1. 81998.31672
    Gerundive imagination reports with an embedded reflexive subject (e.g. Zeno imagines himself swimming ) are ambiguous between an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ reading: the inside reading captures the imaginer’s directly making the described experience (here: swimming); the outside reading captures the imaginer’s having an experience of an event, involving his own counterpart, from an out-of-body point of view (watching one’s counterpart swim). Our paper explains the inside/outside-ambiguity through the observation (i) that imagining can referentially target different phenomenal experiences – esp. proprioception (i.e. bodily feeling) and visual perception (seeing, watching) – and (ii) that imagining and its associated experience can both be de se. Inside/outside readings then arise from intuitive constraints in the lexical semantics of verbs like feel, see. Keywords: Inside/outside readings · Imagistic perspective · Experiential imagining · Self-imagining · Counterfactual parasitism.
    Found 22 hours, 46 minutes ago on Markus Werning's site
  2. 136854.316832
    In Part I of this paper, we identified and compared various schemes for trivalent truth conditions for indicative conditionals, most notably the proposals by de Finetti (1936) and Reichenbach (1935, 1944) on the one hand, and by Cooper (Inquiry, 11, 295–320, 1968) and Cantwell (Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 49, 245– 260, ) on the other. Here we provide the proof theory for the resulting logics DF/TT and CC/TT, using tableau calculi and sequent calculi, and proving soundness and completeness results. Then we turn to the algebraic semantics, where both logics have substantive limitations: DF/TT allows for algebraic completeness, but not for the construction of a canonical model, while CC/TT fails the construction of a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra. With these results in mind, we draw up the balance and sketch future research projects.
    Found 1 day, 14 hours ago on Lorenzo Rossi's site
  3. 136878.316853
    The notion of grounding is usually conceived as an objective and explanatory relation. It connects two relata if one—the ground—determines or explains the other—the consequence. In the contemporary literature on grounding, much effort has been devoted to logically characterize the formal aspects of grounding, but a major hard problem remains: defining suitable grounding principles for universal and existential formulae. Indeed, several grounding principles for quantified formulae have been proposed, but all of them are exposed to paradoxes in some very natural contexts of application. We introduce in this paper a first-order formal system that captures the notion of grounding and avoids the paradoxes in a novel and non-trivial way. The system we present formally develops Bolzano’s ideas on grounding by employing Hilbert’s ε-terms and an adapted version of Fine’s theory of arbitrary objects.
    Found 1 day, 14 hours ago on Lorenzo Rossi's site
  4. 136969.31687
    In a recent paper, Justin D’Ambrosio (2020) has offered an empirical argument in support of a negative solution to the puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger—namely, the question of whether, in the famous scene from Shakespeare’s play, Macbeth sees a dagger in front of him. D’Ambrosio’s strategy consists in showing that “seeing” is not an existence-neutral verb; that is, that the way it is used in ordinary language is not neutral with respect to whether its complement exists. In this paper, we offer an empirical argument in favor of an existence-neutral reading of “seeing”. In particular, we argue that existence-neutral readings are readily available to language users. We thus call into question D’Ambrosio’s argument for the claim that Macbeth does not see a dagger. According to our positive solution, Macbeth sees a dagger, even though there is not a dagger in front of him.
    Found 1 day, 14 hours ago on PhilPapers
  5. 375341.316885
    This paper presents challenge cases for prominent pragmatic responses to the proviso problem. The proviso problem (Geurts 1996, 1999) is the problem for many theories of presupposition of explaining why sentences predicted to semantically presuppose ψP seem in certain uses to commit the speaker to an unconditional presupposition P — for instance, why a use of (1) would typically commit the speaker not merely to (1a), but to the logically stronger (1b).
    Found 4 days, 8 hours ago on Alex Silk's site
  6. 564103.316899
    It has been known for some time that context-dependence poses a problem for disquotationalism, but the problem has largely been regarded as one of detail: one that will be solved by the right sort of cleverness. I argue here that the problem is one of principle and that extant solutions, which are based upon the notion of translation, cannot succeed.
