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45900.805976
Empirical research provides striking examples of non-human animal responses to death, which look very much like manifestations of grief. However, recent philosophical work appears to challenge the idea that animals can grieve. Grief, in contrast to more rudimentary emotional experiences, has been taken to require potentially human-exclusive abilities like a fine-grained sense of particularity, an ability to project toward the distal future and the past, and an understanding of death or loss. This paper argues that these features do not rule out animal grief and are present in many animal loss responses. It argues that the principal kind of “understanding” involved in grief is not intellectual but is instead of a practical variety available to animals, and outlines ways that the disruption to an animal’s life following a loss can hinge upon a specific individual and involve a degree of temporal organisation.
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56268.806208
Physiology has produced a rich theoretical foundation that is now understood to apply to all known life forms from microbes to plants and animals, including humans. Physiological theories are equal in scope to evolutionary theories, but they have received much less attention and critical analysis from biologists and philosophers. Four Theories (Principles) are identified here. These are Homeostasis, Positive Feedback, Growth and Development, and Reproduction. These are undergirded by the universal biological property of Metabolism.
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56327.806219
This paper challenges the soundness of the two-dimensional conceiv-ability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from physical truths (cf. Chalmers, 1996; 2010) in light of a hyperintensional regimentation of the ontology of consciousness. The regimentation demonstrates how ontological dependencies between truths about consciousness and about physics cannot be witnessed by epistemic constraints, when the latter are recorded by the conceivability – i.e., the epistemic possibility – thereof. Generalizations and other aspects of the philosophical significance of the hyperintensional regimentation are further examined.
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56354.806227
This paper aims to provide two abductive considerations adducing in favor of the thesis of Necessitism in modal ontology. I demonstrate how instances of the Barcan formula can be witnessed, when the modal operators are interpreted ‘naturally’ – i.e., as including geometric possibilities – and the quantifiers in the formula range over a domain of natural, or concrete, entities and their contingently non-concrete analogues. I argue that, because there are considerations within physics and metaphysical inquiry which corroborate modal relationalist claims concerning the possible geometric structures of spacetime, and dispositional properties are actual possible entities, the condition of being grounded in the concrete is consistent with the Barcan formula; and thus – in the geometric setting – merits adoption by the Necessitist.
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84672.806234
Two sorts of claims are ubiquitous in philosophy: claims that something is essentially the way it is and claims that something is socially constructed. The purpose of this essay is to explore the relation between essentialist and social constructionist claims. In particular, the focus will be on whether socially constructed items can have essences or essential properties. In section 1, I outline a number of views about the nature of social construction. In section 2, I outline a number of views about essence. In section 3, I consider ways in which certain claims about social construction may be thought to challenge certain claims about essences. Section 4 then offers rejoinders to these challenges and attempts to point the way toward reconciling constructionist and essentialist claims.
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84694.806241
Ontology and Oppression: Race, Gender, and Social Reality, by Katharine Jenkins, is a wonderful and engaging book in social ontology. It perfectly weds a rigorous theoretical account of social kinds with a deep concern for oppressed people. I expect that Jenkins’ book will generate significant conversation about the nature of social kinds and the relation between social ontology (and philosophy in general) and efforts at achieving social justice.
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90921.806249
The term ‘physicalism’ was coined by Otto Neurath in the early 1930s and was quickly adopted by other members of the Vienna Circle, including most prominently by Rudolph Carnap. Neurath was a socialist who believed that enterprises like science and industrial production should be organized according to the results of collective deliberation. Such deliberation, he thought, required a common physicalist language that would permit communication across disciplines and languages in ways that were accessible to everyone. Physicalism focused on universally shared features of human life; it was meant to provide a thing-language which was directed towards empirically observable events and objects. By talking in concrete, pragmatic terms about the problems of ordinary life, Neurath thought physicalism could provide the basis for the unified sciences and for inclusive collective deliberation about research priorities and the allocation of resources. Physicalism was Neurath’s way of eliminating traditional philosophy, which he understood to pose barriers to communication and support to politically reactionary elements. In later decades, and contrary to Neurath’s intention, ‘physicalism’ came to designate an ontological position whose principal features are familiar parts of contemporary philosophy. We now think of physicalism as some version of the claim that all real things are identical with or in some sense necessitated by the basic stuff that physics reveals to us. This was not what Neurath had in mind.
