1. 59300.433166
    I present hitherto unexplored and unaccounted for uses of ‘wants’. I call them advisory uses, on which information inaccessible to the desirer herself helps determine what it’s true to say she wants. I show that extant theories by Stalnaker, Heim, and Levinson fail to predict it. I also show that they fail to predict true indicative conditionals with ‘wants’ in the consequent. These problems are related: intuitively valid reasoning with modus ponens on the basis of the conditionals in question results in unembedded advisory uses. I consider two fixes, and end up endorsing a relativist semantics, according to which desire attributions express information-neutral propositions. The truth of a desire attribution depends on the state of information at the context of assessment. On this view, ‘wants’ functions as a precisification of ‘ought’, which exhibits similar unembedded and compositional behavior. I conclude by sketching a pragmatic account of the purpose of desire attributions, one that explains why it made sense for them to evolve in this way.
    Found 16 hours, 28 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  2. 177562.433221
    In this paper we re-evaluate Segerberg’s “full DDL” (Dynamic Doxas-tic Logic) from the perspective of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), in its belief-revision-friendly incarnation. We argue that a correct version of full DDL must give up the Success Postulate for dynamic revision. Next, we present (an appropriately generalized and simplified version of) full DDL, showing that it is a generalization of the so-called Topo-logic of Moss and Parikh. We construct AGM-friendly versions of full DDL, corresponding to various revising/contracting operations considered in the Belief Revision literature. We show that DDL can internalize inside one model the “external” doxastic dynamics of DEL, as well as the evidential dynamics investigated by van Benthem and Pacuit. In our Conclusions section, we compare three styles of modeling doxastic dynamics: DDL, DEL and PDL/ETL (the Propositional Dynamic Logic approach, with its Epistemic Temporal Logic variant).
    Found 2 days, 1 hour ago on Alexandru Baltag's site
  3. 248838.433238
    Mathematics is a unique body of knowledge. Among others, it is abstract, exact, efficient, symbolizable, and it provides astonishing applications to the real world. In the domain of philosophy of mathematics the study of the practice of mathematics has gradually become an important area of investigation. What aspects of the human body and mind make the peculiar practice of mathematics possible? In this article, I briefly review some cogntive dimensions that play a crucial role in the creation and consolidation of mathematics. Keywords: Mathematics, abstraction, cognition, language, practice, imagination, philosophy of mathematics.
    Found 2 days, 21 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  4. 619149.433253
    I return to the material in [1] “Paris-Harrington in an NF context”. Various people had commented that the concept of a relatively large set of natural numbers is unstratified, and in that essay I mused about whether or not the extra strength of PH over finite Ramsey was to do with this failure of stratification. In the present—self-contained— note I shall show that—somewhat to my annoyance—it is not: Paris-Harrington has a stratified formulation.
    Found 1 week ago on Thomas Forster's site
  5. 865861.433267
    In this paper I provide a new account of linguistic presuppositions, on which they are ancillary speech acts defined by constitutive norms. After providing an initial intuitive characterization of the phenomenon, I present a normative speech act account of presupposition in parallel with Williamson’s analogous account of assertion. I explain how it deals well with the problem of informative presuppositions, and how it relates to accounts for the Triggering and Projection Problems for presuppositions. I conclude with a brief discussion of the consequences of the proposal for the adequacy of Williamson’s account of assertion.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on Manuel Garcia-Carpintero's site
  6. 1041692.433281
    What is the motivational profile of admiration? In this paper I will investigate what form of connection between admiration and motivation there may be good reason to accept. A number of philosophers have advocated a connection between admiration and motivation to emulate. I will start by examining this view. I will present three problems for this view. Before suggesting an expanded account of the connection between admiration and motivation according to which admiration involves motivation to promote the value that is judged to be present in the object of admiration. Finally I will examine the implications of this account for the use of admiration in education.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Alfred Archer's site
  7. 1065608.433295
    Strengthening the prejacent Posted on Tuesday, 12 Jun 2018 Sometimes, when we say that someone can (or cannot, or must, or must not) do P, we really mean that they can (cannot, must, must not) do Q, where Q is logically stronger than P. By what linguistic mechanism does this strengthening come about? …
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on wo's weblog
  8. 1116080.433308
    By Gordon Hull One of the things that marketers like about big data is that they can personalize ads. That operation is getting increasingly sophisticated. We’ve known for a while that basic personality traits (like introversion/extraversion) can be predicted from Facebook likes. …
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on New APPS
  9. 1323719.433325
    The key idea of this paper is that human communication is first and foremost a matter of negotiating commitments, rather than one of conveying intentions, beliefs, and other mental states. Every speech act causes the speaker to become committed to the hearer to act on a propositional content. Hence, commitments are relations between speakers, hearers, and propositions; their purpose is to enable speakers and hearers to coordinate their actions. To illustrate the potential of the approach, commitment-based analyses are offered for a representative sample of speech act types, conversational implicatures, and common ground.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on Bart Geurts's site
  10. 1655568.433345
    Presentism is typically characterised as the thesis that everything (unrestrictedly) is present, and therefore there are (quantifying unrestrictedly) no dinosaurs or Martian presidential inaugurations. Putting aside the vexed question of exactly what it is to be present in this context (see Williamson in Modal logic as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013; Cameron in Anal Philos 57:110–140, 2016; Deasy in Noûs 51:378–397, 2017), this thesis seems quite straightforward. However, a number of authors—such as Merricks (Mind 104:521–531, ), Lombard (Philosophia 27:253–260, 1999), Meyer (New papers on the present, Philosophia Ver-lag, Munich, pp 67–90, 2012), Tallant (Erkenntnis 79:479–501, ) and Sakon (Philosophia 43:1089–1109, 2015)—have argued that Presentism so characterised is either trivially true or false even by Presentist lights. This is the so-called Triviality Argument against Presentism. In this paper I show that three of the four premises of the Triviality Argument are plausibly false. I conclude that Presentists have nothing to fear from the Triviality Argument.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilPapers
  11. 1712900.433359
    Possible worlds semantics is an extremely well-established approach to the semantics of modals , but it faces a range of difficulties for at least certain types of modals, especially deontic modals with their distinction between heavy and light permissions and obligations. This paper outlines a new semantics of modals that aims to overcome some of those difficulties. This semantics is based on an a novel ontology of modal objects, entities like obligations, permissions, needs, as well as epistemic states, abilities, and essences. Moreover, it is based on truthmaking, more precisely the notion of exact truthmaking, in the sense of Fine’s (2014, 2017, to appear a, b) recent truthmaker semantics. Unlike in Fine’s truthmaker semantics, the notion of exact truthmaking (or satisfaction) is taken to apply not only to sentences, but also to modal objects. Thus, situations or actions may be (exact) truthmakers (or satisfiers) not only of sentences, but also of entities like obligations, permissions, and essences. I will call this object-based truthmaker semantics. Object-based truthmaker semantics applies particularly well to deontic modals, which this paper will focus on. But it is meant to apply to all modals, and it will be indicated how it can generalize. The paper will in particular suggest an application of object-based truthmaker semantics to metaphysical modality based on essences as modal objects.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Friederike Moltmann's site
  12. 1888009.433422
    Plurality is an important phenomenon in natural language as well as in our thought. Typical sentences with plurals are those below: (1) a. The students gathered. b. The students slept. c. The students lifted the box. definite plural noun phrases like the students do not stand for single objects, but for pluralities of objects. As such, they allow for various sorts of plural predicates: collective predicates as in (1a), predicates that distribute over the individuals making up the plurality as in (1b), and predicates allowing for both a collective and a distributive interpretation as in (1c). In addition to definite plurals that stand for particular pluralities, natural language displays plural quantification, as below: (2) a. Some students gathered. b. Most students gathered. c. Ten students lifted the box.
    Found 3 weeks ago on Friederike Moltmann's site
  13. 1897400.433457
    Big news! An experiment called MiniBooNE at Fermilab in Chicago has found more evidence that neutrinos are not acting as the Standard Model says they should: • The MiniBooNE Collaboration, Observation of a significant excess of electron-like events in the MiniBooNE short-baseline neutrino experiment. …
    Found 3 weeks ago on Azimuth
  14. 1956093.43347
    Many philosophical discussions are about relations where an entity or some entities, in the most general sense of the terms, give rise others: two oxygen atoms give rise to the oxygen molecule they compose; Socrates and the number 2 give rise to the set they form, {Socrates, 2}; the facts that p is true and that q is true give rise to the fact that p ∧ q is true. Bennett calls such relations “building relations”. The central, and very ambitious, aim of Making Things Up is to present necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to this ‘unified family of building relations’ (p. 2) and to give an account of the phenomenon of fundamentality with the means of building.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  15. 2127648.433483
    At their most basic, logic is the study of consequence, and information is a commodity. Given this, the interrelationship between logic and information will centre on the informational consequences of logical actions or operations conceived broadly. The explicit inclusion of the notion of information as an object of logical study is a recent development. It was by the beginning of the present century that a sizable body of existing technical and philosophical work (with precursors that can be traced back to the 1930s) coalesced into the new emerging field of logic and information (see Dunn 2001).
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  16. 2270138.433496
    I was at an academic conference last week, somewhere in America, where we were invited by our hosts to place a 'preferred pronoun' sticker on our nametags. "If you could pick one of those up during the next break, we'd appreciate it." …
    Found 3 weeks, 5 days ago on Eric Schliesser's blog
  17. 2541691.433511
    There were some really good papers last month. The three I picked to summarize all involve error-based learning on fast time-scales. One is in the saccade system in monkeys, the other in the songbird system in…songbirds. …
    Found 4 weeks, 1 day ago on The Brains Blog
  18. 2657620.433525
    By Gordon Hull In a recent paper, Karen Yeung introduces the concept of a ‘hypernudge’ as a way to capture the way Big Data intensifies design-based ‘nudges’ as a form of regulation. Yeung’s discussion draws partly from discussions of Internet regulation, partly from literature on design, and partly from legal literature around privacy and big data. …
    Found 1 month ago on New APPS
  19. 2721079.433538
    Stacie Friend raises a problem of “co-identification” involving fictional names such as ‘Hamlet’ or ‘Odysseus’: how to explain judgments that different uses of these names are “about the same object”, on the assumption of irrealism about fictional characters on which such expressions do not refer. To deal with this issue, she contrasts a Kripke-inspired “name-centric” approach, pursued among others by Sainsbury, with an Evans-inspired “info-centric” approach, which she prefers. The approach is motivated by her rejection of descriptivist ways of dealing with the problem. In this paper, I rely on the presuppositional, reference-fixing form of descriptivism I favor for the semantics of names, and I explain how it helps us deal with Friend's problem, which I take to concern primarily the semantic contribution of names to ascriptions of representational content to fictions. The result is a form of the “name-centric” sort of approach that Friend rejects, which can (I'll argue) stand her criticisms.
    Found 1 month ago on Manuel Garcia-Carpintero's site
  20. 2851682.43355
    Gómez-Torrente advances a methodological argument in favor of the “disquotational”, Tarski-inspired theory of pure quotation, DT, which he has been contributing to make the perhaps most widely supported view in recent years, against all other theories including the Davidsonian, demonstrative Deferred Ostension DO view that I myself favor. He argues that they all make quotation “an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon” (op. cit., 353). In this paper I aim to turn the methodological tables on him. I will reply to Gómez-Torrente’s objections to DO, and I will show that DT fares no better on the data he brings to bear. To tip the scale, I will show that, unlike DO, DT creates a division in the interpretation of quotations for which its proponents have not given any good support, by distinguishing those which semantically refer to their intuitive referents, and those which merely speaker-refer to them. I’ll conclude that DO still affords the “loveliest” explanations.
    Found 1 month ago on Manuel Garcia-Carpintero's site
  21. 2901239.433563
    Logical monists and pluralists disagree about how many correct logics there are; the monists say there is just one, the pluralists that there are more. Could it turn out that both are wrong, and that there is no logic at all? Such a view might with justice be called logical nihilism and here I’ll assume a particular gloss on what that means: nihilism is the view that there are no laws of logic, so that all candidates—e.g. the law of excluded middle, modus ponens, disjunctive syllogism et. al.—fail. Nihilism might sound absurd, but the view has come up in recent discussions of logical pluralism. Some pluralists have claimed that different logics are correct for different kinds of case, e.g. classical logic for consistent cases and paraconsistent logics for dialethic ones. Monists have responded by appealing to a principle of generality for logic: a law of logic must hold for absolutely all cases, so that it is only those principles that feature in all of the pluralist’s systems that count as genuine laws of logic. The pluralist replies that the monist’s insistence on generality collapses monism into nihilism, because, they maintain, every logical law fails in some cases.
    Found 1 month ago on Gillian Russell's site
  22. 2968592.433575
    1. We express our personality by what we say and by what we do. 1.1 What we say we say with words... 1.2 What we do, we do in many ways, and these ways "show" a personality. 1.21 "Style" is a word sometimes used to describe this. …
    Found 1 month ago on Eric Schliesser's blog
  23. 3059976.433589
    This edition of the newsletter continues a focus on pedagogy and outreach—of teaching Native American and Indigenous philosophy and of creating supports for Native American and other underrepresented students so that more see college and further study of philosophy as live options for themselves.
    Found 1 month ago on Alex Guerrero's site
  24. 3100878.433604
    « The stupidest story I ever wrote (it was a long flight) PDQP/qpoly = ALL I’ve put up a new paper. Unusually for me these days, it’s a very short and simple one (8 pages)—I should do more like this! Here’s the abstract: We show that combining two different hypothetical enhancements to quantum computation—namely, quantum advice and non-collapsing measurements—would let a quantum computer solve any decision problem whatsoever in polynomial time, even though neither enhancement yields extravagant power by itself. …
    Found 1 month ago on Scott Aaronson's blog
  25. 3112130.433616
    Metalinguistic approaches to names hold that proper names are semantically associated with name-bearing properties. I argue that metalinguistic theorists owe us an account of the metaphysics of those properties. The unique structure of the debate about names gives an issue which might look to be narrowly linguistic an important metaphysical dimension. The only plausible account of name-bearing treats name-bearing properties as a species of response-dependent property. I outline how such an account should look, drawing on forms of response-dependence identified in the literature on colour, moral properties, etc. Having done that, I show how the account can illuminate a feature of the communicative function of names which would otherwise be puzzling from the perspective of metalinguistic accounts.
    Found 1 month ago on Ergo
  26. 3531363.43363
    Since Keenan & Stavi (1986), exceptive phrases (EPs) like but/except Luciano have been taken to modify generalized quantifiers by subtracting their complements from the ‘host’ quantifier’s domain. Thus, an EP entails a negatively-restricted relative clause (NRR).
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Daniel Lassiter's site
  27. 3637600.433643
    Have you ever had an argument with someone about an issue that you cared deeply about, and you just knew you were right? But the other person kept citing statistics and studies and factual claims that felt suspect to you, but you couldn't prove it on the spot. …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on James K. Stanescu's blog
  28. 3759640.433655
    Situational irony is, first, explained as a severe violation of one or more established, non-moral norms; such violation constitutes that situation’s absurdity. The classical “inversion” theory of communicative irony associated with Cicero and Quintilian, as well as its refinement in terms of the notion of conversational implicature (Grice 1989), are then shown to be inadequate. The echoic (Sperber (1984), Wilson (2006), Wilson & Sperber (2012)) and pretence (Currie 2010) theories are also shown to fail to account for the broad range of communicative irony, although they each contain valuable insights. Further, both theories hold that ironic speakers express attitudes but do not explain how they do so. On the basis of prior work by Green conceptualizing the notion of expression as signaling and showing a psychological state, we defend a view of communicative irony as expressing a sense of a situation’s absurdity. The view generalizes beyond absurdity to encompass expression of a sense of situations’ silliness, wackiness, or goofiness, and accommodates milder forms of irony such as we find in meiosis.
  29. 3809216.433667
    We advocate and develop a states-based semantics for both nominal and adjectival confidence reports, as in Ann is confident/has confidence that it’s raining, and their comparatives Ann is more confident/has more confidence that it’s raining than that it’s snowing. Other examples of adjectives that can report confidence include sure and certain. Our account adapts Wellwood’s account of adjectival comparatives in which the adjectives denote properties of states, and measure functions are introduced compositionally. We further explore the prospects of applying these tools to the semantics of probability operators. We emphasize three desirable and novel features of our semantics: (i) probability claims only exploit qualitative resources unless there is explicit compositional pressure for quantitative resources; (ii) the semantics applies to both probabilistic adjectives (e.g., likely) and probabilistic nouns (e.g., probability); (iii) the semantics can be combined with an account of belief reports that allows thinkers to have incoherent probabilistic beliefs (e.g. thinking that A & B is more likely than A) even while validating the relevant purely probabilistic claims (e.g. validating the claim that A & B is never more likely than A). Finally, we explore the interaction between confidence-reporting discourse (e.g., I am confident that...) and belief-reports about probabilistic discourse (e.g., I think it’s likely that...).
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilPapers
  30. 3874632.433679
    Classical logic is characterized by the familiar truth-value semantics, in which an interpretation assigns one of two truth values to any propositional letter in the language (in the propositional case), and a function from a power of the domain to the set of truth values in the predicate case. Truth values of composite sentence are assigned on the basis of the familiar truth functions. This abstract semantics immediately yields an applied semantics in the sense that the truth value of an interpreted sentence is given by the truth value of that sentence in an interpretation in which the propositional variables are given the truth values of the statements that interpret them. So if p is interpreted as the statement “Paris is in France” and q as “London is in Italy” then the truth value of “p ∨ q” is |p ∨ q| where the interpretation | | is given by |p| = T and |q| = F. And since the truth value of |A ∨ B| is defined as
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilPapers