1. 474887.966809
    This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/018015/> (1974) and Michael Glanzberg (2001, 2004a), the Liar sentence λ (asserting that λ does not express a true proposition) doesn’t express a true proposition in the initial context of reasoning c, but expresses a true one in a new, richer context c , where more propositions are available for expression. On the further assumption that Liar sentences involve propositional quantifiers whose domains may vary with context, the Liar reasoning is blocked. But why should context shift? We argue that the paradox involves principles of contextualist reflection that explain, by analogy with well-known reflection principles for arithmetic, why context must shift from c to c in the course of the Liar reasoning. This provides a diagnosis of the Liar Paradox—one that equally applies to two revenge arguments against contextualist approaches, one recently advanced by Andrew Bacon (2015), the other mentioned by Charles Parsons (1974) and more recently revived by Cory Juhl (1997).
    Found 5 days, 11 hours ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  2. 610689.966885
    It is widely supposed that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject’s possession of a singular thought, then ‘acquaintance’-style requirements on singular thought must be rejected. I show that this belief rests on poorly motivated claims about how we talk about the attitudes. I offer a framework for propositional attitude reports which provides both attractive solutions to recalcitrant puzzle cases and the key to preserving acquaintance constraints. The upshot is that there is an independently motivated response to the principal argument against acquaintance.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  3. 779984.966939
    I’d like to discuss the issue of error and error propagation in the constructions of classical geometry. How sensitive are the familiar classical constructions to small errors in the use of the straightedge or compass? …
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Joel David Hamkins's blog
  4. 1016406.966968
    [S]peaking of this very thing, justice, are we to affirm thus without qualification that it is truth-telling and paying back what one has received from anyone, or may these very actions sometimes be just and sometimes unjust? …
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on Eric Schliesser's blog
  5. 1063713.967002
    On standard views, logic has as one of its goals to characterize (and give us practical means to tell apart) a peculiar set of truths, the logical truths, of which the following English sentences are paradigmatic examples: (1) If death is bad only if life is good, and death is bad, then life is good. (2) If no desire is voluntary and some beliefs are desires, then some beliefs are not voluntary. (3) If Drasha is a cat and all cats are mysterious, then Drasha is mysterious. As it turns out, it is very hard to think of universally accepted ideas about what the generic properties of logical truths are or should be.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  6. 1239755.967036
    Temporal reasoning with conditionals is more complex than both classical temporal reasoning and reasoning with timeless conditionals, and can lead to some rather counter-intuitive conclusions. For instance, Aristotle’s famous “Sea Battle Tomorrow” puzzle leads to a fatalistic conclusion: whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not, but that is necessarily the case now. We propose a branching-time logic LTC to formalise reasoning about temporal conditionals and provide that logic with adequate formal semantics. The logic LTC extends the Nexttime fragment of CTL , with operators for model updates, restricting the domain to only future moments where antecedent is still possible to satisfy. We provide formal semantics for these operators that implements the restrictor interpretation of antecedents of temporalized conditionals, by suitably restricting the domain of discourse. As a motivating example, we demonstrate that a naturally formalised in our logic version of the ‘Sea Battle’ argument renders it unsound, thereby providing a solution to the problem with fatalist conclusion that it entails, because its underlying reasoning per cases argument no longer applies when these cases are treated not as material implications but as temporal conditionals. On the technical side, we analyze the semantics of LTC and provide a series of reductions of LTC-formulae, first recursively eliminating the dynamic update operators and then the path quantifiers in such formulae. Using these reductions we obtain a sound and complete axiomatization for LTC, and reduce its decision problem to that of the modal logic KD.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Valentin Goranko's site
  7. 1362100.967082
    Help! Well, it’s not back to square one, but it is time to radically re-think plans for the shape of the book (and what will go into it, and what will survive as online supplements). Let me explain the practical problem — as all thoughts and comments will be gratefully received. …
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on Peter Smith's blog
  8. 1528383.967119
    According to the kind of open futurist at issue, both of these claims may well fail to be true. According to many, however, the disjunction of these claims can be represented as p ∨ ~p – that is, as an instance of LEM. And if this is so, the open futurist is plainly in a difficult position. She must either deny LEM outright, or instead maintain that a disjunction can be true without either of its disjuncts being true. And whereas open futurists have defended both such options with considerable care and ingenuity, both are also faced with substantial costs.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  9. 1574780.967153
    In “Must …stay …strong!” (von Fintel & Gillies 2010) we set out to slay a dragon, or rather what we called The Mantra: that epistemic must has a modal force weaker than expected from standard modal logic, that it doesn’t entail its prejacent, and that the best explanation for the evidential feel of must is a pragmatic explanation. We argued that all three sub-mantras are wrong and offered an explanation according to which must is strong, entailing, and the felt indirectness is the product of an evidential presupposition carried by epistemic modals. Mantras being what they are, it is no surprise that each of the sub-mantras have been given new defenses. Here we offer them new problems and update our picture, concluding that must is (still) strong.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on Anthony Gillies's site
  10. 1587348.967185
    I provide an analysis of sentences of the form ‘To be F is to be G’ in terms of exact truth-maker semantics—an approach that identifies the meanings of sentences with the states of the world directly responsible for their truth-values. Roughly, I argue that these sentences hold just in case that which makes something F is that which makes it G. This approach is hyperintensional, and possesses desirable logical and modal features. These sentences are reflexive, transitive and symmetric, and, if they are true, then they are necessarily true, and it is necessary that all and only F s are Gs. I integrate this account with the λ-calculus and argue that analysis is preserved through β-conversion. I briefly discuss how this account might be extended to analyses of singular terms, and close by defining an asymmetric and irreflexive notion of analysis in terms of the reflexive and symmetric one.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on PhilPapers
  11. 1685241.967219
    Recent work on logical pluralism has suggested that the view is in danger of collapsing into logical nihilism, the view on which there are no valid arguments at all. The goal of the present paper is to argue that the prospects for resisting such a collapse vary quite considerably with one’s account of logical consequence. The first section will lay out four varieties of logical consequence, beginning with the approaches Etchemendy (1999) called interpretational and representational, and then adding a Quinean substitutional approach as well as the more recent universalist account given in Williamson (2013, 2017). The second section recounts how the threat of logical nihilism arises in the debate over logical pluralism. The third and final section looks at the ways the rival accounts of logical consequence are better or worse placed to resist the threat.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Gillian Russell's site
  12. 1687599.967253
    This paper evaluates the argument for the contradictoriness of unity, that begins Priest’s recent book One. The argument is seen to fail because it does not adequately differentiate between different forms of unity. This diagnosis of the argument’s failure is used as a basis for two consistent accounts of unity. The paper concludes by arguing that reality contains two absolutely fundamental and unanalysable forms of unity, which are in principle presupposed by any theory of anything. These fundamental forms of unity are closely related to the unity of propositions and facts.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Nicholas K Jones's site
  13. 1693687.967287
    Particular topics of conversation seem to be inaccessible to speakers who lack an insider’s view of the subject matter concerned. The familiar examples involve sensory deficiencies: discourse about music may be inaccessible to the tone deaf, wine talk to the anosmic, the finer points of interior decorating to the colour blind, and so on. The traditional secondary qualities thus provide the obvious cases of concepts which seem to exhibit this form of subjectivity—this dependence on specific and quite contingent human capacities.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Huw Price's site
  14. 1790489.967319
    Modified numerals are expressions such as more than three, less/fewer than three, at least three, at most three, up to ten, betwen three and ten, approximately ten, about ten, exactly ten, etc. At first sight, their semantic contribution seems pretty easy to describe. However, this impression is deceptive. Modified numerals do in fact raise very serious challenges for formal semantics and pragmatics, many of which have yet to be addressed in a fully satisfactorily way. These challenges relate to two broad questions: first, what is the linguistically encoded meaning of modified numerals? Second, how can we make sense of all the inferences they give rise to, and how should we divide the work between com-positional semantics and pragmatics in order to account for all these effects? These are the two questions we will address in this chapter, focusing on a few striking puzzles.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Benjamin Spector's site
  15. 1835122.967352
    Do I contradict myself? Very well, then, I contradict myself. (I am large, I contain multitudes.) —Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself” Vorrei e non vorrei.    —Zerlina, “Là ci darem la mano”, Don Giovanni This entry outlines the role of the law of non-contradiction (LNC) as the foremost among the first (indemonstrable) principles of Aristotelian philosophy and its heirs, and depicts the relation between LNC and LEM (the law of excluded middle) in establishing the nature of contradictory and contrary opposition. §1 presents the classical treatment of LNC as an axiom in Aristotle's “First Philosophy” and reviews the status of contradictory and contrary opposition as schematized on the Square of Opposition.
    Found 3 weeks ago on Wes Morriston's site
  16. 1915534.967384
    Concepts are grounded in intuitive theories, yet intuitive theories are often sparse and incomplete. Deferring to experts can potentially fill those gaps. Sometimes experts convey new information, such as discovering a new planet (Experiment 1 and 3). Other times they revise past conclusions, such as concluding that Pluto is actually not a planet (Experiment 2 and 3). For non-experts to maintain scientific accuracy, they need to assimilate the expert judgments in either case. However, we find that people are less likely to defer after revision than novel discovery. In each case, their essentialist intuitions explain the pattern of results. The more participants construe categories in essentialist terms, the more they reject category revision; the opposite occurs for novel discoveries. Moreover, people only reject revision when it conflicts with essentialist intuitions (Experiment 4). Thus, the same intuitive theories that encourage deference also constrain it. but the knowledge of how to distinguish gold from other substances (like fool’s gold) and leopards from other animals (like jaguars) is relatively rare. Fortunately, this knowledge is available in the broader linguistic community (Putnam, 1973). Certain experts do know gold’s constitutive properties (composed of the element with 79 protons) and how to determine the presence of these properties (chemical assays). In principle, non-experts can tap into this knowledge by deferring to those who know more, enabling the greater community to self-correct and apply concepts accurately. Nevertheless, there are persistent and widespread ambiguities in the application of natural concepts (Dupré, 1981).
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Frank Keil's site
  17. 1946098.967425
    At the beginning of his paper (2004), Nenad Miscevic said that “empirical concepts have not received the epistemological treatment they deserve”. When first reading this complaint I was surprised. Are the huge philosophical efforts to come to terms with concepts not primarily directed to empirical concepts? Miscevic insists, however, that concepts evolve, that we learn concepts and change concepts, and that this is most obvious in the case of empirical concepts like our concept of whales or our concept of water. I realized then that Miscevic has raised a most important question: How can a concept change? Why is this question important?
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Wolfgang Spohn's site
  18. 2030839.967465
    At a hate site that I’ve decided no longer to mention by name (or even check, effective today), someone recently wrote that my blog is “too high on nerd whining content and too low on actual compsci content to be worth checking too regularly.”  While that’s surely one of the mildest criticisms I’ve ever received, I hope that today’s post helps to even things out. …
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on Scott Aaronson's blog
  19. 2046164.967484
    John Campbell has claimed that the interventionist account of causation must be amended if it is to be applied to causation in psychology. The problem, he argues, is that it follows from the so-called ‘surgical’ constraint on interventions that intervening on psychological states requires the suspension of the agent’s rational autonomy. In this paper, I argue that the problem Campbell identifies is in fact an instance of a wider problem for interventionism, extending beyond psychology, which I call the problem of ‘abrupt transitions’. I then defend a solution to the problem, which replaces the surgical constraint with a weaker constraint on interventions that nevertheless does all the work the surgical constraint was designed to do. I conclude by exploring some interesting consequences of this weaker constraint for causation in psychology.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on Alex Kaiserman's site
  20. 2052054.9675
    A counteridentical is a counterfactual with an identity statement in the antecedent. While counteridenticals generally seem non-trivial, most semantic theories for counterfactuals, when combined with the necessity of identity and distinctness, attribute vacuous truth conditions to such counterfactuals. In light of this, one could try to save the orthodox theories either by appealing to pragmatics or by denying that the antecedents of alleged counteridenticals really contain identity claims. Or one could reject the orthodox theory of counterfactuals in favor of a hyperintensional semantics that accommodates non-trivial counterpossibles. In this paper, I argue that none of these approaches can account for all the peculiar features of counteridenticals. Instead, I propose a modified version of Lewis’s counterpart theory, which rejects the necessity of identity, and show that it can explain all the peculiar features of counteridenticals in a satisfactory way. I conclude by defending the plausibility of contingent identity from objections.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  21. 2405380.967528
    Infallibilism is commonly rejected because it is apparently subject to easy counter-examples. I describe a strategy that infallibilists can use to resist this objection. Because the sentences used in the counter-examples to express evidence and belief are context-sensitive, the infallibilist can insist that such counter-examples trade on a vacillation between different readings of these sentences. I describe what difficulties await those who try to produce counter-examples against which the proposed strategy is ineffective.
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on PhilPapers
  22. 2424589.967562
    John Foley, Joe Moeller and I have made some nice progress on compositional tasking for the Complex Adaptive System Composition and Design Environment project. ‘Compositional tasking’ means assigning tasks to a network of agents in such a way that you can connect or even overlay such networks and get larger such networks. …
    Found 4 weeks ago on Azimuth
  23. 2448476.967595
    Disjunctions scoping under possibility modals give rise to the free choice e↵ect. The e↵ect also arises if the disjunction takes wide scope over possibility modals; it is independent of the modal flavor at play (deontic, epistemic, and so on); and it arises even if disjunctions scope under or over necessity modals. At the same time, free choice e↵ects disappear in the scope of negation or if the speaker signals ignorance or unwillingness to cooperate. I show how we can account for this wide variety of free choice observations without unwelcome side-e↵ects in an update-based framework whose key innovations consist in (i) a refined test semantics for necessity modals and (ii) a generalized conception of narrow and wide scope free choice e↵ects as arising from lexically or pragmatically generated prohibitions against the absurd state (an inconsistent information carrier) serving as an update relatum. The fact that some of these prohibitions are defeasible together with a binary semantics that distinguishes between positive and negative update relata accounts for free choice cancellation e↵ects.
    Found 4 weeks ago on Malte Willer's site
  24. 2505762.967626
    Truth pluralism is a metaphysical theory of the nature of truth. The pluralist rejects the deflationist claim that truth is at best a ‘shallow’, insubstantial property. Indeed, the pluralist embraces a plurality of substantive truth properties (such as superwarrant, supercoherence, or correspondence), appropriate to different domains of discourse.
    Found 4 weeks, 1 day ago on Dorit Bar-On's site
  25. 2597195.967676
    According to logical inferentialists, the meanings of logical expressions are fully determined by the rules for their correct use. Two key proof-theoretic requirements on admissible logical rules, harmony and separability, directly stem from this thesis—requirements, however, that standard single-conclusion and assertion-based formalizations of classical logic provably fail to satisfy (Dummett in The logical basis of metaphysics, Harvard University Press, Harvard, MA, 1991; Prawitz in Theoria, 43:1–40, 1977; Tennant in The taming of the true, Oxford University Press, Oxford, ; Humberstone and Makinson in Mind 120(480):1035–1051, 2011). On the plausible assumption that our logical practice is both single-conclusion and assertion-based, it seemingly follows that classical logic, unlike intuitionistic logic, can’t be accounted for in inferentialist terms. In this paper, I challenge orthodoxy and introduce an assertion-based and single-conclusion formalization of classical propositional logic that is both harmonious and separable. In the framework I propose, classicality emerges as a structural feature of the logic.
    Found 1 month ago on Julien Murzi's site
  26. 2618267.967704
    In 1933 the Polish logician Alfred Tarski published a paper in which he discussed the criteria that a definition of ‘true sentence’ should meet, and gave examples of several such definitions for particular formal languages. In 1956 he and his colleague Robert Vaught published a revision of one of the 1933 truth definitions, to serve as a truth definition for model-theoretic languages. This entry will simply review the definitions and make no attempt to explore the implications of Tarski’s work for semantics (natural language or programming languages) or for the philosophical study of truth. (For those implications, see the entries on truth and Alfred Tarski.)
    Found 1 month ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  27. 2637347.967736
    This use of the name ‘Pegasus’ clearly should not make (~P) ontologically committing. After all, the name is used precisely to deny the existence of Pegasus. And here arises one of the oldest philosophical conundrums, going back to Parmenides—the problem of Non-Being. If one assumes the truth of ‘Pegasus lacks being’, then it follows (does it not?) that there is nothing to which the subject-term refers. So it does not refer to Pegasus in particular. In which case, the statement fails to say anything in reference to Pegasus. But of course, it is saying something in reference to Pegasus—that Pegasus is not. But if you can refer to Pegasus, it seems that Pegasus must in some sense “be.” Legions of responses to this problem have ensued.
    Found 1 month ago on PhilPapers
  28. 2791177.967773
    Identity is often said to be a relation each thing bears to itself and to no other thing (e.g., Zalabardo 2000). This characterization is clearly circular (“no other thing”) and paradoxical too, unless the notion of “each thing” is qualified. More satisfactory (though partial) characterizations are available and the idea that such a relation of absolute identity exists is commonplace. Some, however, deny that a relation of absolute identity exists. Identity, they say, is relative: It is possible for objects \(x\) and \(y\) to be the same \(F\) and yet not the same \(G\), (where \(F\) and \(G\) are predicates representing kinds of things (apples, ships, passengers) rather than merely properties of things (colors, shapes)).
    Found 1 month ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  29. 2810577.967809
    Silencing is usually explained in terms of conventionalism about the nature of speech acts. More recently, theorists have tried to develop intentionalist theories of the phenomenon. I argue, however, that if intentionalists are to accommodate the conventionalists’ main insight, namely that silencing can be so extreme as to render certain types of speech act completely unavailable to victims, they must take two assumptions on board. First, it must be possible that speakers’ communicative intentions are opaque to the speakers themselves. Secondly, it needs to be assumed that structural oppression can have hidden psychological effects on its victims. Since both assumptions can be motivated independently, I argue that silencing can be fully understood without appealing to linguistic conventions.
    Found 1 month ago on PhilPapers
  30. 2840493.967842
    In recent work, Alfredo Roque Freire and I have realized that the axiom of well-ordered replacement is equivalent to the full replacement axiom, over the Zermelo set theory with foundation. The well-ordered replacement axiom is the scheme asserting that if $I$ is well-ordered and every $i\in I$ has unique $y_i$ satisfying a property $\phi(i,y_i)$, then $\{y_i\mid i\in I\}$ is a set. …
    Found 1 month ago on Joel David Hamkins's blog