1. 48066.277885
    18th-century British aesthetics addressed itself to a variety of questions: What is taste? What is beauty? Is there is a standard of taste and of beauty? What is the relation between the beauty of nature and that of artistic representation? What is the relation between one fine art and another? How ought the fine arts be ranked one against another? What is the nature of the sublime and ought it be ranked with the beautiful? What is the nature of genius and what is its relation to taste? Although none of these questions was peripheral to 18th-century British aesthetics, not all were equally central.
    Found 13 hours, 21 minutes ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  2. 108818.277935
    Quantum entanglement has long been thought to be have deep metaphysical consequences. For example, it has been claimed to show that Humean supervenience is false or to involve a novel form of ontological holism. One way to avoid confronting the metaphysical consequences is to adopt some form of antirealism. In this paper we discuss two prominent strands in recent literature—wavefunction realism and “Super-Humeanism”—that appear quite different, but, as we see it, are instances of a more general strategy. In effect, what these attempt to do is to diffuse the puzzle of entanglement by eliminating it. These interpretative movements are advertised as equally realist, but, we claim, fail to take an appropriately realist attitude towards entanglement. What we advocate instead is a genuine metaphysics of entanglement: instead of eliminating entanglement, develop a metaphysics that accounts for and explains it.
    Found 1 day, 6 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  3. 108842.277952
    Developments in genetic engineering may soon allow biologists to clone organisms from extinct species. The process, dubbed “de-extinction,” has been publicized as a means to bring extinct species back to life. For theorists and philosophers of biology, the process also suggests a thought experiment for the ongoing “species problem”: given a species concept, would a clone be classified in the extinct species? Previous analyses have answered this question in the context of specific de-extinction technologies or particular species concepts. The thought experiment is given more comprehensive treatment here. Given the products of three de-extinction technologies, twenty-two species concepts are “tested” to see which are consistent with the idea that species may be resurrected. The ensuing discussion considers whether or not de-extinction is a conceptually coherent research program and, if so, whether or not its development may contribute to a resolution of the species problem. Ultimately, theorists must face a choice: they may revise their commitments to species concepts (if those concepts are inconsistent with de-extinction) or they may recognize de-extinction as a means to make progress in the species problem.
    Found 1 day, 6 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  4. 124810.277966
    This use of the name ‘Pegasus’ clearly should not make (~P) ontologically committing. After all, the name is used precisely to deny the existence of Pegasus. And here arises one of the oldest philosophical conundrums, going back to Parmenides—the problem of Non-Being. If one assumes the truth of ‘Pegasus lacks being’, then it follows (does it not?) that there is nothing to which the subject-term refers. So it does not refer to Pegasus in particular. In which case, the statement fails to say anything in reference to Pegasus. But of course, it is saying something in reference to Pegasus—that Pegasus is not. But if you can refer to Pegasus, it seems that Pegasus must in some sense “be.” Legions of responses to this problem have ensued.
    Found 1 day, 10 hours ago on PhilPapers
  5. 173260.27798
    I’ve been talking about my new paper with Jade Master: • John Baez and Jade Master, Open Petri nets. In Part 1 we saw the double category of open Petri nets; in Part 2 we saw the reachability semantics for open Petri nets as a double functor. …
    Found 2 days ago on Azimuth
  6. 182586.277994
    Perdurantists think of continuants as mereological sums of stages (that is, sums of instantaneous spatiotemporal parts) from different times. This view of persistence would force us to drop the idea that there is genuine change in the world. By exploiting a presentist metaphysics, Brogaard (2000) proposed a theory, called presentist four-dimensionalism, that aims to reconcile perdurantism with the idea that things undergo real change. However, her proposal commits us to reject the idea that stages must exist in their entirety. Giving up the tenet that all the stages are equally real could be a price that perdurantists are unwilling to pay. I argue that Kit Fine (2005)’s fragmentalism provides us with the tools to combine a presentist metaphysics with a perdurantist theory of persistence without giving up the idea that reality is constituted by more than purely present stages.
    Found 2 days, 2 hours ago on PhilPapers
  7. 278640.278011
    Identity is often said to be a relation each thing bears to itself and to no other thing (e.g., Zalabardo 2000). This characterization is clearly circular (“no other thing”) and paradoxical too, unless the notion of “each thing” is qualified. More satisfactory (though partial) characterizations are available and the idea that such a relation of absolute identity exists is commonplace. Some, however, deny that a relation of absolute identity exists. Identity, they say, is relative: It is possible for objects \(x\) and \(y\) to be the same \(F\) and yet not the same \(G\), (where \(F\) and \(G\) are predicates representing kinds of things (apples, ships, passengers) rather than merely properties of things (colors, shapes)).
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  8. 298063.278025
    We defend the thesis that every necessarily true proposition is always true. Since not every proposition that is always true is necessarily true, our thesis is at odds with theories of modality and time, such as those of Kit Fine and David Kaplan, which posit a fundamental symmetry between modal and tense operators. According to such theories, just as it is a contingent matter what is true at a given time, it is likewise a temporary matter what is true at a given possible world; so a proposition that is now true at all worlds, and thus necessarily true, may yet at some past or future time be false in the actual world, and thus not always true. We reconstruct and criticize several lines of argument in favor of this picture, and then argue against the picture on the grounds that it is inconsistent with certain sorts of contingency in the structure of time.
    Found 3 days, 10 hours ago on PhilPapers
  9. 302685.278038
    Philosophy has been divided into theoretical and practical since the time of Aristotle’s distinction of the sciences, and within theoretical philosophy, the enquire on nature was of major import in Ancient and Medieval times. Most of its contents later developed into modern natural science as the seeds of physics or chemistry, but its founding concepts are still worth reflecting upon. Concepts such as those of body and extension, motion and change, time and place, finiteness and infiniteness, and of nature itself have kept their philosophical gist. The Iranian philosopher Ibn Sina [Avicenna] (d. 1037 CE) organized his philosophical encyclopedia “The Healing” in four sections: Logic, mathematical, and natural sciences, and sciences of the Divine; the doctrine on the human soul was part of the natural sciences.
    Found 3 days, 12 hours ago on Wes Morriston's site
  10. 490025.278051
    Descartes believed that non-human animals are automata, incapable of conscious experience. Kant wrote in the Anthropology that you and I are “through rank and dignity an entirely different being from things, such as irrational animals, with which one may do as one likes” (Kant 1798, 7: 127). Almost no philosopher would now defend these claims. They strike us as being antiquated, at best. Yet not long ago, a prominent contributor to these debates could write, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, that “people born autistic are incapable of forming deep personal relations” (McMahan 1996: 4). And it is a commonplace view in moral philosophy that humans born with severe congenital cognitive disabilities are ethically equivalent to pets.
    Found 5 days, 16 hours ago on Kieran Setiya's site
  11. 496747.278064
    Jade Master and I have nearly finished a paper on open Petri nets, and it should appear on the arXiv soon. I’m excited about this, especially because our friends at Statebox are planning to use open Petri nets in their software. …
    Found 5 days, 17 hours ago on Azimuth
  12. 549390.278077
    This paper advances two claims. The positive claim offers a correctness condition for perceptual experiences, one that does justice to the so-called “particularity of perception”: (T1) the perceptual content of a perceptual experience is correct iff there are perceived objects of which it is non-accidentally true.
    Found 6 days, 8 hours ago on Mark Sainsbury's site
  13. 566922.27809
    The definition of art is controversial in contemporary philosophy. Whether art can be defined has also been a matter of controversy. The philosophical usefulness of a definition of art has also been debated. Contemporary definitions can be classified with respect to the dimensions of art they emphasize. One distinctively modern, conventionalist, sort of definition focuses on art’s institutional features, emphasizing the way art changes over time, modern works that appear to break radically with all traditional art, the relational properties of artworks that depend on works’ relations to art history, art genres, etc.
    Found 6 days, 13 hours ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  14. 661412.278103
    This will be a series of lectures on the philosophy of mathematics, given at Oxford University, Michaelmas term 2018. The lectures are mainly intended for undergraduate students preparing for exam paper 122, although all interested parties are welcome. …
    Found 1 week ago on Joel David Hamkins's blog
  15. 665654.278118
    Imagine seeming to see a box of matches on a table. Now imagine moving slightly, while trying to keep the matchbox in view. You would be startled if the box of matches were suddenly to stop looking to you like a box, instead apparently morphing into a toy car. We thus tend to betray our implicit visual expectations, by responding with sudden surprise to visual experiences that are suitably discontinuous with their immediate predecessors. The surprise illustrated there is different to the more considered surprise that we often feel in other contexts. I would be taken aback if an ordinarily reliable informant told me that an eight-year old child recently ran a marathon in just over two hours. But the surprise that I would then feel is different to the startlement illustrated in the previous paragraph. While the surprise in the earlier case is doubtless shaped by one’s experiences of the world, it seems to arise independently of the relatively sophisticated processes of learning that lead us to our beliefs about, say, age-related marathon times.
    Found 1 week ago on Dominic Gregory's site
  16. 685497.278131
    In recent years, theoretical biologists and philosophers of biology have made increasing efforts to defend organisms as biological players in their own right against overly gene-centred views of life both in developmental and evolutionary biology (in the latter case specifically in the context of the so-called Modern Synthesis). Pursuing a non-reductionist systems biological approach, these scholars emphasise the autonomous character of organisms as selforganising biological systems (e.g., Moreno & Mossio 2015, Walsh 2015, Rosslenbroich 2014), thereby referring back to the older theory of autopoiesis (Varela 1979, Maturana & Varela 1980). Organisms and their characteristic development, it is argued, cannot be understood by looking at their parts only; it is the specific interplay of the parts, their organisation, that needs to be studied as giving rise to a functioning autonomous whole. This is believed to provide new avenues also for the understanding of evolution. Evolution, on this view, turns out to be ‘enacted’ by organisms as “autonomous, purposive systems” (Walsh 2015, 217).
    Found 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  17. 891925.278145
    Composition as identity is the view that a whole is identical to its parts taken collectively. Such a view raises the question of how the same portion of reality can be both one thing and many things. A primitivist view holds that there is no explanation to be had and that we simply need to accept that being one thing and being many things are compatible. One might think that we can do better by resorting to relativization. A relativist view may seem to explain how the same portion of reality can be both one thing and many things on the basis of the assumption that the portion of reality is these ways relative to different ‘concepts’ or ‘counts’. This paper discusses whether relativization truly leads to a satisfactory explanation of how something can be both one thing and many things. The conclusion will be that, when we consider the current accounts of the involved parameters, these relativizations make no explanatory progress.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on Martin A. Lipman's site
  18. 991093.27816
    When Aristotle argues at the Metaphysics Z.17, 1041b11–33 that a whole, which is not a heap, contains ‘something else’, i.e. the form, besides the elements, it is not clear whether or not the form is a proper part of the whole. I defend the claim that the form is not a proper part within the context of the relevant passage, since the whole is divided into elements, not into elements and the form. Different divisions determine different senses of ‘part’, and thus the form is not a part in the same sense as the elements are parts. I object to Koslicki’s (2006) interpretation, according to which the form is a proper part along the elements in a single sense of ‘part’, although she insists that the form and the elements belong to different categories. I argue that Koslicki’s reading involves a category mistake, i.e. the conjunction of items that do not belong to the same category (Goldwater 2018). Since for Aristotle parthood presupposes some kind of similarity of parts, the conjunction of form and elements requires treating these items as somehow belonging to the same category, e.g. ‘being’, but no such category exists.
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on Kathrin Koslicki's site
  19. 1011286.278177
    Supposing the growing block theory of time is correct and you have a choice between two options. You suffer 60 minutes of pain from 10:30 pm to 11:30 pm. You suffer 65 minutes of pain from 10:50 pm to 11:55 pm. …
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  20. 1131699.27819
    A number of important philosophical problems are at the intersection of logic and ontology. Both logic and ontology are diverse fields within philosophy and, partly because of this, there is not one single philosophical problem about the relation between them. In this survey article we will first discuss what different philosophical projects are carried out under the headings of “logic” and “ontology” and then we will look at several areas where logic and ontology overlap.
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Thomas Hofweber's site
  21. 1162937.278204
    I propose a new model of implicit bias, according to which implicit biases are constituted by unconscious imaginings. I begin by endorsing a principle of parsimony when confronted with unfamiliar phenomena. I introduce implicit bias in terms congenial to what most philosophers and psychologists have said about their nature in the literature so far, before moving to a discussion of the doxastic model of implicit bias and objections to it. I then introduce unconscious imagination and argue that appeal to it does not represent a departure from a standard view of imagination, before outlining my model and showing how it accommodates characteristic features of implicit bias. I argue for its advantages over the doxastic model: it does not violate the parsimony principle, it does not face any of the objections so far raised to doxasticism, and it can accommodate the heterogeneity in the category of implicit bias. Finally, I address whether my view limits our ability to hold people accountable for their biases (it does not), and whether it is consistent with what we know about intervention strategies (it is). I conclude that implicit biases are constituted by unconscious imaginings.
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Ema Sullivan-Bissett's site
  22. 1168669.278219
    A. Enayat, J. D. Hamkins, and B. Wcisło, “Topological models of arithmetic,” ArXiv e-prints, 2018. (under review)   Citation arχiv @ARTICLE{EnayatHamkinsWcislo2018:Topological-models-of-arithmetic, author = {Ali Enayat and Joel David Hamkins and Bartosz Wcisło}, title = {Topological models of arithmetic}, journal = {ArXiv e-prints}, year = {2018}, volume = {}, number = {}, pages = {}, month = {}, note = {under review}, abstract = {}, keywords = {}, source = {}, doi = {}, eprint = {1808.01270}, archivePrefix = {arXiv}, primaryClass = {math.LO}, keywords = {under-review}, url = {http://wp.me/p5M0LV-1LS}, } Abstract. …
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Joel David Hamkins's blog
  23. 1456795.278232
    This paper presents a uniform semantic treatment of nonmonotonic inference operations that allow for inferences from infinite sets of premisses. The semantics is formulated in terms of selection functions and is a generalization of the preferential semantics of Shoham (1987), (1988), Kraus, Lehman, and Magidor (1990) and Makinson (1989), (1993). A selection function picks out from a given set of possible states (worlds, situations, models) a subset consisting of those states that are, in some sense, the most preferred ones. A proposition α is a nonmonotonic consequence of a set of propositions Γ iff α holds in all the most preferred Γ-states. In the literature on revealed preference theory, there are a number of well-known theorems concerning the representability of selection functions, satisfying certain properties, in terms of underlying preference relations. Such theorems are utilized here to give corresponding representation theorems for nonmonotonic inference operations. At the end of the paper, the connection between nonmonotonic inference and belief revision, in the sense of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson, is explored. In this connection, infinitary belief revision operations, that allow for the revision of a theory with a possibly infinite set of propositions, are introduced and characterized axiomatically. Several semantic representation theorems are proved for operations of this kind.
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  24. 1558844.278245
    A prophet is a person who plays as special role mediating the relationship between other people and the divine. People typically envision prophecy in terms of God communicating through a prophet to others some important information that could not have been known to the prophet in any ordinary way. Prophecy is interesting from a philosophical point of view for many reasons, including the fact that it raises compelling questions about divine knowledge and communication, human language, the nature of time, and human freedom. Unlike theologians or apologists, philosophers rarely argue about who has actually prophesied what, or whether or not a given prophecy came true.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  25. 1822266.278258
    Hylomorphism is the view that at least some material objects are comprised of both matter and form. Hylomorphism was first introduced as a theory of material objects by Aristotle (although Plato’s own view of material objects can, to some extent, be considered hylomorphic). During the medieval period, hylomorphism became the dominant view. Medieval scholastics advanced sophisticated hylomorphic theories of the natural world, and used the language of form and matter to articulate and to elucidate various theological doctrines. At the start of the early modern period, however, with the rise of modern science, notions of form and matter were rejected in favor of more “empirically adequate” mechanistic explanations. As the story goes, the early moderns liberated philosophy from the constraints of the Aristotelian worldview, and laid the groundwork for a more scientifically informed reductionist account of material objects. For centuries afterward, the theory of hylomorphism was seen as obscure, unmotivated, and outdated.
    Found 3 weeks ago on Kathrin Koslicki's site
  26. 1822279.278274
    Hylomorphism is the theory that objects are composites of form and matter. Recently it has been argued that form is structure, or the arrangement of an object’s parts. This paper shows that the principle of form cannot be ontologically exhausted by structure. That is, I deny form should be understood just as the arrangement of an object’s parts. I do so by showing that structure cannot play the role form is supposed to in a certain domain of objects, specifically, in mereological simples. Thus, I show that Hylomorphism does not reduce to Structuralism. I also draw out some important consequences from my argument for Hylomorphism in general.
    Found 3 weeks ago on Kathrin Koslicki's site
  27. 1876312.27829
    The question of whether the universe has a cause typically falls under the umbrella of the cosmological argument, the aim of which is to establish the existence of something outside the natural order. In this debate Robert Koons argues that the universe must have a cause, and that there must be something distinct from the universe that is uncaused. On the other side, Graham Oppy argues that if there is an uncaused cause, we should prefer the hypothesis that that cause is a part of the natural order to the hypothesis that it exists outside that order.
    Found 3 weeks ago on Robert C. Koons's site
  28. 1933895.278304
    To understand Aristotle’s conception of form, we have to see clearly the relationship between his account and Plato’s Theory of Forms. I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s Moderate Realism, in which forms are simple particulars that ground the character and mutual similarity of the entities they inform. Such an account has advantages in three areas: explaining (1) the similarity of particulars, (2) the synchronic unity of composite particulars, and (3) the diachronic unity or persistence of intrinsically changing particulars.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Robert C. Koons's site
  29. 2006090.278318
    Buddhism currently enjoys the reputation of being one of the leading voices in a chorus that sings the praises of religious tolerance and perhaps even of pluralism. It is open to question, however, whether this reputation is deserved. The purpose of the present article is to examine whether the teachings of classical Buddhism have a contribution to make to the jubilation over religious pluralism that has become fashionable in some quarters in recent years. It is hoped that this examination might shed some light both on some of the implications of religious pluralism and on the spirit of the teachings of classical Buddhism.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on Richard Hayes's site
  30. 2006102.278331
    Religious doctrines and the philosophical arguments supporting them often become more clearly defined as a result of being challenged by opposing views and counterarguments. Conversely, ideas that are never challenged often remain relatively obscure and poorly defined. The process of encountering rival ideas and alternative theories requires people to re-examine their own assumptions and provide reasons for holding views that could previously be taken for granted. It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of important notions within Buddhist philosophy became better defined in the centuries after they became more widely dispersed in the Indian subcontinent; for it was only after coming into contact with opposing theories that many of the ideas articulated by the Buddha, and the presuppositions underlying those ideas, were seriously examined. Once these doctrines were challenged, later Buddhist philosophers had the task of either offering solid arguments in their support or revising the doctrines to a form in which they could be supported.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on Richard Hayes's site