    Found 6 days, 12 hours ago on PhilPapers
  7. 595972.316914
    Gödel’s slingshot-argument proceeds from a referential theory of definite descriptions and from the principle of compositionality for reference. It outlines a metasemantic proof of Frege’s thesis that all true sentences refer to the same object—as well as all false ones. Whereas Frege drew from this the conclusion that sentences refer to truth-values, Gödel rejected a referential theory of definite descriptions. By formalising Gödel’s argument, it is possible to reconstruct all premises that are needed for the derivation of Frege’s thesis. For this purpose, a reference-theoretical semantics for a language of first-order predicate logic with identity and referentially treated definite descriptions will be defined. Some of the premises of Gödel’s argument will be proven by such a reference-theoretical semantics, whereas others can only be postulated. For example, the principle that logically equivalent sentences refer to the same object cannot be proven but must be assumed in order to derive Frege’s thesis. However, different true (or false) sentences can refer to different states of affairs if the latter principle is rejected and the other two premises are maintained. This is shown using an identity criterion for states of affairs according to which two states of affairs are identical if and only if they involve the same objects and have the same necessary and sufficient condition for obtaining.
    Found 6 days, 21 hours ago on PhilPapers
  8. 670981.316927
    Welcome to the Brains Blog’s Symposium series on the Cognitive Science of Philosophy! The aim of the series is to examine the use of methods from the cognitive sciences to generate philosophical insight. …
    Found 1 week ago on The Brains Blog
  9. 737294.316944
    It is one of the great good fortunes of my life that I was able to count Dick as a friend for almost 40 years. I first met him shortly after I arrived at the University in 1975 as a new assistant professor in the Philosophy Department. I moved to California in 1999, but the friendship continued at a distance after that.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on David Malament's site
  10. 1004641.31697
    Strategic speakers often convey their messages by insinuation or innuendo, or by using so-called code words or dogwhistles. Why? Many hold that retaining deniability is one key factor here: people often use these indirect forms of communication because they want to retain deniability. In this paper, we shed light on various questions and puzzles that surround the notion of deniability at issue by offering an account of deniability. On our account, deniability is an epistemic phenomenon. A speaker has deniability if she can make it epistemically irrational for her audience to reason in certain ways. To avoid predictable confusion, we distinguish deniability from a practical correlate we call untouchability. Roughly, a speaker has untouchability if she can make it practically irrational for her audience to act in certain ways.
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on Julia Zakkou's site
  11. 1127953.316987
    It has been argued recently (in Beall (2009) and Beall and Murzi (2013)) that dialetheist theories are unable to express the concept of naive validity. In this paper, we will show that LP can be non-trivially expanded with a naive validity predicate. The resulting theory, LPVal reaches this goal by adopting a weak self-referential procedure. We show that LPVal is sound and complete with respect to the three-sided sequent calculus SLPVal.
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Buenos Aires Logic Group
  12. 1128048.317001
    The aim of this paper is to explore the peculiar case of infectious logics, a group of systems obtained generalizing the semantic behavior characteristic of the {¬, ∧, ∨}-fragment of the logics of nonsense, such as the ones due to Bochvar and Hallden, among others. Here, we extend these logics with classical negations, and we furthermore show that some of these extended systems can be properly regarded as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) and Logics of Formal Undeterminedness (LFUs).
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Buenos Aires Logic Group
  13. 1606037.317014
    Supervenience in metaethics is the notion that there can be no moral difference between two acts, persons or events without some non-moral difference underlying it. If St. Francis is a good man, there could not be a man exactly like St. Francis in non-evaluative respects that is not good. The phenomenon was first systematically discussed by R. M. Hare (1952), who argued that realists about evaluative properties struggle to account for it. As is well established, Hare, and following him, Simon Blackburn, mistakenly took the relevant phenomenon to be weak rather than strong supervenience, and the explanations they offered for it are accordingly outdated. In this paper, I present a non-factualist account of strong supervenience of the evaluative and argue that it fares better than competing realist views in explaining the conceptual nature of the phenomenon, as well as in offering an account of the supervenience of the evaluative in general, rather than more narrowly the moral. While Hare and Blackburn were wrong about the specifics, they were right in that non-factualists can offer a plausible account of the supervenience of the evaluative, that in certain respects is superior to competing realist explanations.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on PhilPapers
  14. 1775118.317028
    The relation between literal meaning (semantics) and inferences based on language use (pragmatics) has been the subject of a longstanding debate in philosophy and linguistics and important progress has been made in the development of diagnostics to distinguish between semantic and pragmatic inference and in the formal derivation of the latter from general principles of conversation. On the canonical view, pragmatic inference (aka conversational implicature) is derivable by general conversational principles, is cancellable, and is not embeddable under logical operators. Semantic inference, instead, lacks all these properties.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Maria Aloni's site
  15. 2017152.317041
    Frege’s Puzzle is a founding problem in analytic philosophy. It lies at the intersection of central topics in the philosophy of language and mind: the theory of reference, the nature of propositional attitudes, the nature of semantic theorizing, the relation between semantics and pragmatics, etc. The puzzle concerns the relation between the referential significance of a sentence (or utterance)—i.e., the way it portrays properties and relations as distributed over objects—and its cognitive significance. ‘Cognitive significance’ is an umbrella term, used to pick out a range of cognitively relevant features of a sentence: the state of mind a speaker could express with it, the kinds of evidence the speaker takes to be relevant to it, the states of mind in others she can use it to report, etc. Frege’s Puzzle seems to show that reference and cognitive significance don’t align in the way that independent considerations suggest they should. This chapter is an overview of the puzzle and of the space of contemporary approaches to it.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on Aidan Gray's site
  16. 2155355.317055
    Here is a natural way of thinking of how propaganda impairs democracy. Democracy is a space of neutral deliberative reason. In such a space, participants in a discussion solely focus on exchanging reasons. Since the space of deliberation is neutral, it is devoid of biased perspective. Since it is devoid of biased perspective, the best argument wins. Why, according to this picture, do we not live in a democracy? Because propaganda prevents the neutral exchange of reason. Propaganda wields perspective as a weapon, sometimes explicitly, other times covertly, masking perspective behind a facade of apparent neutrality. Propaganda excites emotion, and fosters in-group bonding, impeding rationality. Propaganda is thus a mortal threat to the realization of the democratic ideal. Propaganda and ideological discourse are barriers to the neutral space of reasons that is the liberal ideal.
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on Jason Stanley's site
  17. 2156697.317084
    Prior to Kripke’s seminal work on the semantics of modal logic, McKinsey offered an alternative interpretation of the necessity operator, inspired by the Bolzano-Tarski notion of logical truth. According to this interpretation, ‘it is necessary that A’ is true just in case every sentence with the same logical form as A is true. In our paper, we investigate this interpretation of the modal operator, resolving some technical questions, and relating it to the logical interpretation of modality and some views in modal metaphysics. In particular, we present an hitherto unpublished solution to problems 41 and 42 from Friedman’s 102 problems, which uses a different method of proof from the solution presented in the paper of Tadeusz Prucnal. A common conception of a logical truth, often credited to Bolzano, is that of a sentence true in virtue of its logical form alone. In a given interpreted language one might make this precise by stipulating a sentence to be logically true if and only if the result of uniformly substituting any of the non-logical constants with expressions of the same grammatical category is true, and dually, logically consistent if and only if some substitution instance is true. For instance, ‘if John is tall then John is tall’ is a logical truth, since the result of substituting any name and predicate for ‘John’ and ‘is tall’ respectively results in a truth, whereas ‘John is tall’ is not a logical truth because it is either already false or the result of substituting the predicate ‘not tall’ for ‘tall’ in it is false.
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on Andrew Bacon's site
  18. 2472700.317101
    When I was starting out in my academic career, I was assigned a senior colleague as a mentor. This is not an unusual practice. The hope is that the senior colleague can provide advice on how to navigate the thickets of academic life. …
    Found 4 weeks ago on John Danaher's blog
  19. 2474951.317118
    This paper formulates a bilateral account of harmony, which is an alternative to the one proposed by Francez. It builds on an account of harmony for unilateral logic proposed by K ürbis and the observation that reading some of the rules for the connectives of bilateral logic bottom up gives the grounds and consequences of formulas with the opposite speech act. Thus the consequences of asserting a formula give grounds for denying it, namely if the opposite speech act is applied to the consequences. Similarly, the consequences of denying a formula give grounds for asserting the formula. I formulate a process of inversion, which allows the determination of assertive elimination rules from assertive introduction rules, and rejective elimination rules from rejective introduction rules, and conversely. It corresponds to Francez’s notion of vertical harmony. I also formulate a process of conversion, which allows the determination of rejective introduction rules from certain assertive elimination rules and conversely, and the determination for assertive introduction rules from certain rejective elimination rules and conversely. It corresponds to Francez’s notion of horizontal harmony.
    Found 4 weeks ago on PhilPapers
  20. 2506151.317132
    P Ω defined by a utility function u, an ambiguity index φ, and a belief µ over a set P of probabilities. We provide an axiomatic foundation for the representation, taking as a primitive a preference over standard Anscombe-Aumann acts. We study a special case where P is a subjective statistical model that is point identified, i.e. the decision maker believes that the true law p ∈ P can be recovered empirically. Our main axiom is a joint weakening of Savage’s sure-thing principle and Anscombe- Aumann’s mixture independence. In addition, we show that the parameters of the representation can be uniquely recovered from preferences, thereby making operational the separation between ambiguity attitude and perception, an hallmark feature of the smooth ambiguity representation.
    Found 4 weeks, 1 day ago on Luciano Pomatto's site
  21. 2515918.317146
    The sentence The boss fired the employee who is always late invites the defeasible inference that the speaker is attempting to convey that the lateness caused the firing (cf. The boss fired the employee who is from Philadelphia, which does not invite an analogous inference). We argue that such inferences cannot be understood in terms of familiar approaches to extrasemantic enrichment such as implicature, impliciture, explicature, or species of local enrichment already in the literature. Rather, we propose that they arise from more basic cognitive strategies, grounded in processes of coherence establishment, that thinkers use to make sense of the world. Attention to such cases provides a richer and more varied landscape of extrasemantic enrichment than has been appreciated to date.
    Found 4 weeks, 1 day ago on Jonathan Cohen's site
  22. 2532869.317159
    The problem of intentional inexistence arises because the following (alleged) intuitions are mutually conflicting: it seems that sometimes we think about things that do not exist; it seems that intentionality is a relation between a thinker and what such a thinker thinks about; it seems that relations entail the existence of what they relate. In this paper, I argue for what I call a radical relationist solution. First, I contend that the extant arguments for the view that relations entail the existence of their relata are wanting. In this regard, I defend a kind of pluralism about relations according to which more than one kind of relation involves non-existents. Second, I contend that there are reasons to maintain that all thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things they are about. More accurately, I contend that the radical relationist solution is to be preferred to both the intentional content solution (as developed by Crane) and the adverbial property solution (as developed by Kriegel). Finally, I argue that once the distinction between thinking “X” and thinking about X has been drawn, the radical relationist solution can handle issues like ontological commitment, substitutivity failure, scrutability, and non-specificity.
    Found 4 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  23. 2706468.317173
    Many commentators hold that Frege is committed to the existence of an infinite hierarchy of independent indirect senses and we are left totally in the dark as to just what these are. (Carnap 1947/1956, Kripke 2008, e.g.). In consequence of this, some have held that Frege’s theory has the unfortunate result that languages that can express indirect discourse are unlearnable (Davidson 1968). I maintain that neither is the case.
    Found 1 month ago on PhilPapers
  24. 2764536.317186
    The present paper argues that there is a knowledge norm for conversational implicature: one may conversationally implicate p only if one knows p. Linguistic data about the cancellation behavior of implicatures and the ways they are challenged and criticized by speakers is presented to support the thesis. The knowledge norm for implicature is then used to present a new consideration in favor of the KK thesis. It is argued that if implicature and assertion have knowledge norms, then assertion requires not only knowledge but iterated knowledge: knowing that you know that you know that . . . you know. Such a condition on permissible assertion is argued to be plausible only if the KK thesis is true.
    Found 1 month ago on PhilPapers
  25. 2793866.3172
    A classical result by Słupecki states that a logic L is functionally complete for the 3-element set of truth-values THREE if, in addition to functionally including Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued logic Ł3, what he names the ‘ -function’ is definable in L. By leaning upon this classical result, we prove a general theorem for defining binary expansions (i.e., expansions with a binary connective) of Kleene’s strong logic that are functionally complete for THREE.
    Found 1 month ago on Gemma Robles's site
  26. 2923196.317213
    Presuppositions of complex sentences are empirically distinguished from the propositional contexts that render a sentence coherent. This distinction is at the heart of the proviso problem for presupposition projection. Here we show that Karttunen’s inference-based approach in his proposals from the early 1970s can be used to directly avoid the proviso problem. Inference-based projection is different from trivalent accounts or satisfaction-based methods in distinguishing presuppositions from admittance conditions on contexts. This distinction is used within a new propositional fragment, whose rules for updating local contexts and satisfying presuppositions are explained using the same Incrementality principle of previous accounts, but without any of the additional assumptions that have been used to tackle the proviso problem.
    Found 1 month ago on Yoad Winter's site
  27. 2923239.317227
    Many languages have verbal stems like hug and marry whose intransitive realization is interpreted as reciprocal. Previous semantic analyses of such reciprocal intransitives rely on the assumption of symmetric participation. Thus, ‘Sam and Julia hugged’ is assumed to entail both ‘Sam hugged Julia’ and ‘Julia hugged Sam’. In this paper we report experimental results that go against this assumption. It is shown that although symmetric participation is likely to be preferred by speakers, it is not a necessary condition for accepting sentences with reciprocal verbs. To analyze the reciprocal alternation, we propose that symmetric participation is a typical feature connecting the meanings of reciprocal and binary forms. This accounts for the optionality as well as to the preference of this feature. Further, our results show that agent intentionality often boosts the acceptability of sentences with reciprocal verbs. Accordingly, we propose that intentionality is another typical semantic feature of such verbs, separate from symmetric participation.
    Found 1 month ago on Yoad Winter's site
  28. 2923303.317241
    Classic works define presuppositions of a sentence S as conclusions that follow from both S and its negation. Other studies focus on the necessary conditions for admitting S as true or false, assuming that those conditions converge with S’s presuppositions. Here we study this assumption in three systems: asymmetric Kleene truth tables, Heim’s admittance-based theory, and a new propositional calculus inspired by Karttunen’s entailment-based approach. Common versions of the Kleene and Heim systems are known to be semantically congruent, and we show that they identify presuppositions with admittance conditions. By contrast, it is proved that the proposed Karttunen calculus distinguishes the two notions. This aspect of the Karttunen calculus avoids the “proviso problem” for the Kleene/Heim approaches: the generation of presuppositions that appear to be too weak.
    Found 1 month ago on Yoad Winter's site
  29. 3024504.317254
    It so rarely happens that witnesses of the same transaction perfectly and entirely agree in all points connected with it, that an entire and complete coincidence in every particular, so far from strengthening their credit, not unfrequently engenders a suspicion of practice and concert.
    Found 1 month ago on Lydia McGrew's site
  30. 3168274.317268
    In this paper, we axiomatize the deontic logic in Fusco 2015, which uses a Stalnaker-inspired account of diagonal acceptance and a two-dimensional account of disjunction to treat Ross’s Paradox and the Puzzle of Free Choice Permission. On this account, disjunction-involving validities are a priori rather than necessary. We show how to axiomatize two-dimensional disjunction so that the introduction/elimination rules for boolean disjunciton can be viewed as one-dimensional projections of more general two-dimensional rules. These completeness results help make explicit the restrictions Fusco’s account must place on free-choice inferences. They are also of independent interest, as they raise difficult questions about how to ‘lift’ a Kripke frame for a one-dimensional modal logic into two dimensions.
    Found 1 month ago on Melissa Fusco's site