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106810.806255
Suppose that we have n objects α1, ..., αn, and we want to define something like numerical values (at least hyperreal ones, if we can’t have real ones) on the basis of comparisons of value. Here is one interesting way to proceed. …
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114040.806262
We propose our account of the meaning of local symmetries. We argue that the general covariance principle and gauge principle both are principles of democratic epistemic access to the law of physics, leading to ontological insights about the objective nature of spacetime. We further argue that relationality is a core notion of general-relativistic gauge field theory, tacitly encoded by its (active) local symmetries.
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292691.806268
Humean Supervenience (HS) is a metaphysical model of the world according to which all truths hold in virtue of nothing but the total spatiotemporal distribution of perfectly natural intrinsic properties. David Lewis and others have worked out many aspects of HS in great detail. A larger motivational question, however, remains unanswered: As Lewis admits, there is strong evidence from fundamental physics that HS is false. What then is the purpose of defending HS? In this paper, we argue that the philosophical merit of HS is largely independent of whether it correctly represents the world’s fundamental structure. In particular, we show that insofar as HS is an apt model of the world’s higher-level structure, it thereby provides a powerful argument for reductive physicalism and explains otherwise opaque inferential relations. Recent criticism of HS on the grounds that it misrepresents fundamental physical reality is, therefore, beside the point.
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292725.806275
We present the reply Leibniz gave to Stahl’s Theoria medica vera (1707), and the controversy between the authors that those remarks stimulated. After having described the main points of Stahl’s dualism between life and death, correlated to his dualism mechanism/organism, we unravel the main epistemological and scientific points of debate. We propose several distinctions in order to make sense of the various uses of mechanism in this period, and suggest that what essentially motivated Leibniz was both Stahl’s implicit denial of uniform laws of nature, and Stahl’s misunderstanding of the metaphysics of substance and causality that Leibniz was in general elaborating in his own conceptions. We finally suggest how both authors were misunderstanding each other because of different scientific agendas and metaphysical commitments.
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334735.806282
During the first half of the eighteenth century, Newton’s work became the emblem of the “new philosophy” all over Europe. It provided a model to be followed in every field and the divide between the friends and the enemies of Reason. Reasons for such a sanctification of Newton are primarily due to the competitor’s disappearance of the polemics against Aristotelianism, which had provided seventeenth-century philosophers with an excellent straw man with its sequel of occult qualities and substantial forms. Secondly, they are to be found in the birth of controversy between Cartesians and Newtonians. This controversy will grow with a snowball effect, starting with a purely scientific issue, namely the theory of vortices, coming to include two overall views of the scientific method and two distinct theories of knowledge. Thus, as the interest in attacking Aristotle vanished since Aristotelianism ceased being perceived as a real competitor, the villain became Descartes, the author of an “illusive philosophy” or “one of the most entertaining romances” ever written.
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397541.806288
One feature of language is that we are able to make mistakes in our use of language. Amongst other sorts of mistakes, we can misspeak, misspell, missign, or misunderstand. Given this, it seems that our metaphysics of words should be flexible enough to accommodate such mistakes. It has been argued that a nominalist account of words cannot accommodate the phenomenon of misspelling. I sketch a nominalist trope-bundle view of words that can.
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400453.806295
‘Naturalism’ is a term so notorious for its murkiness that entire anthologies have been devoted largely to the task of pinning down its meaning – and for all that, nothing near consensus has been reached. Agreement is elusive even on how the available options are best taxonomized. One general tendency is to distinguish ‘ontological’ or ‘metaphysical’ versions – those that recognize only ‘physical’ or ‘material’ or ‘scientific’ items, eschewing, for example, angels or abstracta – from ‘epistemological’ or ‘methodological’ versions – those that recognize only ‘empirical’ or ‘scientific’ ways of finding out about the world, eschewing, for example, revelation – but these broad categories contain multitudes. So the task of explicating the current state of naturalism about logic is unusually daunting.
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450372.806302
Let serious propositional contingentism (SPC) be the package of views which consists in (i) the thesis that propositions expressed by sentences featuring terms depend, for their existence, on the existence of the referents of those terms, (ii) serious actualism— the view that it is impossible for an object to exemplify a property and not exist—and (iii) contingentism—the view that it is at least possible that some thing might not have been something. SPC is popular and compelling. But what should we say about possible worlds, if we accept SPC? Here, I first show that a natural view of possible worlds, well-represented in the literature, in conjunction with SPC is inadequate. Though I note various alternative ways of thinking about possible worlds in response to the first problem, I then outline a second more general problem—a master argument— which generally shows that any account of possible worlds meeting very minimal requirements will be inconsistent with compelling claims about mere possibilia which the serious propositional contingentist should accept.
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691549.806312
This paper explores the concept of "Nothingness" and its connection to Graham Priest's paraconsistent logic, with a critical focus on Heidegger's ontological perspective. Heidegger argues that logic and ontology are incompatible, and truth extends beyond mere propositions, tied to the indescribable experience of "Nothing." He contends that logical rules are not essential for ontological truth, leading to two conceptions of truth: fundamental and propositional. The study delves into this profound examination, considering the implications for understanding truth and the limitations of logic in grasping the elusive aspects of existence.
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864593.806319
I apply Dennett’s ‘real patterns’ idea to the ontology of physics, and specifically to the puzzle of how to relate the very different ontologies one finds at different scales in physics (e.g. particles vs continua, or fields vs particles). I argue that real patterns provide part but not all of the answer to the puzzle, and locate the rest of the answer in the structural-realist idea that ontology in general is secondary to (mathematically-presented) structure. I make some suggestions for the application of these ideas outside physics, including in the philosophy of mind context that motivated Dennett’s original proposal.
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1050925.806325
I’ve been thinking a bit about the relationship between dignity and value. Here are four plausible principles:
If x has dignity, then x has great non-instrumental value. If x has dignity, then x has great non-instrumental value because it has dignity. …
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1085763.806332
According to the causal-historical theory of reference, natural kind terms refer in virtue of complicated causal relations the speakers have to their environment. A common objection to the theory is that purely causal relations are insufficient to fix reference in a determinate fashion. The so-called hybrid view holds that what is also needed for successful fixing are true descriptions associated in the mind of the speaker with the referent. The main claim of this paper is that the objection fails: reference fixing of natural kind terms can be purely causal. The main argument draws inspiration from recent theoretical advances made in metaphysics of kinds by Marion Godman, Antonella Mallozzi, and David Papineau. The main claim is that their notion of super-explanatory properties may explain how reference of many kind terms can be fixed purely causally.
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1095402.806338
Among the various attempts to formulate a theory of quantum gravity, a class of approaches suggests that spacetime, as modeled by general relativity, is destined to fade away. A major issue becomes then to identify which structures may inhabit the more fundamental, non-spatiotemporal environment, as well as to explain the relationship with the higher-level spatiotemporal physics. Recently, it has been suggested that a certain understanding of functionalism is the proper tool to suitably account for the recovery of spacetime. Here the viability and usefulness of such a conceptual strategy is explored, by looking at the various levels of spacetime emergence a theory of quantum gravity is expected to deal with. Our conclusion will be that, while its viability is clear also in a quantum gravity context, the import of spacetime functionalism remains rather unsettled.
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1095431.806344
ABSTRACT: While there is considerable disagreement on the precise nature of material objecthood, it is standardly assumed that material objects must be spatial. In this paper, I provide two arguments against this assumption. The first argument is made from largely a priori considerations about modal plenitude. The possibility of non-spatial material objects follows from commitment to certain plausible principles governing material objecthood and plausible principles regarding modal plenitude. The second argument draws from current philosophical discussions regarding theories of quantum gravity and the emergence of spacetime. When it is appreciated what possible worlds these current theories commit us to, the possibility of non-spatial material objects will follow. Thus, either route will lead us to the possibility of non-spatial material objects. The significance of this result is that we need to revise our accounts of material objecthood to both accommodate these possibilities and the theories that lead to them.
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1210712.80635
Within the context of general relativity, Leibnizian metaphysics seems to demand that worlds are “maximal” with respect to a variety of space-time properties (Geroch 1970; Earman 1995). Here, we explore maximal worlds with respect to the “Heraclitus” asymmetry property which demands that of no pair of spacetime events have the same structure (Manchak and Barrett 2023). First, we show that Heraclitus-maximal worlds exist and that every Heraclitus world is contained in some Heraclitus-maximal world. This amounts to a type of compatibility between the Leibnizian and Heraclitian demands. Next, we consider the notion of “observationally indistinguishable” worlds (Glymour 1972, 1977; Malament 1977). We know that, modulo modest assumptions, any world is observationally indistinguishable from some other (non-isomorphic) world (Manchak 2009). But here we show a way out of this general epistemic predicament: if attention is restricted to Heraclitus-maximal worlds, then worlds are observationally indistinguishable if and only if they are isomorphic. Finally, we show a sense in which cosmic underdetermination can still arise for individual observers even if the Leibnizian and Heraclitian demands are met.
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1210808.806356
Philosophers and physicists often claim that the ‘privileged coordinates’ of a physical theory provide a window into its structure. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether this is the case. We show that there are general relativistic spacetimes that admit the same privileged coordinates but have different structure, and we infer from this that privileged coordinates do not provide a perfect guide to underlying structure. We conclude by isolating the conditions under which privileged coordinates do perfectly reflect structure.
