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533119.653988
In grand ceremony King Lear parcels out his kingdom, intending afterwards to retire, and “unburdened crawl toward death.” But who shall get what? For this he runs a royal bonus round, and the contestants, his daughters, must answer, “Which of you shall we say doth love us most?” After insincere speeches from Goneril and Regan, Cordelia, his favorite, won’t play—“I love your Majesty according to my bond, no more nor less.” Furious, Lear disowns her: “I disclaim all my parental care...and as a stranger to my heart and me hold thee from this forever.” Soon the elder sisters, newly-empowered, strip Lear of his armed attendants and his dignity, in a delicious Shakespearean phrase:
Be then desired By her that else will take the thing she begs, A little to diquantity your train,
and Lear is left out in a storm, helpless, in the company of fools and madness. …
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566002.654244
Mainstream statistical physics proceeds by assigning probability functions to classical systems, and mixed quantum states to quantum systems, and then calculating synchronic and diachronic properties of those functions. Recent philosophy of physics refers to this mainstream approach as “Gibbsian statistical mechanics” (henceforth GSM) and contrasts it, usually unfavorably, to (so-called) “Boltzmannian statistical mechanics”, in which the role of probability is lessened and in some versions eliminated altogether.
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566027.654265
One type of computational indeterminacy arises from partitioning a system’s physical state space into state types that correspond to the abstract state types underlying the computation concerned. The mechanistic individuative strategy posits that computation can be uniquely identified through either narrow physical properties exclusively or wide, proximal properties. The semantic strategy posits that computation should be uniquely identified through semantic properties. We develop, and defend, an alternative functional individuative strategy that appeals—when needed—to wide, distal functions. We claim that there is no actual computation outside of a functional context. Desiderata for the underlying notion of teleofunction are discussed.
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566057.654284
Species lists play an important role in biology and practical domains like conservation, legislation, biosecurity and trade regulation. However, their effective use by non-specialist scientific and societal users is sometimes hindered by disagreements between competing lists. While it is well-known that such disagreements exist, it remains unclear how prevalent they are, what their nature is, and what causes them. In this study, we argue that these questions should be investigated using methods based on taxon concept rather than methods based on Linnaean names, and use such a concept-based method to quantify disagreement about bird classification and investigate its relation to research effort. We found that there was disagreement about 38% of all groups of birds recognized as a species, more than three times as much as indicated by previous measures. Disagreement about the delimitation of bird groups was the most common kind of conflict, outnumbering disagreement about nomenclature and disagreement about rank. While high levels of conflict about rank were associated with lower levels of research effort, this was not the case for conflict about the delimitation of bird groups. This suggests that taxonomic disagreement cannot be resolved simply by increasing research effort.
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571829.654295
I wrote a little book about entropy; here’s the current draft:
If you see mistakes in it, please let me know! An alternative title would be 91 Tweets on Entropy, but people convinced me that title wouldn’t age well: in decade or two few people may remember what ‘tweets’ were. …
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601663.654306
TLDR: You’re unsure about something. Then it happens—and you think to yourself, “I kinda expected that.” Such hindsight bias is commonly derided as irrational. But any Bayesian who is (1) unsure of exactly what they think, and (2) trusts their own judgment should exhibit hindsight bias. …
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610932.654317
I led a session of a workshop, recently, on how to write a “trade book” in philosophy. I don’t love the phrase “trade book,” which I’ve put in protective scare-quotes. And I feel some discomfort, too, in being cast as an authority. …
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680488.654327
It is well known how to define the operator Q for the total charge (i.e., positron number minus electron number) on the standard Hilbert space of the second-quantized Dirac equation. Here we ask about operators QA representing the charge content of a region A ⊆ R in 3d physical space. There is a natural formula for QA but, as we explain, there are difficulties about turning it into a mathematically precise definition. First, QA can be written as a series but its convergence seems hopeless. Second, we show for some choices of A that if QA could be defined then its domain could not contain either the vacuum vector or any vector obtained from the vacuum by applying a polynomial in creation and annihilation operators. Both observations speak against the existence of QA for generic A.
