counterexample. However, that doesn’t leave Lange’s account unchallenged. I argue that the debate between Lange and Smith ultimately revolves around an ambiguity which, once clarified, leads to a dilemma. Which symmetry principle explains? Is it the symmetry of the action or the symmetry of equations of motion? If the former, then the symmetry is no more stable than conservation laws. Hence, we lose the desired explanatory direction. If the latter, the symmetry lacks explanatory relevance and fails to exhibit greater stability than conservation laws. However one disambiguates ‘symmetry’, it remains mysterious why symmetry principles explain conservation laws.
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3510055.143879
Scientists often find themselves in disagreement with their peers, yet continue to hold fast to their views. While Conciliationism, a prominent position in the epistemology of disagreement, condemns such steadfastness as epistemically irrational, philosophers of science often defend it as rationally permissible—indeed, even beneficial for scientific progress. This tension gives rise to what we call the puzzle of scientific disagreement.
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3610650.143888
I don’t usually offer recipes on my Substack, but I am giving you one today. 1. Be a woman, who is hence not supposed to ask for much of anything—much less people’s money and time and attention;
2. Violate a minor—and largely arbitrary—social norm, such as the norm that you don’t go paid straightaway on Substack;
3. …
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3665367.143895
It is well-known—a feature and not a bug—that Tarski’s definition of truth needs to be given in a metalanguage rather than the object language. Here I want to note a feature of this that I haven’t seen before. …
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3682946.143903
In this paper, open questions about the nature of gravitation and space-time are discussed, including the emergence of spacetime, and the quest for a theory of quantum gravity. The contribution highlights the contingent nature of the question of spacetime emergence and concludes with some remarks on the possibility of reading different programs in quantum gravity in terms of scientific theory change.
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3682966.14391
This paper proposes a transformative reinterpretation of local gauge invariance, a cornerstone of gauge theories, as a physical symmetry rather than a mathematical redundancy. Conventionally, gauge invariance ensures that only gauge-invariant quantities, such as the electromagnetic field strength Fµν = ∂µAν − ∂νAµ, bear physical significance, rendering the potential Aµ a calculational tool. Challenging this view, I argue that local gauge invariance, analogous to translation invariance, reflects a fundamental phase freedom of quantum fields, with Aµ and the wave function ψ, fixed in the Lorenz gauge (∂µA = 0), constituting real physical states.
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3682987.143917
A persistent debate in the philosophy of mind revolves around whether our conscious experience is richer than the content we are aware of. According to the overflow argument, we have a rich conscious experience, yet we can only cognitively access a small portion of it. Proponents defend this view by referencing the famous Sperling experiments in experimental psychology.
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3798241.143925
The metaphysics of quantum entanglement has been a subject of interest among philosophers of physics in recent decades. Entanglement is commonly described as a relation that does not depend on the intrinsic properties of its relata. This feature has led some authors to propose that the quantum reality is fundamentally relational and/or holistic. Moreover, it has been employed to support various influential metaphysical perspectives within the metaphysics of science, including structuralism, monism, and, recently, coherentism. This paper advocates a non-reductionist approach to internal relations, drawing on Fine’s analysis of propositions involving essential properties. Assuming the pervasiveness of quantum entanglement, it is argued that treating it as an internal relation is the most compelling option. Under this interpretation, entanglement can be accommodated within different metaphysical frameworks: (1) as a fundamental internal relation, it aligns with structuralism; (2) as a derivative internal relation, it is compatible with monism; and (3) as a relation of dependence, it supports coherentism.
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3834787.143933
The natural right to liberty surely includes the right to bring children into this world, and to raise them as your own. If you do so, it’s your business, and (barring abuse or neglect) interference by others, or the state, is illegitimate; nor do you need a justification for your act. …
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3845676.143941
In ‘Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline’, Bernard Williams argued that philosophy has a distinctive relationship with history, and not just the history of philosophy. He had in mind, especially, moral and political theory. For Williams, changes in ethical outlook are typically driven by social and cultural forces distinct from the power of rational argument. When an ethical idea prevails over time, holders of the outlook it supplants often have ‘have [no] reason to recognize the transition as an improvement’ (Williams 2000, p. 486). By their lights, the arguments for change are question-begging, In this respect, Williams believed, the history of ethics is unlike the history of modern science, whose telling typically vindicates later scientists on terms compelling to their predecessors.
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3907086.143948
We will be using classical sentential (viz., truth-functional/Boolean) logic as our background, deductive logical theory. This theory (viz., the truth-table method we will be using to reason, semantically, about it) traces back to Peirce [8] (and, later, Wittgenstein [17]). The basic units of analysis in sentential logic are atomic sentences. These are meant to be declarative sentences which contain no (sentential) logical connectives. We will use capital letters: A, B, C , . . . to denote atomic sentences. The only other elements of the language of sentential logic (LSL) are the (sentential) logical connectives (hereafter, the connectives) themselves. The meanings of the connectives are given by the following truth-table definitions.