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1242878.806362
Years ago, I read a clever argument against physician assisted suicide that held that medical procedures need informed consent, and informed consent requires that one be given relevant scientific data on what will happen to one after a procedure. …
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1316758.806368
Emotional hardcore and other music genres featuring screamed vocals are puzzling for the appreciator. The typical fan attaches appreciative value to musical screams of emotional pain all the while acknowledging it would be inappropriate to hold similar attitudes towards their sonically similar everyday counterpart: actual human screaming. Call this the screamed vocals problem. To solve the problem, I argue we must attend to the anti-sublimating aims that get expressed in the emotional hardcore vocalist’s choice to scream the lyrics. Screamed vocals help us see the value in rejecting (a) restrictive social norms of emotional expressiveness and (b) restrictive artistic norms about how one ought to express or represent pain in art, namely that if one is going to do so they must ensure the pain has been ‘beautified’. In developing this second point I argue that emotional hardcore is well-suited (though not individually so) for putting pressure on longstanding views in the history of aesthetics about the formal relationship between art and human pain.
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1400620.806374
The advanced division of cognitive labor generates a set of challenges and opportunities for professional philosophers. In this paper, I re-characterize the nature of synthetic philosophy in light of these challenges and opportunities. For my definition of synthetic philosophy see part 2. In part 1, I’ll remind you of the centrality of the division of labor to Plato’s Republic, and why this is especially salient in his banishment of the poets from his Kallipolis. I’ll then focus on the significance of an easily overlooked albeit rather significant character, Damon, mentioned in that dialogue. I’ll argue that if we take the relationship between Socrates and Damon seriously, we’ll notice that in modeling imperfect polities, Plato inscribes Socrates within the advanced division of cognitive labor who defers to Damon as an expert on a key feature of the art of government. In fact, I’ll argue that in Republic, Plato offers us at least two ways to conceptualize philosophy’s relationship to the sciences, and that he alerts us to the social significance of this.
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1400637.806379
Illusionists and a posteriori physicalists agree entirely on the metaphysical nature of reality—that all concrete entities are composed of fundamental physical entities. Despite this basic agreement on metaphysics, illusionists hold that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, whereas a posteriori physicalists hold that it does. One explanation of this disagreement would be that either the illusionists have too demanding a view about what consciousness requires, or the a posteriori physicalists have too tolerant a view. However, we will argue that this divergence of opinion is merely an upshot of the semantic indeterminacy of the term ‘conscious’ and its cognates. We shall back up this diagnosis by showing how semantic indeterminacy of the kind in question is a pervasive feature of language. By illustrating this pattern with a range of historical examples, we shall show how the dispute between the illusionists and their a posteriori physicalist opponents is one instance of a common kind of terminological imprecision. The disagreement between the illusionists and the a posteriori physicalists is thus not substantial. In effect, the two sides differ only about how to make an indeterminate term precise. The moral is that they should stop looking for arguments designed to settle the dispute in their favour.
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1480015.806386
It is one thing to believe something, and it is another to grasp it. For example, everyone knows that life is short, but most of us arguably do not fully grasp this fact. Grasping this fact can have a notable effect on our cognition and behavior, prompting us to reconsider how to best spend our limited time. Similarly, most of us know but seldom grasp that children are starving all around the world and that we could, if we put in a sufficient collective effort, halt much of this suffering. Grasping these facts makes us more inclined to donate to charity—or at least makes us more inclined to feel guilty if we don't. As both of these examples illustrate, grasping seems to be something above and beyond mere belief or knowledge, and it seems to make an important difference to our cognitive and decision-making processes.
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1489895.806392
A classic objection to Humeanism about scientific laws is that Humeans cannot make sense of the counterfactual invariance of the laws. For example, if there were ‘nothing in the entire history of the universe except a single electron’ (Lange, 2009, p. 55) then, intuitively, the laws would still be the same. But classic Humean views don’t seem to get such results.
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1663049.806397
The paper argues against a commitment to metaphysical necessity, semantic modalities are enough. The best approaches to elucidate the semantic modalities are (still) versions of lingustic ersatzism and fictionalism, even if only developed in parts. Within these necessary properties and the difference between natural and semantic laws can be accounted for. The proper background theory for this is an updated version of Logical Empiricism, which is congenial to recent trends in Structural Realism. The anti-metaphysical attitude of Logical Empiricism deserves revitalization. Another target besides metaphysical necessity are substantial forms of iterated modalities, as used, for instance, in the philosophy of religion.