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680496.654336
This is the second of several short interviews on AI and agency. In the interest of our guests’ and audience’s time, the interviews will be brief, but each interview is supplemented with a reading list that allows readers to explore the topic in greater depth. …
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680629.654347
As to whether time is real Some say yes and some say no. This dispute I’ll settle now: Sitting still, I’ve felt time go. I believe that what we see As a progress of events Is a progress of events, Not a timeless tapestry. …
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683233.654358
[Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Marc Artiga replaces the
former entry
on this topic by the previous author.]
The concept of information is widely used in the biological sciences. Informational concepts are central to molecular biology, where it is
standard to talk about translation, transcription, proofreading,
redundancy, DNA libraries, the genetic code, genetic editing, or the
genetic program. Genes are also meant to carry information about our
evolutionary past. Information is a key notion in cognitive science;
cognitive systems are said to trade on information, which is connected
to talk of mental representation, neural signals, neurotransmitters,
and so forth.
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692126.654393
Whenever we communicate, we inevitably have to say one thing before another. This means introducing particularly subtle patterns of salience into our language. In this paper, I introduce ‘order-based salience patterns,’ referring to the ordering of syntactic contents where that ordering, pretheoretically, does not appear to be of consequence. For instance, if one is to describe a colourful scarf, it wouldn’t seem to matter if one were to say it is ‘orange and blue’ or ‘blue and orange.’ Despite their apparent triviality, I argue that order-based salience patterns tend to make the content positioned first more salient – in the sense of attention-grabbing – in a way that can have surprising normative implications. Giving relative salience to gender differences over similarities, for instance, can result in the activation of cognitively accessible beliefs about gender differences. Where those beliefs are epistemically and/or ethically flawed, we can critique the salience pattern that led to them, providing an instrumental way of evaluating those patterns. I suggest that order-based salience patterns can also be evaluated on constitutive grounds; talking about gender differences before similarities might constitute a subtle form of bias. Finally, I reflect on how the apparent triviality of order-based salience patterns in language gives them an insidious strength.
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692151.654404
Standard approaches to ontological simplicity focus either on the number of things or types a theory posits or on the number of fundamental things or types a theory posits. In this paper, I suggest a ground-theoretic approach that focuses on the number of something else. After getting clear on what this approach amounts to, I motivate it, defend it, and complete it.
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692173.654414
We spend much of our adult lives thinking and reminiscing about particular events of the past, which, by their very nature, can never be repeated. What is involved in a capacity to think thoughts of this kind? In this paper, I propose that such thoughts are essentially connected with a capacity to communicate about past events, and specifically in the special way in which events of the past are valued and shared in our relationships with one another. I motivate this proposal by way of the claim that such thoughts are practically useless: there are no practical, forward-looking tasks that require information which is specific to particular past events. Thus I suggest that thoughts of this specific kind have a home only in the cognitive economy of a creature who finds past events to be of interest for their own sake, and that this interest in the past is a peculiar feature of human social life.
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692197.654425
For several decades, intercultural philosophers have produced an extensive body of scholarly work aimed at mutual intercultural understanding. They have focused on the ideal of intercultural dialogue that is supported by dialogue principles and virtuous attitudes. However, this ideal is challenged by decolonial scholarship as one which neglects power inequalities. Decolonial scholars have emphasized the differences between cultures and worldviews, shifting the focus to colonial history and radical alterity. In return, intercultural philosophers have worried about the very possibility of dialogue and mutual understanding in frameworks that use coloniality as their singular pole of analysis. In this paper, we explore the complex relations between decolonial
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692222.654445
Past philosophical analyses of bullshit have generally presented bullshit as a formidable threat to truth. However, most of these analyses also reduce bullshit to a mere symptom of a greater evil (e.g. indifference towards truth). In this paper, I introduce a new account of bullshit which, I argue, is more suited to understand the threat posed by bullshit. I begin by introducing a few examples of “truth-tracking bullshit”, before arguing that these examples cannot be accommodated by past, process-based accounts of bullshit. I then introduce my new, output-based account of bullshit, according to which a claim is bullshit when it is presented as or appears as interesting at first sight but is revealed not to be that interesting under closer scrutiny. I present several arguments in favor of this account, then argue that it is more promising than past accounts when it comes to explaining how bullshit spreads and why it is a serious threat to truth.
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692248.654451
A number of philosophers hold that some types of mental states are composed of two or more mental states. It is commonly thought, for instance, that hoping involves the desire for some outcome to occur and the belief that such an outcome is possible (but has yet to occur). Although the existence of combinatory states (CS’s) is widely accepted, one issue that has not been thoroughly discussed is how we know we token a given combinatory state. This paper aims to fill this lacuna. I do so by first discussing one way of knowing our CS’s—namely, by knowing we token the relevant constituting states, and then inferring that we have the relevant CS from such a knowledge-base. I argue that while anti-skeptics of self-knowledge should embrace the view that we can know our CS’s in this manner, this way of knowing we possess such states is quite demanding. Given the latter, I proceed to examine whether there are alternative ways we can know our CS’s. I defend the view that given the tenability of particular accounts of self-knowledge for non-CS’s, we can avoid the view that we only know our CS’s by in part knowing the constituents of such states.
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692344.654457
People report believing weird things: that the Earth is flat, that senior Democrats are subjecting kidnapped children to abuse, and so on. How can people possibly believe things like this? Some philosophers have recently argued for a surprising answer: people don’t believe these things at all. Rather, they mistake their imaginings for beliefs. They are shmelievers, not believers. In this paper, I consider the prospects for this kind of explanation. I argue that some belief reports are simply insincere, and that much of the evidence for shmeliefs can be explained by the content of the beliefs reported, rather than by the attitude people take to them. But some reported beliefs are good candidates for being shmeliefs. I consider how shmeliefs are acquired and sustained, and why they might be harmful despite not being seriously believed.
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692401.654462
In this paper I aim to undermine Stoic and Neo-Stoic readings of Benedict de Spinoza by examining the latter’s strong agreements with Epicurus (a notable opponent of the Stoics) on the nature and ethical role of pleasure in living a happy life. Ultimately, I show that Spinoza and Epicurus are committed to three central claims which the Stoics reject: (1) pleasure holds a necessary connection to healthy natural being, (2) pleasure manifests healthy being through positive changes in state and states of healthy being per se, and (3) pleasure is by nature good. The Stoics reject these three claims due to their views on pleasant sensations as preferred moral indifferents and passionate pleasures as diseases of the soul, views which Spinoza (due to the above-mentioned commitments) is strongly opposed to, thereby placing him (at least on the subject of pleasure) outside the realm of merely following or improving on Stoic doctrines. From this comparative analysis we also gain deeper insight into both Spinoza’s engagement with ancient Greek philosophy and the value of Epicureanism and Spinozism in helping us achieve and maintain happiness in the present day, particularly with respect to the benefits and harms of bodily and mental pleasures.
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732642.654468
Most philosophers agree that lies are assertions. Most also agree that to presuppose information is different from asserting it. In a series of papers, Viebahn (2020), (2021), along with an empirical study in Viebahn, Wiegmann, Engelmann, and Williemsen (2021), has recently argued that one can lie with presuppositions, and therefore one can assert that p by presupposing that p. The latter conclusion is a rejection of a cornerstone of modern philosophy of language and linguistics, and as such we should require strong reasons for accepting it. I argue here that the reasons for thinking that presuppositions can be lies are too weak to motivate giving up either the view that lies are assertions or the traditional distinction between presuppositions and assertions.
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738434.654473
Higher-order metaphysicians take facts to be higher-order beings, i.e., entities in the range of irreducibly higher-order quantifiers. In this paper, I investigate the impact of this conception of facts on the debate about the reality of tense. I identify two major repercussions. The first concerns the logical space of tense realism: on a higher-order conception of facts, a prominent version of tense realism, dynamic absolutism, turns out to conflict with the laws of (higher-order tense) logic. The second concerns our understanding of the positions occupying this logical space: on a higher-order conception of facts, an attractive interpretation of the central tense realist notion of ‘facts constituting reality’ becomes unavailable. I discuss these results in the context of the more general project of higher-order metaphysics and the (meta)metaphysics of time, drawing out their implications for the nature of the disputes both between realists and anti-realists about tense and between different tense realist factions.
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742132.654479
It is an honor to have been asked to contribute a paper to a Festschrift for John Martin Fischer and it is a pleasure to do so. A paper to be included in a volume honoring a scholar need not, speaking strictly, address that scholar’s work, but I would not dream of contributing an essay to a book honoring John that was not about his work. That resolution, however, confronts me with a problem, for the only things worth anyone’s attention that I have to say about John’s contributions to philosophy pertain to his well-known and influential work on the relation (or lack thereof) between determinism and moral responsibility, and those things I have already said —and said as well as I shall ever be able to. The only solution to this problem seems to me to be to reply to one of John’s criticisms of my own work—which carries the danger of my own work, rather than John’s, becoming the topic of this chapter. My only excuse for risking this unseemly outcome is that when I tried to think of a topic for the essay that addressed John’s work and about which I had something to say that I had not already said, only this came to mind.
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754873.654484
Last month I was on the wonderful Joe Walker Podcast. You can watch the full video, or read the unabridged transcript. Joe handpicked the following highlights:
What did you learn about Japanese urbanism? …
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760951.654489
This paper concerns local yet systematic problems of contrastive underdetermination of model choice in cognitive neuroscience debates about the so-called two visual systems hypothesis. The underdetermination problem is systematically generated by the way certain assumptions about the representationalist nature of computation are translated into experimental practice. The problem is that behavioural data underdetermine the choice between competing representational models. In this paper, I diagnose how these assumptions generate underdetermination problems in the choice between competing functional models of perception– action. Using the tools of philosophy of science, I describe the type of underdetermination and sketch a possible cure.
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776962.654497
This is the summer break and I’m publishing old essays written when the audience of this newsletter was confidential. This post has been originally published March 16, 2022. This morning, I almost fell off from my chair (fortunately, I was in my bed) when I read an op-ed (gated, in French) from Cécile Philippe, head of the libertarian French think tank Molinari Institute. …
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778869.654503
All Humeans hold, roughly, that laws are informative summaries of non-lawful matters of fact. Pragmatic Humeans go further: for them, what makes these summaries the laws is their usefulness to agents like us. By adding elements of our specific epistemic interests and constraints, pragmatists contend, we can arrive at satisfying explanations of otherwise surprising features of our actual laws and our actual scientific practice. But the pragmatic shift is not without problems. The more elements of our particular psychology we add to our nomic formula, the more susceptible we are to idealistic ratbaggery. Intuitively, what can or must happen does not depend on our particular cognitive architecture: we cannot change the laws by changing us. But if laws are distinguished from accidents by features of our psychology or the language our society contingently speaks, then changes in our psychology or culture might lead to differences in what the laws of nature allow. My aim here is to clarify the role of pragmatic constraints, and thereby respond to this challenge from creeping idealism.
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779789.654514
When do two sentences say the same thing, that is, express the same content? We defend two-component (2C) semantics: the view that propositional contents comprise (at least) two irreducibly distinct constituents: (1) truth-conditions and (2) subject-matter. We contrast 2C with one-component (1C) semantics, focusing on the view that subject-matter is reducible to truth-conditions. We identify exponents of this view and argue in favor of 2C. An appendix proposes a general formal template for propositional 2C semantics.
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827474.654522
All facts completely reducible to physics are first-order facts. All facts completely explained by first-order facts are themselves completely reducible to first-order facts. Facts about our epistemic reliability are facts about truth. …
-
827474.654532
In a lovely paper, Leon Porter shows that semantic naturalism is false. One way to put the argument is as follows:
If semantic naturalism is true, truth is a natural property. All natural properties are first order. …
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831500.65454
The truthteller paradox is focused on the sentence:
- This sentence is true. There is no contradiction in taking (1) to be true, but neither is there a contradiction in taking (1) to be false. So where is the paradox? …