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3908247.143954
I made a joke, last year, about philosophy’s failure as a pedagogy of death: if it was meant to teach me how to reconcile with mortality, it doesn’t seem to have done its job. Not that philosophers haven’t tried. …
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3913507.143967
At present, there are at least two set theories motivated by quantum ontology: Décio Krause’s quasi-set theory (Q) and Maria Dalla Chiara and Giuliano Toraldo di Francia’s quasi-set theory (QST). Recent work [Jorge-Holik-Krause, 2023] has established certain links between QST and Pawlak’s rough set theory (RST), showing that both are strong candidates for providing a non-deterministic semantics of N matrices that generalizes those based on ZF. In this work, we show that the new atomless quasi-set theory Q , recently introduced to account for a quantum property ontology [Krause-Jorge, 2024], has strong structural similarities with QST and RST. We study the level of extensionality that each theory presents, its relation to the Leibniz principle and the rigidity property. We believe that developing common features among these three theories can motivate common fields of research. By revealing shared structures, the developments of each theory can have a positive impact on the others.
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3914756.143975
This is an attempt to make an argument for the natural immortality of the soul from the premise that the soul has a proper operation that is independent of the body. The argument is going to be rather odd, because it depends on my rather eccentric four-dimensionalist version of Aristotelian metaphysics. …
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3944047.143983
Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777), also known by his
courtesy name Dai Dongyuan 戴東原, was a highly
accomplished scholar of the Qianlong-Jiaqing era of the Qing dynasty. His expertise encompassed a wide range of fields, including philology,
phonology, mathematics, astronomy, ancient institutions, geography,
chorography, and philosophy. Although his contributions to other
disciplines were recognized during his lifetime, his philosophy was
not widely acknowledged. Despite this, his ideas significantly
influenced philosophically-minded interpreters of the Confucian
Analects and the Mencius, notably Jiao Xun
焦循 (1763–1820), who frequently referenced
Dai’s works in his influential book, Mengzi
Zhengyi
孟子正義 (The Correct Meaning of the
Mencius).
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3944303.14399
Aquinas argues that because the human soul has a proper operation—abstract thought—that does not depend on the body, the soul would survive the destruction of the body. I’ve never quite understood this argument. …
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3947548.143998
For years I have thought the finite to be mysterious, and needs something metaphysical like divine illumination or causal finitism to pick it out. Now I am not sure. I think snakes and exact duplicates can help. …
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3966269.144005
Truth-value realism about (first-order) arithmetic is the thesis that for any first-order logic sentence in the language of arithmetic (i.e., using the successor, addition and multiplication functions along with the name “0”), there is a definite truth value, either true or false. …
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3971167.144013
This paper proposes a naturalistic, emergentist libertarian account of free will, conceptualized as emergent autonomy arising from biological organization and inherent physical indeterminacy. Critiquing classical deterministic assumptions about static time and infinite precision, we introduce "creative time" (objective, dynamic becoming) and "potentiality realism" (objective possibilities) as foundations. Autonomy emerges from the interplay of organizational closure (self-maintenance), non-equilibrium thermodynamics, and the system's capacity to harness ontic indeterminacy (objective openness utilized functionally). Drawing on systems biology, physics, and process philosophy, we outline the philosophical basis (emergence, potentiality realism), scientific principles (thermodynamics, dynamics), biological realization (minimal agency, materiality), and a model of choice involving downward constraint (organizational influence) and emergent sourcehood (agent as origin). We address neural implementation, reinterpret empirical challenges (e.g., Libet), and defend against objections (luck, manipulation). This framework offers a research program for understanding freedom as a graded, natural phenomenon rooted in life's organization unfolding through creative time.
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4040432.144022
Suppose that an extremely reliable cannon is loaded with a rock, and pointed at a window, and the extremely reliable timer on the cannon is set for two minutes. Two minutes later, the cannon shoots out the rock causing the window to break. …
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4051889.144029
Say that a fact is temporally pure about an instantaneous time t provided that it holds solely in virtue of how things are at t. (The term is due to Richard Gale, but I am not sure he would have wanted the “instantaneous” restriction.) …
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4087794.144037
- Grant Sanderson, of 3blue1brown, has put up a phenomenal YouTube video explaining Grover’s algorithm, and dispelling the fundamental misconception about quantum computing, that QC works simply by “trying all the possibilities in parallel.” Let me not futz around: this video explains, in 36 minutes, what I’ve tried to explain over and over on this blog for 20 years … and it does it better. …
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4117215.144044
It is a pleasure to read and respond to Professor Orr’s learned statement of a conservatism, one that is both rooted in tradition and updated to the contemporary. Conservatism’s top values, we learn, are order, hierarchy, a sense of belonging to a particular community in a particular time and place, a deference to tradition, and a resistance to changes that are too sweeping or too quick. Simultaneously, conservatism is distrustful of abstract definitions, eschews commitments to universal principles and certainties, preferring the empirical, the particular, and the pragmatic. Professor Orr devotes a paragraph or two to explicating further each of those core concepts.
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4117249.144051
The most direct route to political fundamentals is to ask: What should governments do? The different ‘isms’—liberalism, socialism, fascism, and so on—answer that question based on their most cherished values, holding that the purpose of government is to achieve those values. Yet societies are complex and we create many kinds of social institutions—businesses, schools, friendships and families, sports teams, churches/synagogues/mosques/temples, associations dedicated to artistic and scientific pursuits, governments, and so on—to achieve our important values.