1. 65427.555992
    As predicted, the nationalist parties have slightly improved their scores in the European parliamentary elections. Put together, the parties belonging to the European Conservatives & Reformists and Identity & Democracy groups have won 131 seats over the 720 of the European Parliaments, to which we should also add part of the 100 seats earned by non-aligned parties. …
    Found 18 hours, 10 minutes ago on The Archimedean Point
  2. 492203.556134
    We study the anchoring effect in a computational model of group deliberation on preference rankings. Anchoring is a form of path-dependence through which the opinions of those who speak early have a stronger influence on the outcome of deliberation than the opinions of those who speak later. We show that anchoring can occur even among fully rational agents. We then compare the respective effects of anchoring and three other determinants of the deliberative outcome: the relative weight or social influence of the speakers, the popularity of a given speaker’s opinion, and the homogeneity of the group. We find that, on average, anchoring has the strongest effect among these. We finally show that anchoring is often correlated with increases in proximity to single-plateauedness. We conclude that anchoring can constitute a structural bias that might hinder some of the otherwise positive effects of group deliberation.
    Found 5 days, 16 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  3. 514184.556148
    In this paper, I stress the need to broaden the scope of diversity in value-laden ideals of science to include geographic diversity. I argue that egalitarian and normic value-laden ideals have conceptual limitations when considering this dimension. While egalitarian frameworks advocate for a placeless science, normic frameworks predominantly locate scientific knowledge within the “Global North,” highlighting the importance of including “non- Western” perspectives from the “Global South.” These limitations have negative and unjust epistemic consequences: they risk perpetuating cultural imperialism, reproducing a colonial epistemic norming of space, and epistemic exoticization towards scientific communities in subaltern regions.
    Found 5 days, 22 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  4. 599935.556155
    Peter Galison 1,2,3,*, Juliusz Doboszewski 1,4,*, Jamee Elder 1,4,* , Niels C. M. Martens 5,4,6,7,* , Abhay Ashtekar , Jonas Enander , Marie Gueguen 10 , Elizabeth A. Kessler 11, Roberto Lalli 12,13, Martin Lesourd , Alexandru Marcoci 14 Luis Reyes-Galindo 19 , Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez 15 , Priyamvada Natarajan 1,16,17, James Nguyen 18, , Sophie Ritson 20 , Mike D. Schneider 21, Emilie Skulberg 22,23, Helene Sorgner 7,24, , Mike D. Schneider 21, Emilie Skulberg 22,23, Helene Sorgner 7,24, Matthew Stanley 25, Ann C. Thresher 26, Jeroen Van Dongen 22,23, James Owen Weatherall 27 , Jingyi Wu 27
    Found 6 days, 22 hours ago on James Owen Weatherall's site
  5. 656290.556163
    From today June 6 to Sunday, June 9, more than 400 million Europeans are invited to vote for European parliamentary elections. As those who have followed these elections even superficially know, far-right parties are predicted to be making significant progress across the continent compared to previous elections. …
    Found 1 week ago on The Archimedean Point
  6. 735935.556169
    There’s one respect in which philosophical training seems to make (many) philosophers worse at practical ethics. Too many are tempted to treat tidy thought experiments as a model for messy real-world ethical quandaries. …
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Good Thoughts
  7. 810445.556174
    How Constitutional Litigation Can Help End Exclusionary Zoning A guest post by Ilya Somin Here’s a guest essay by Ilya Somin of GMU’s Scalia Law School. While Ilya and I continue to disagree on war and peace, we are (nearly) of one mind on both immigration and housing. …
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Bet On It
  8. 827181.556183
    Famous problems in variable-population welfare economics have led some to suggest that social welfare comparisons over such populations may be incomplete. In the theory of rational choice with incomplete preferences, attention has recently centered on the Expected Multi-Utility framework, which permits incompleteness but preserves vNM independence and can be derived from weak, attractive axioms. Here, we apply this framework to variable-population welfare economics. We show that Expected Multi-Utility for social preferences, combined with a stochastic ex-ante- Pareto-type axiom, characterizes Expected Critical-Set Generalized Utilitarianism, in the presence of basic axioms. The further addition of Negative Dominance, an axiom recently introduced to the philosophy literature, yields a characterization of Expected Critical-Level Generalized Utilitarianism.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Peter Fritz's site
  9. 860630.556189
    In contrast to the history of science and to science and technology studies, the value discourse in the philosophy of science has not provided a thorough analysis of the material culture of science. Instruments in science have a special characteristic, namely that they explicitly and clearly emerge from and remain embedded in social contexts, and are thus imbued with values. We argue that the materials (in most cases they are artifacts) used in science are necessarily influenced by both epistemic and non-epistemic considerations. A consequence of this is that a descriptive term cannot give sufficient information whether an artifact is performing in an acceptable way. Instead of the prevailing descriptive approach, we therefore advocate a normative notion of values in the material culture of science. To this end, we connect the material culture of science to the so-called “new demarcation problem”, in order to lay the foundations for a value-sensitive approach to the analysis of instruments. By assessing the five approaches of demarcation concerning value-influences, it will be shown that they break down at various points if the material aspects of science are taken seriously.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  10. 863306.556195
    Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733), an Anglo-Dutch physician and philosopher, achieved fame through his notorious work The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits. He is most well-known for arguing that economic prosperity depends upon harnessing individuals’ self-interested and even vicious passions, an idea which outraged his contemporaries and has subsequently led to him occupying an important place in the history of economic thought. The Fable of the Bees is a far more wide-ranging work, however, which offers incisive explorations of human nature, the passions, and the origins of moral and social norms.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  11. 901455.556201
    By the power of Gabriel Calzada Álvarez, I’m going to be a visiting professor this summer at the Universidad de las Hespérides in the Canary Islands. I expect it to be a glorious experience for my entire family. …
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on Bet On It
  12. 1091464.556206
    There is a growing consensus among philosophers that quantifying value-laden concepts can be epistemically successful and politically legitimate if all value-laden choices in the process of quantification are aligned with stakeholder values. I argue that proponents of this view have failed to argue for its basic premise: successful quantification is sufficiently unconstrained so that it can be achieved along specific, stakeholder-relative pathways. I then challenge this premise by considering a rare example of successful value-laden quantification in seismology. Seismologists quantified earthquake size precisely by excluding stakeholder values from measure design and testing.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  13. 1091585.556212
    This chapter addresses some outstanding historical issues concerning Paul Feyerabend’s positions on realism and relativism in the 1970s. In the Feyerabend literature, there is general agreement that there is a discernible shift in Feyerabend’s philosophical thinking sometime in the mid-1970s (Preston, 1997; Tsou, 2003; Brown, Brown and Kidd, 2016). John Preston (1997b) characterizes this shift as Feyerabend’s ‘retreat from realism to relativism’: after the publication of the first edition of Against Method (1975) Feyerabend shifts away from realism towards a relativist position, as exemplified in Science in a Free Society (1978). Eric Oberheim (2006) contests Preston’s presentation, suggesting that there’s no discontinuity in Feyerabend’s views on the issue of realism. On Oberheim’s reading, Feyerabend consistently defended a pluralist metaphilosophical view (see Kuby 2021a), but this metaphilosophy did not commit Feyerabend to any specific philosophical positions, such as scientific realism. Hasok Chang (2021) also rejects Preston’s narrative, arguing that Feyerabend never abandoned realism in his career. For Chang, Feyerabend began with a narrow view of realism (‘pluralist realism’) and broadened it over time.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  14. 1377135.556219
    Today, Harry Frankfurt would have turned 95. We lost him last year, a couple of months after his 94th birthday. It would be hard to underestimate the impact he made on my career and my life. He was my teacher when I was an undergraduate and the second reader of my undergraduate thesis (expertly and generously advised by Elijah Millgram), which included a chapter dedicated to articles from his then recently published collection, The Importance of What We Care about. …
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PEA Soup
  15. 1489960.556225
    Human psychology seems to drive us to pick a side in conflicts and then go all in. Hence a disappointing number of those observing the Israel-Hamas war even from a safe and comfortable distance argue not only that one side is in the right, but that it can do no wrong and that the other side is entirely evil. …
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on The Philosopher's Beard
  16. 1497544.556235
    Rob Henderson includes support for open borders on his short list of “luxury beliefs”: When an affluent person advocates for drug legalization, or defunding the police, or open borders, or loose sexual norms, or white privilege, they are engaging in a status display. …
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on Bet On It
  17. 1668853.55624
    This paper critically revises the organisational account of teleology, which argues that living systems are first and foremost oriented towards a goal: maintaining their own conditions of existence. It points out some limitations of this account, mainly in the capability to account for the richness and complexity of biological systems and their purposeful behaviours. It identifies the reason of these limitations in the theoretical grounding of this account, specifically in the too narrow notion of closure of constraints, focused on self- production. It proposes to ground an organisational account of biological teleology in the capability of living system not just to produce and replace their parts, but to control their own internal dynamics and behaviours in such a way as to maintain themselves. This theoretical framework has two advantages. It better captures the distinctive features of biological organisations and consequently the richness and active nature of their purposeful behaviours. By doing so, it makes it possible to apply this framework beyond minimal theoretical models to real biological cases.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  18. 1696413.556249
    Brian Goff’s piece on the cost disease is one of my most-read guest posts. Now he’s written some thoughtful commentary on my recent piece on the RCT agenda. Enjoy! Bryan Your post regarding the ideological presuppositions of RCTs is very insightful and important (looking forward to the book). …
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Bet On It
  19. 1722449.556254
    Moral disagreement pervades our lives. We disagree about the rightness or wrongness of actions, the goodness or badness of outcomes, and the justice or injustice of institutions. These disagreements often seem quite reasonable — and equally intractable. Moral reasoning is hard, requiring us to navigate complex concepts and their intricate and often surprising implications. We come to this task with different life experiences, educations, and social networks, and so with different biases, priors, and evidence bases. And, even when we agree about which moral considerations matter, we often disagree about their weights. Moral thinking, in other words, is subject to the “burdens of judgment” (Rawls 2005, 55–57; compare MacAskill et al. 2020, 11–14). And it is a predictable consequence of these burdens that intelligent people, reasoning in good faith, will come to different conclusions about morality.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  20. 1722481.55626
    The first aim of this essay is to show that, for the purposes of addressing systemic injustice, we need an understanding of emancipatory attention. The second is to indicate some resources from which this might be built.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  21. 1722513.556265
    Here is a paradigmatic case of consent-undermining coercion: Coercion: Badguy reliably threatens Goodguy that unless Goodguy pays Badguy a sum of money, Badguy will beat up Goodguy. Goodguy agrees to pay, and pays. Assuming that no other non-standard complications are in place (such as Badguy for some reason being entitled to the money, and so on), Goodguy’s consent is not valid. If Goodguy transfers the money to Badguy, Badguy does not acquire the relevant property rights in the money (as he would have had the consent been unproblematically valid). If Goodguy signed a document seemingly undertaking a commitment to pay, no such duty has been created (as it would have been had Goodguy’s consent been unproblematically valid).
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  22. 1783620.556271
    Recent analytic-philosophical works in the field of situated cognition have proposed to conceptualize the self as deeply entwined with the environment, and even as constituted by it. A common move has been to characterize the self in narrative terms, and then to argue that the narrative self is partly constituted by narratives about the past that are scaffolded (shaped and maintained) by, or distributed over, a variety of objects that can rekindle episodic memories. While we are sympathetic to these approaches, here we propose a different strategy to situate the self—one which can be seen as complementing the narrative one, and which draws from concepts and ideas central to the phenomenological-existentialist tradition. We suggest, first, that the self has a sense of its past not just via narratives and episodic memories, but in virtue of being embodied and thus, importantly, sedimented (in other words, it has, or rather is, a body memory). Embodiment and sedimentation, in turn, always necessarily imply an environment or a situation, entailing that the self is also inherently situated. Second, we discuss the future-oriented dimension of selfhood, and argue that we understand ourselves as projected into the future, again not necessarily only narratively and reflectively, but also tacitly, in a bodily and inherently situated way.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Giovanna Colombetti's site
  23. 1841901.556276
    Synthetic biology has immense potential to ameliorate widespread environmental damage. The promise of such technology could, however, be argued to potentially risk the public, industry, or governments not curtailing their environmentally damaging behaviour or even worse exploit the possibility of this technology to do further damage. In such cases, there is the risk of a worse outcome than if the technology was not deployed. This risk is often couched as an objection to new technologies, that the technology produces a moral hazard. This paper describes how to navigate a moral hazard argument and mitigate the possibility of a moral hazard. Navigating moral hazard arguments and mitigating the possibility of a moral hazard will improve the public and environmental impact of synthetic biology.
    Found 3 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  24. 1841931.556283
    There has been increased attention on how scientific communities should respond to spurious dissent. One proposed method is to hide such dissent by preventing its publication. To investigate this, I computationally model the epistemic effects of hiding dissenting evidence on scientific communities. I find that it is typically epistemically harmful to hide dissent, even when there exists an agent purposefully producing biased dissent. However, hiding dissent also allows for quicker correct epistemic consensus among scientists. Quicker consensus may be important when policy decisions must be made quickly, such as during a pandemic, suggesting times when hiding dissent may be useful.
    Found 3 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  25. 2014948.55629
    Research on the role of values in science and objectivity has typically approached trust through its epistemic aspects. Yet, recent work on public trust in science has emphasized the role of non-epistemic values in building and maintaining trust. This paper will use a concept of trust that adds concerns about justice to epistemic conditions to investigate this problem in relation to public health. I will argue that trust-conducive values, particularly justice, are relevant in deciding which value influences are legitimate in scientific decision-making. Drawing on public health ethics, I will provide a consequentialist justification for employing trust-conducive values. While several concepts of justice have been explored in the context of public health, I will further draw on public health ethics, focusing on a view that brings together both distributive and procedural aspects. For illustration, I will use the case of cardiovascular disease prevention, particularly how concerns about justice apply when choosing between population-based and individual-based approaches.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  26. 2042159.556295
    On his Substack, Chris Freiman argues that libertarianism is “liberalism without exceptions.” Basically, liberals (in the European meaning of the word) and libertarians agree that the state ought to prioritize a range of civil liberties (freedom of association, freedom of speech, …) but disagree with respect to the status of property. …
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on The Archimedean Point
  27. 2110626.556301
    What's Really Wrong with "Luxury Beliefs" A critique of Rob Henderson, with a callback to Charles Murray I’ve yet to meet Rob Henderson, but I’ve watched some of his cultural criticism, and he seems like a great guy. …
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on Bet On It
  28. 2182814.556307
    Many philosophers hold that generics (i.e., unquantified generalizations) are pervasive in communication and that when they are about social groups, this may offend and polarize people because generics gloss over variations between individuals. Generics about social groups might be particularly common on Twitter (X). This remains unexplored, however. Using machine learning (ML) techniques, we therefore developed an automatic classifier for social generics, applied it to 1.1 million tweets about people, and analyzed the tweets. While it is often suggested that generics are ubiquitous in everyday communication, we found that most tweets (78%) about people contained no generics. However, tweets with generics received more “likes” and retweets. Furthermore, while recent psychological research may lead to the prediction that tweets with generics about political groups are more common than tweets with generics about ethnic groups, we found the opposite. However, consistent with recent claims that political animosity is less constrained by social norms than animosity against gender and ethnic groups, negative tweets with generics about political groups were significantly more prevalent and retweeted than negative tweets about ethnic groups. Our study provides the first ML-based insights into the use and impact of social generics on Twitter.
    Found 3 weeks, 4 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  29. 2303417.556316
    We propose an approach to the evolution of joint agency and cooperative behavior that contrasts with views that take joint agency to be a uniquely human trait. We argue that there is huge variation in cooperative behavior and that while much human cooperative behavior may be explained by invoking cognitively rich capacities, there is cooperative behavior that does not require such explanation. On both comparative and theoretical grounds, complex cognition is not necessary for forms of joint agency, or the evolution of cooperation. As a result, promising evolutionary approaches to cooperative behavior should explain how it arises across many contexts.
    Found 3 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  30. 2305499.556322
    Pregnancy and birth can be approached from many philosophical angles, including philosophy of law, philosophy of biology, and mereology. Some authors have focused on ethical issues surrounding abortion and assisted reproduction, others have discussed pregnancy in phenomenological terms, and others have used pregnancy and/or birth as a springboard for more theoretical reflections on the nature of selfhood, care, embodiment, and personal identity (see entries on feminist perspectives on reproduction and the family, parenthood and procreation, and the grounds of moral status for discussions of these and related issues).
    Found 3 weeks, 5 days ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy