1. 28065.664843
    Accountability is a cornerstone of the governance of artificial intelligence (AI). However, it is often defined too imprecisely because its multifaceted nature and the sociotechnical structure of AI systems imply a variety of values, practices, and measures to which accountability in AI can refer. We address this lack of clarity by defining accountability in terms of answerability, identifying three conditions of possibility (authority recognition, interrogation, and limitation of power), and an architecture of seven features (context, range, agent, forum, standards, process, and implications). We analyse this architecture through four accountability goals (compliance, report, oversight, and enforcement). We argue that these goals can be complementary, and that policy-makers emphasise or prioritise some over others depending on the use of accountability and the missions of AI governance.
    Found 7 hours, 47 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  2. 86393.66505
    To talk about ethics and the moral life in India, and whether and when Indians misunderstood each other’s views, we must know something about what Indians thought about ethical and moral issues. However, there is a commonly held view among scholars of Indian thought that Indians, and especially their intellectuals, were not really interested in ethical matters (Matilal 1989, 5; Raju 1967, 27; Devaraja 1962, v-vi; Deutsch 1969, 99). This view is false and strange. Understanding how it is that posterity has managed to misunderstand ethics and the moral life in India so profoundly is not something that we can address without thinking about issues pertaining to scholarship, interpretation and translation. Most importantly, studying a culture demands a philosophical engagement with the categories against which one attempts to understand it. If one believes, as many scholars do, that it is a rigorous study of Sanskrit and other classical Indian languages alone that holds the key to understanding classical India, then there is apparently neither need nor room for such reflection. It is this very same failure to engage philosophically with the category of the ethical and its place in translation that has allowed many modern Indians to misunderstand Indians of yore.
    Found 23 hours, 59 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  3. 188789.6651
    Many scientists routinely generalize from study samples to larger populations. It is commonly assumed that this cognitive process of scientific induction is a voluntary inference in which researchers assess the generalizability of their data and then draw conclusions accordingly. Here we challenge this view and argue for a novel account. The account describes scientific induction as involving by default a generalization bias that operates automatically and frequently leads researchers to unintentionally generalize their findings without sufficient evidence. The result is unwarranted, overgeneralized conclusions. We support this account of scientific induction by integrating a range of disparate findings from across the cognitive sciences that have until now not been connected to research on the nature of scientific induction. The view that scientific induction involves by default a generalization bias calls for a revision of our current thinking about scientific induction and highlights an overlooked cause of the replication crisis in the sciences. Commonly proposed interventions to tackle scientific overgeneralizations that may feed into this crisis need to be supplemented with cognitive debiasing strategies to most effectively improve science.
    Found 2 days, 4 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  4. 192929.665142
    Science is a cultural practice, and cultural practices tend to change over time via processes of cultural selection and social learning. There is a long history of philosophers of science arguing that scientific theories evolve through a “critical” evolutionary process where new hypotheses are criticized, modified, eliminated, or replaced (Popper 1972; Hull 1988). More recent work has suggested that other features of science such as methodologies, beliefs, and norms may develop likewise. Such features of science exhibit key characteristics that make them suitable for evolutionary analysis. They are reliably transmitted via pedagogy and cultural imitation, and produce non-random variation that leads to differential success in subsequent transmission. For this reason, a new body of work has emerged looking at cultural evolutionary processes in science. This research addresses topics ranging from the persistence of poor statistical practices, to conservatism in science, to the ideal communication structure for scientific communities.
    Found 2 days, 5 hours ago on Cailin O’Connor's site
  5. 256440.665163
    London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK ‘spontaneous order’, antithetical to design, they now design markets to achieve specific purposes. This paper reconstructs how this change in what markets are and can do came about and considers some consequences. Two decisive developments in economic theory are identified: first, Hurwicz’s view of institutions as mechanisms, which should be designed to align incentives with social goals; and second, the notion of marketplaces – consisting of infrastructure and algorithms – which should be designed to exhibit stable properties. These developments have empowered economists to create marketplaces for specific purposes, by designing appropriate algorithms. I argue that this power to create marketplaces requires a shift in ethical reasoning, from whether markets should reach into certain spheres of life, to how market algorithms should be designed. I exemplify this shift, focusing on bias, and arguing that transparency should become a goal of market design.
    Found 2 days, 23 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  6. 279098.66518
    Supporters of conceptual engineering often use Haslanger’s ameliorative project as a key example of their methodology. However, at face value, Haslanger’s project is no cause for optimism about conceptual engineering. If we interpret Haslanger as seeking to revise how people in general use and understand words such as ‘woman’, ‘man’, etc., then her project has been unsuccessful. And if we interpret her as seeking to reveal the meaning of those words, then her project does not involve conceptual engineering. I develop and defend an alternative interpretation of Haslanger’s project and argue that, so interpreted, it is a successful conceptual engineering project after all. In so doing, I develop what I call a particularist account of the success conditions for conceptual engineering.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on Mark Pinder's site
  7. 372259.665195
    Developing tools is a crucial aspect of experimental practice, yet most discussions of scientific change traditionally emphasize theoretical over technological change. To elaborate on the role of tools in scientific change, I offer an account that shows how scientists use tools in exploratory experiments to form novel concepts. I apply this account to two cases in neuroscience and show how tool development and concept formation are often intertwined in episodes of tool-driven change. I support this view by proposing common normative principles that specify when exploratory concept formation and tool development succeed (rather than fail) to initiate scientific change.
    Found 4 days, 7 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  8. 485741.665212
    Economic theory comprises three types of inquiry. One examines economic phenomena, one develops analytical tools, and one studies the scientific endeavor in economics in general and in economic theory in particular. We refer to the first as economics, the second as the development of economic methods, and the third as the methodology of economics. The same mathematical result can often be interpreted as contributing to more than one of these categories. We discuss and clarify the distinctions between these categories, and argue that drawing the distinctions more sharply can be useful for economic research.
    Found 5 days, 14 hours ago on Itzhak Gilboa's site
  9. 489801.665228
    Common philosophical accounts of creativity align creative products and processes with a particular kind of agency: namely, that deserving of praise or blame. Considering evolutionary examples, we explore two ways of denying that creativity requires forms of agency. First, we argue that decoupling creativity from praiseworthiness comes at little cost: accepting that evolutionary processes are non-agential, they nonetheless exhibit many of the same characteristics and value associated with creativity. Second, we develop a ‘product-first’ account of creativity by which a process is creative just in case it gives rise to products deserving of certain forms of aesthetic engagement.
    Found 5 days, 16 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  10. 491045.665243
    It is common for people to be sensitive to aesthetic qualities in one another’s speech. We allow the loveliness or unloveliness of a person’s voice to make impressions on us. What is more, it is also common to allow those aesthetic impressions to affect how we are inclined to feel about the speaker. We form attitudes of liking, trusting, disliking or distrusting partly in virtue of the aesthetic qualities of a person’s speech.
    Found 5 days, 16 hours ago on PhilPapers
  11. 548796.665257
    Proponents of the extended mind have suggested that phenomenal transparency may be important to the way we evaluate putative cases of cognitive extension. In particular, it has been suggested that in order for a bio-external resource to count as part of the machinery of the mind, it must qualify as a form of transparent equipment or transparent technology. The present paper challenges this claim. It also challenges the idea that phenomenological properties can be used to settle disputes regarding the constitutional (versus merely causal) status of bio-external resources in episodes of extended cognizing. Rather than regard phenomenal transparency as a criterion for cognitive extension, we suggest that transparency is a feature of situations that support the ascription of certain cognitive/mental dispositional properties to both ourselves and others. By directing attention to the forces and factors that motivate disposition ascriptions, we arrive at a clearer picture of the role of transparency in arguments for extended cognition and the extended mind. As it turns out, transparency is neither necessary nor sufficient for cognitive extension, but this does not mean that it is entirely irrelevant to our understanding of the circumstances in which episodes of extended cognizing are apt to arise.
    Found 6 days, 8 hours ago on PhilPapers
  12. 606613.665277
    Social norms are commonly understood as rules that dictate which behaviors are appropriate, permissible, or obligatory in different situations for members of a given community.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  13. 736366.665315
    This essay explores various ethical dimensions of the important concept of fihavanana and its role in Malagasy ethics. As a first pass, we can say that fihavanana is a state of peace or harmony that people can achieve with others within their communities; it is modeled on the peace, harmony, solidarity, love, and closeness that is often seen in family ties.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Casey Woodling's site
  14. 736403.665377
    No one needs to bear a burden to mitigate climate change. The benefits of mitigation will be so great that everyone can share in them, provided they are well distributed across the world’s population and across generations. Distributing them will require a new financial institution, which will also mobilize financial resources to implement the investment needed for decarbonizing the world economy. In this paper we outline the rationale for a World Climate Bank, and its possible structure.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on John Broome's site
  15. 752960.665422
    Stefánsson’s (2022) central claim is that we have stronger moral reasons to direct resources to charitable organizations like those recommended by GiveWell than we have to use the same resources to offset our greenhouse gas emissions. The main reason why this is the case, on his view, is that offsetting our emissions will not reduce the climate change-related risks faced by the very same people who face increased risks as a result of our emissions. Offsetting, then, is not a way of ensuring that we avoid wrongfully imposing additional risks on particular people through our emitting activity – instead, it at best reduces the risks faced by different people. And since the amount of good done by reducing risks through offsetting is so much lower than the amount of good done by donating the same resources to an effective charity, the moral reasons to do the latter are much stronger than the moral reasons to offset.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Brian Berkey's site
  16. 752991.665462
    In recent years, Ingrid Robeyns and several others have argued that, whatever the correct complete account of distributive justice looks like, it should include a Limitarian requirement. The core Limitarian claim is that there is a ceiling – a limit – to the amount of resources that it is permissible for any individual to possess. While this core claim is plausible, there are a number of important questions about precisely how the requirement should be understood, and what its implications are regarding the obligations of various agents, that have not been adequately addressed in the discussions thus far. In this paper, I focus on questions about the relationship between the grounds for the Limitarian requirement and its role in generating obligations of justice for different agents. I argue that the plausible grounds for the requirement are incompatible with the widely accepted view, deriving from John Rawls, that the principles of justice apply directly to the institutions of what Rawls calls the “basic structure of society,” but do not apply directly to the conduct of individuals and other possible agents (e.g. corporations) acting within that structure. If my argument succeeds, then Limitarians must accept that if the grounds that they have offered in defense of Limitarian policy interventions are compelling, then individuals are obligated to voluntarily direct any resources that they possess above the threshold in ways that will promote the same goals that justify Limitarian policies.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Brian Berkey's site
  17. 953115.665484
    In a book in progress, I consider a number of political-philosophical commonplaces, at least in the liberal democratic tradition. Negatively, I observe that we cannot fully explain these commonplaces by appealing to what I call “interests in improvement”—that we be provisioned with the means to lead a fulfilling life—or “rights against invasion”—that others not transgress our person, property, or choices. Positively, I conjecture that these commonplaces—which include the ideas that the state must be justified or legitimated, that public officials should not be corrupt and should treat like cases alike, that discrimination is wrong, that the state must be democratic—must be explained instead by what I call “claims against inferiority”—claims that we not be set beneath another natural person in a social hierarchy.
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on PhilPapers
  18. 1007375.665498
    All the famous moralists of olden days drew attention to the way in which certain happenings would leave indelible and distressing memories - memories to which the sufferer was continually returning, and by which he was tormented, by day and by night (Janet 1919/1925: 589, quoted in van der Kolk and van der Hart 1989:1530).
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  19. 1099136.665514
    Although anxiety is frequently seen as a predominantly negative phenomenon, some recent researchers have argued that it plays an important positive function, serving as an alert to warn agents of possible problems or threats. I argue that not only can one’s own, first-personal anxiety perform this function; because it is possible for others—in particular, one’s friends—to feel anxious on one’s behalf, their anxious feelings can sometimes play the same role in our functioning, and make similar contributions to our well-being. I distinguish between a number of kinds of cases in which what I call proxy anxiety serves a positive function, including Anxiety Avoidance (where there is good reason for an agent to avoid becoming anxious herself, but can benefit from a friend’s anxiety on her behalf), Anxiety Omission (where an agent fails to become anxious due to a malfunctioning anxiety-generating system), long-term commitments involving dispositions to feel other-directed proxy anxiety, and cases in which proxy anxiety can help reduce or relieve excessive anxiety. A person’s friends, it is argued, are particularly well positioned to help regulate deficient and/or excessive anxieties, precisely because friends are close enough to care for and identify with the agent, but at the same time distant enough to maintain a relatively objective perspective. I conclude by examining connections between proxy anxiety and theories of well-being.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Troy Jollimore's site
  20. 1122825.665532
    In this Chapter, we address the challenge of explaining institutional change, asking whether the much-criticized rational choice perspective can contribute to the understanding of institutional change in political science. We discuss the methodological reasons why rational choice institutionalism (RCI) often assumes that institutional change is exogenous and discontinuous. We then identify and explore the possible pathways along which RCI can be extended to be more useful in understanding institutional change in political science. Finally, we reflect on what RCI theorizing would look like if it started to take endogenous change seriously: by giving up some of its simplifying assumptions, RCI can be a useful tool for analyzing institutional change, but choosing this path has consequences for the generality of the models in RCI as well as for the style of its theorizing.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  21. 1180581.665547
    Born in 1893 of a family of great intellectual culture, Nicod at first turned towards the sciences, and he had acquired by the age of eighteen, after two years of special mathematical studies, that solid fund of knowledge and technical habits which are obtained only with difficulty in later education. But philosophy appealed to him and ... he came to the Sorbonne, where in three years he obtained his degree, diploma of graduate studies and the [agrégation of philosophy] ... Meanwhile, he had pursued graduate course in the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, and in the Faculty of Sciences; he had learned both Greek and English so well that he ...
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  22. 1198072.665561
    As rational agents, we are governed by reasons. The fact that there is beer at the pub might be a reason to go there and a reason to believe you will enjoy it. Facts reported on the news might be reasons to believe there is suffering in a war zone and donate to charity. Specifically, these are normative reasons—considerations that rationally support responses we can give in light of them. They must be distinguished from motivating reasons: reasons for which, or considerations in light of which, we respond. Motivating reasons can be normative reasons, but they need not be: the reasons for which we think or do things may not really support those responses. Hereafter by “reasons” we mean normative reasons unless indicated.
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Conor McHugh's site
  23. 1269723.665575
    On 11 February 2020, the Center for Science and Democracy at the Union of Concerned Scientists put out a report titled Endangering Generations: How the Trump Administration’s Assault on Science Is Harming Children’s Health, detailing how, during Donald Trump’s presidency, federal agencies had rolled back evidence-based environmental and health regulations, while at the same time cutting funding to a number of research centers, including those dedicated to pediatric health. A day earlier, in his budget request to Congress, President Trump had demanded that more than US$25 billion be assigned to NASA for fiscal year 2021 as part of his plan to put a man on the Moon (again) – an increase of more than 10% over the budget that had been approved the year before. As this juxtaposition illustrates, the Trump administration’s much-lamented ‘assault on science’ was not a uniform attack on the whole of science, but targeted some disciplines more than others – notably those that were deemed at best irrelevant to national prestige, at worst a potential threat to free market capitalism.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Axel Gelfert's site
  24. 1274297.665591
    The scholarly consensus appears to be that Graves’s book is unsuitable as a companion to Penguin Classics – it has memorably been described as a monument of pseudo-scholarship (Dimock 1955: 454) – but what more detailed criticisms have been made of it? Below are some criticisms, with no attempt to place them in order of importance. Faux ancient claims. Graves’s tellings of the myths are supposed to be based on ancient sources and he introduces claims which are like claims from such sources but which you will not find in any ancient sources and are probably his own addition. For example, Dionysus sits at the right hand of Zeus. “This sort of thing makes a great trap for the unwary and a great botheration for the wary who look up Graves’ references.” (Dimock 1955: 450; see also Rose 1955: 208).
    Found 2 weeks ago on PhilPapers
  25. 1274307.665605
    This paper continues a debate on the normative limits of conceptual engineering. In particular, it responds to [Isaac, Manuel Gustavo. 2021. “Post-truth conceptual engineering.” Inquiry. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2021.1887758] claim, in response to [Simion, Mona. 2018a. “The ‘Should’ in Conceptual Engineering.” Inquiry 61(8): 914–928 and Podosky, Paul-Mikhail Catapang. 2018. “Ideology and Normativity: Constraints on Conceptual Engineering.” Inquiry. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562374], but in particular Podosky, that cognitive efficacy, rather than truth and knowledge, should be the normative standard by which we assess the legitimacy of a conceptual engineering project – at least for ideological concepts. I argue that Isaac has not done enough to show us that truth and knowledge are insignificant for the conceptual engineering of ideological concepts.
    Found 2 weeks ago on PhilPapers
  26. 1353663.665619
    Many philosophers of science have recently argued that extra-academic participation in scientific knowledge production does not threaten scientific objectivity. Quite the contrary: citizen science, participatory projects, transdisciplinary research, and other similar endeavours can even increase the objectivity of the research conducted. Simultaneously, researchers working in fields where such participation is common have expressed worries about various ways in which it can result in biases. In this paper I clarify how these arguments and worries can be compared, and how extra-academic participation can both increase and threaten the objectivity of the research conducted.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilSci Archive
  27. 1405956.665634
    Carolina State University. He conducts research on ethical questions in the biological sciences. He is especially interested in animal minds and the moral relevance of what's known and not known about the brains and behaviors of nonhuman mammals. In his book, Research Ethics: A Philosophical Guide to the Responsible Conduct of Research (Cambridge, 2013), Comstock shows how Peter Singer’s expanding circle metaphor lends coherence to an otherwise disparate set of issues in research ethics.
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  28. 1485104.665648
    Chat-bots are amazing these days! About a month ago LaMDA made the news when it apparently convinced an engineer at Google that it was sentient. GPT-3 from OpenAI is similarly sophisticated, and my collaborators and I have trained it to auto-generate Splintered Mind blog posts. …
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on The Splintered Mind
  29. 1655151.665661
    The statement that we are currently failing to address some of humanity’s greatest challenges seems uncontroversial – we are not doing enough to limit global warming to a maximum of 2ºC and we are exposing vulnerable people to preventable diseases when failing to produce herd immunity. But what singles out such failings (inactions) from all the things we did not do (non-actions) when all are unintended? Unlike their individualist counterparts, collective inaction and omission have not yet received much attention in the literature. (Unintended) collective inaction, I argue, can be attributed to a group of agents where a collective action (or a collective outcome) x that the agents did not perform (or did not produce) was collectively feasible at time t where each agent in that group had sufficient reason to contribute to performing (or producing) x or others had a reasonable expectation that they would perform (or produce) x. I show that, perhaps surprisingly, we can speak of collective inaction even where only one member of the group fails to act. However, where large and dispersed groups of agents are concerned, there is often no meaningful way of attributing collective failings. Still, I contend that the failure to close the global emissions gap and – in some cases – to generate herd immunity are indeed on us.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Anne Schwenkenbecher's site
  30. 1655170.665677
    Despite decades of concerted efforts to communicate to the public on important scientific issues pertaining to the environment and public health, gaps between public acceptance and the scientific consensus on these issues remain stubborn. One strategy for dealing with this shortcoming has been to focus on the existence of scientific consensus on the relevant matters. Recent science communication research has added support to this general idea, though the interpretation of these studies and their generalizability remains a matter of contention. In this paper, we describe results of a qualitative interview study on different models of scientific consensus and the relationship between such models and trust of science, finding that familiarity with scientific consensus is rarer than might be expected. These results suggest that consensus messaging strategies may not be effective.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on M. H. Slater's site