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82766.291513
Philosophy and Society Vol. 30, No. 4, 463–644 Mega-Labs is a Challenging Task That Requires a Combination of Case-Based and Formal Epistemic Approaches. Data-Driven Studies Suggest That Projects Pursued by Smaller Master-Teams (Fewer Members, Fewer Sub-Teams) Are Substantially More Efficient Than Larger Ones Across Sciences, Including Experimental Particle Physics. Smaller Teams Also Seem to Make Better Project Choices Than Larger, Centralized Teams. Yet the Epistemic Requirement of Small, Decentralized, and Diverse Teams Contradicts the Often Emphasized and Allegedly Inescapable Logic of Discovery That Forces Physicists Pursuing the Fundamental Levels of the Physical World to Perform Centralized Experiments in Mega-Labs at High Energies. We Explain, However, That This Epistemic Requirement Could Be Met, Since the Nature of Theoretical and Physical Constraints in High Energy Physics and the Technological Obstacles Stemming From Them Turn Out to Be Surprisingly Open-Ended.
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206814.29175
This paper explores the theme of human limitedness and the virtues in David McPherson’s The Virtues of Limits. I survey some of the main themes of his discussion— including kinds of human limits and the idea of “limiting-virtues”—and indicate salient themes in Buddhist and classical Chinese philosophical traditions. I then suggest that McPherson is too quick to dismiss forms of moral quietism and that his discussion of our limitedness rests on a latent pessimism worthy of further articulation.
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264634.29176
The notion of malfunction is critical to biological explanation. It provides a test-bed for the normative character of functional attribution. Theories of biological functioning must permit traits to operate but, at the same time, be judged as malfunctioning (in some naturalized, non-arbitrary sense). Whereas malfunctioning has attracted most attention and discussion in evolutionary etiological approaches, systemic and organizational ones have been less discussed. The most influential of the organizational approaches (by Saborido, Moreno and Mossio) takes a dual-order approach to malfunctions, as a set of functions that fit first-order constitutive norms but fail to obey second-order regulatory ones. We argue that this conception is unnecessarily complicated (malfunctions do not need to arise as a result of two conflicting orders of norms) and too narrow (it excludes canonical cases of malfunctioning). We provide an alternative organizational account grounded on viability theory. The dynamics of the traits that constitute an organism define the normative field of its viability space: sugar must be replaced at certain rate, blood must be pumped at a certain pace, etc. A trait operates normatively when its effects on the viability space correlate positively with the normative field.
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292106.291768
We draw on value theory in social psychology to conceptualize the range of motives that can influence researchers’ attitudes, decisions, and actions. To conceptualize academic research values, we integrate theoretical insights from the literature on personal, work, and scientific work values, as well as the outcome of interviews and a survey among 255 participants about values relating to academic research. Finally, we propose a total of 246 academic research value items spread over 11 dimensions and 34 sub-themes. We relate our conceptualization and proposed items to existing work and provide recommendations for future scale development. Gaining a better understanding of researchers’ different values can improve careers in science, attract a more diverse range of people to enter science, and elucidate some of the mechanisms that lead to both exemplary and questionable scientific practices.
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422741.291774
1. You can make your child learn the cello, and refuse to serve them candy for breakfast. Parents have these, and other, rights. What is the source, and extent, of these rights? As for source, the welfare of the child is a natural answer: in general and on average, granting parents certain rights is in the best interest of children. …
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437634.291779
I argue that chatbots create a peculiar new kind of responsibility gap, which I call the “speech act responsibility gap”. Unlike the responsibility gaps commonly discussed in the context of self-driving cars and autonomous weapons, speech act responsibility gaps arise from the fact that paradigmatic speech acts like assertions (statements), promises or orders always generate linguistic commitments and entitlements. Unlike more familiar kinds of responsibility gaps, speech act responsibility gaps are inherently interpersonal and directed. I first argue that currently dominant treatments of chatbot speech acts as proxy agents cannot bridge these gaps. I also discuss why current arguments against the existence of responsibility gaps don’t apply in the case of chatbots. Instead, responsibility appears to be best attributed to the chatbot itself. However, this poses a dilemma. Either these machines don’t speak (we are fundamentally mistaken about their output), or we need to engineer (broaden) our notion of responsibility.
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466034.291785
Mexican existentialism grows out of the encounter, engagement, and
appropriation with French and German existentialist philosophies in
Mexico mid-way through the twentieth-century. Key players in this
tradition were José Gaos (1900–1969), Antonio Caso
(1883–1946), and, especially, el grupo Hiperión
(the Hyperion Group). Members of Hyperion, but particularly Emilio
Uranga (1921–1988), Leopoldo Zea (1912–2004), Jorge
Portilla (1918–1963), and Luis Villoro (1922–2014),
focused their efforts on existential reinterpretations of that
which is Mexican (“lo mexicano” or Mexicanness), a
focus that lends this tradition its historical and conceptual
uniqueness and importance.
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473973.29179
"Pirate" training of generative AI is fair use and in the public interest
Property is essentially coercive: property rights exclude others from use of the “owned” good. But there are obvious reasons why property is nonetheless a socially valuable institution (especially for “rival” goods, like a sandwich, that cannot be shared without loss). …
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512200.291795
Sunwin chính chủ sở hữu bộ core game cùng hệ thống chăm sóc khách hàng vô địch. Sunwin hiện nay giả mạo rất nhiều anh em chú ý check kĩ uy tín đường link để đảm bảo an toàn và trải nghiệm game đỉnh cao duy nhất. …
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512200.2918
Sunwin chính chủ sở hữu bộ core game cùng hệ thống chăm sóc khách hàng vô địch. Sunwin hiện nay giả mạo rất nhiều anh em chú ý check kĩ uy tín đường link để đảm bảo an toàn và trải nghiệm game đỉnh cao duy nhất. …
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552992.291805
Hannah Rubin, Mike D. Schneider, Remco Heesen, Alejandro Bortolus, Emelda E. Chukwu, Chad L. Hewitt, Ricardo Kaufer, Veli Mitova, Anne Schwenkenbecher, Evangelina Schwindt, Temitope O. Sogbanmu, Helena Slanickova, Katie Woolaston
Knowledge brokers, usually conceptualized as passive intermediaries between scientists and policymakers in evidence-based policymaking, are understudied in philosophy of science. Here, we challenge that usual conceptualization. As agents in their own right, knowledge brokers have their own goals and incentives, which complicate the effects of their presence at the science-policy interface. We illustrate this in an agent-based model and suggest several avenues for further exploration of the role of knowledge brokers in evidence-based policy.
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610805.291812
Technological understanding is not a singular concept but varies depending on the context. Building on De Jong and De Haro’s (2025) notion of technological understanding as the ability to realise an aim by using a technological artefact, this paper further refines the concept as an ability that varies by context and degree. We extend its original specification for a design context by introducing two additional contexts: operation and innovation. Each context represents a distinct way of realising an aim through technology, resulting in three types (specifications) of technological understanding. To further clarify the nature of technological understanding, we propose an assessment framework based on counterfactual reasoning. Each type of understanding is associated with the ability to answer a specific set of what-if questions, addressing changes in an artefact’s structure, performance, or appropriateness. Explicitly distinguishing these different types helps to focus efforts to improve technological understanding, clarifies the epistemic requirements for different forms of engagement with technology, and promotes a pluralistic perspective on expertise.
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670640.291822
The philosopher Joseph S. Ullian died late last year. He is probably best-known for an introduction to epistemology co-authored with W. V. Quine, that is very much of its time. But what caught my eye in the obits was his reputation as a baseball fanatic. …
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678445.291828
This is a bit of a shaggy dog story, but I think it’s fun, and there’s a moral about the nature of mathematical research. Act 1
Once I was interested in the McGee graph, nicely animated here by Mamouka Jibladze:
This is the unique (3,7)-cage, meaning a graph such that each vertex has 3 neighbors and the shortest cycle has length 7. …
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782696.291833
We develop a theory of policy advice that focuses on the relationship between the competence of the advisor (e.g., an expert bureaucracy) and the quality of advice that the leader may expect. We describe important tensions between these features present in a wide class of substantively important circumstances. These tensions point to the presence of a trade-off between receiving advice more often and receiving more informative advice. The optimal realization of this trade-off for the leader sometimes induces her to prefer advisors of limited competence – a preference that, we show, is robust under different informational assumptions. We consider how institutional tools available to leaders affect preferences for advisor competence and the quality of advice they may expect to receive in equilibrium.
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783783.291839
There are two main strands of arguments regarding the value-free ideal (VFI): desirability and achievability (Reiss and Sprenger 2020). In this essay, I will argue for what I will call a compatibilist account of upholding the VFI focusing on its desirability even if the VFI is unachievable. First, I will explain what the VFI is. Second, I will show that striving to uphold the VFI (desirability) is compatible with the rejection of its achievability. Third, I will demonstrate that the main arguments against the VFI do not refute its desirability. Finally, I will provide arguments on why it is desirable to strive to uphold the VFI even if the VFI is unachievable and show what role it can play in scientific inquiry. There is no single definition of the VFI, yet the most common way to interpret it is that non-epistemic values ought not to influence scientific reasoning (Brown 2024, 2). Non-epistemic values are understood as certain ethical, social, cultural or political considerations. Therefore, it is the role of epistemic values, such as accuracy, consistency, empirical adequacy and simplicity, to be part of and to ensure proper scientific reasoning.
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783800.291844
There is an overwhelmingly abundance of works in AI Ethics. This growth is chaotic because of how sudden it is, its volume, and its multidisciplinary nature. This makes difficult to keep track of debates, and to systematically characterize goals, research questions, methods, and expertise required by AI ethicists. In this article, I show that the relation between ‘AI’ and ‘ethics’ can be characterized in at least three ways, which correspond to three well-represented kinds of AI ethics: ethics and AI; ethics in AI; ethics of AI. I elucidate the features of these three kinds of AI Ethics, characterize their research questions, and identify the kind of expertise that each kind needs. I also show how certain criticisms to AI ethics are misplaced, as being done from the point of view of one kind of AI ethics, to another kind with different goals. All in all, this work sheds light on the nature of AI ethics, and set the grounds for more informed discussions about scope, methods, and trainings of AI ethicists.
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812193.29185
Critical theory arose as a response to perceived inadequacies in
Marxist theory, and perceived changes in modern capitalism. Critical
theorists emphasized the ability of capitalism to shape the thought
and experience of individuals: it distorts how modern society and its
products appear to us, and how we think about them. So, aesthetic
experience – like all other experience – is moulded to and
compromised by capitalism. For critical theory, if we seek to
understand aesthetics we need to acknowledge this distorting
effect. Critical theorists ask us to pay attention to how art, and aesthetic
experience, suffer under capitalism, and become part of the way in
which capitalism prevents the formation of a better life.
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869865.291855
Prioritarianism is generally understood as a kind of moral
axiology. An axiology provides an account of what makes items, in
this case outcomes, good or bad, better or worse. A moral
axiology focuses on moral value: on what makes outcomes
morally good or bad, morally better or worse. Prioritarianism, specifically, posits that the moral-betterness
ranking of outcomes gives extra weight (“priority”) to
well-being gains and losses affecting those at lower levels of
well-being. It differs from utilitarianism, which is indifferent to
the well-being levels of those affected by gains and
losses.[ 1 ]
Although it is possible to construe prioritarianism as a
non-axiological moral view, this entry follows the prevailing approach
and trains its attention on axiological prioritarianism.
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869879.29186
Dehumanization is widely thought to occur when someone is treated or
regarded as less than human. However, there is an ongoing debate about
how to develop this basic characterization. Proponents of the
harms-based approach focus on the idea that to dehumanize someone
is to treat them in a way that harms their humanity; whereas
proponents of the psychological approach focus on the idea
that to dehumanize someone is to think of them as less than
human. Other theorists adopt a pluralistic view that combines elements
of both approaches. In addition to explaining different views on what it means to
dehumanize someone, this article focuses on related issues, such as
how to resolve the so-called “paradox of dehumanization”;
the causes and consequences of dehumanization; the sorts of contexts
in which dehumanization typically occurs; and the relation between
dehumanization and objectification.
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899207.291865
In a recent publication, Kukla (2014) has argued that we should we abandon naturalistic and social constructivist considerations in attempts to define health due to their alleged failure to account for their normativity and instead define them purely in terms of ‘social justice’. Here, I shall argue that such a purely normativist project is self-defeating, and hence, that health and disease cannot be defined through recourse to social justice alone.
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980182.29187
Political disagreement tends to display a “radical” nature that is partly related to the fact that political beliefs and judgments are generally firmly held. This makes people unlikely to revise and compromise on them. …
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1074382.291876
Common moral intuitions are an unprincipled mess. That’s “the trolley problem” in a nutshell. It’s also demonstrated by attempts to distinguish Singer’s drowning child case from our everyday failures to donate to life-saving charities. …
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1274299.291881
Comparative philosophy of religion is a subfield of both philosophy of
religion and comparative philosophy. Philosophy of religion engages
with philosophical questions related to religious belief and practice,
including questions concerning the concept of religion itself. Comparative philosophy compares concepts, theories, and arguments from
diverse philosophical traditions. The term “comparative
philosophy of religion” can refer to the comparative
philosophical study of different religions or of different
philosophies of religion. It can thus be either a first-order
philosophical discipline—investigating matters to do with
religion—or a second-order philosophical discipline,
investigating matters to do with philosophical inquiry into religion.
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1520479.291886
I've been exploring in this newsletter recently how people's growing inability to understand and control the institutions that shape their lives affects their political views (see here or here for instance). …
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1765462.291891
At the start of the pandemic, Peter Singer and I argued that our top priority should be to learn more, fast. I feel similarly about AI, today. I’m far from an expert on the topic, so the main things I want to do in this post are to (i) share some resources that I’ve found helpful as a novice starting to learn more about the topic over the past couple months, and (ii) invite others to do likewise! …
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1874532.291897
According to classical utilitarianism, well-being consists in pleasure or happiness, the good consists in the sum of well-being, and moral rightness consists in maximizing the good. Leibniz was perhaps the first to formulate this doctrine. Bentham made it widely known. For a long time, however, the second, summing part lacked any clear foundation. John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, and Richard Hare all gave arguments for utilitarianism, but they took this summing part for granted. It was John Harsanyi who finally presented compelling arguments for this controversial part of the utilitarian doctrine.
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1908759.291902
[Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Juliana
Bidadanure and David Axelsen replaces the
former entry
on this topic by the previous author.]
Egalitarianism is a school of thought in contemporary political
philosophy that treats equality as the chief value of a just political
system. Simply put, egalitarians argue for equality. They
have a presumption in favor of social arrangements that advance
equality, and they treat deviations from equality as prima
facie suspect. They recommend a far greater degree of equality
than we currently have, and they do so for distinctly egalitarian
reasons.
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2081868.291907
Organ sale – for example, allowing or encouraging consenting
adults to become living kidney donors in return for money – has
been proposed as a possible solution to the seemingly chronic shortage
of organs for transplantation. Many people however regard this idea as
abhorrent and argue both that the practice would be unethical and that
it should be banned. This entry outlines some of the different
possible kinds of organ sale, briefly states the case in favour, and
then examines the main arguments against.
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2110272.291911
This paper considers the mundane ways in which AI is being incorporated into scientific practice today, and particularly the extent to which AI is used to automate tasks perceived to be boring, “mere routine” and inconvenient to researchers. We label such uses as instances of “Convenience AI” — that is situations where AI is applied with the primary intention to increase speed and minimize human effort. We outline how attributions of convenience to AI applications involve three key characteristics: (i) an emphasis on speed and ease of action, (ii) a comparative element, as well as (iii) a subject-dependent and subjective quality. Using examples from medical science and development economics, we highlight epistemic benefits, complications, and drawbacks of Convenience AI along these three dimensions. While the pursuit of convenience through AI can save precious time and resources as well as give rise to novel forms of inquiry, our analysis underscores how the uncritical adoption of Convenience AI for the sake of shortcutting human labour may also weaken the evidential foundations of science and generate inertia in how research is planned, set-up and conducted, with potentially damaging implications for the knowledge being produced. Critically, we argue that the consistent association of Convenience AI with the goals of productivity, efficiency, and ease, as often promoted also by companies targeting the research market for AI applications, can lower critical scrutiny of research processes and shift focus away from appreciating their broader epistemic and social implications.