1. 235864.400742
    I return to the material in [1] “Paris-Harrington in an NF context”. Various people had commented that the concept of a relatively large set of natural numbers is unstratified, and in that essay I mused about whether or not the extra strength of PH over finite Ramsey was to do with this failure of stratification. In the present—self-contained— note I shall show that—somewhat to my annoyance—it is not: Paris-Harrington has a stratified formulation.
    Found 2 days, 17 hours ago on Thomas Forster's site
  2. 482576.400804
    In this paper I provide a new account of linguistic presuppositions, on which they are ancillary speech acts defined by constitutive norms. After providing an initial intuitive characterization of the phenomenon, I present a normative speech act account of presupposition in parallel with Williamson’s analogous account of assertion. I explain how it deals well with the problem of informative presuppositions, and how it relates to accounts for the Triggering and Projection Problems for presuppositions. I conclude with a brief discussion of the consequences of the proposal for the adequacy of Williamson’s account of assertion.
    Found 5 days, 14 hours ago on Manuel Garcia-Carpintero's site
  3. 658407.400833
    What is the motivational profile of admiration? In this paper I will investigate what form of connection between admiration and motivation there may be good reason to accept. A number of philosophers have advocated a connection between admiration and motivation to emulate. I will start by examining this view. I will present three problems for this view. Before suggesting an expanded account of the connection between admiration and motivation according to which admiration involves motivation to promote the value that is judged to be present in the object of admiration. Finally I will examine the implications of this account for the use of admiration in education.
    Found 1 week ago on Alfred Archer's site
  4. 682323.400858
    Strengthening the prejacent Posted on Tuesday, 12 Jun 2018 Sometimes, when we say that someone can (or cannot, or must, or must not) do P, we really mean that they can (cannot, must, must not) do Q, where Q is logically stronger than P. By what linguistic mechanism does this strengthening come about? …
    Found 1 week ago on wo's weblog
  5. 732795.400882
    By Gordon Hull One of the things that marketers like about big data is that they can personalize ads. That operation is getting increasingly sophisticated. We’ve known for a while that basic personality traits (like introversion/extraversion) can be predicted from Facebook likes. …
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on New APPS
  6. 940434.400911
    The key idea of this paper is that human communication is first and foremost a matter of negotiating commitments, rather than one of conveying intentions, beliefs, and other mental states. Every speech act causes the speaker to become committed to the hearer to act on a propositional content. Hence, commitments are relations between speakers, hearers, and propositions; their purpose is to enable speakers and hearers to coordinate their actions. To illustrate the potential of the approach, commitment-based analyses are offered for a representative sample of speech act types, conversational implicatures, and common ground.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on Bart Geurts's site
  7. 1272283.400946
    Presentism is typically characterised as the thesis that everything (unrestrictedly) is present, and therefore there are (quantifying unrestrictedly) no dinosaurs or Martian presidential inaugurations. Putting aside the vexed question of exactly what it is to be present in this context (see Williamson in Modal logic as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013; Cameron in Anal Philos 57:110–140, 2016; Deasy in Noûs 51:378–397, 2017), this thesis seems quite straightforward. However, a number of authors—such as Merricks (Mind 104:521–531, ), Lombard (Philosophia 27:253–260, 1999), Meyer (New papers on the present, Philosophia Ver-lag, Munich, pp 67–90, 2012), Tallant (Erkenntnis 79:479–501, ) and Sakon (Philosophia 43:1089–1109, 2015)—have argued that Presentism so characterised is either trivially true or false even by Presentist lights. This is the so-called Triviality Argument against Presentism. In this paper I show that three of the four premises of the Triviality Argument are plausibly false. I conclude that Presentists have nothing to fear from the Triviality Argument.
    Found 2 weeks ago on PhilPapers
  8. 1329615.40097
    Possible worlds semantics is an extremely well-established approach to the semantics of modals , but it faces a range of difficulties for at least certain types of modals, especially deontic modals with their distinction between heavy and light permissions and obligations. This paper outlines a new semantics of modals that aims to overcome some of those difficulties. This semantics is based on an a novel ontology of modal objects, entities like obligations, permissions, needs, as well as epistemic states, abilities, and essences. Moreover, it is based on truthmaking, more precisely the notion of exact truthmaking, in the sense of Fine’s (2014, 2017, to appear a, b) recent truthmaker semantics. Unlike in Fine’s truthmaker semantics, the notion of exact truthmaking (or satisfaction) is taken to apply not only to sentences, but also to modal objects. Thus, situations or actions may be (exact) truthmakers (or satisfiers) not only of sentences, but also of entities like obligations, permissions, and essences. I will call this object-based truthmaker semantics. Object-based truthmaker semantics applies particularly well to deontic modals, which this paper will focus on. But it is meant to apply to all modals, and it will be indicated how it can generalize. The paper will in particular suggest an application of object-based truthmaker semantics to metaphysical modality based on essences as modal objects.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on Friederike Moltmann's site
  9. 1504724.400998
    Plurality is an important phenomenon in natural language as well as in our thought. Typical sentences with plurals are those below: (1) a. The students gathered. b. The students slept. c. The students lifted the box. definite plural noun phrases like the students do not stand for single objects, but for pluralities of objects. As such, they allow for various sorts of plural predicates: collective predicates as in (1a), predicates that distribute over the individuals making up the plurality as in (1b), and predicates allowing for both a collective and a distributive interpretation as in (1c). In addition to definite plurals that stand for particular pluralities, natural language displays plural quantification, as below: (2) a. Some students gathered. b. Most students gathered. c. Ten students lifted the box.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on Friederike Moltmann's site
  10. 1514115.401023
    Big news! An experiment called MiniBooNE at Fermilab in Chicago has found more evidence that neutrinos are not acting as the Standard Model says they should: • The MiniBooNE Collaboration, Observation of a significant excess of electron-like events in the MiniBooNE short-baseline neutrino experiment. …
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on Azimuth
  11. 1572808.401053
    Many philosophical discussions are about relations where an entity or some entities, in the most general sense of the terms, give rise others: two oxygen atoms give rise to the oxygen molecule they compose; Socrates and the number 2 give rise to the set they form, {Socrates, 2}; the facts that p is true and that q is true give rise to the fact that p ∧ q is true. Bennett calls such relations “building relations”. The central, and very ambitious, aim of Making Things Up is to present necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to this ‘unified family of building relations’ (p. 2) and to give an account of the phenomenon of fundamentality with the means of building.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on PhilPapers
  12. 1744363.401077
    At their most basic, logic is the study of consequence, and information is a commodity. Given this, the interrelationship between logic and information will centre on the informational consequences of logical actions or operations conceived broadly. The explicit inclusion of the notion of information as an object of logical study is a recent development. It was by the beginning of the present century that a sizable body of existing technical and philosophical work (with precursors that can be traced back to the 1930s) coalesced into the new emerging field of logic and information (see Dunn 2001).
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  13. 1886853.401101
    I was at an academic conference last week, somewhere in America, where we were invited by our hosts to place a 'preferred pronoun' sticker on our nametags. "If you could pick one of those up during the next break, we'd appreciate it." …
    Found 3 weeks ago on Eric Schliesser's blog
  14. 2158406.401129
    There were some really good papers last month. The three I picked to summarize all involve error-based learning on fast time-scales. One is in the saccade system in monkeys, the other in the songbird system in…songbirds. …
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on The Brains Blog
  15. 2274335.401163
    By Gordon Hull In a recent paper, Karen Yeung introduces the concept of a ‘hypernudge’ as a way to capture the way Big Data intensifies design-based ‘nudges’ as a form of regulation. Yeung’s discussion draws partly from discussions of Internet regulation, partly from literature on design, and partly from legal literature around privacy and big data. …
    Found 3 weeks, 5 days ago on New APPS
  16. 2337794.401193
    Stacie Friend raises a problem of “co-identification” involving fictional names such as ‘Hamlet’ or ‘Odysseus’: how to explain judgments that different uses of these names are “about the same object”, on the assumption of irrealism about fictional characters on which such expressions do not refer. To deal with this issue, she contrasts a Kripke-inspired “name-centric” approach, pursued among others by Sainsbury, with an Evans-inspired “info-centric” approach, which she prefers. The approach is motivated by her rejection of descriptivist ways of dealing with the problem. In this paper, I rely on the presuppositional, reference-fixing form of descriptivism I favor for the semantics of names, and I explain how it helps us deal with Friend's problem, which I take to concern primarily the semantic contribution of names to ascriptions of representational content to fictions. The result is a form of the “name-centric” sort of approach that Friend rejects, which can (I'll argue) stand her criticisms.
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on Manuel Garcia-Carpintero's site
  17. 2468397.401219
    Gómez-Torrente advances a methodological argument in favor of the “disquotational”, Tarski-inspired theory of pure quotation, DT, which he has been contributing to make the perhaps most widely supported view in recent years, against all other theories including the Davidsonian, demonstrative Deferred Ostension DO view that I myself favor. He argues that they all make quotation “an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon” (op. cit., 353). In this paper I aim to turn the methodological tables on him. I will reply to Gómez-Torrente’s objections to DO, and I will show that DT fares no better on the data he brings to bear. To tip the scale, I will show that, unlike DO, DT creates a division in the interpretation of quotations for which its proponents have not given any good support, by distinguishing those which semantically refer to their intuitive referents, and those which merely speaker-refer to them. I’ll conclude that DO still affords the “loveliest” explanations.
    Found 4 weeks ago on Manuel Garcia-Carpintero's site
  18. 2517954.401244
    Logical monists and pluralists disagree about how many correct logics there are; the monists say there is just one, the pluralists that there are more. Could it turn out that both are wrong, and that there is no logic at all? Such a view might with justice be called logical nihilism and here I’ll assume a particular gloss on what that means: nihilism is the view that there are no laws of logic, so that all candidates—e.g. the law of excluded middle, modus ponens, disjunctive syllogism et. al.—fail. Nihilism might sound absurd, but the view has come up in recent discussions of logical pluralism. Some pluralists have claimed that different logics are correct for different kinds of case, e.g. classical logic for consistent cases and paraconsistent logics for dialethic ones. Monists have responded by appealing to a principle of generality for logic: a law of logic must hold for absolutely all cases, so that it is only those principles that feature in all of the pluralist’s systems that count as genuine laws of logic. The pluralist replies that the monist’s insistence on generality collapses monism into nihilism, because, they maintain, every logical law fails in some cases.
    Found 4 weeks, 1 day ago on Gillian Russell's site
  19. 2585307.401269
    1. We express our personality by what we say and by what we do. 1.1 What we say we say with words... 1.2 What we do, we do in many ways, and these ways "show" a personality. 1.21 "Style" is a word sometimes used to describe this. …
    Found 4 weeks, 1 day ago on Eric Schliesser's blog
  20. 2676691.401297
    This edition of the newsletter continues a focus on pedagogy and outreach—of teaching Native American and Indigenous philosophy and of creating supports for Native American and other underrepresented students so that more see college and further study of philosophy as live options for themselves.
    Found 1 month ago on Alex Guerrero's site
  21. 2717593.401325
    « The stupidest story I ever wrote (it was a long flight) PDQP/qpoly = ALL I’ve put up a new paper. Unusually for me these days, it’s a very short and simple one (8 pages)—I should do more like this! Here’s the abstract: We show that combining two different hypothetical enhancements to quantum computation—namely, quantum advice and non-collapsing measurements—would let a quantum computer solve any decision problem whatsoever in polynomial time, even though neither enhancement yields extravagant power by itself. …
    Found 1 month ago on Scott Aaronson's blog
  22. 2728845.401349
    Metalinguistic approaches to names hold that proper names are semantically associated with name-bearing properties. I argue that metalinguistic theorists owe us an account of the metaphysics of those properties. The unique structure of the debate about names gives an issue which might look to be narrowly linguistic an important metaphysical dimension. The only plausible account of name-bearing treats name-bearing properties as a species of response-dependent property. I outline how such an account should look, drawing on forms of response-dependence identified in the literature on colour, moral properties, etc. Having done that, I show how the account can illuminate a feature of the communicative function of names which would otherwise be puzzling from the perspective of metalinguistic accounts.
    Found 1 month ago on Ergo
  23. 3148078.401379
    Since Keenan & Stavi (1986), exceptive phrases (EPs) like but/except Luciano have been taken to modify generalized quantifiers by subtracting their complements from the ‘host’ quantifier’s domain. Thus, an EP entails a negatively-restricted relative clause (NRR).
    Found 1 month ago on Daniel Lassiter's site
  24. 3254315.401403
    Have you ever had an argument with someone about an issue that you cared deeply about, and you just knew you were right? But the other person kept citing statistics and studies and factual claims that felt suspect to you, but you couldn't prove it on the spot. …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on James K. Stanescu's blog
  25. 3376355.401427
    Situational irony is, first, explained as a severe violation of one or more established, non-moral norms; such violation constitutes that situation’s absurdity. The classical “inversion” theory of communicative irony associated with Cicero and Quintilian, as well as its refinement in terms of the notion of conversational implicature (Grice 1989), are then shown to be inadequate. The echoic (Sperber (1984), Wilson (2006), Wilson & Sperber (2012)) and pretence (Currie 2010) theories are also shown to fail to account for the broad range of communicative irony, although they each contain valuable insights. Further, both theories hold that ironic speakers express attitudes but do not explain how they do so. On the basis of prior work by Green conceptualizing the notion of expression as signaling and showing a psychological state, we defend a view of communicative irony as expressing a sense of a situation’s absurdity. The view generalizes beyond absurdity to encompass expression of a sense of situations’ silliness, wackiness, or goofiness, and accommodates milder forms of irony such as we find in meiosis.
  26. 3425931.401452
    We advocate and develop a states-based semantics for both nominal and adjectival confidence reports, as in Ann is confident/has confidence that it’s raining, and their comparatives Ann is more confident/has more confidence that it’s raining than that it’s snowing. Other examples of adjectives that can report confidence include sure and certain. Our account adapts Wellwood’s account of adjectival comparatives in which the adjectives denote properties of states, and measure functions are introduced compositionally. We further explore the prospects of applying these tools to the semantics of probability operators. We emphasize three desirable and novel features of our semantics: (i) probability claims only exploit qualitative resources unless there is explicit compositional pressure for quantitative resources; (ii) the semantics applies to both probabilistic adjectives (e.g., likely) and probabilistic nouns (e.g., probability); (iii) the semantics can be combined with an account of belief reports that allows thinkers to have incoherent probabilistic beliefs (e.g. thinking that A & B is more likely than A) even while validating the relevant purely probabilistic claims (e.g. validating the claim that A & B is never more likely than A). Finally, we explore the interaction between confidence-reporting discourse (e.g., I am confident that...) and belief-reports about probabilistic discourse (e.g., I think it’s likely that...).
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  27. 3491347.401476
    Classical logic is characterized by the familiar truth-value semantics, in which an interpretation assigns one of two truth values to any propositional letter in the language (in the propositional case), and a function from a power of the domain to the set of truth values in the predicate case. Truth values of composite sentence are assigned on the basis of the familiar truth functions. This abstract semantics immediately yields an applied semantics in the sense that the truth value of an interpreted sentence is given by the truth value of that sentence in an interpretation in which the propositional variables are given the truth values of the statements that interpret them. So if p is interpreted as the statement “Paris is in France” and q as “London is in Italy” then the truth value of “p ∨ q” is |p ∨ q| where the interpretation | | is given by |p| = T and |q| = F. And since the truth value of |A ∨ B| is defined as
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  28. 3609431.4015
    Roger Swyneshed, in his treatise on insolubles (logical paradoxes), dating from the early 1330s, drew three notorious corollaries of his solution. The third states that there is a contradictory pair of propositions both of which are false. This appears to contradict the Rule of Contradictory Pairs, which requires that in every such pair, one must be true and the other false. Looking back at Aristotle’s treatise De Interpretatione, we find that Aristotle himself, immediately after defining the notion of a contradictory pair, gave counterexamples to the rule. Thus Swyneshed’s solution to the logical paradoxes is not contrary to Aristotle’s teaching, as many of Swyneshed’s contemporaries claimed. Dialetheism, the contemporary claim that some propositions are both true and false, is wedded to the Rule, and in consequence divorces denial from the assertion of the contradictory negation.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  29. 3674897.401523
    Margaret Gilbert has long defended the view that, roughly speaking, agents share the intention to perform an action if and only if they jointly commit to performing that action.1 This view has proven both influential and controversial. While some authors have raised concerns over the joint commitment view of shared intention, including at times offering purported counterexamples to certain aspects of the view, straightforward counterexamples to the view as a whole have yet to appear in the literature.2 Here we provide such counterexamples to show that joint commitment is neither necessary nor sufficient for shared intention.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
  30. 3691693.401548
    Might counterfactuals Posted on Tuesday, 08 May 2018 A might counterfactual is a statement of the form 'if so-and-so were the case then such-and-such might be the case'. I used to think that there are different kinds of might counterfactuals: that sometimes the 'might' takes scope over the entire conditional, and other times it does not. …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on wo's weblog