1. 50540.829621
    In this article, I try to shed new light on Frege’s envisaged definitional introduction of real and complex numbers in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) and the status of cross-sortal identity claims with side glances at Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (vol. I 1893, vol. II 1903). As far as I can see, this topic has not yet been discussed in the context of Grundlagen. I show why Frege’s strategy in the case of the projected definitions of real and complex numbers in Grundlagen is modelled on his definitional introduction of cardinal numbers in two steps, tentatively via a contextual definition and finally and definitively via an explicit definition. I argue that the strategy leaves a few important questions open, in particular one relating to the status of the envisioned abstraction principles for the real and complex numbers and another concerning the proper handling of cross-sortal identity claims.
    Found 14 hours, 2 minutes ago on Rush T. Stewart's site
  2. 392116.829884
    This article distinguishes between two different kinds of biological normativity. One is the ‘objective ’ biological normativity of biological units discussed in anglophone philosophy of biology on the naturalization of such notions as function and pathology. The other is a ‘subjective’ biological normativity of the biological subject discussed in the continental tradition of Canguilhem and Goldstein. The existence of these two distinct kinds of biological normativity calls for a closer philosophical examination of their relationship. The aim of this paper is to address this omission in the literature and to initiate the construction of conceptual bridges that span the gaps between continental, analytic, and naturalist philosophy on biological normativity.
    Found 4 days, 12 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  3. 564696.82992
    This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License <www.philosophersimprint.org/000000/> This can be pronounced as the claim that necessarily everything necessarily exists, if it is kept in mind that ‘exists’ is understood in terms of quantification and identity. The position is called first-order necessitism because the quantification in question is first-order, i.e. quantification into the syntactic position of singular terms. First-order contingentism is the view that it is a contingent matter what individuals there are. Thus, first-order contingentists assert the negation of (Nec), which amounts to the claim that possibly something could have failed to exist. Of course, most first-order contingentists also believe the stronger claim that in fact (not merely possibly) many (not just some) individuals could have failed to exist.
    Found 6 days, 12 hours ago on Lukas Skiba's site
  4. 623294.829936
    It is impossible to deduce the properties of a strongly emergent whole from a complete knowledge of the properties of its constituents, according to C. D. Broad, when those constituents are isolated from the whole or when they are constituents of other wholes. Elanor Taylor proposes the Collapse Problem. Macro-level property p supposedly emerges when its micro-level components combine in relation r. However, each component has the property that it can combine with the others in r to produce p. Broad’s nondeducibility criterion is not met. This article argues that the amount of information required for r is physically impossible. Strong Emergence does not collapse. But the Collapse Problem does. Belief in Strong Emergence is strongly warranted. Strong Emergence occurs whenever it is physically impossible to deduce how components, in a specific relation, would combine to produce a whole with p. Almost always, that is impossible. Strong Emergence is ubiquitous.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  5. 653071.829956
    Faced with an intractable problem, some philosophers employ a singular strategy: their idea is to dismiss or dissolve the problem in some way, as opposed to meeting it head on with a proposed solution. Multiversism in many of its varieties has recently emerged as a popular application of this approach to the continuum problem: CH is true in some worlds, false in others; the effort to settle it one way or the other is misguided, a pseudo-problem. My goal here is to examine a few actual and possible implementations of this strategy, but first, in the interest of transparency, I should acknowledge a tendency toward the opposing view of CH. At least for now, I believe that one of the most pressing questions in the contemporary foundations of set theory is how to extend ZFC (or ZFC+LCs) in mathematically defensible ways so as to settle CH (and other independent questions) and to produce a more fruitful theory. It seems best to begin by sketching in my own peculiar take on this opposing view. Then, with this as backdrop, I’ll turn to multiversism.
    Found 1 week ago on Penelope Maddy's site
  6. 669613.829971
    Post 4 of 5 from Mazviita Chirimuuta on The Brain Abstracted (Open Access: MIT Press). A central claim of the book is that recognition of the challenge of brain complexity — how it places pressure on scientists to devise experimental methods, theories and models, which drastically cut down the apparent complexity of neural processes – is indispensable when evaluating the philosophical import of neuroscientific results, and more generally, in understanding the historical trajectory of research on the brain. …
    Found 1 week ago on The Brains Blog
  7. 785613.829982
    Is it possible, for instance, that the ratio between the diameter and circumference of a Euclidean circle be something other than the number π? If so, what would it be like to live in a Euclidean world where that ratio is different — wouldn’t something go horribly wrong? If you think the answer here is obvious, what about the more abstract mathematical claims, such as 4, 5 and 6 above, which also can have interpretations in Euclidean physical space, but are independent of our most widely accepted mathematical and physical theories?
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Andrew Bacon's site
  8. 855641.829994
    John Italos (fl. 1070s) was a prominent and controversial intellectual figure in eleventh-century Byzantium. An immigrant from Byzantine Italy, he made a stellar career in Constantinople succeeding Michael Psellos as head of the imperially sponsored school of philosophy. His dialectical method and combative temper made him a renowned figure in the Eastern Mediterranean. Among his students counted the future Constantinopolitan elite as well as foreigners from the Latin West, the Near East, and the Caucasus. His meteoric rise and Platonic teachings gained him not only admiration but also fierce opposition, which led to his repeated investigation in 1076/77 and 1082.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  9. 916181.830005
    The Scene: Socrates is watching a massive protest of students at the School of Athens. Elektra, a protest leader, and Leonidas, a merchant, notice Socrates furrowing his brow in puzzlement. Leonidas: [approaches Socrates] Aha, Socrates. …
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on Bet On It
  10. 1252467.830016
    Our aim in this paper is to extend the semantics for the kind of logic of ground developed in [deRosset and Fine, 2023]. In that paper, the authors very briefly suggested a way of treating universal and existential quantification over a fixed domain of objects. Here we explore some options for extending the treatment to allow for a variable domain of objects.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Louis deRosset's site
  11. 1252490.830027
    This paper is concerned with the semantics for the logics of ground that derive from a slight variant GG of the logic of [Fine, 2012b] that have already been developed in [deRosset and Fine, 2023]. Our aim is to outline that semantics and to provide a comparison with two related semantics for ground, given in [Correia, 2017] and [Kramer, 2018a]. This comparison highlights the strengths and difficulties of these different approaches. KEYWORDS: Impure Logic of Ground; Truthmaker Semantics; Logic of Ground; Ground This paper concerns the semantics for the logics of ground deriving from a slight variant GG of the logic of [Fine, 2012b] that have already been developed in [deRosset and Fine, 2023]. Our aim is to outline that semantics and to provide a comparison with two related semantics for ground, given in [Correia, 2017] and [Kramer, 2018a]. This will serve to highlight the strengths and difficulties of these different approaches. In particular, it will show how deRosset and Fine’s approach has a greater degree of flexibility in its ability to acccommodate different extensions of a basic minimal system of ground. We shall assume that the reader is already acquainted with some of the basic work on ground and on the framework of truthmaker semantics. Some background material may be found in [Fine, 2012b, 2017a,b].
    Found 2 weeks ago on Louis deRosset's site
  12. 1430933.830038
    We consider two simple criteria for when a physical theory should be said to be “generally covariant”, and we argue that these criteria are not met by Yang-Mills theory, even on geometric formulations of that theory. The reason, we show, is that the bundles encountered in Yang-Mills theory are not natural bundles; instead, they are gauge-natural. We then show how these observations relate to previous arguments about the significance of solder forms in assessing disanalogies between general relativity and Yang-Mills theory. We conclude by suggesting that general covariance is really about functoriality.
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  13. 1546361.830051
    This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  14. 1604550.830062
    This essay introduces, develops, and appraises the mitonuclear compatibility species concept (MCSC), identifying advantages and limitations with respect to alternative species concepts. While the consensus amongst most philosophers of biology is that (kind) essentialism about species is mistaken, and that species at most have relational essences, we appeal to the MCSC to defend a thoroughgoing intrinsic essentialism. Namely, the doctrine that species have fully intrinsic essences and, thus, are natural kinds (of sorts), while allowing that species aren’t categorically distinct.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  15. 1604604.830074
    The present paper is divided in two parts . In the first part we will propose Meinong’s theory of time outlined in 1899 interpreted in such a way that the subtlety of his argumentation is emphasised. In the second, we will discuss different solutions for the celebrated McTaggart’s paradox, reaching the conclusion that a theory of time suggested by the reflections of the Austrian Philosopher seems to be the most adequate perspective for tackling this problem . Meinong is concerned with time above all in his essays of 1894 and 1899; thereafter he deals again with the topic only in a cursory manner. Certainly the best of his reflections on the subject is the Third Section of the 1899 essay, and thus we will concern ourselves almost exclusively with this . Let us emphasise that time is not a Meinong’s topic, but briefly in the central part of his thinking, i.e. during the passage from his first psychological-descriptive works – influenced by his teacher Brentano – to the theoretical-objective period, stimulated firstly by the reading of Twardowski and Bolzano . In spite of this we have the feeling that in this short writing the Austrian philosopher outlines a theory of time which ante litteram opens a possible solution of the paradoxes connected with the flux of time, like McTaggart’s. We have to admire the remarkable subtlety of his psychological analysis, accompanied by a clear awareness of the objectivity of time; the latter helps him to avoid the psychologistic drift of Bergson’s perspective, the former to stay away from the scientistic point of view more and more in fashion in connection with modern physics .
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  16. 1604651.830085
    What is the meaning of atemporality in Hegel’s philosophy? What is the relationship between philosophy and physics, according to Hegel’s Naturphilosophie? And why should Hegel’s reading of Plato’s Timaeus be interesting for understanding both his idea of atemporality of time and the philosophical approach to the problem of the origins of the world? This Chapter addresses these questions by analysing some passages of Hegel’s writings, from the Dissertation on the orbits of the planets (1801) up to the Encyclopedia (1817/1827/1830). Hegel tackles the concept of atemporality (Zeitlosigkeit) when he refers to the idea or to the ideal dimension as considered in se and per se, the question about the eternity or the beginning of the world emerges as an integral part of the problem. The Chapter includes Hegel’s reconsideration of Plato’s Timaeus up to the arguments about the origins of the world and the notion of life in the second part of the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse devoted to Naturphilosophie.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  17. 1604704.830097
    This Chapter endeavors to explore the notion of atemporality within selected works belonging to the Platonic tradition. Beyond providing an overview of various facets of atemporality and highlighting their mutual relations, this chapter aims to investigate their role in a range of accounts of the world’s origins. By focusing on the cosmogonical views elaborated by Platonists who deny that the cosmos is generated in time, such as Plotinus, Porphyry, Calcidius, and Proclus, I will dwell on a specific kind of atemporality, namely ‘timeless simultaneity,’ and shed light on its theoretical advantages in explaining the demiurgic creation of the cosmos within a sempiternalist framework. Paradoxical as it may seem, within this perspective, the assertion that the Demiurge creates the cosmos at once does not conflict but, in fact, is fully compatible with the assumption that the cosmos has no temporal beginning, causally depends on a higher cause, and is always in a process of coming to be. As a result, a multi-layered taxonomy of atemporality, and especially the notion of ‘timeless simultaneity,’ enables Platonists adopting a sempiternalist stance to argue consistently that the cosmos is both ungenerated and created all at once, and to effectively explain in what sense it is so.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  18. 1714156.830119
    This axiomatization parallels the structure of first order logic exactly. It can be read as a reduction of the axiom scheme of comprehension of TST(U) to finitely many axiom templates (up to type assignment) or as a reduction of the axiom scheme of stratified comprehension to finitely many axioms. Probably one should assume weak extensionality: nonempty sets with the same elements are equal.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on M. Randall Holmes's site
  19. 1714402.830133
    According to urban legend, people’s number one fear is public speaking. Death is number two.1 I don’t know if it’s true, but if it is, I’d bet that the most dreaded form of public speaking is to stand onstage, alone, attempting to make an audience of strangers laugh. …
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Under the Net
  20. 1723886.830144
    Fictionalists about a kind of disputed entity aim to give a face-value interpretation of our discourse about those entities without affirming their existence. The fictionalist’s commitment to non-realism leaves open three options regarding their ontological position: they may deny the existence of the disputed entities (anti-realism), remain agnostic regarding their existence (agnosticism), or deny that there are ontological facts of the matter (ontological anti-realism). This paper outlines a method of adjudicating between these options and argues that fictionalists may be expected to hold preferences between them. The typical arguments and motivations for fictionalism lead naturally to a practice-based metaontological framework under which our practices regarding a kind of disputed entity might inform our ontological beliefs about those entities. When that framework is applied to fictionalism, it is found that the usual motivations for fictionalism lead naturally, though not decisively, to ontological anti-realism. And, where there are reasons against ontological anti-realism, fictionalism leans more toward anti-realism than agnosticism.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Ergo
  21. 1998034.830156
    Alonzo Church proposed a theory of sequences of functions and their arguments as surrogates for Russellian singular propositions and singular concepts. Church’s proposed theory accords with his Alternative (0), the strictest of his three competing criteria for strict synonymy. The currently popular objection to strict criteria like (0) on the basis of the Russell-Myhill antinomy is rebutted. Russell-Myhill is not a problem specifically for 1 ACKOWLEDGMENTS: This essay is dedicated to the memory of the great philosopher and logician, Alonzo Church. I had the good fortune to study under Prof. Church (among others) through the 1970s. Years later he read my Frege’s Puzzle (1986), in which I defend what is now called a Millian theory of semantic content. In May 1989, Prof. Church sent me a pair of manuscripts, then not yet published, in which he independently proposed similar ways of developing a theory of n–tuple surrogates for singular propositions. Church’s cover letter began “Just to prove that great minds run in the same channel.” Although his throwaway remark did not reflect a genuine assessment—of me or of himself—it was exceedingly generous, and the memory of it can still cause me to blush. The present essay is in part a much delayed result of careful study of Church’s excellent papers. I am profoundly in his debt.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  22. 2055806.830167
    Empirical research provides striking examples of non-human animal responses to death, which look very much like manifestations of grief. However, recent philosophical work appears to challenge the idea that animals can grieve. Grief, in contrast to more rudimentary emotional experiences, has been taken to require potentially human-exclusive abilities like a fine-grained sense of particularity, an ability to project toward the distal future and the past, and an understanding of death or loss. This paper argues that these features do not rule out animal grief and are present in many animal loss responses. It argues that the principal kind of “understanding” involved in grief is not intellectual but is instead of a practical variety available to animals, and outlines ways that the disruption to an animal’s life following a loss can hinge upon a specific individual and involve a degree of temporal organisation.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  23. 2066174.83018
    Physiology has produced a rich theoretical foundation that is now understood to apply to all known life forms from microbes to plants and animals, including humans. Physiological theories are equal in scope to evolutionary theories, but they have received much less attention and critical analysis from biologists and philosophers. Four Theories (Principles) are identified here. These are Homeostasis, Positive Feedback, Growth and Development, and Reproduction. These are undergirded by the universal biological property of Metabolism.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  24. 2066233.830192
    This paper challenges the soundness of the two-dimensional conceiv-ability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from physical truths (cf. Chalmers, 1996; 2010) in light of a hyperintensional regimentation of the ontology of consciousness. The regimentation demonstrates how ontological dependencies between truths about consciousness and about physics cannot be witnessed by epistemic constraints, when the latter are recorded by the conceivability – i.e., the epistemic possibility – thereof. Generalizations and other aspects of the philosophical significance of the hyperintensional regimentation are further examined.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  25. 2066260.830205
    This paper aims to provide two abductive considerations adducing in favor of the thesis of Necessitism in modal ontology. I demonstrate how instances of the Barcan formula can be witnessed, when the modal operators are interpreted ‘naturally’ – i.e., as including geometric possibilities – and the quantifiers in the formula range over a domain of natural, or concrete, entities and their contingently non-concrete analogues. I argue that, because there are considerations within physics and metaphysical inquiry which corroborate modal relationalist claims concerning the possible geometric structures of spacetime, and dispositional properties are actual possible entities, the condition of being grounded in the concrete is consistent with the Barcan formula; and thus – in the geometric setting – merits adoption by the Necessitist.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  26. 2094578.830217
    Two sorts of claims are ubiquitous in philosophy: claims that something is essentially the way it is and claims that something is socially constructed. The purpose of this essay is to explore the relation between essentialist and social constructionist claims. In particular, the focus will be on whether socially constructed items can have essences or essential properties. In section 1, I outline a number of views about the nature of social construction. In section 2, I outline a number of views about essence. In section 3, I consider ways in which certain claims about social construction may be thought to challenge certain claims about essences. Section 4 then offers rejoinders to these challenges and attempts to point the way toward reconciling constructionist and essentialist claims.
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on Aaron M. Griffith's site
  27. 2094600.83023
    Ontology and Oppression: Race, Gender, and Social Reality, by Katharine Jenkins, is a wonderful and engaging book in social ontology. It perfectly weds a rigorous theoretical account of social kinds with a deep concern for oppressed people. I expect that Jenkins’ book will generate significant conversation about the nature of social kinds and the relation between social ontology (and philosophy in general) and efforts at achieving social justice.
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on Aaron M. Griffith's site
  28. 2100827.830243
    The term ‘physicalism’ was coined by Otto Neurath in the early 1930s and was quickly adopted by other members of the Vienna Circle, including most prominently by Rudolph Carnap. Neurath was a socialist who believed that enterprises like science and industrial production should be organized according to the results of collective deliberation. Such deliberation, he thought, required a common physicalist language that would permit communication across disciplines and languages in ways that were accessible to everyone. Physicalism focused on universally shared features of human life; it was meant to provide a thing-language which was directed towards empirically observable events and objects. By talking in concrete, pragmatic terms about the problems of ordinary life, Neurath thought physicalism could provide the basis for the unified sciences and for inclusive collective deliberation about research priorities and the allocation of resources. Physicalism was Neurath’s way of eliminating traditional philosophy, which he understood to pose barriers to communication and support to politically reactionary elements. In later decades, and contrary to Neurath’s intention, ‘physicalism’ came to designate an ontological position whose principal features are familiar parts of contemporary philosophy. We now think of physicalism as some version of the claim that all real things are identical with or in some sense necessitated by the basic stuff that physics reveals to us. This was not what Neurath had in mind.
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on John Symons's site
  29. 2116716.830254
    Suppose that we have n objects α1, ..., αn, and we want to define something like numerical values (at least hyperreal ones, if we can’t have real ones) on the basis of comparisons of value. Here is one interesting way to proceed. …
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  30. 2123946.830266
    We propose our account of the meaning of local symmetries. We argue that the general covariance principle and gauge principle both are principles of democratic epistemic access to the law of physics, leading to ontological insights about the objective nature of spacetime. We further argue that relationality is a core notion of general-relativistic gauge field theory, tacitly encoded by its (active) local symmetries.
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive