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664471.866104
In this paper we will try to provide a solid form of intrinsic set theoretical optimism. In other words, we will try to vindicate Gödel’s views on phenomenology as a method for arriving at new axioms of ZFC in order to decide independent statements such as CH. Since we have previously written on this very same subject [41, 43, 44], it is necessary to provide a justification for addressing it once again.
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664522.866206
I discuss the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic approaches to reformulating a theory with symmetries, and offer an account of the special value of intrinsic formalisms, drawing on a distinction between which mathematical expressions are meaningful within an extrinsic formalism and which are not.
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664567.866217
This work explores the connection between logical independence and the algebraic structure of quantum mechanics. Building on results by Brukner et al., it introduces the notion of onto-epistemic ignorance : situations in which the truth of a proposition is not deducible due to an objective breakdown in the phenomenal chain that transmits information from a system A to a system B, rather than to any subjective lack of knowledge. It is shown that, under such conditions, the probabilities accessible to a real observer are necessarily conditioned by decidability and obey a non-commutative algebra, formally equivalent to the fundamental postulates of quantum mechanics.
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664591.866225
In the 1960s and 1970s a series of observations and theoretical developments highlighted the presence of several anomalies which could, in principle, be explained by postulating one of the following two working hypotheses: (i) the existence of dark matter, or (ii) the modification of standard gravitational dynamics in low accelerations. In the years that followed, the dark matter hypothesis as an explanation for dark matter phenomenology attracted far more attention compared to the hypothesis of modified gravity, and the latter is largely regarded today as a non-viable alternative. The present article takes an integrated history and philosophy of science approach in order to identify the reasons why the scientific community mainly pursued the dark matter hypothesis in the years that followed, as opposed to modified gravity. A plausible answer is given in terms of three epistemic criteria for the pursuitworthiness of a hypothesis: (a) its problem-solving potential, (b) its compatibility with established theories and the feasibility of incorporation, and (c) its independent testability. A further comparison between the problem of dark matter and the problem of dark energy is also presented, explaining why in the latter case the situation is different, and modified gravity is still considered a viable possibility.
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726819.866233
The puzzle of aphantasia concerns how individuals reporting no visual imagery perform more-or-less normally on tasks presumed to depend on it [1]. In his splendid recent review in TiCS, Zeman [2] canvasses four ‘cognitive explanations’: (i) differences in description; (ii) ‘faulty introspection’; (iii) “unconscious or ‘sub-personal’ imagery”; and (iv) total lack of imagery. Difficulties beset all four. To make progress, we must recognize that imagery is a complex and multidimensional capacity and that aphantasia commonly reflects partial imagery loss with selective sparing. Specifically, I propose that aphantasia often involves a lack of visual-object imagery (explaining subjective reports and objective correlates) but selectively spared spatial imagery (explaining Some researchers have suggested that aphantasics may have failed to follow instructions or engage imagery [7]. This is unconvincing. In studies of galvanic skin responses, trials were excluded in which subjects failed to demonstrate ‘proper reading and comprehension’ of the frightening stories. Thus, it remains a mystery why spontaneous imagery did not emerge [6]. Similarly, in studies of pupillary light responses, aphantasics showed a characteristic in-task correlation between pupil and stimulus set size, indicating that they were not “‘refusing’ to actively participate…due to…a belief that they are unable to imagine” [5]. Aphantasics also do voluntarily form images in other tasks despite a lack of incentives [8].
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750924.86624
Scientists decide to perform an experiment based on the expectation that their efforts will bear fruit. While assessing such expectations belongs to the everyday work of practicing scientists, we have a limited understanding of the epistemological principles underlying such assessments. Here I argue that we should delineate a “context of pursuit” for experiments. The rational pursuit of experiments, like the pursuit of theories, is governed by distinct epistemic and pragmatic considerations that concern epistemic gain, likelihood of success, and feasibility. A key question that arises is: what exactly is being evaluated when we assess experimental pursuits? I argue that, beyond the research questions an experiment aims to address, we must also assess the concrete experimental facilities and activities involved, because (1) there are often multiple ways to address a research question, (2) pursuitworthy experiments typically address a combination of research questions, and (3) experimental pursuitworthiness can be boosted by past experimental successes. My claims are supported by a look into ongoing debates about future particle colliders.
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750947.866249
The question of which scientific ideas are worth pursuing is a fundamental challenge in science, particularly in fields where the stakes are high, and resources are limited. When the research is also time-sensitive, then the challenge becomes even greater. Philosophers of science have analyzed the pursuitworthiness of science from multiple perspectives, on topics ranging from whether there is a logic of pursuit (Feyerabend 1975; Shaw 2022), whether scientific standards ought to be relaxed in times of “fast science” (Friedman and Šešelja 2023; Stegenga 2024) as well as the role of criticism in evaluating scientific pursuits (DiMarco and Khalifa 2022).
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750972.866257
This article revisits Taurek’s famous question: Should the greater number be saved in situations of resource scarcity? At the heart of this debate lies a central issue in normative ethics—whether numerical superiority can constitute a moral pro tanto reason. Engaging with this question helps to illuminate core principles of normative theory. Welfarismmin presents a pro-number position. The article first outlines Taurek’s original argument. It then examines non-welfarist responses and explains why they remain unsatisfactory. Finally, it identifies the main shortcomings of the hybrid welfarismmin approach and suggests a possible alternative for more adequately addressing the Taurek problem.
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814064.866265
The EA Forum is currently hosting a fun debate (courtesy of) over whether morality is objective. Many of the anti-realists seem to find it mysterious how there could be a fact of the matter as to which fundamental normative standards are correct. …
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824340.866272
Tarot is widely disdained as a way of finding things out. Critics claim it is bunk or—worse— a wretched scam. This disdain misunderstands both tarot and the activity of finding thing out. I argue that tarot is an excellent tool for inquiry. It initiates and structures percipient conversation and contemplation about important, challenging, and deep topics. It galvanises creative attention, especially towards inward-looking, introspective inquiry and openminded, collaborative inquiry with others. Tarot can cultivate virtues like epistemic playfulness and cognitive dexterity.
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835932.866283
Very short summary: This is a two-part essay on the crisis of contemporary liberalism. I argue that this crisis reflects the growing influence of a conception of the political as a praxis that is beyond human rationality and reason. …
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837082.866291
The epistemic projection approach (EPA) is an intermediate approach to value management in science. It recognizes that there are sometimes good reasons to make research responsive to contextual values, but it achieves this responsiveness via the careful formulation of a research problem in the problem-selection stage of investigation. EPA is thus an approach that could be acceptable to some parties on both sides of the debate over the value-free ideal. Independent of this, EPA provides practitioners with concrete guidance on how to make research responsive to contextual values. This is illustrated with an example involving air pollution.
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837104.866298
Key elements of the recent dialectic surrounding the hole argument in the philosophy of general relativity are clarified by close attendance to the nature of scientific representation. I argue that a structuralist account of representation renders the purported haecceitistic differences between target systems irrelevant to the representational role of models of general relativity. Framing the hole argument in this way helps resolve the impasse in the literature between Weatherall and Pooley and Read.
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837131.866305
People are often interested in physics due to its purported objectivity. It aims to truly be a study of nature (φύσεις) in itself. On the other hand, physics is a human construct, a language we use to describe the world as we experience it. In our quest for absolute reality, then, it seems that we must rid our description of the world of all subjectivity. This lecture concerns part of a story of such an attempt: the quest for absolute measurement. We will consider physical and philosophical aspects of the attempts of Maxwell, Peirce, and Planck to rid our language of physical measurement of undue subjectivity. This will shed some light on the possibility of knowing absolute reality—and the possibility of communication with aliens.
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945739.866312
In this paper I develop a view of token causation that is inspired by Anscombe’s Causality and Determination, and is likely what she meant by “causality consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its causes”. On this view, token causation is not a logical relation, even in a very broad sense, and so is very different from logical consequence, conditional probability, and counterfactual dependence. Instead, causation is a kind of ontological dependence, so that to cause something means to confer existence on it. Causation is thus absent from physics, but I argue that recognising this absence enables us to make sense of the direction of time and the stability of physical probabilities.
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983447.86632
The debate about laws of nature mainly focuses on the laws’ connection to regularities and modal facts. The much-discussed inference problem concerns why ‘it is a law that p’ entails ‘p’. Another problem (the ‘modality problem’) is about the need to explain the laws’ relation to counterfactuals, causation, and dispositions. In this paper, we argue that a third problem, the ‘normativity problem’, should play an equally important role in the debate: A theory of laws needs to explain the laws’ distinctive significance for what agents ought to do and believe. We argue that, just like the other two problems, the normativity problem poses distinct challenges for Humeans and non-Humeans and that it should be taken into account when comparing different views of laws.
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989961.866327
I was going to post the following as Deep Thoughts XLIII, in a series of posts meant to be largely tautologous or at least trivial statements:
- Everyone older than you was once your age. And then I realized that this is not actually a tautology. …
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1003571.866334
In this paper, I challenge the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism by arguing that the inference principle it relies upon is not well motivated. The sorts of non-question-begging instances that might be offered in support of it fall short.
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1003593.866344
It is commonplace to note that libertarians about free will face a compatibility problem of their own. Indeterminism appears to be at odds with freedom rather than a condition for it, since it injects only chance or luck into the etiology of action. This problem, the luck problem, is widely regarded as unique to libertarians. However, this is false. Compatibilists face the same luck problem that animates libertarians. In this paper, I set out what the luck problem is and why compatibilists face it too. I then show that the most natural resources one might think a compatibilist should use to solve the problem are insufficient. I close with a proposal for compatibilists.
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1005902.866353
Bryan here. Last month, I blogged on “The Strange Economics of HOT Lanes.” Today, my co-author Zixuan Ma argues that two little-known regulations explain why “overpricing” is plausibly profit-maximizing after all. …
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1010126.866359
Achilles and the tortoise compete in a race where the beginning (the start) is at point O and end (the finish) is at point P. At all times the tortoise can run at a speed that is a fraction of Achilles' speed at most (with being a positive real number lower than 1, 0 < < 1), and both start the race at t = 0 at O. If the trajectory joining O with P is a straight line, Achilles will obviously win every time. It is easy to prove that there is a trajectory joining O and P along which the tortoise has a strategy to win every time, reaching the finish before Achilles.
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1010148.866368
In recent years, there has been heightened interest in (at least) two threads regarding geometrical aspects of spacetime theories. On the one hand, physicists have explored a richer space of relativistic spacetime structures than that of general relativity, in which the conditions both of torsion-freeness and of metric compatibility are relaxed—this has led to the study of so-called ‘metricaffine theories’ of gravitation, on which see e.g. Hehl et al. (1995) for a masterly review. On the other hand, physicists have been increasingly interested in securing a rigorous and fully general understanding of the non-relativistic limit of general relativity—this has to novel version of Newtonian physics, potentially with spacetime torsion (‘Type II’ Newton–Cartan theory—see Hansen et al. (2022) for a systematic overview).
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1063318.866375
▼ AbStrACt Since the early days of its professionalization, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the history of science has been seen as a bridge between the natural sciences and the humanities. However, only one aspect of this triadic nexus, the relations between the history of science and the natural sciences, has been extensively discussed. The other aspect, the relations between the history of science and the humanities, has been less commented upon. With this paper I hope to make a small step towards redressing this imbalance, by discussing the relationships between the history of science and two other humanistic disciplines that have been historically and institutionally associated with it: the philosophy of science and general history. I argue that both of these relationships are marked by the characteristics of an unrequited friendship: on the one hand, historians of science have ignored, for the most part, calls for collaboration from their philosopher colleagues; and, on the other hand, historians specializing in other branches of history have been rather indifferent, again for the most part, to the efforts of historians of science to understand science as a historical phenomenon.
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1085157.866382
I argue that rationality does not always require proportioning one’s beliefs to one’s evidence. I consider cases in which an agent’s evidence deteriorates over time, revealing less about the world or the agent’s location than their earlier evidence. I claim that the agent should retain beliefs that were supported by the earlier evidence, even if they are no longer supported by the later evidence. Failing to do so would violate an attractive principle of epistemic conservatism; it would foreseeably decrease the accuracy of the agent’s beliefs; it would make the agent susceptible to simple Dutch Books; it would allow them to manipulate their evidence to increase their confidence in desirable propositions over which they have no control. I defend the background assumption that dynamic considerations are relevant to epistemic rationality.
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1087772.866389
Sebens and Carroll (2018) propose that self-locating uncertainty, constrained by their Epistemic Separability Principle (ESP), derives Born rule probabilities in Everettian quantum mechanics. Their global branching model, however, leads to local amplitudes lost, undermining this derivation. This paper argues that global branching’s premature splitting of observers, such as Bob in an EPR-Bohm setup, yields local pure states devoid of amplitude coefficients essential for Born rule probabilities. Despite their innovative framework, further issues with global branching—conflicts with decoherence, relativistic violations via physical state changes, and constraints on superposition measurements—render it empirically inadequate. Defenses, such as invoking global amplitudes, fail to resolve these flaws. Additionally, observer-centric proofs of the Born rule neglect objective statistics, weakening their empirical grounding. This analysis underscores the need to reconsider branching mechanisms to secure a robust foundation for Everettian probabilities.
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1103336.866396
Imagine living in a society where most people (at least in the privileged classes) regularly participate in perpetuating a moral atrocity—slavery, say, or factory farming; any practice you’re deeply appalled by will do. …
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1145417.866403
I want to argue for this thesis:
- For a punishment P for a fault F to be right, P must stand in a causal-like relation to P.
What is a causal-like relation? Well, causation is a causal-like relation. …
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1178170.86641
I have long believed in what philosophers call “libertarian free will.” This isn’t about political philosophy, but philosophy of mind. Holding all physical conditions constant, determinism holds that there is exactly one thing that I can do. …
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1194166.866416
This article defends the compatibility of evolutionary theory and religious belief against the objection that God could not have intentionally brought humans into existence given that the evolutionary process by which humans came into existence crucially involves random genetic mutation. The thought behind the objection is that a process cannot be both random and intended by God to unfold as it does.
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1197410.866425
When we count, we often count fractions, too. We contend that fractional counting involves partial entities, which are merely possible parts of entities of the counted kind. The size of these possible parts is measured with respect to the size of a possible member of that kind. Therefore, partialhood is mereomodal, and the logical form of fractional counting claims includes mereological predicates, modal operators, and a measurement functor. Different varieties of modality and forms of measurement are involved, depending on the kinds of entities to be counted and the context. The mereomodal account validates the idea that fractional counting is a way of counting by identity, in continuity with logic-based accounts of non-fractional counting, albeit more complex than them. Such an account also explains why some kinds of entities are not involved in partialhood and cannot be fractionally counted, while others only have marginal involvement in these phenomena. In the last part, we discuss some difficult cases and show that an integrity condition for partial entities is required in the logical form of some fractional counting claims.