1. 27577.329597
    Successful communication depends not only on our knowledge of language, but also our knowledge of context. If a speaker utters the sentence “he is going to get burnt,” we will have to rely on our knowledge of the context in order to grasp what proposition they are trying to express. If there is a mutually salient individual in front of us, whose trousers have just caught on fire, then we will know that this salient individual is the intended referent. If we were talking about our mutual friend Frank, and somebody has just asked how Frank’s latest business deal is going, it will be clear that Frank is the intended referent. Two completely different propositions are expressed in these situations, and without contextual knowledge, we would not be able to tell which proposition was expressed.
    Found 7 hours, 39 minutes ago on Andrew Peet's site
  2. 88694.329678
    In this situation, uttering (1a) is to lie while uttering (1b) is not. Crucially, (1a) is something the speaker believes (indeed knows) to be false, whereas (1b) is something she believes to be true. Yet both utterances are aimed at the same thing: deceiving the hearer into believing that the speaker has not been opening the mail.
    Found 1 day ago on Andreas Stokke's site
  3. 95998.329727
    It has been frequently observed in the literature that assertions of plain sentences containing predicates like fun and frightening give rise to an acquaintance inference: they imply that the speaker has first-hand knowledge of the item under consideration. The goal of this paper is to develop and defend a broadly expressivist explanation of this phenomenon: acquaintance inferences arise because plain sentences containing subjective predicates are designed to express distinguished kinds of attitudes that differ from beliefs in that they can only be acquired by undergoing certain experiences. Its guiding hypothesis is that natural language predicate expressions lexically specify what it takes for their use to be properly “grounded” in a speaker’s state of mind: what state of mind a speaker must be in for a predication to be in accordance with the norms governing assertion. The resulting framework accounts for a range of data surrounding the acquaintance inference as well as for striking parallels between the evidential requirements on subjective predicate uses and the kind of considerations that fuel motivational internalism about the language of morals. A discussion of how the story can be implemented compositionally and of how it compares with other proposals currently on the market is provided.
    Found 1 day, 2 hours ago on Malte Willer's site
  4. 295420.329775
    In a recent paper, Barrio, Tajer and Rosenblatt establish a correspondence between metainferences holding in the strict-tolerant logic of transparent truth ST and inferences holding in the logic of paradox LP . They argue that LP is ST ’s external logic and they question whether ST ’s solution to the semantic paradoxes is fundamentally different from LP ’s. Here we establish that by parity of reasoning, ST can be related to LP ’s dual logic K3 . We clarify the distinction between internal and external logic and argue that while ST ’s nonclassicality can be granted, its self-dual character does not tie it to LP more closely than to K3 .
    Found 3 days, 10 hours ago on David Ripley's site
  5. 310851.32982
    This paper presents a novel typed term calculus and reduction relation for it, and proves that the reduction relation is strongly normalizing—that there are no infinite reduction sequences. The calculus bears a close relation to the →, ¬ fragment of core logic, and so is called ‘core type theory’. This paper presents a novel typed term calculus and reduction relation for it, and proves that the reduction relation is strongly normalizing—that there are no infinite reduction sequences. The calculus is similar to the simply-typed lambda calculus with an empty type, but with a twist. The simply-typed lambda calculus with an empty type bears a close relation to the →, ⊥ fragment of intuitionistic logic ([Howard, ; Scherer, 2017; Sørensen and Urzyczyn, 2006]); the calculus to be presented here bears a similar relation to the →, ¬ fragment of a logic known as core logic. Because of this connection, I’ll call the calculus core type theory.
    Found 3 days, 14 hours ago on David Ripley's site
  6. 361781.329848
    The Knobe effect is that people judge cases of good and bad foreseen effects differently with respect to intention: in cases of bad effects, they tend to attribute intention, but not so in cases of good effects. …
    Found 4 days, 4 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  7. 616545.329888
    Art works are artefacts and, like all artefacts, are the product of agency. How important is that for our engagement with them? For many artefacts, agency hardly matters. The paperclips on my desk perform their function without me having to think of them as the outputs of agency, though I might on occasion admire their design. But for those artefacts we categorise as works of art, the connection is important: if I treat something as art I need to see how it manifests the choices, preferences, actions and sensibilities of the maker. I am not asked to see it simply as a record of those things. The work is not valuable merely as a conduit to the qualities of the maker; it has final value and not merely instrumental value. Its value depends on its relation to the maker; in Korsgaard’s terms it is value that is final and extrinsic.
    Found 1 week ago on Gregory Currie's site
  8. 624465.329931
    In linguistics, the dominant approach to the semantics of plurals appeals to mereology. However, this approach has received strong criticisms from philosophical logicians who subscribe to an alternative framework based on plural logic. In the first part of the article, we offer a precise characterization of the mereological approach and the semantic background in which the debate can be meaningfully reconstructed. In the second part, we deal with the criticisms and assess their logical, linguistic, and philosophical significance. We identify four main objections and show how each can be addressed. Finally, we compare the strengths and shortcomings of the mereological approach and plural logic. Our conclusion is that the former remains a viable and well-motivated framework for the analysis of plurals.
    Found 1 week ago on David Nicolas's site
  9. 752279.329964
    I argue that in addressing worries about the validity and reliability of implicit measures of social cognition, theorists should draw on research concerning “entitativity perception.” In brief, an aggregate of people is perceived as highly “entitative” when its members exhibit a certain sort of unity. For example, think of the difference between the aggregate of people waiting in line at a bank versus a tight-knit group of friends: the latter seems more “groupy” than the former. I start by arguing that entitativity perception modulates the activation of implicit biases and stereotypes. I then argue that recognizing this modulatory role will help researchers to address concerns surrounding the validity and reliability of implicit measures.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  10. 858011.329993
    The vast majority of philosophers accept Assertion Incompatibilism: according to this view, given intuitive variability of proper assertion with practical stakes, non-shifty invariantism (NSI) is incompatible with a biconditional knowledge norm of assertion (KNA). There are also a few dissenting voices, however: some invariantists venture to explain the sensitivity data for proper assertion in a fashion that preserves both NSI and KNA (Assertion Compatibilism). In this paper, I argue that my preferred incarnation of Compatibilism fares better than the competition. According to the competition, shiftiness in proper assertability is to be explained via appealing to the pragmatics of language. According to the view I defend, what varies with practical considerations is the all-things-considered propriety of assertion: epistemic propriety and the epistemic standard at stake are invariant.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Mona Simion's site
  11. 875343.33004
    There’s an interesting debate in moral and political philosophy about the nature of, and relationship between, ideal and non-ideal theory. In this paper we discuss whether an analogous distinction can be drawn in philosophy of language. Our conclusion is negative: Even if you think that distinction can be put to work within moral and political philosophy, there’s no useful way to extend it to work that has been done in the philosophy of language. Here is the plan:
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on Herman Cappelen's site
  12. 1041796.330083
    The apparent consistency of Sobel sequences (example below) famously motivated David Lewis to defend a variably strict conditional semantics for counterfactuals. (a) If Sophie had gone to the parade she would have seen Pedro. (b) If Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind someone tall she would not have seen Pedro. But if the order of the counterfactuals in a Sobel sequence is reversed – in the example, if (b) is asserted prior to (a) – the second counterfactual asserted no longer rings true. This is the Heim sequence problem. That the order of assertion makes this difference is surprising on the variably strict account. Some argue that this is reason to reject the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics outright. Others argue that the problem motivates a contextualist rendering of counterfactuals. Still others maintain that the explanation for the phenomenon is merely pragmatic. I argue that none of these are right, and defend a novel way to understand the phenomenon. My proposal avoids the problems faced by the alternative analyses and enjoys independent support. There is, however, a difficulty for my view: it entails that many ordinarily-accepted counterfactuals are not true. I argue that this (apparent) cost is acceptable.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilPapers
  13. 1041955.330126
    What are the truth conditions of want ascriptions? According to a highly influential and fruitful approach, championed by Heim (1992) and von Fintel (1999), the answer is intimately connected to the agent’s beliefs: ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff within S’s belief set, S prefers the p worlds to the ¬p worlds. This approach faces a well known and as-yet unsolved problem, however: it makes the entirely wrong predictions with what we call (counter)factual want ascriptions, wherein the agent either believes p or believes ¬p—e.g., ‘I want it to rain tomorrow and that is exactly what is going to happen’ or ‘I want this weekend to last forever but of course it will end in a few hours’. We solve this problem. The truth conditions for want ascriptions are, we propose, connected to the agent’s conditional beliefs. We bring out this connection by pursuing a striking parallel between (counter)factual and non-(counter)factual want ascriptions on the one hand and counterfactual and indicative conditionals on the other.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilPapers
  14. 1100857.330157
    This paper introduces the logic of evidence and truth LETF as an extension of the Belnap-Dunn four-valued logic F DE. LETF is a slightly modified version of the logic LETJ , presented in Carnielli and Rodrigues (2017). While LETJ is equipped only with a classicality operator ○, LETF is equipped with a non-classicality operator ● as well, dual to ○. Both LETF and LETJ are logics of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness in which the operator ○ recovers classical logic for propositions in its scope. Evidence is a notion weaker than truth in the sense that there may be evidence for a proposition α even if α is not true. As well as LETJ , LETF is able to express preservation of evidence and preservation of truth. The primary aim of this paper is to propose a probabilistic semantics for LETF where statements P (α) and P (○α) express, respectively, the amount of evidence available for α and the degree to which the evidence for α is expected to behave classically – or non-classically for P (●α). A probabilistic scenario is paracomplete when P (α) + P (¬α) < 1, and paraconsistent when P (α) + P (¬α) > 1, and in both cases, P (○α) < 1. If P (○α) = 1, or P (●α) = 0, classical probability is recovered for α. The proposition ○α ∨ ●α, a theorem of LETF , partitions what we call the information space, and thus allows us to obtain some new versions of known results of standard probability theory.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  15. 1107403.330174
    Conditionals pervade every aspect of our thinking, from the mundane and everyday such as ‘if you eat too much cheese, you will have nightmares’ to the most fundamental concerns as in ‘if global warming isn’t halted, sea levels will rise dramatically’. Many decades of research have focussed on the semantics of conditionals and how people reason from conditionals in everyday life. Here it has been rather overlooked how we come to such conditionals in the first place. In many cases, they are learned through testimony: someone warns us about the ill-effects of cheese. Any full account of the conditional must consequently incorporate such learning. Here, we provide a new formal account of belief change in response to a testimonial conditional.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Stephan Hartmann's site
  16. 1329066.330188
    This post about psychological explanation and implicit bias by Gabbrielle Johnson is the first post of this week’s series on An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind (Routledge, 2020). …
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on The Brains Blog
  17. 1386275.330202
    What does it take to be trustworthy? At a first glance, trustworthiness seems like a complicated affair. First, trustworthiness seems complicated for the person who aims to be trustworthy in virtue of the fact that it is, intuitively, hard to achieve: it’s a property that isn’t easy to come by. Second, it seems like a complicated topic for the theorist to shed light on, because there seem to be many ways and domains in which one can be more or less trustworthy. If so, the function from these diverse ways of being trustworthy to trustworthiness simpliciter seems like a hard one to figure out.
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on Mona Simion's site
  18. 1396407.330216
    Classically, vagueness has been regarded as something bad. It leads to the Sorites paradox, borderline cases, and the (apparent) violation of the logical principle of bivalence. Nevertheless, there have always been people claiming that vagueness is also valuable. Many have pointed out that we could not communicate as successfully or efficiently as we do if we would not use vague language. Indeed, we often use vague terms when we could have used more precise ones instead. Many people (implicitly or explicitly) assume that we do so because their vagueness has a positive function. But how and in what sense can vagueness be said to have a value? This paper is an attempt to give an answer to this question. It examines seven arguments that can be reconstructed from the literature. The (negative) result of this examination is, however, that there is not much reason to believe that vagueness has a positive function at all, since none of the arguments is (even remotely) conclusive.
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  19. 1408075.330229
    Here's a neat little result about Bregman divergences that I just happened upon. It might help to prove some more decomposition theorems along the lines of this classic result by Morris DeGroot and Stephen Fienberg and, more recently, this paper by my colleagues in the computer science department at Bristol. …
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on M-Phi
  20. 1766676.330243
    Epistemic counterparts 6: De re/de dicto equivalence Posted on Wednesday, 22 Jul 2020 Compare the following three sentences. (1) I thought my husband was a bear. (2) Mary thinks her husband is a bear. …
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on wo's weblog
  21. 1908203.330257
    This paper discusses the scope and significance of the so-called triviality result stated by Allan Gibbard for indicative conditionals, showing that if a conditional operator satisfies the Law of Import-Export, is supraclassical, and is stronger than the material conditional, then it must collapse to the material conditional. Gib-bard’s result is taken to pose a dilemma for a truth-functional account of indicative conditionals: give up Import-Export, or embrace the two-valued analysis. We show that this dilemma can be averted in trivalent logics of the conditional based on Reichenbach and de Finetti’s idea that a conditional with a false antecedent is undefined. Import-Export and truth-functionality hold without triviality in such logics. We unravel some implicit assumptions in Gibbard’s proof, and discuss a recent generalization of Gibbard’s result due to Branden Fitelson.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Lorenzo Rossi's site
  22. 1921709.33027
    The conventionality of simultaneity thesis as established by Reichenbach and Grünbaum is related to the partial freedom in the definition of simultaneity in an inertial reference frame. An apparently altogether different issue is that of the conventionality of spatial geometry, or more generally the conventionality of chronogeometry when taking also into account the conventionality of the uniformity of time. Here we will consider Einstein's version of the conventionality of (chrono)geometry, according to which we might adopt a different spatial geometry and a particular definition of equality of successive time intervals. The choice of a particular chronogeometry would not imply any change in a theory, since its “physical part” can be changed in a way that, regarding experimental results, the theory is the same. Here, we will make the case that the conventionality of simultaneity is closely related to Einstein's conventionality of chronogeometry, as another conventional element leading to it.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilSci Archive
  23. 2021270.330288
    Crupi, Tentori, and Gonzalez [1] provide a very interesting set of theoretical and empirical arguments in favor of the following (piecewise) Bayesian measure of the degree to which evidence E confirms hypothesis H, relative background knowledge K.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on Branden Fitelson's site
  24. 2201120.330302
    Questions concerning the proof-theoretic strength of classical versus non-classical theories of truth have received some attention recently. A particularly convenient case study concerns classical and nonclassical axiomatizations of fixed-point semantics. It is known that nonclassical axiomatizations in four- or three-valued logics are substantially weaker than their classical counterparts. In this paper we consider the addition of a suitable conditional to First-Degree Entailment – a logic recently studied by Hannes Leitgeb under the label ‘hype’. We show in particular that, by formulating the theory pkf over hype, one obtains a theory that is sound with respect to fixed-point models, while being proof-theoretically on a par with its classical counterpart kf. Moreover, we establish that also its schematic extension – in the sense of Feferman – is as strong as the schematic extension of kf, thus matching the strength of predicative analysis.
    Found 3 weeks, 4 days ago on Carlo Nicolai's site
  25. 2902157.330315
    Decision theory and folk psychology both purport to represent the same phenomena: our belief-like and desire- and preference-like states. They also purport to do the same work with these representations: explain and predict our actions. But they do so with different sets of concepts. There’s much at stake in whether one of these two sets of concepts can be accounted for with the other. Without such an account, we’d have two competing representations and systems of prediction and explanation, a dubious dualism. Many would be tempted to reject one of the two pictures, yet neither can be let go lightly. Folk psychology structures our daily lives and has proven fruitful in the study of mind and ethics, while decision theory is pervasive in various disciplines, including the quantitative social sciences, neuroscience, and philosophy. My interest is in accounting for folk psychology with decision theory—in particular, for believing and wanting, which decision theory omits. Many have attempted this task for belief.
    Found 1 month ago on PhilPapers
  26. 3077787.330328
    In the causal modelling literature, it is well known that “ill-defined” variables may give rise to “ambiguous manipulations” (Spirtes and Scheines, 2004). Here, we illustrate how ill-defined variables may also induce mistakes in causal inference when standard causal search methods are applied (Spirtes et al., ; Pearl, 2009). To address the problem, we introduce a representation framework, which exploits an independent component representation of the data, and demonstrate its potential for detecting ill-defined variables and avoiding mistaken causal inferences.
    Found 1 month ago on PhilSci Archive
  27. 3135499.330353
    The paper is about ‘absolute logic’: an approach to logic that differs from the standard first-order logic and other known approaches. It should be a new approach the author has created proposing to obtain a general and unifying approach to logic and a faithful model of human mathematical deductive process. In first-order logic there exist two different concepts of term and formula, in place of these two concepts in our approach we have just one notion of expression. The set-builder notation is enclosed as an expression-building pattern. In our system we can easily express second-order, third order and any-order conditions. The meaning of a sentence will depend solely on the meaning of the symbols it contains, it will not depend on external ‘structures’. Our deductive system is based on a very simple definition of proof and provides a good model of human mathematical deductive process. The soundness and consistency of the system are proved. We also discuss how our system relates to the most know types of paradoxes, from the discussion no specific vulnerability to paradoxes comes out. The paper provides both the theoretical material and a fully documented example of deduction.
    Found 1 month ago on PhilSci Archive
  28. 3461208.330391
    Many epistemologists explain the empirically attested contextual variation in knowledge ascriptions by appeal to a kind of warranted assertability maneuver (WAM) that finds the locus of variability in epistemic norms of assertion. I show that this way to WAM fails. It cannot explain the variability of embedded uses of knowledge sentences in assertoric speech acts in which the knowledge sentences are not themselves asserted.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Dirk Kindermann's site
  29. 3592211.330416
    The morphological marking that distinguishes conditionals that are called “counterfactual” or “subjunctive” from those that are not called that does not always signal counterfactuality, nor is it consistently “subjunctive”. It is often found in other modal constructions, such as in the expression of unattainable desires and in weak necessity modality. We propose to call it “X-marking”. In this paper, we lay out desiderata for a successful theory of X-marking and make an initial informal proposal. Much remains to be done.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Kai von Fintel's site
  30. 3596730.33043
    Philosophers are divided on whether it is possible to intend believed-impossible outcomes. Several thought experiments in the action theory literature suggest that this is conceptually possible, though they have not been tested in ordinary social cognition. We conducted three experiments to determine whether, on the ordinary view, it is conceptually possible to intend believed-impossible outcomes. Our findings indicate that participants firmly countenance the possibility of intending believed-impossible outcomes, suggesting that it is conceptually possible to intend to do something that one believes is impossible.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilPapers