1. 81903.638607
    Let’s start with some uncontroversial facts. In 1817–1818, Beethoven composed the Piano Sonata No. 29 in B flat major, Opus 106, which is known as the Hammerklavier Sonata. In 1970, Glenn Gould performed the Hammerklavier in Toronto. In 1995, András Schiff performed the Hammerklavier in New York. We can conclude that there is something— the Hammerklavier—that Beethoven composed and that Gould and Schiff performed. But what sort of thing is this?
    Found 22 hours, 45 minutes ago on Ben Caplan's site
  2. 172278.63885
    We give a new and elementary construction of primitive positive decomposition of higher arity relations into binary relations on finite domains. Such decompositions come up in applications to constraint satisfaction problems, clone theory and relational databases. The construction exploits functional completeness of 2-input functions in many-valued logic by interpreting relations as graphs of partially defined multivalued ‘functions’. The ‘functions’ are then composed from ordinary functions in the usual sense. The construction is computationally effective and relies on well-developed methods of functional decomposition, but reduces relations only to ternary relations. An additional construction then decomposes ternary into binary relations, also effectively, by converting certain disjunctions into existential quantifications. The result gives a uniform proof of Peirce’s reduction thesis on finite domains, and shows that the graph of any Sheffer function composes all relations there.
    Found 1 day, 23 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  3. 172347.638867
    We argue that traditional formulations of the reduction thesis that tie it to privileged relational operations do not suffice for Peirce’s justification of the categories, and invite the charge of gerrymandering to make it come out as true. We then develop a more robust invariant formulation of the thesis by explicating the use of triads in any relational operations, which is immune to that charge. The explication also allows us to track how Thirdness enters the structure of higher order relations, and even propose a numerical measure of it. Our analysis reveals new conceptual phenomena when negation or disjunction are used to compound relations.
    Found 1 day, 23 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  4. 496280.638879
    We study the anchoring effect in a computational model of group deliberation on preference rankings. Anchoring is a form of path-dependence through which the opinions of those who speak early have a stronger influence on the outcome of deliberation than the opinions of those who speak later. We show that anchoring can occur even among fully rational agents. We then compare the respective effects of anchoring and three other determinants of the deliberative outcome: the relative weight or social influence of the speakers, the popularity of a given speaker’s opinion, and the homogeneity of the group. We find that, on average, anchoring has the strongest effect among these. We finally show that anchoring is often correlated with increases in proximity to single-plateauedness. We conclude that anchoring can constitute a structural bias that might hinder some of the otherwise positive effects of group deliberation.
    Found 5 days, 17 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  5. 974079.638899
    This paper discusses some remarks Kaplan made in ”Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice” concerning empty names. I show how his objections to a particular view involving descriptions derived from Ramsification can be avoided by a nearby alternative framed in terms of discourse reference. I offer a treatment of empty names as variables carrying presuppositions concerning unique occupants of roles, or sets of properties, determined by the originating discourse.
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on Andreas Stokke's site
  6. 1082018.63891
    Why is copper red? Why is it so soft compared to, say, nickel—the element right next to it in the periodic table? Why is it such a good conductor of electricity? All of this stems from a violation of Hund’s rules. …
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Azimuth
  7. 1095714.638921
    The mass-count distinction is a morpho-syntactic distinction among nouns in English and many other languages. Tree, chair, person, group, and portion are count nouns, which come with the plural and accept numerals such as one and first; water, rice, furniture, silverware, and law enforcement are mass nouns, which lack the plural and do not accept numerals. The morpho-syntactic distinction is generally taken to have semantic content or reflect a semantic mass-count distinction. At the center of the semantic mass-count distinction is, in some way or another, a notion of being one or being a single entity, the basis of countability. There is little unanimity, however, of how the notion of being a single entity is to be understood and thus what the semantic mass-count distinction consists in.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Friederike Moltmann's site
  8. 1095797.638933
    One of the most influential accounts of high-level causation appeals to a notion of proportionality, which aims to identify the cause (variable) at an appropriate level given an effect (variable) of interest. Here we ask the dual question: Given a cause (variable) of interest, what is an appropriate level to model the effect? We argue that this question is not yet settled by the proportionality account and develop a natural counterpart to the proportionality account for this question. We also discuss several challenges for the effect-of-cause question that do not have an analog in the cause-of-effect question.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  9. 1215848.638944
    This paper argues for a distinction between fictional characters, as parts of intentionally created abstract artifacts, and intentional objects, as nonexistent objects generated by referential acts that fail to refer. It argues that intentional objects as the nonexistent objects of imagination and other objectual attitudes are well-reflected in natural language, though in a highly restricted way, reflecting their ontological dependence on referential acts. The paper elaborates how that ontological dependence can be understood.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Friederike Moltmann's site
  10. 1726449.638955
    tences—‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white—Quine writes: “To ascribe truth to the sentence is to ascribe whiteness to snow; such is the correspondence, in this example. Ascription of truth just cancels the quotation marks. Truth is disquotation” (PT: 80).
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  11. 1735111.63897
    Natural language does not express all connectives definable in classical logic as simple lexical items. Coordination in English is expressed by conjunction and, disjunction or, and negated disjunction nor. Other languages pattern similarly. Non-lexicalized connectives are typically expressed compositionally: in English, negated conjunction is typically expressed by combining negation and conjunction (not both). This is surprising: if ∧ and ∨ are duals, and the negation of the latter can be expressed lexically (nor), why not the negation of the former? I present a two-tiered model of the semantics of the binary connectives. The first tier captures the expressive power of the lexicon: it is a bilateral state-based semantics that, under a restriction, can express all and only the distinctions that can be expressed by the lexicon of natural language (and, or, nor). This first tier is characterized by rejection as non-assertion and a Neglect Zero assumption. The second tier is obtained by dropping the Neglect Zero assumption and enforcing a stronger notion of rejection, thereby recovering classical logic and thus definitions for all Boolean connectives. On the two-tiered model, we distinguish the limited expressive resources of the lexicon and the greater combinatorial expressive power of the language as a whole. This gives us a logic-based account of compositionality for the Boolean fragment of the language.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Rush T. Stewart's site
  12. 2237038.638985
    A standard line of iambic pentameter is five “feet,” each of which is an “iamb”—an unstressed, then a stressed syllable. Or so says the classical theory of English meter. Similarly, trochaic hexameter is four trochees (stressed-then-unstressed). …
    Found 3 weeks, 4 days ago on Mostly Aesthetics
  13. 2307454.638995
    Judgment-aggregation theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as coherence of judgments at a given time, defined as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. This paper asks whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments in light of some information (a learnt proposition), then the new aggregate judgments are the old ones revised in light of this information, i.e., aggregation and revision commute. We prove an impossibility theorem: if the propositions on the agenda are non-trivially connected, no judgment aggregation rule with standard properties is dynamically rational with respect to any revision operator satisfying some basic conditions. Our theorem is the dynamic-rationality counterpart of some well-known impossibility theorems for static rationality. We also explore how dynamic rationality might be achieved by relaxing some of the conditions on the aggregation rule and/or the revision operator. Notably, premise-based aggregation rules are dynamically rational with respect to so-called premise-based revision operators.
    Found 3 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  14. 2452988.639005
    This work investigates absolute adjectives in the not very construction and how their pragmatic interpretation depends on the evaluative polarity and the scale structure of their antonymic pairs. Our experimental study reveals that evaluatively positive adjectives (clean) are more likely to be strengthened than evaluatively negative ones (dirty ), and that maximum standard adjectives (clean or closed) are more likely to be strengthened than minimum standard ones (dirty or open). Our findings suggest that both evaluative polarity and scale structure drive the asymmetric interpretation of gradable adjectives under negation. Overall, our work adds to the growing literature on the interplay between pragmatic inference, valence and semantic meaning.
    Found 4 weeks ago on Diana Mazzarella's site
  15. 2542796.639017
    In this paper we re-assess the philosophical foundation of Exactly True Logic (ETL), a competing variant of First Degree Entailment (FDE). In order to do this, we first rebut an argument against it. As the argument appears in an interview with Nuel Belnap himself, one of the fathers of FDE , we believe its provenance to be such that it needs to be taken seriously. We submit, however, that the argument ultimately fails, and that ETL cannot easily be dismissed. We then proceed to give an overview of the research that was inspired by this logic over the last decade, thus providing further motivation for the study of ETL and, more generally, of FDE-related logics that result from semantical analyses alternative to Belnap’s canonical one. We focus, in particular, on philosophical questions that these developments raise.
    Found 4 weeks, 1 day ago on Rush T. Stewart's site
  16. 2638849.639028
    On a standard understanding of externalist metasemantic theories, such theories require a speaker to defer to other speakers in order to share content with them. We argue that this standard understanding is mistaken, and that, on a proper understanding of externalism, sharing content does not depend in any way on deference, either to experts, or one’s linguistic community. We defend a version of externalism that we call ‘pure externalism’, and we argue that the idea that shared content requires deference is a residue of internalism/descriptivisism to which externalists ought to be opposed. We also argue that, despite common belief to the contrary, several of the originators of externalism, including Tyler Burge, do not think that deference is in any way relevant, let alone required, for shared externalist content.
    Found 4 weeks, 2 days ago on Herman Cappelen's site
  17. 2708531.639038
    Since May 1st, Kris Brown, Nathaniel Osgood, Xiaoyan Li, William Waites and I have been meeting daily in James Clerk Maxwell’s childhood home in Edinburgh. We’re hard at work on our project called New Mathematics and Software for Agent-Based models. …
    Found 1 month ago on Azimuth
  18. 2716111.639048
    The Scene: Socrates is watching a massive protest of students at the School of Athens. Elektra, a protest leader, and Leonidas, a merchant, notice Socrates furrowing his brow in puzzlement. Leonidas: [approaches Socrates] Aha, Socrates. …
    Found 1 month ago on Bet On It
  19. 2978039.639058
    In this paper, we investigate, by means of a computational model, how individuals map quantifiers onto numbers and how they order quantifiers on a mental line. We selected five English quantifiers (few, fewer than half, many, more than half, and most) which differ in truth conditions and vagueness. We collected binary truth value judgment data in an online quantifier verification experiment. Using a Bayesian three-parameter logistic regression model, we separated three sources of individual differences: truth condition, vagueness, and response error. Clustering on one of the model’s parameter that corresponds to truth conditions revealed four subgroups of participants with different quantifier-to-number mappings and different ranges of the mental line of quantifiers. Our findings suggest multiple sources of individual differences in semantic representations of quantifiers and support a conceptual distinction between different types of imprecision in quantifier meanings. We discuss the consequence of our findings for the main theoretical approaches to quantifiers: the bivalent truth-conditional approach and the fuzzy logic approach. We argue that the former approach neither can explain inter-individual differences nor intra-individual differences in truth conditions of vague quantifiers. The latter approach requires further specification to fully account for individual differences demonstrated in this study.
    Found 1 month ago on Jakub Szymanik's site
  20. 3052397.639068
    Our aim in this paper is to extend the semantics for the kind of logic of ground developed in [deRosset and Fine, 2023]. In that paper, the authors very briefly suggested a way of treating universal and existential quantification over a fixed domain of objects. Here we explore some options for extending the treatment to allow for a variable domain of objects.
    Found 1 month ago on Louis deRosset's site
  21. 3265231.639077
    Consumption decisions are partly influenced by values and ideologies. Consumers care about global warming, child labor, fair trade, etc. We develop an axiomatic model of intrinsic values – those that are carriers of meaning in and of themselves – and argue that they often introduce discontinuities near zero. For example, a vegetarian’s preferences would be discontinuous near zero amount of animal meat. We distinguish intrinsic values from instrumental ones, which are means rather than ends and serve as proxies for intrinsic values. We illustrate the relevance of our value-based model in different contexts, including equity concerns and prosocial behavior.
    Found 1 month ago on Itzhak Gilboa's site
  22. 3496839.639089
    This picture by Roice Nelson shows a remarkable structure: the hexagonal tiling honeycomb. What is it? Roughly speaking, a honeycomb is a way of filling 3d space with polyhedra. The most symmetrical honeycombs are the ‘regular’ ones. …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Azimuth
  23. 3514086.639098
    This axiomatization parallels the structure of first order logic exactly. It can be read as a reduction of the axiom scheme of comprehension of TST(U) to finitely many axiom templates (up to type assignment) or as a reduction of the axiom scheme of stratified comprehension to finitely many axioms. Probably one should assume weak extensionality: nonempty sets with the same elements are equal.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on M. Randall Holmes's site
  24. 3514239.639107
    When a person decides to do something in the future, she forms an intention and her intention persists. Philosophers have thought about the rational requirement that an agent’s intention persists until its execution. But philosophers have neglected to think about the causal memory mechanisms that could enable this kind of persistence and its role in rational long-term agency. Our aim of this paper is to fill this gap by arguing that memory for intention is a specific kind of memory. We do this by evaluating and rejecting standard declarative accounts of memory for intention and arguing for the plausibility of an alternative model of memory for intention. We argue for the alternative by spelling out a number of computational principles that could enable retaining and retrieving intentions from long-term memory. These principles could explain a number of core features of intentions.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Thor Grünbaum's site
  25. 3514332.639117
    According to urban legend, people’s number one fear is public speaking. Death is number two.1 I don’t know if it’s true, but if it is, I’d bet that the most dreaded form of public speaking is to stand onstage, alone, attempting to make an audience of strangers laugh. …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Under the Net
  26. 3524273.639125
    The main goal of this essay is to propose and make plausible a framework for developing a philosophical account of musical notation. The proposed framework countenances four elements of notation: symbols (abstract objects that collectively constitute the backbone of a ‘system’ of notation), their characteristic ‘forms’ (for example, shapes, understood abstractly), the concrete instances, or ‘engravings’, of those forms, and the meanings of the symbols. It is argued that these elements are distinct. Along the way, several preliminary arguments are given for how one ought to understand them—for example, it is suggested that engravings represent symbols rather than instantiate forms, although they are characteristically seen to represent a symbol by being seen to instantiate an associated form. Having proposed this framework, the essay explores the nature of musical instructions, as the meanings of symbols, and offers an argument in favor of the commonly held (but recently challenged) view that those meanings are imperative. Specifically, composites of musical notation (paradigmatically, musical scores) primarily express instructional meaning, and denote something like ‘sonic structures’ only secondarily, in virtue of their primary, imperative, meaning.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Ergo
  27. 3573145.639134
    I want to comment on an old objection to the “similarity analysis” of counterfactuals, and on a more recent, but related, argument for counterfactual skepticism. According to the similarity analysis, a counterfactual ? > ? is true iff ? is true at all ? worlds that are most similar, in certain respects, to the actual world. The old objection that I have in mind is that the similarity analysis fails to validate Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents (SDA), the inference from (? ∨ ?) > ? to ? > ? and ? > ?. Imagine someone utters (1a) on a hot summer day.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Wolfgang Schwarz's site
  28. 3580343.639142
    Jc Beall’s Divine Contradiction is a fascinating defence of the idea that contradictions are true of the tri-personal God. This project requires a logic that avoids the consequence that every proposition follows from a contradiction. Beall presents such a logic. This ‘gap/glut’ logic is the topic of this article. A gap/glut logic presupposes that falsity is not simply the absence of truth – for a proposition that is true may also be false. This article is essentially an examination of the idea that falsity is not simply untruth. The author rejects this position but does not claim to have an argument against it. In lieu of an argument, he presents three ‘considerations’. First, it is possible to give an intuitive semantics for the language of sentential logic that yields ‘classical’ sentential logic (including ‘p, ¬ p ⊢ q’) and which makes no mention of truth-values. Second, it is possible to imagine a race who manage their affairs very well without having the concept ‘falsity’. Third, it is possible to construct a semantics that yields a logic identical with the dialetheist logic and which makes no mention of truth-values – and which, far from being plausible, seems pointless.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Peter van Inwagen's site
  29. 3797964.639151
    Alonzo Church proposed a theory of sequences of functions and their arguments as surrogates for Russellian singular propositions and singular concepts. Church’s proposed theory accords with his Alternative (0), the strictest of his three competing criteria for strict synonymy. The currently popular objection to strict criteria like (0) on the basis of the Russell-Myhill antinomy is rebutted. Russell-Myhill is not a problem specifically for 1 ACKOWLEDGMENTS: This essay is dedicated to the memory of the great philosopher and logician, Alonzo Church. I had the good fortune to study under Prof. Church (among others) through the 1970s. Years later he read my Frege’s Puzzle (1986), in which I defend what is now called a Millian theory of semantic content. In May 1989, Prof. Church sent me a pair of manuscripts, then not yet published, in which he independently proposed similar ways of developing a theory of n–tuple surrogates for singular propositions. Church’s cover letter began “Just to prove that great minds run in the same channel.” Although his throwaway remark did not reflect a genuine assessment—of me or of himself—it was exceedingly generous, and the memory of it can still cause me to blush. The present essay is in part a much delayed result of careful study of Church’s excellent papers. I am profoundly in his debt.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  30. 3797989.639159
    I propose an approach to liar and Curry paradoxes inspired by the work of Roger Swyneshed in his treatise on insolubles (1330-1335). The keystone of the account is the idea that liar sentences and their ilk are false (and only false) and that the so-called “capture” direction of the T-schema should be restricted. The proposed account retains what I take to be the attractive features of Swyneshed’s approach without leading to some worrying consequences Swyneshed accepts. The approach and the resulting logic (called “Swynish Logic”) are non-classical, but are consistent and compatible with many elements of the classical picture including modus ponens, modus tollens, and double-negation elimination and introduction. It is also compatible with bivalence and contravalence. My approach to these paradoxes is also immune to an important kind of revenge challenge that plagues some of its rivals.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilPapers