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48130.245641
The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which the ‘privileged coordinates’ of a physical theory provide a window into how much structure it posits. We first isolate a problem for this idea. We show that there are geometric spaces that admit the same privileged coordinates, but have different amounts of structure. We then compare this ‘coordinate approach’ to comparing amounts of structure to the familiar ‘automorphism approach,’ and we conclude with some brief remarks about implicit definability.
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48153.245943
In this paper, we will introduce a novel argument (the “Region Argument”) that objects do not have frame-independent shapes in special relativity. The Region Argument lacks vulnerabilities present in David Chalmers’ argument for that conclusion based on length contraction. We then examine how views on persistence interact with the Region Argument. We argue that this argument and standard four-dimensionalist assumptions entail that nothing in a relativistic world has any shape, not even stages or the regions occupied by them. We also argue that endurantists have viable ways of preserving shape despite the Region Argument. The upshot of these arguments is that contrary to conventional wisdom, considerations about shape in relativity support endurantism rather than four-dimensionalism. We conclude by examining the implications of our discussion for the debate over Edenic shapes, noting that endurantists have a satisfying response to skeptical arguments about Edenic shapes similar to the one they have against the Region Argument.
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75828.245961
Most philosophers accept Necessity of Actuality: whenever ‘actually ’ is true, it is true with metaphysical necessity. The logic that results from rejecting this principle has recently been studied by Glazier and Krämer (2024); the present paper develops its philosophical foundations. Although Necessity of Actuality may seem to be required by actuality’s role in comparing what is with what might have been, I argue that the principle is false and that such comparisons are in good standing even without the principle. The rejection of Necessity of Actuality reopens the following question: for which ? is ‘actually ’ metaphysically possible? I propose an answer that appeals to the idea that actuality has an essence, and I explore some hypotheses about what this essence might be.
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396002.245978
There have been a number of recent attempts to identify the best metaphysical framework for capturing Rovelli’s Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). All such accounts commit to some form of fundamentalia, whether they be traditional objects, physical relations, events or ‘flashes’, or the cosmos as a fundamental whole. However, Rovelli’s own recommendation is that ‘a natural philosophical home for RQM is an anti-foundationalist perspective' (2018:10). This gives us some prima facie reason to explore options beyond these foundationalist frameworks, and take seriously a picture that lacks fundamentalia.
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396106.245996
Super-Humeans (Esfeld & Deckert, 2017) argue that the most parsimonious ontology of the natural world compatible with our best physical theories consists exclusively of particles and the distance relations between them. This paper argues by contrast that Super-Humean reduction goes insufficiently far, by showing there to be a more parsimonious ontology compatible with physics: Ultimate-Humeanism. This novel view posits an ontology consisting solely of the particles and distance relations required for the existence of a single brain. Super-Humeans impose conditions on what counts as an ontology of the natural world to avoid their view slipping into this kind of ontology, but these conditions are arbitrarily imposed and once this is exposed, Super-Humeans face a dilemma. Either they can embrace Ultimate-Humeanism as the minimal ontology of the natural world compatible with physics, or (more likely) they can rethink the methodology that got them there. Overall, this paper argues that Super-Humeanism currently lacks principled motivation, outlines a framework for naturalistic ontological reductions, and exposes the consequences of unchecked adherence to a simplicity-driven methodology.
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396150.246005
According to the laws of physics, the state of a physical system can only be measured by another system (usually a particular measuring device) via a physical interaction. However, when our brain is in a conscious mental state, it can in principle output the information about its physical state based on the psycho-physical correspondance between the mental state and the physical state. It is argued that this suggests that the conscious mind violates physical laws and it is not physical as physicalism claims.
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695251.246015
Standard approaches to ontological simplicity focus either on the number of things or types a theory posits or on the number of fundamental things or types a theory posits. In this paper, I suggest a ground-theoretic approach that focuses on the number of something else. After getting clear on what this approach amounts to, I motivate it, defend it, and complete it.
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741534.246025
Higher-order metaphysicians take facts to be higher-order beings, i.e., entities in the range of irreducibly higher-order quantifiers. In this paper, I investigate the impact of this conception of facts on the debate about the reality of tense. I identify two major repercussions. The first concerns the logical space of tense realism: on a higher-order conception of facts, a prominent version of tense realism, dynamic absolutism, turns out to conflict with the laws of (higher-order tense) logic. The second concerns our understanding of the positions occupying this logical space: on a higher-order conception of facts, an attractive interpretation of the central tense realist notion of ‘facts constituting reality’ becomes unavailable. I discuss these results in the context of the more general project of higher-order metaphysics and the (meta)metaphysics of time, drawing out their implications for the nature of the disputes both between realists and anti-realists about tense and between different tense realist factions.
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915250.246034
According to Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction account of mental disorder, a mental disorder must involve an objective dysfunction couched in evolutionary terms. However, selected effects functions are indeterminate, because the same trait can be both selectively advantageous and disadvantageous. Therefore, in some cases there may be a dysfunction, on the basis of which a psychiatric disorder is attributed, that can be described in multiple empirically adequate ways. The choices involved in these cases are value-laden. Some cases of addiction may fit this mold. Indeterminacy in the alternative descriptions of the states/processes/mechanisms involved in addiction implicates opposing value judgments.
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1265338.246045
How is essence related to laws and explanation? A number of things could be meant by this question. One issue concerns the role of essences qua explanantia, i.e. the ability of facts about essence to explain certain other facts. This potential role of essence is discussed in many other chapters of this collection (see, for example, the contributions of Scarpati on persistence and individuations, Nye on persons, Brigandt on biological species, and Vaidya and Wallner, Griffith, Passinsky, Rosario, and Mallon on various aspects of social ontology). A different question is whether essences underlie any distinctive type of explanation. That is, do essences play any role in explanations not qua explanantia (that which explains) but as the link that connects some explanantia to an explanandum (see Schaffer 2017 and Kappes 2021 for this distinction)? But here, too, we can ask at least two different questions. One concerns the role of essences in scientific explanation. Various aspects of this issue occupy other chapters of this volume (see the contributions of Tahko on natural kinds essentialism, Dumsday on scientific essentialism, and Lam on dispositional essentialism; and in the special sciences, Brigandt on biological species and Brown on psychology and psychiatry). The present chapter’s main focus will be the role of essence in metaphysical explanation: the kind of explanation that philosophers often appeal to when making non-causal “in virtue of” and “because”-claims.
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1666902.246054
Alongside Madhyamaka, Yogācāra is one of the two major
philosophical traditions of Mahāyāna Buddhism that
originated in India. The philosophical and soteriological ideas set
forth in the Yogācāra works had a great impact on the
development of Buddhist thought not only in the Indian subcontinent
but also in other parts of Asia, especially in China, Japan and Tibet. Besides its highly influential exposition of the stages of the
Mahāyāna path to liberation, the tradition developed several
emblematic philosophical doctrines, such as the mind-only
(cittamātra) teaching, the theory of three natures
(trisvabhāva), and the eightfold classification of
consciousness, including the introduction of the so-called defiled
mind (kliṣṭamanas) and the substratum or store
consciousness (ālayavijñāna).
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1745277.246063
I’m listening to In a Silent Way, the Miles Davis album that opened his electric period, but I’m not really listening. Also drawing my attention are reviews of all of his other albums, which I’m scanning as I contemplate which to listen to next. …
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1766306.246072
Crispin Wright and Filippo Ferrari have accused relativism of not accounting for ‘parity’ – the idea that, when we argue over matters of taste, we take our opponents’ opinions to be ‘as good as ours’ from our own committed perspective. In this paper, I show that (i) explaining parity has not been taken to be a desideratum by relativists and thus they cannot be accused of failing to fulfil a promise; (ii) Wright’s and Ferrari’s reasons for claiming that parity should be a desideratum are unconvincing.
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1837908.246085
We discuss connections and differences between the hole argument in general relativity on the one hand, and Putnam’s model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism (‘Putnam’s paradox’) on the other. Both arguments identify means by which objects in theories fail to correspond uniquely to metaphysical content in the world, and thereby motivate anti-realism about certain structure. We object to claims that the hole argument is a specific case of Putnam’s paradox, because (following Pooley (2002)) the latter underwrites a more pervasive failure of correspondence than the former. Both of these arguments have been responded to through meta-linguistic means— while van Fraassen (1997) claims that Putnam’s paradox dissolves due to our inability to identify a function mapping our theories to objects in the world independent of our total language, Bradley and Weather-all (2022) maintain that the language of general relativity does not allow for the hole argument to be formulated. In the latter sections of this article, we compare these responses and assess the extent to which either is successful.
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2126349.246094
David Wallace’s ‘Dennett’s Criterion’ plays a key part in establishing realist claims about the existence of a multiverse emerging from the mathematical formalism of quantum physics, even after decoherence is fully appreciated. Although the philosophical preconditions of this criterion are not neutral, they are rarely explicitly addressed conceptually. I tease apart three: (I) a rejection of conceptual bridge laws even in cases of inhomogeneous reduction; (II) a reliance on the pragmatic notion of usefulness to highlight quasi-classical patterns, as seen in a decoherence basis, over others; and (III) a structural realist or ‘functional realist’ point of view that leads to individuating those patterns as real macroscopic objects at the coarse-grained level, as they are seen from the Classical Stance (analogous to Dennett’s Intentional Stance). I conclude that the justification of Dennett’s Criterion will be intimately tied up with the fate of strong forms of naturalism, and in particular that Wallacian quantum mechanics is a key case study for concretely evaluating his ‘math-first’ structural realism (Wallace 2022).
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2191518.246105
Assume naturalism and suppose that digital electronic systems can be significantly conscious. Suppose Alice is a deterministic significantly conscious digital electronic system. Imagine we duplicated Alice to make another such system, Bob, and fed them both the same inputs. …
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2240528.246116
In the course of presenting his own solution to the insolubles (logical paradoxes such as the Liar), Marsilius of Inghen criticises four earlier theories, which appear to be those of Albert of Saxony, (the early) Buridan, Roger Swyneshed and a modification of William Heytesbury’s solution which we find in many textbooks and anonymous treatises known as presentations of the Logica Oxoniensis. Marsilius’s solution bears interesting resemblances to all four, but has its own distinctive features. The core idea of his solution is that all propositions have a two-fold signification, a material signification and a formal one. The material signification, also called the primary or direct signification, is what most would call the proposition’s usual signification; e.g., the material signification of ‘This proposition is false’ is that that proposition is false. Its formal, aka indirect or reflexive, signification is, in the case of affirmative propositions, that the subject and predicate supposit for the same thing, and in the case of negative propositions, that they do not. This reflexive signification derives from the meaning of the (affirmative resp. negative) copula. Thus the reflexive signification of ‘This proposition is false’ is that ‘this proposition’ and ‘false’ supposit for the same thing, that is, that it is false that that proposition is false. Presenting Marsilius’s formal signification in such cases as stating of that proposition’s being false, for example (which is the material signification of ‘This proposition is false’), that it is false (that is, falls under the supposition of ‘false’) suggested to Paul Spade that Marsilius’s solution was a development of Gregory of Rimini’s account. I will argue that any resemblance here is, in the absence of any external evidence, superficial and coincidental, and that Marsilius’s view is much closer to the Oxford solutions and Albert’s—Albert and Marsilius being, after all, members of the English Nation at Paris. Marsilius’s arguments in favour of his theory, and his application of the solution to a range of insolubles, are well worth looking at in detail, which I will do, though not at the length which Marsilius devotes to it.
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2357010.246125
According to a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, the causal role of human consciousness in the measuring process is called upon to solve a foundational problem called the “measurement problem.” Traditionally, this interpretation is tied up with the metaphysics of substance dualism. As such, this interpretation of quantum mechanics inherits the dualist’s mind-body problem. Our working hypothesis is that a process-based approach to the consciousness causes collapse interpretation (CCCI) —leaning on Whitehead’s solution to the mind-body problem— offers a better metaphysical understanding of consciousness and its role in interpreting quantum mechanics. This article is the kickoff for such a research program in the metaphysics of science.
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2357033.246135
This chapter examines the history of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of psychiatry as subfields of philosophy of science that emerged in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. The chapter also surveys related literatures that developed in psychology and psychiatry. Philosophy of psychology (or philosophy of cognitive science) has been a well-established subfield of philosophy of mind since the 1990s and 2000s. This field of philosophy of psychology is narrowly focused on issues in cognitive psychology and cognitive science. Compared to the thriving subfield of philosophy of cognitive science, there has been a lack of corresponding interest among philosophers of science in broader methodological questions about different paradigms and fields of study in psychology. These broader methodological questions about psychology have been addressed in the field of theoretical psychology, which is a subfield of psychology that materialized in the 1980s and 1990s. Philosophy of psychiatry emerged as a subfield of philosophy of science in the mid-2000s. Compared to philosophy of psychology, the philosophy of psychiatry literature in philosophy of science engaged with issues examined in an older and more interdisciplinary tradition of philosophy of psychiatry that developed after the 1960s. The participation of philosophers of science in the literature on theoretical psychology, by contrast, has been limited.
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2513139.246147
Among the various proposals for quantum ontology, both wavefunction realists and the primitive ontologists have argued that their approach is to be preferred because it relies on intuitive notions: locality, separability and spatiotemporality. As such, these proposals should be seen as normative frameworks asserting that one should choose the fundamental ontology which preserves these intuitions, even if they disagree about their relative importance: wavefunction realists favor preserving locality and separability, while primitive ontologists advocate for spatiotemporality. In this paper, first I clarify the main tenets of wavefunction realism and the primitive ontology approach, arguing that seeing the latter as favoring constructive explanation makes sense of their requirement of a spatiotemporal ontology. Then I show how the aforementioned intuitive notions cannot all be kept in the quantum domain. Consequently, wavefunction realists rank locality and separability higher than spatiotemporality, while primitive ontologists do the opposite. I conclude that however, the choice of which notions to favor is not as arbitrary as it might seem. In fact, they are not independent: requiring locality and separability can soundly be justified by requiring spatiotemporality, and not the other way around. If so, the primitive ontology approach has a better justification of its intuitions than its rival wavefunction realist framework.
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2583576.246156
from our empathy for the dead. Much needs to be done to give a satisfying defense of this proposal — beginning with a defense of the suggestion that empathy can extend, beyond the living, to those who experience nothing. But the very suggestion that empathy plays even some role in grief may itself come as a surprise. In fact, the suggestion goes against the grain of much recent theorizing in philosophical discussions of grief. One of the major divides in this literature is between “agent-centered” views of grief, which claim that the loss to be grieved is a loss from the perspective of the bereaved person’s life, and “object-centered” views, which claim that the loss to be grieved is an objective loss of life, not, primarily, a loss to the griever. Empathy disappears from view in this setting because it straddles the divide between self (the grieving agent) and other (the objective loss); in empathizing, it is said that one feels for another.
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2583629.246165
Thoughts are like Pancakes, and the Brain is the Pan wherein they are tossed and turned by the several Objects, as several Hands.
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2645852.246181
Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science. Keywords: ontology, ontological naturalism, quantum mechanics, metaontology.
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2818887.246191
This paper integrates type functionalism with the Kairetic account to develop context-specific models for explaining mental states, particularly pain, across different species and systems. By employing context-dependent mapping fc, we ensure cohesive causal explanations while accommodating multiple realizations of mental states. The framework identifies context subsets Ci and maps them to similarity subspaces Si, capturing the unique physiological, biochemical, and computational mechanisms underlying pain in different entities such as humans, octopi, and AI systems. This approach highlights the importance of causal relations in defining mental states and preserves their functional roles across diverse contexts. Furthermore, the paper incorporates elements of token functionalism by recognizing species-specific realizations of mental states. By acknowledging the unique representations of mental states within different species and systems, the framework provides a nuanced understanding of how similar functional roles can be fulfilled by diverse physical substrates. This synthesis of type and token functionalism enhances our explanatory power and coherence in addressing the complex nature of mental states. The resulting framework offers a robust tool for analyzing and understanding mental phenomena, with significant implications for cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and artificial intelligence. By maintaining the functional roles of mental states while accommodating their multiple realizations, this approach not only advances theoretical understanding but also opens new avenues for practical applications in cross-species empathy, AI ethics, and the development of context-aware cognitive models.
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2819058.2462
Existing metaphysical accounts of mechanisms commit to the existence of objects or entities posited in scientific theories, and thus fall within the category of maximal metaphysics. In this paper, I demonstrate the incompatibility of object-based metaphysics of mechanisms with the prevailing trend in the philosophy of physics by discussing the so-called bottoming-out problem. In response, I propose and flesh out a structuralist metaphysics of mechanisms based on Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), which is a kind of minimal metaphysics. I argue that the metaphysical underpinnings of mechanisms are structures, whose metaphysical nature is elaborated through comparison with existing metaphysical theories of mechanisms. After that, I address the concern of whether objects in mechanisms can be accommodated in my account by invoking existing metaphysical theories of objects in special science by structuralists, such as Ladyman and Ross (2007)’s real pattern account and suggesting a potential alignment between OSR and processual ontology. Finally, I demonstrate how my view can naturally serve as the metaphysics for Mechanism 2.0 and be applied to systems biology.
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3049835.246209
Recent advances in stem cell-derived human brain organoids and microelectrode array (MEA) technology raise profound questions about the potential for these systems to give rise to sentience. Brain organoids are 3D tissue constructs that recapitulate key aspects of brain development and function, while MEAs enable bidirectional communication with neuronal cultures. As brain organoids become more sophisticated and integrated with MEAs, the question arises: Could such a system support not only intelligent computation, but subjective experience? This paper explores the philosophical implications of this thought experiment, considering scenarios in which brain organoids exhibit signs of sensory awareness, distress, preference, and other hallmarks of sentience. It examines the ethical quandaries that would arise if compelling evidence of sentience were found in brain organoids, such as the moral status of these entities and the permissibility of different types of research. The paper also explores how the phenomenon of organoid sentience might shed light on the nature of consciousness and the plausibility of artificial sentience. While acknowledging the speculative nature of these reflections, the paper argues that the possibility of sentient brain organoids deserves serious consideration given the rapid pace of advances in this field. Grappling with these questions proactively could help set important ethical boundaries for future research and highlight critical avenues of scientific and philosophical inquiry. The thought experiment of sentient brain organoids thus serves as a valuable lens for examining deep issues at the intersection of neuroscience, ethics, and the philosophy of mind.
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3338641.246219
Stephen Yablo’s notion of proportionality, despite controversies surrounding it, has played a significant role in philosophical discussions of mental causation and of high-level causation more generally. In particular, it is invoked in James Woodward’s interventionist account of high-level causation and explanation, and is implicit in a novel approach to constructing variables for causal modeling in the machine learning literature, known as causal feature learning (CFL). In this article, we articulate an account of proportionality inspired by both Yablo’s account of proportionality and the CFL account of variable construction. The resulting account has at least three merits. First, it illuminates an important feature of the notion of proportionality, when it is adapted to a probabilistic and interventionist framework. The feature is that at the center of the notion of proportionality lies the concept of “determinate intervention effects.” Second, it makes manifest a virtue of (common types of) high-level causal/explanatory statements over low-level ones, when relevant intervention effects are determinate. Third, it overcomes a limitation of the CFL framework and thereby also addresses a challenge to interventionist accounts of high-level causation.
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3338672.24623
Despite its being one of Roger Penrose’s greatest contributions to spacetime physics, there is a dearth of philosophical literature on twistor theory. The one exception to this is (Bain, 2006)—but although excellent, there remains much more to be said going beyond that article on the foundations and philosophy of twistor theory. In this article, we seek to make some progress in this direction, by (a) presenting an introduction to twistor theory which should be (reasonably) accessible to philosophers, (b) considering how the spacetime–twistor correspondence interacts with the blossoming philosophical literature on theoretical equivalence, and (c) exploring the bearing which twistor theory might have on philosophical issues such as the status of dynamics, the geometrisation of physics, spacetime ontology, the emergence of spacetime, and symmetry-to-reality inferences. We close with an elaboration of a variety of further opportunities for philosophical investigation into twistor theory.
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3915693.246239
Structural representations are likely the most talked about representational posits in the contemporary debate over cognitive representations. Indeed, the debate surrounding them is so vast virtually every claim about them has been made. Some, for instance, claimed structural representations are di erent from indicators. Others argued they are the same. Some claimed structural representations mesh perfectly with mechanistic explanations, others argued they can’t in principle mash. Some claimed structural representations are central to predictive processing accounts of cognition, others rebuked predictive processing networks are blissfully structural representation free. And so forth. Here, I suggest this confusing state of a airs is due to the fact that the term “structural representations” is applied to a number of distinct conceptions of representations. In this paper, I distinguish four such conceptions, argue that these four conceptions are actually distinct, and then show that such a fourfold distinction can be used to clarify some of the most pressing questions concerning structural representations and their role in cognitive theorizing, making these questions more easily answerable.
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4003565.246249
Under what conditions are material objects, such as particles, parts of a whole object? This is the composition question and is a longstanding open question in philosophy. Existing attempts to specify a non-trivial restriction on composition tend to be vague and face serious counterexamples. Consequently, two extreme answers have become mainstream: composition (the forming of a whole by its parts) happens under no or all conditions. In this paper, we provide a self-contained introduction to the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. We show that IIT specifies a non-trivial restriction on composition: composition happens when integrated information is maximized. We compare the IIT restriction to existing proposals and argue that the IIT restriction has significant advantages, especially in response to the problems of vagueness and counterexamples. An appendix provides an introduction to calculating parts and wholes with a simple system.