1. 3704.604777
    (This is the originally submitted version of the paper, a significantly revised version of which is forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Please cite the final version!) Abstract. According to an influential line of argument, our beliefs about which material objects exist were influenced by selective pressures that are insensitive to the true ontology of material objects, and are therefore debunked (Merricks 2001, Korman 2014, 2015, Rose and Schaffer 2017). Extant responses to this line of reasoning presuppose controversial philosophical theses, such as anti-realism about material objects, theism, or a special faculty of apprehension. The present paper develops a novel strategy for responding to debunking arguments against belief in ordinary objects, which I call “semideflationism”: our beliefs about which material objects exist are the consequents of conditional statements that we are a priori entitled to believe and whose antecedents we have empirical justification to believe. Semi-deflationism offers an attractive epistemology of material objects that. It also shares certain similarities with Amie Thomasson’s (2007, 2014) analytic deflationism, but it is immune to several difficulties with it. Most importantly, semi-deflationism doesn’t imply that seemingly difficult debates about the ontology of material objects can be trivially settled, and it leaves open the possibility that although our beliefs about which objects exist are rational, they are ultimately undermined by substantive arguments for revisionary views.
    Found 1 hour, 1 minute ago on David Mark Kovacs's site
  2. 40854.604883
    Abortion is the intentional termination of a pregnancy, either via surgery or via the taking of medication. Ordinary people disagree about abortion: many people think abortion is deeply morally wrong, while many others think abortion is morally permissible. Philosophy has much to contribute to this discussion, by distinguishing and clarifying different arguments against abortion, distinguishing and clarifying different responses to those arguments, offering novel arguments against abortion, offering novel defenses of abortion, and offering novel views about the relevant issues at stake. This entry’s central question is: is abortion morally wrong?
    Found 11 hours, 20 minutes ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  3. 48418.604901
    The article offers a novel reconstruction of Hilbert’s early metatheory of formal axiomatics. His foundational work from the turn of the last century is often regarded as a central contribution to a “model-theoretic” viewpoint in modern logic and mathematics. The article will re-assess Hilbert’s role in the development of model theory by focusing on two aspects of his contributions to the axiomatic foundations of geometry and analysis. First, we examine Hilbert’s conception of mathematical theories and their interpretations; in particular, we argue that his early semantic views can be understood in terms of a notion of translational isomorphism between models of an axiomatic theory. Second, we offer a logical reconstruction of his consistency and independence results in geometry in terms of the notion of interpretability between theories.
    Found 13 hours, 26 minutes ago on Georg Schiemer's site
  4. 100150.604913
    The debate over whether cognitive science is committed to the existence of neural representations is usually taken to hinge on the status of representations as theoretical posits: it depends on whether or not our best-supported scientific theories commit us to the existence of representations. Thomson and Piccinini (2018) and Nanay (2022) seek to reframe this debate to focus more on scientific experimentation than on scientific theorizing. They appeal to arguments from observation and manipulation to propose that experimental cognitive neuroscience gives us non-theoretical reasons to be ontologically committed to representations. In this paper, I challenge their claims about observation and manipulation, and I argue that the question of whether we are ontologically committed to representations is still best understood as a question about the level of support we have for our representation-positing scientific theories.
    Found 1 day, 3 hours ago on Zoe Drayson's site
  5. 126179.604931
    In recent work, Nina Emery has defended the view that, in the context of naturalistic metaphysics, one should maintain the same epistemic attitude towards science and metaphysics. That is, naturalists who are scientific realists ought to be realists about metaphysics as well; and naturalists who are antirealists about science should also be antirealists about metaphysics. We call this the ‘parity thesis’. This paper suggests that the parity thesis is widely, albeit often implicitly, accepted among naturalistically inclined philosophers, and essentially for reasons similar to Emery’s. Then, reasons are provided for resisting Emery’s specific inference from scientific realism to realism about metaphysics. The resulting picture is a more nuanced view of the relationship between science and metaphysics within the naturalistic setting than the one which is currently most popular. Keywords: meta-metaphysics; metaphysics and science; naturalistic metaphysics; realism and antirealism.
    Found 1 day, 11 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  6. 126279.604945
    In previous papers, we demonstrated that an ontology of quantum mechanics, described in terms of states and events with internal phenomenal aspects (a form of panprotopsychism), is well suited to explain consciousness. We showed that the combination problems of qualities, structures and subjects in panpsychism and panprotopsychism stem from implicit hypotheses based on classical physics regarding supervenience, which are not applicable at the quantum level. Within this view, consciousness arises in entangled quantum systems coupled to the neural network of the brain. In entangled systems, the properties of individual parts disappear, giving rise to an exponential number of emergent properties and states. Here, we analyze self-consciousness as the capacity to view oneself as a subject of experience. The causal openness of quantum systems provides self-conscious beings the ability to make independent choices and decisions, reflecting a sense of self-governance and autonomy. In this context, the issue of personal identity takes a new form free from the problems of the simple view or the reductive approaches.
    Found 1 day, 11 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  7. 144594.604956
    Arithmetical truth-value realists hold that any proposition in the language of arithmetic has a fully determined truth value. Arithmetical truth-value necessists add that this truth value is necessary rather than merely contingent. …
    Found 1 day, 16 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  8. 299318.604968
    This paper explores zero and infinity as dual scalar operators that shape mathematical and physical structures across scales. From Cantorian set theory to black hole thermodynamics and fractal geometry, we argue that 0 and ∞ are not opposites but mirrors—reciprocally defining limits within a scalable universe.
    Found 3 days, 11 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  9. 454406.604979
    In Ontology Made Easy (2015), I defend the idea that there are ‘easy’ inferences that begin from uncontroversial premises and end with answers to disputed ontological questions. But what do easy inferences really get us? Bueno and Cumpa (this journal, 2020) argue that easy inferences don’t tell us about the natures of properties—they don’t tell us what properties are. Moreover, they argue, by accepting an ontologically neutral quantifier we can also resist the conclusion that properties or numbers exist. Here I address these two issues in turn—in ways that help clarify both the scope and results of easy ontology. First, it is important to see that easy inferences were never intended to address modal questions. Modal questions are addressed by a different part of the total deflationary view—modal normativism. So understood, metaphysical modal questions nonetheless do not provide a remaining area for serious metaphysical inquiry. Second, I argue that we have reason to resist adopting an ontologically neutral quantifier, if we aim to answer ontological questions (without begging the question). Addressing these issues helps to clarify both what does (and does not) follow from easy inferences, and how they form part of a larger deflationary metametaphysical view.
    Found 5 days, 6 hours ago on Amie Thomasson's site
  10. 454444.604991
    The essays in this volume cover the gamut of my work, from its beginnings in work on fiction, through work on the ontology of art and artifacts, social ontology, and work on ordinary objects generally, through more recent work on metametaphysics, modality, and conceptual engineering. On the surface, these themes might seem to have little in common. In this essay, however, I aim to make clear how they have been interconnected, and form parts of a vision of, and for, metaphysics.
    Found 5 days, 6 hours ago on Amie Thomasson's site
  11. 933615.605002
    The metaphysics of quantum entanglement has been a subject of interest among philosophers of physics in recent decades. Entanglement is commonly described as a relation that does not depend on the intrinsic properties of its relata. This feature has led some authors to propose that the quantum reality is fundamentally relational and/or holistic. Moreover, it has been employed to support various influential metaphysical perspectives within the metaphysics of science, including structuralism, monism, and, recently, coherentism. This paper advocates a non-reductionist approach to internal relations, drawing on Fine’s analysis of propositions involving essential properties. Assuming the pervasiveness of quantum entanglement, it is argued that treating it as an internal relation is the most compelling option. Under this interpretation, entanglement can be accommodated within different metaphysical frameworks: (1) as a fundamental internal relation, it aligns with structuralism; (2) as a derivative internal relation, it is compatible with monism; and (3) as a relation of dependence, it supports coherentism.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  12. 1048881.605015
    At present, there are at least two set theories motivated by quantum ontology: Décio Krause’s quasi-set theory (Q) and Maria Dalla Chiara and Giuliano Toraldo di Francia’s quasi-set theory (QST). Recent work [Jorge-Holik-Krause, 2023] has established certain links between QST and Pawlak’s rough set theory (RST), showing that both are strong candidates for providing a non-deterministic semantics of N matrices that generalizes those based on ZF. In this work, we show that the new atomless quasi-set theory Q , recently introduced to account for a quantum property ontology [Krause-Jorge, 2024], has strong structural similarities with QST and RST. We study the level of extensionality that each theory presents, its relation to the Leibniz principle and the rigidity property. We believe that developing common features among these three theories can motivate common fields of research. By revealing shared structures, the developments of each theory can have a positive impact on the others.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  13. 1101643.605027
    Truth-value realism about (first-order) arithmetic is the thesis that for any first-order logic sentence in the language of arithmetic (i.e., using the successor, addition and multiplication functions along with the name “0”), there is a definite truth value, either true or false. …
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  14. 1757029.605038
    This paper reconsiders the metaphysical implication of Einstein algebras, prompted by the recent objections of Chen (2024) on Rosenstock et al. (2015)’s conclusion. Rosenstock et al.’s duality theorem of smooth manifolds and smooth algebras supports a conventional wisdom which states that the Einstein algebra formalism is not more “relationalist” than the standard manifold formalism. Nevertheless, as Chen points out, smooth algebras are different from the relevant algebraic structure of an Einstein algebra. It is therefore questionable if Rosenstock et al.’s duality theorem can support the conventional wisdom. After a re-visit of John Earman’s classic works on the program of Leibniz algebras, I formalize the program in category theory and propose a new formal criterion to determine whether an algebraic formalism is more “relationalist” than the standard manifold formalism or not. Based on the new formal criterion, I show that the conventional wisdom is still true, though supported by a new technical result. I also show that Rosenstock et al. (2015)’s insight can be re-casted as a corollary of the new result. Finally, I provide a justification of the new formal criterion with a discussion of Sikorski algebras and differential spaces. The paper therefore provides a new perspective for formally investigating the metaphysical implication of an algebraic formalism for the theory of space and time.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  15. 1757065.605049
    This paper critically examines Ian Hacking’s account of looping effects and human kinds, focusing on three related arguments defended by Hacking: (1) the looping effects of human science classifications render their objects of classification inherently unstable, (2) looping effects preclude the possibility of generating stable projectable inferences (i.e., reliable predictions) based on human kind terms, and (3) looping effects can demarcate human science classifications from natural science classifications. Contra-Hacking, I argue that: (1) some objects of human science classifications (viz., biological kinds) remain stable despite the feedback generated by their classifications, (2), human science classifications that individuate biological kinds yield stable projectable inferences, and (3) looping effects are a problematic criterion for distinguishing human science classifications from natural science classifications.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  16. 2015843.605061
    [Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Sam Cowling and Daniel Giberman replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author.] Nominalism is an exclusionary thesis in ontology. It asserts that there are no entities of certain sorts. Precisely which entities it excludes depends on the relevant variety of nominalism, but nominalist theses typically deny the existence of universals or abstract entities. For those who accept nominalism, a central challenge in metaphysics is to make sense of phenomena that anti-nominalist theories explain via universals or abstract entities.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  17. 2442498.605071
    ‘Structural hylemorphism’ holds that the concept of structure should replace the allegedly less explanatory concept of form. Adherents do not, however, give us a precise idea of what structure is meant to be, and on analysis it is difficult to know how to define it as a replacement for form. I compare and contrast classical and structural hylemorphism. I rehearse the ‘content-fixing problem’ for structuralism about form, then set out the ‘qualitative problem’. These seem insurmountable obstacles to a viable version of structural hylemorphism. Exploration of the relation between quantity and quality shows that classical form can never be reduced to/replaced by a quantitative concept of form. In the end, structure does not capture what metaphysics requires. More radically, I suggest that there is no clear concept of what structure is. Classical hylemorphism, by contrast, gives us form in full metaphysical technicolor—adequate both for science and for fundamental metaphysics.
    Found 4 weeks ago on David S. Oderberg's site
  18. 2671704.605085
    The View from Everywhere is now available for those with an Oxford Scholarship Online subscription; hardcopies ship next month (but you can preorder now). I’ll probably write more about it as the print publication date approaches. …
    Found 1 month ago on Good Thoughts
  19. 2910567.605096
    I argue that the thoroughly algorithmic nature of current AI systems (such as LLMs) is no obstacle to their being conscious. To this end, I present a picture on which current AI systems comprise dispositional properties which realize categorical phenomenal properties where the laKer, in turn, provide the identity conditions for their dispositional realizers. This mutual ontological dependence, or, symmetrical grounding, at the heart of the proposal yields a novel picture of (AI) consciousness that avoids epiphenomenalism and is more permissive regarding the specific nature/functional organization of conscious systems than has been previously suggested. This, in turn, suggests an epistemology of AI consciousness focused on investigating the high-level behaviours of AI systems rather than their low-level functional organization.
    Found 1 month ago on PhilSci Archive
  20. 3056457.605108
    In his paper, Cian Dorr presents formal development of the view that higher-order entities such as properties, relations, and propositions act not just act as semantic values of predicates and sentences, but also as referents of referential noun phrases (NPs), generally considered singular terms. Dorr’s paper focuses on properties; thus, wise as in Socrates is wise is taken to stand for the very same entity, a property, as the NPs wisdom and the property of being wise. The view entails that lots of expressions now would apply to entities of different types: some, the, is interesting now apply to entities of the type of individuals as well as the type of properties. Moreover, quantifiers like everything will now be able to range over both individuals and properties, and in fact over both individuals and properties at once (Everything is interesting). These problems are dealt with by imposing type ambiguities on the relevant expressions and allowing quantifiers like everything to be specified for sum types, roughly, a disjunctive specification of types.
    Found 1 month ago on Friederike Moltmann's site
  21. 3141265.60512
    Summary. In the first part of this contribution I will present aspects and attitudes towards ’axiomatic thinking’ in various branches of theoretical physics. In the second and more technical part, which is approximately of the same size, I will focus on mathematical results that are relevant for axiomatic schemes of space-time in connection with attempts to axiomatise Special and General Relativity.
    Found 1 month ago on PhilSci Archive
  22. 3174637.605131
    I consider the sense in which teleparallel gravity and symmetric teleparallel gravity may be understood as gauge theories of gravity. I first argue that both theories have surplus structure. I then consider the relationship between Yang-Mills theory and Poincare Gauge Theory and argue that though these use similar formalisms, there are subtle disanalogies in their interpretation.
    Found 1 month ago on James Owen Weatherall's site
  23. 3174674.605142
    We consider the class of physical theories whose dynamics are given by natural equations, which are partial differential equations determined by a functor from the category of n- manifolds, for some n, to the category of fiber bundles, satisfying certain further conditions. We show how the theory of natural equations clarifies several important foundational issues, including the status and meaning of minimal coupling, symmetries of theories, and background structure. We also state and prove a fundamental result about the initial value problem for natural equations.
    Found 1 month ago on James Owen Weatherall's site
  24. 3227192.605152
    Branching time (BT) is a multipurpose label, which is mainly used to denote (i) a family of structures (BT representations or BT frames), possibly along with the axiomatic theories defining them, (ii) a family of semantics for temporal and modal logics (BT semantics); and (iii) a metaphysical conception concerning our universe and its temporal and modal features (branching conception of time or BT conception). In very general terms, a BT representation is a complex of histories (or chronicles, or possible worlds) and moments (or nodes), which purports to represent all possible temporal developments of a given system.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  25. 3256605.605199
    Homology is a fundamental but controversial concept in biology, referring to the sameness of biological characters across organisms. Despite its crucial role, its ontological nature has been a subject of intense debate, with a dichotomy between individualist and natural kind views. This study proposes a category-theoretic framework to reconcile these views by emphasizing the processual nature of homology. We first review major philosophical views of homology with their respective advantages and disadvantages. Next, we highlight the dynamic and evolving nature of homologs through two thought experiments. Through mathematical formulation, we then show that the individualist and natural kind views represent ordered set- and groupoid-like aspects, derived from a primary category-theoretical model based on a process-first dynamic view of homology. Our model covers a wide range of phenomena linked with homology, such as atavism, deep homology, and developmental system drift (DSD). Furthermore, it provides a unified perspective on the ontological nature of homology, overcoming the longstanding dichotomy between individuals and kinds in Western philosophy.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  26. 3259935.605212
    Inphilosophyofscience,constitutive explanation shave attracted much attention sinceCraver’sinfluentialbookExplaining the Brain(2007).HisMutualManipulability(MM)theory of constitution aimed to explicate constitution as anon-causal explanatory relation and to demarcate between constituent sand non-constituents. But MM received decisive criticism.Inresponse,Craveretal.(2021)haverecently proposedanewtheory,called Matched Inter level Experiments(MIE),whichis currently gaining traction in various fields. The authors claim that MIE retains “the spirit of MM without conceptual confusion.”Our paper argues that this claim isnotborneout:neitherdoesMIEmeetMM’sob jectivesnorisit free of conceptual confusion.Atthesametime,we show that it is possible to meet MM’sobjectivesin aconceptuallysoundmanner—byadoptingtheso-calledNoDe-Couplingtheory ofconstitution.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Ergo
  27. 3660388.605223
    This article describes confirmation of the proposition that numbers are identified with operators in the following three steps. 1. The set of operators to construct finite cardinals satisfies Peano Axioms. 2. Accordingly, the natural numbers can be identified with these operators. 3. From the operators, five kinds of operators are derived, and on the basis of the step 2, the integers, the fractions, the real numbers, the complex numbers and the quaternions are identified with the five kinds of operators respectively. These operators stand in a sequential inclusion relationship, in contrast to the embedding relationship between those kinds of numbers defined as sets.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  28. 4179464.605233
    I argue that we need to distinguish between three concepts of actual causation: total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. I provide two lines of argument in support of this account. First, I address three thought experiments that have been troublesome for unified accounts of actual causation, and I show that my account provides a better explanation of corresponding causal intuitions. Second, I provide a functional argument: if we assume that a key purpose of causal concepts is to guide agency, we are better off making a distinction between three concepts of actual causation.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  29. 4387704.605246
    In this paper we provide an ontological analysis of so-called “artifactual functions” by deploying a realizable-centered approach to artifacts which we have recently developed within the framework of the upper ontology Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). We argue that, insofar as material artifacts are concerned, the term “artifactual function” can refer to at least two kinds of realizable entities: novel intentional dispositions and usefactual realized entities. They inhere, respectively, in what we previously called “canonical artifacts” and “usefacts”. We show how this approach can help to clarify functions in BFO, whose current elucidation includes reference to the term “artifact”. In our framework, having an artifactual function implies being an artifact, but not vice versa; in other words, there are artifacts that lack an artifactual function.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on Kathrin Koslicki's site
  30. 4842995.605277
    Comparative philosophy of religion is a subfield of both philosophy of religion and comparative philosophy. Philosophy of religion engages with philosophical questions related to religious belief and practice, including questions concerning the concept of religion itself. Comparative philosophy compares concepts, theories, and arguments from diverse philosophical traditions. The term “comparative philosophy of religion” can refer to the comparative philosophical study of different religions or of different philosophies of religion. It can thus be either a first-order philosophical discipline—investigating matters to do with religion—or a second-order philosophical discipline, investigating matters to do with philosophical inquiry into religion.
    Found 1 month, 3 weeks ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy