1. 523793.516068
    Frege famously claimed that variations in the sense of a proper name can sometimes be ‘tolerated’. In this paper, we offer a novel explanation of this puzzling claim. Frege, we argue, follows Trendelenburg in holding that we think in language— sometimes individually and sometimes together. Variations in sense can be tolerated in just those cases where we are using language to coordinate our actions, but we are not engaged in thinking together about an issue.
    Found 6 days, 1 hour ago on Eliot Michaelson's site
  2. 559946.51622
    Angell’s logic of analytic containment AC has been shown to be characterized by a 9-valued matrix NC by Ferguson, and by a 16-valued matrix by Fine. We show that the former is the image of a surjective homomorphism from the latter, i.e., an epimorphic image. The epimorphism was found with the help of MUltlog, which also provides a tableau calculus for NC extended by quantifiers that generalize conjunction and disjunction.
    Found 6 days, 11 hours ago on PhilPapers
  3. 560021.516242
    The heyday of discussions initiated by Searle's claim that computers have syntax, but no semantics has now past, yet philosophers and scientists still tend to frame their views on artificial intelligence in terms of syntax and semantics. In this paper I do not intend to take part in these discussions; my aim is more fundamental, viz. to ask what claims about syntax and semantics in this context can mean in the first place. And I argue that their sense is so unclear that that their ability to act as markers within any disputes on artificial intelligence is severely compromised; and hence that their employment brings us little more than a harmful illusion of explanation.
    Found 6 days, 11 hours ago on Jaroslav Peregrin's site
  4. 751591.516258
    ABSTRACT: Philosophers often characterize discourse in general as aiming at some sort of convergence (in beliefs, plans, dispositions, feelings, etc.), and many views about aesthetic discourse in particular affirm this thought. I argue that a convergence norm does not govern aesthetic discourse. The conversational dynamics of aesthetic discourse suggest that typical aesthetic claims have directive force. I distinguish between dynamic and illocutionary force and develop related theories of each for aesthetic discourse. I argue that the illocutionary force of aesthetic utterances is typically invitational because its dynamic force is influenced by a ‘communal’ discourse norm. I draw on dynamic pragmatics to develop a formal account of this dynamic force that explains why invitation has pride of place in aesthetic conversation. It turns out that the end of aesthetic discourse is not convergence but a distinctive form of community, a kind of harmony of individuality, that is compatible with aesthetic disagreement. If this is right, then convergence theories of aesthetic and normative discourse, and of conversation in general, need to be revised.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  5. 809615.516272
    Some find it plausible that a sufficiently long duration of torture is worse than any duration of mild headaches. Similarly, it has been claimed that a million humans living great lives is better than any number of worm-like creatures feeling a few seconds of pleasure each. Some have related bad things to good things along the same lines. For example, one may hold that a future in which a sufficient number of beings experience a lifetime of torture is bad, regardless of what else that future contains, while minor bad things, such as slight unpleasantness, can always be counterbalanced by enough good things. Among the most common objections to such ideas are sequence arguments. But sequence arguments are usually formulated in classical logic. One might therefore wonder if they work if we instead adopt many-valued logic. I show that, in a common many-valued logical framework, the answer depends on which versions of transitivity are used as premises. We get valid sequence arguments if we grant any of several strong forms of transitivity of ‘is at least as bad as’ and a notion of completeness. Other, weaker forms of transitivity lead to invalid sequence arguments. The plausibility of the premises is largely set aside here, but I tentatively note that almost all of the forms of transitivity that result in valid sequence arguments seem intuitively problematic. Still, a few moderately strong forms of transitivity that might be acceptable result in valid sequence arguments, although weaker statements of the initial value claims avoid these arguments at least to some extent.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  6. 1215003.516288
    In a recent article, P. Roger Turner and Justin Capes argue that no one is, or ever was, even partly morally responsible for certain world-indexed truths. Here we present our reasons for thinking that their argument is unsound: It depends on the premise that possible worlds are maximally consistent states of affairs, which is, under plausible assumptions concerning states of affairs, demonstrably false. Our argument to show this is based on Bertrand Russell’s original ‘paradox of propositions’. We should then opt for a different approach to explain world-indexed truths whose upshot is that we may be (at least partly) morally responsible for some of them. The result to the effect that there are no maximally consistent states of affairs is independently interesting though, since this notion motivates an account of the nature of possible worlds in the metaphysics of modality. We also register in this article, independently of our response to Turner and Capes, and in the spirit of Russell’s aforementioned paradox and many other versions thereof, a proof of the claim that there is no set of all true propositions one can render false.
    Found 2 weeks ago on PhilPapers
  7. 1225249.516303
    As part of her argument that relativism and contextualism are nothing but notational variants of each other, Stojanovic holds that contextualism is flexible enough to achieve whatever relativism might do if the matter is what truth-value is assigned to each pair of sentence and context. In this paper, I reply to this statement by arguing that contextualism cannot be made as flexible as relativism without in fact turning it into a version of relativism. The key to my response to Stojanovic is that, while relativism relativizes utterance truth, contextualism does not, so parameters that are not fixed at the context of utterance will be accessible for the relativist, but not for the contextualist. Although the relativity of utterance truth follows as soon as propositional truth is relativized to contexts of assessment, as the relativist does, it is easy to lose sight of this fact if we identify the context of assessment with the assessor’s context. Hence, the point of this paper is that the difference between relativism and contextualism is not one as to whose parameters play a role in determining the sentence’s truth-value. If it were, contextualism could indeed be made just as flexible as relativism.
    Found 2 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  8. 1279899.516317
    This paper describes a method for learning from a teacher’s potentially unreliable corrective feedback in an interactive task learning setting. The graphical model uses discourse coherence to jointly learn symbol grounding, domain concepts and valid plans. Our experiments show that the agent learns its domain-level task in spite of the teacher’s mistakes.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Alex Lascarides's site
  9. 1328193.51634
    The phenomenon of shared intention has received much attention in the philosophy of mind and action. Margaret Gilbert (1989, 2000c, 2014b) argues that a shared intention to do A consists in a joint commitment to intend to do A. But we need to know more about the nature of joint commitments to know what exactly this implies. While the persistence of joint commitments has received much attention in the literature, their impersistence has received very little attention. In this paper, we shed light on the impersistence of joint commitments by showing how joint commitments can be dissolved by unexpected events.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  10. 1330914.516356
    The Ideal Worlds Account of Desire says that S wants p just in case all of S’s most highly preferred doxastic possibilities make p true. The account predicts that a desire report pS wants pq should be true so long as there is some doxastic p-possibility that is most preferred (by S). But we present a novel argument showing that this prediction is incorrect. More positively, we take our examples to support alternative analyses of desire, and close by briefly considering what our cases suggest about the logic of desire.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  11. 1647591.516378
    This paper aims to show that the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) can lead to trouble in certain dialectical contexts. Suppose a person knows that p but does not know that they know that p. They assert p in compliance with the KNA. Their interlocutor responds: ‘but do you know that p?’ It will be shown that the KNA blocks the original asserter from providing any good response to this perfectly natural follow-up question, effectively forcing them to retract p from the conversational scoreboard. This finding is not simply of theoretical interest: I will argue that the KNA would allow the retort ‘but do you know that p?’ to be weaponized in strategic communication, serving as a tool for silencing speakers without having to challenge their testimonial contributions on their own merits. Our analysis can thereby provide a new dimension to the study of epistemic injustice, as well as underscoring the importance of considering the norms governing speech acts also from the point of view of non-ideal social contexts.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Endre Begby's site
  12. 1653416.516398
    While presuppositions are often thought to be lexically encoded, researchers have repeatedly argued for ‘triggering algorithms’ that productively classify certain entailments as presuppositions. We provide new evidence for this position and sketch a novel triggering rule. On the empirical side, we show that presuppositions are productively generated from iconic expressions (such as gestures) that one may not have seen before, which suggests that a triggering algorithm is indeed called for. Turning to normal words, we show that sometimes a presupposition p is triggered by a simple or complex expression that does not even entail p: it is only when contextual information guarantees that the entailment goes through that the presupposition emerges. On standard theories, this presupposition could not be hardwired, because if so it should make itself felt (by way of projection or accommodation) in all cases.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Philippe Schlenker's site
  13. 1759774.516413
    This study takes a careful inferentialist look at Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox (LP). I conclude that it is sorely in need of a proof-system that could furnish formal proofs that would regiment faithfully the ‘naïve logical’ reasoning that could be undertaken by a rational thinker within LP (if indeed such reasoning could ever take place).
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Neil Tennant's site
  14. 1759867.516437
    Our regimentation of Goodman and Myhill’s proof of Excluded Middle revealed among its premises a form of Choice and an instance of Separation. Here we revisit Zermelo’s requirement that the separating property be definite. The instance that Goodman and Myhill used is not constructively warranted. It is that principle, and not Choice alone, that precipitates Excluded Middle.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Neil Tennant's site
  15. 1759915.516454
    We explore the problems that confront any attempt to explain or explicate exactly what a primitive logical rule of inference is, or consists in. We arrive at a proposed solution that places a surprisingly heavy load on the prospect of being able to understand and deal with specifications of rules that are essentially self-referring. That is, any rule ñ is to be understood via a specification that involves, embedded within it, reference to rule ñ itself. Just how we arrive at this position is explained by reference to familiar rules as well as less familiar ones with unusual features. An inquiry of this kind is surprisingly absent from the foundations of inferentialism— the view that meanings of expressions (especially logical ones) are to be characterized by the rules of inference that govern them.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Neil Tennant's site
  16. 1759961.516469
    The one-page 1978 informal proof of Goodman and Myhill is regimented in a weak constructive set theory in free logic. The decidability of identities in general (a=b∨¬a=b) is derived; then, of sentences in general (ψ∨¬ψ). Martin- Lof’s and Bell’s receptions of the latter result are discussed. Regimentation reveals the form of Choice used in deriving Excluded Middle. It also reveals an abstraction principle that the proof employs. It will be argued that the Goodman–Myhill result does not provide the constructive set theorist with a dispositive reason for not adopting (full) Choice.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Neil Tennant's site
  17. 1760065.516485
    This paper clarifies, revises, and extends the account of the transmission of truthmakers by core proofs that was set out in chap. 9 of Tennant (2017). Brauer provided two kinds of example making clear the need for this. Unlike Brouwer’s counterexamples to excluded middle, the examples of Brauer that we are dealing with here establish the need for appeals to excluded middle when applying, to the problem of truthmaker-transmission, the already classical metalinguistic theory of model-relative evaluations.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Neil Tennant's site
  18. 1760123.5165
    In the inferential semantics presented in Tennant [2010] and Tennant [forthcoming], simple inferences determine the truth value of a sentence in a model. They allow one to define co-inductively the notions ‘V is a verification of ϕ in the model M ’ and ‘F is a falsification of ϕ in the model M ’. Such evaluations explicate the different ways that a sentence is true, or false, in M . They explicate the structure involved in ϕ’s being true under a given interpretation M . These evaluations employ facts relevantly to determine truth-value. They can be infinitary if the domain is infinite. Verifications and falsifications are relevantly from, or relative to, a set of literals expressing some of the atomic information in the model.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Neil Tennant's site
  19. 1877881.516517
    A recurring narrative in the literature on conditionals is that the empirical facts about negated ifs provide compelling evidence for the principle of Conditional Excluded Middle and sit uncomfortably with a large family of analyses of conditionals as universal quantifiers over possible worlds. I show that both parts of the narrative are in need of a rewrite. I do so by articulating an innovative conditional analysis in a bilateral semantic setting that takes inspiration from the Ramsey test for conditionals but distinguishes the classical Ramseyan question of what it takes to accept a conditional from the one of what it takes to reject a conditional. The resulting framework disentangles the empirical facts about negated conditionals from the validity of Conditional Excluded Middle but also shows how the principle can live happily in a strict analysis of conditionals, and in fact how it can co-exist with other non-classical principles such as Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents without negative side effects.
    Found 3 weeks ago on Malte Willer's site
  20. 2098376.51653
    A serious problem for adverbialism about intentionality is the many-property problem, one major aspect of which is the claim that natural inferences between thought contents are blocked if adverbialism is true. Kriegel (2007. “Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.” Philosophical Perspectives 21: 307– “The 340.
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on Casey Woodling's site
  21. 2352510.516547
    An experiment by Proietti et al purporting to instantiate the ‘Wigner’s Friend’ thought experiment is discussed. It is pointed out that the stated implications of the experiment regarding the alleged irreconcilability of facts attributed to different observers warrant critical review. In particular, violation of a Clauser-Horne-Shimony inequality by the experimental data actually shows that the attribution of measurement outcomes to the “Friends” (modeled by internal photons undergoing unitary interactions) violates quantum theory. An elementary but often overlooked result regarding improper mixtures is adduced in support of this assessment. It is further noted that under an assumption of unbroken unitarity, no measurement correlation can ever yield an outcome, since all systems remain in improper mixtures, and attributing a definite but unknown outcome contradicts their composite pure state. It is pointed out that there already exists a solution to this conundrum in the form of an alternative formulation of quantum theory, which accounts for the data showing that no outcomes occurred at the interior entangled photon level and also predicts that outcomes can and do occur at the exterior “super-observer” level in this type of experiment.
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  22. 2352623.516563
    It is a standard assumption that proper names for entities of different types have the very same semantics, denoting well-individuated entities and thus classify as count nouns. It has moreover become a standard view in philosophy of language that names are rigid designators standing for the same entities in different circumstances in virtue of the causal-historical change to which they belong on a given use. A view that is less standard, argued for by philosophers such as Geach (1957) and Dummett (1973), is that names involve a sortal, as a requirement for a speaker to be able to use them to refer to an entity. This paper presents syntactic evidence from German for the presence of sortals in names, and argues that different types of names may involve sortals of different kinds and in different ways.
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on Friederike Moltmann's site
  23. 2384006.516586
    What is style in art? A common distinction is between general style and individual style. General style is a feature of artworks, and a given general style is associated with a set of distinctive properties that distinguish works in that style from works not in it. Impressionism, minimalism, abstract expressionism, and graffiti wildstyle are familiar general styles. It’s enough for a work to be in a general style that it exhibit some suitable collection of artistic properties. Certain general styles are of art historical interest due to how they arose in and influenced the history of art: neoclassical, rococo, cubism, and so on.
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  24. 2384273.516605
    we find the following passage: “‘You can’t say I ever forgave them,’ she’ll hear herself say, not knowing anymore what it means to forgive. Can you take back forgiveness, nullify it? Was it ever forgiveness then, or what was it called instead?” (2011: 83) The unnamed narrator neither provides a context for the passage nor makes any attempt to answer its queries, but simply leaves the matter to drop. Yet, as dropped matters go, this is one worth recovering. The questions at its core represent a rich moral psychological puzzle  a puzzle that, though relatively neglected in the philosophical literature, has implications for how we understand the nature of forgiveness.
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  25. 2394713.516621
    Since Sun-Joo Shin’s groundbreaking study (2002), Peirce’s existential graphs have attracted much attention as a way of writing logic that seems profoundly different from our usual logical calculi. In particular, Shin argued that existential graphs enjoy a distinctive property that marks them out as “diagrammatic”: they are “multiply readable,” in the sense that there are several different, equally legitimate ways to translate one and the same graph into a standard logical language. Stenning (2000) and Bellucci and Pietarinen (2016) have retorted that similar phenomena of multiple readability can arise for sentential notations as well. Focusing on the simplest kinds of existential graphs, called alpha graphs (AGs), this paper argues that multiple readability does point to important features of AGs, but that both Shin and her critics have misdiagnosed its source.
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on Dirk Schlimm's site
  26. 2544601.516635
    This article focuses on ‘therefore’ constructions such as ‘The switch is on, and therefore the lights are on’. We submit that the contribution of ‘therefore’ is to express a dependence as part of the core content of these constructions, rather than being conveyed by conventional implicature (Grice 1975, Potts 2005, Neta 2013) or a triggered presupposition (Pavese 2017, forthcoming, Stokke 2017). We argue that the standard objections to this view can be answered by relying on the general projection hypothesis defended by Roberts et al. (2009) and Simons et al. (2010), leaving our view on solid ground.
    Found 4 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  27. 2613547.516649
    Welcome to the Brains Blog’s Symposium series on the Cognitive Science of Philosophy. The aim of the series is to examine the use of methods from the cognitive sciences to generate philosophical insight. …
    Found 1 month ago on The Brains Blog
  28. 2913462.516665
    Evaluative and deontic judgments play a practical role in our thought. Judging that something is good, or right, or what we ought to do, ranks things in ways that guide us towards the higher-ranked things. When I judge that I ought to eat more iron, normally I reveal (or make) myself to be motivated or at least committed to eating more iron, feeling bad if I don’t, and so on. When we judge that we have most reason to slow down climate change, this normally “stops the buck” in deliberation and decision about what to do. It is controversial whether such a role in practical reasoning is essential to the evaluative or deontic concepts deployed in these judgments. It is controversial to what extent “thick” concepts like TACTFUL, KIND, and CHASTE play such a practical role in our thought. And it is controversial just what the practical role of a given normative concept is. But it is widely agreed that, at minimum, descriptively “thin” normative concepts play some such practical role for rational agents with a normal grasp of those concepts. Thin normative concepts are, roughly, normative concepts which encode little descriptive information. They are characteristically expressed by terms like good, right, and ought in English and their equivalents in other languages. Call these ‘thin normative terms’.
    Found 1 month ago on Pekka Väyrynen's site
  29. 3123206.516678
    Propositions represent the entities from which they are formed. This fact has puzzled philosophers and some have put forward radical proposals in order to explain it. This paper develops a primitivist account of the representational properties of propositions that centers on the operation of application. As we will see, this theory wins out over its competitors on grounds of strength, systematicity and unifying power. Propositions are (or can be) about individuals and predicate properties of them. The proposition that two is prime is about two, for instance, and predicates being prime of it. Many philosophers think we need a reductive theory of propositions in order to account for the representational features of propositions. This paper challenges this claim. I’ll develop a primitivist account of the representational features of propositions and argue that it is no less elegant, simple, or perspicuous than any of the reductive accounts currently on offer.
    Found 1 month ago on PhilPapers
  30. 3537359.516693
    In a series of papers Ladyman and Presnell raise an interesting challenge of providing a pre-mathematical justification for homotopy type theory. In response, they propose what they claim to be an informal semantics for homotopy type theory where types and terms are regarded as mathematical concepts. The aim of this paper is to raise some issues which need to be resolved for the successful development of their types-as-concepts interpretation.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive