1. 116204.255549
    Sometimes one defends a thesis which turns out to be false. This is an occupational hazard; it is something every philosopher who makes substantive claims will end up doing. Much worse is to defend a position in a dispute which turns out to be merely verbal. Then one has not just taken the wrong side in a debate, but has wasted one’s time by engaging in a debate which turns out not to have been worth having in the first place. This is also, unfortunately, an occupational hazard. What I want to explore in this paper is the question of whether certain sorts of debates in which many philosophers of perception (including myself) have engaged turn out to be, on closer inspection, just verbal disputes.
    Found 1 day, 8 hours ago on Jeff Speaks's site
  2. 425439.255925
    This paper argues for the individuation of cognitive abilities within cognitive sciences based on the same phylogenetic framework that underlies the individuation of parts and traits at multiple levels of biological organization in comparative biology. When our scientific interests directly involve cross-species comparisons, this is the operative framework. When they do not, the units we are interested in, as explananda or explanantia, presuppose this comparative framework.
    Found 4 days, 22 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  3. 486775.256091
    According to orthodoxy, our best physical theories strongly support Eternalism over Presentism. Our goal is to argue against this consensus, by arguing that a certain overlooked aspect of our best physical theories strongly supports Presentism over Eternalism.
    Found 5 days, 15 hours ago on PhilPapers
  4. 522276.256172
    In this chapter we summarize results obtained in five studies (n = 1027) using an open format self-report procedure aimed at collecting naturally occurring inner speech in young adults. We look at existing inner speech measures as well as their respective strengths and limitations, emphasizing the appropriateness of an open format self-report method for our purpose. We describe the coding scheme used to organize inner speech instances produced by our participants. We present results in terms of the most frequently self-reported inner speech topics, which sheds light on the typical perceived content and functions of inner speech use. Some of these are: negative emotions, problem solving/thinking, planning/time management, self-motivating speech, emotional control, and self-reflection. These results are consistent with the self-regulatory and self-reflective functions of inner speech discussed in the literature, as well as with what several existing questionnaires aim to measure. However, our results also show that young adults in our samples talk to themselves about various topics and for multiple functions not captured by current research on inner speech. We conclude with a brief discussion regarding the relevance of our results for education.
    Found 6 days, 1 hour ago on Alain Morin's site
  5. 598804.256254
    Peirce’s diagrammatic system of Existential Graphs (EGα) is a logical proof system corresponding to the Propositional Calculus (P L). Most known proofs of soundness and completeness for EGα depend upon a translation of Peirce’s diagrammatic syntax into that of a suitable Frege-style system. In this paper, drawing upon standard results but using the native diagrammatic notational framework of the graphs, we present a purely syntactic proof of soundness, and hence consistency, for EGα, along with two separate completeness proofs that are constructive in the sense that we provide an algorithm in each case to construct an EGα formal proof starting from the empty Sheet of Assertion, given any expression that is in fact a tautology according to the standard semantics of the system.
    Found 6 days, 22 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  6. 763157.256311
    I once opened a fortune cookie containing the message, ‘All happiness is in the mind;’ it is still affixed to my refrigerator. I did not put it there to signal assent so much as ripeness for further investigation. As befits the genre, it is a wise-sounding pronouncement. If we think of ‘happiness’ as a state of mind, as we moderns do almost reflexively, then the pronouncement would be trivial. But presumably it is intended to be substantive. To understand it we need to know what substitutions are permitted for ‘happiness.’ The well-lived life? What is naturally sought, perhaps ultimately? Well-being? We also need to probe the phrase ‘in the mind.’ For students of philosophy, it could be tempting to read ‘mind’ as soul or even self—familiar translations of the Greek psuche. In that case, we are being told that what we human beings seek, perhaps ultimately, turns on the condition of our soul. I could potentially get on board with this, but a lot depends. Are we talking about an absence of sin? Psychological health? Facility with rational powers?
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on L. Nandi Theunissen's site
  7. 774655.256396
    In a series of stimulating writings, C. Thi Nguyen has made novel connections between the theory of art and the theory of games. In ‘Autonomy and Aesthetic Engagement’ (Nguyen 2019), he argues that we should see the aesthetic judgement of works of art as in important ways like playing a game. And in Games: Agency as Art, he makes the converse argument: that a central feature of game-play, and the source of much of its value, is that it offers aesthetic experiences, in particular of one’s own agency. Playing a game, he claims, is like engaging with art.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Thomas Hurka's site
  8. 829653.256454
    This paper will argue that there is no such thing as miscomputation, contrary to the received view in philosophy of computation. There are just hardware problems on the one hand and design errors on the other, neither of which qualify as a distinct kind of computational errors. The main upshot of this argument is that philosophical accounts of physical computation should not be assessed on whether they can accommodate miscomputation, but rather on whether they can make sense of the range of different phenomenona that are commonly (and misleadingly) described as miscomputations.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  9. 1002851.256515
    I discuss the monumental shift in our understanding of the brain triggered by the project of computational cognitive science: the use of tools, concepts, and strategies from the computer sciences to investigate the brain. Philosophers have typically understood this project, and the computational explanations it provides, to assume that the brain is a computer, in a sense to be specified by the metaphysics of computation. That metaphysics, by revealing what exactly we attribute to the brain when we say it computes, is supposed to show how and why computational explanations work, and in doing so to provide a philosophical foundation for them. In contrast, I give an account of computational explanation that focuses on the resources computational explanations bring to bear on the study of the brain. I argue that computational explanations help cognitive scientists build perspicuous models that capture precisely the kinds of causal structures they seek, and that no metaphysics of computation is required to understand how they do this.
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  10. 1011118.256549
    Welcome to the Brains Blog’s Symposium series on the Cognitive Science of Philosophy. The aim of the series is to examine the use of empirical methods to generate philosophical insights.The use of diverse methods in research on causal cognition has come with a plurality of theories about how causal cognition works. …
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on The Brains Blog
  11. 1060556.256589
    In a recent paper, Kerry McKenzie identifies theory change in science as a source for doubts about the value of engaging in metaphysics of science before a final theory is at hand. According to McKenzie, the basic problem is that naturalized metaphysics lacks a concept of progress. More specifically, naturalized metaphysics lacks a concept of progress as approximation that can easily be taken to correspond to the scientific sources of naturalized metaphysical inquiry. In this paper, we criticise the proposed concept of progress as approximation as too narrow a concept, notably, even in science, and propose an alternative notion of scientific progress that metaphysical investigations can and do latch on to, namely progress understood as exploring and constraining theory space. First, we motivate this notion of progress via an examination of progress in particle physics and propose that it can be applied to metaphysics as well. Second, we argue that this notion of progress leads to a convincing reply to McKenzie’s argument. Third, we discuss how this notion of progress relates to the program of naturalized metaphysics and argue that it speaks in favor of a more lenient version of naturalistically-inclined metaphysics, namely inductive metaphysics.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  12. 1098089.25661
    I survey, for a general scientific audience, three decades of research into which sorts of problems admit exponential speedups via quantum computers—from the classics (like the algorithms of Simon and Shor), to the breakthrough of Yamakawa and Zhandry from April 2022. I discuss both the quantum circuit model, which is what we ultimately care about in practice but where our knowledge is radically incomplete, and the so-called oracle or black-box or query complexity model, where we’ve managed to achieve a much more thorough understanding that then informs our conjectures about the circuit model. I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of switching attention to sampling tasks, as was done in the recent quantum supremacy experiments. I make some skeptical remarks about widely-repeated claims of exponential quantum speedups for practical machine learning and optimization problems. Through many examples, I try to convey the “law of conservation of weirdness,” according to which every problem admitting an exponential quantum speedup must have some unusual property to allow the amplitude to be concentrated on the unknown right answer(s).
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Scott Aaronson's site
  13. 1118446.25663
    In the literature on enactive approaches to cognition, representationalism is often seen as a rival theory. In this paper, I argue that enactivism can be fruitfully combined with representationalism by adopting Frances Egan’s content pragmatism. This representational enactivism avoids some of the problems faced by anti-representational versions of enactivism. Most significantly, representational enactivism accommodates empirical evidence that neural systems manipulate representations. In addition, representational enactivism provides a valuable insight into how to identify representational content, especially in brainless organisms: we can identify representational content by investigating autopoietic processes.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  14. 1222719.25665
    Perceptual Confidence is the view that our conscious perceptual experiences assign degrees of confidence. In previous papers, I motived it using first-personal evidence (Morrison 2016) and Jessie Munton motivated it using normative evidence (Munton 2016). In this paper, I will consider the extent to which it is motivated by third-personal evidence. I will argue that the current evidence is supportive but not decisive. I will also describe experiments that might provide more decisive evidence.
    Found 2 weeks ago on John Morrison's site
  15. 1261929.256724
    In this paper, my focus will be on some central aspects of Jenefer Robinson’s influential work ‘Deeper than Reason’, more specifically on the role our emotional responses play in art appreciation and the value attributed to the ensuing emotional experience. Whereas Robinson argues (1) that bodily responses, and our awareness of these bodily changes, can provide us with information relevant to the appreciation of artworks, and (2) that in some cases affective empathy is necessary to artistic understanding, I want to raise two concerns about whether this position holds for artworks conveying self-conscious emotions. Such emotions are of particular interest in this context since, in the first place, self-conscious emotions can, in fact, be experienced without moving us physiologically in a full-fledged sense. These higher cognitive emotions, also known as non-primary or intellectual emotions—including guilt, shame, embarrassment, pride, or nostalgia—are not automatically triggered but require self-evaluation. And, unlike the basic emotions, they are also believed to lack stereotypical expressive or behavioural features. Second, self-conscious emotions are unavailable to affective empathy since they are known for involving self-directed cognition. As we will see, it is this tight connection to the self— where the ‘self’ is both the subject and the particular object of the emotion—which makes it difficult to take the emotional perspective of another person.
    Found 2 weeks ago on PhilPapers
  16. 1363798.256751
    Valerie Gray HardcastleInstitute for Health InnovationNorthern Kentucky UniversityI agree that novel tool use is connected to significant conceptual and theoretical advancement in science. Indeed, I believe that technological advancement is the primary limiting factor in neurobiological theory development. …
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on The Brains Blog
  17. 1410893.256774
    There is a dimension of rationality, known as structural rationality, according to which a paradigmatic example of what it means to be rational is not to be akratic. Although some philosophers claim that aesthetics falls within the scope of rationality, a non-akrasia constraint prohibiting certain combinations of attitudes is yet to be developed in this domain. This essay is concerned with the question of whether such a requirement is plausible and, if so, whether it is an actual requirement of aesthetic rationality. Ultimately, this paper defends the view that aesthetics is no different from other domains in that it requires coherence between a subject’s mental states (in our case, between what is judged and what is aesthetically liked). Keywords: rational requirements, structural rationality, aesthetic akrasia, aesthetic rationality, aesthetic appreciation.
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  18. 1447520.256794
    Dan BurnstonPhilosophy Department, Tulane UniversityTulane Brain InstituteTools come in a variety of forms. Many experimental tools are ways of intervening upon and measuring the system of interest. Other tools, however, are analytical tools – tools for organizing and scrutinizing data taken from measurement. …
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on The Brains Blog
  19. 1524891.256818
    Ann-Sophie BarwichPhilosophy and Cognitive ScienceUniversity of Indiana, BloomingtonImagine for a moment that you are observing the development of a groundbreaking experiment right before your eyes. You rapidly recognize that this study will make substantial contributions to the field and actually break new ground, but you are unable to disclose its specifics with anybody – until you can.Such an experiment is the focus of my chapter. …
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on The Brains Blog
  20. 1533736.256854
    Can we be manipulated by technology? Science fction suggests that the answer is yes. In the 2014 movie, Ex Machina, software engineer Caleb falls prey to the empathic android Ava’s sly charm. She has a subtle grasp of Caleb’s needs and desires and feigns romantic feelings for the engineer. However, as it turns out, she merely uses him as a means to fee from her creator’s enclosure. Caleb falls in love with her and helps her escape, and Ava leaves him to die once she is set free.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on Michael Klenk's site
  21. 1632396.256876
    The success of deep learning in natural language processing raises intriguing questions about the nature of linguistic meaning and ways in which it can be processed by natural and artificial systems. One such question has to do with subword segmentation algorithms widely employed in language modeling, machine translation, and other tasks since 2016. These algorithms often cut words into semantically opaque pieces, such as ‘period’, ‘on’, ‘t’, and ‘ist’ in ‘period|on|t|ist’. The system then represents the resulting segments in a dense vector space, which is expected to model grammatical relations among them. This representation may in turn be used to map ‘period|on|t|ist’ (English) to ‘par|od|ont|iste’ (French). Thus, instead of being modeled at the lexical level, translation is reformulated more generally as the task of learning the best bilingual mapping between the sequences of subword segments of two languages; and sometimes even between pure character sequences: ‘p|e|r|i|o|d|o|n|t|i|s|t|’ → ‘p|a|r|o|d|o|n|t|i|s|t|e’. Such subword segmentations and alignments are at work in highly efficient end-to-end machine translation systems, despite their allegedly opaque nature. The computational value of such processes is unquestionable. But do they have any linguistic or philosophical plausibility? I attempt to cast light on this question by reviewing the relevant details of the subword segmentation algorithms and by relating them to important philosophical and linguistic debates, in the spirit of making artificial intelligence more transparent and explainable.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on Yuri Balashov's site
  22. 1632422.256896
    The problem discussed in this paper arises from the observation that in the course of inter-subjective communication "understanding" seems to be entrusted to the implementation of a real process, not only affective but also cognitive, of processing information contained in the perceived behavior. In a previous study (Greco, 1979) we proposed to consider this process of "reconstruction" of meaning as analogous to the process of "construction" used for oneself. Here we will deal with this process of construction or awareness using theoretical models offered by experimental research.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  23. 1641067.256918
    The rapid development of natural language processing in the last three decades has drastically changed the way professional translators do their work. Nowadays most of them use computer-assisted translation (CAT) or translation memory (TM) tools whose evolution has been overshadowed by the much more sensational development of machine translation (MT) systems, with which TM tools are sometimes confused. These two language technologies now interact in mutually enhancing ways, and their increasing role in human translation has become a subject of behavioral studies. Philosophers and linguists, however, have been slow in coming to grips with these important developments. The present paper seeks to fill in this lacuna. I focus on the semantic aspects of the highly distributed human–computer interaction in the CAT process which presents an interesting case of an extended cognitive system involving a human translator, a TM tool, an MT engine, and sometimes other human translators or editors. Considered as a whole, such a system is engaged in representing the linguistic meaning of the source document in the target language. But the roles played by its various components, natural as well as artificial, are far from trivial, and the division of linguistic labor between them throws new light on the familiar notions that were initially inspired by rather different phenomena in the philosophy of language, mind, and cognitive science.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on Yuri Balashov's site
  24. 1708802.256937
    Putting Theory in its PlaceJohn Bickle, Mississippi State University and University of Mississippi Medical CenterI begin “Tinkering in the lab” by reviewing my previous publications on tool development in neuroscience. …
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on The Brains Blog
  25. 1927494.25696
    According to the so-called ‘proportionality principle’, causes should be proportional to their effects: they should be both enough and not too much for the occurrence of their effects. This principle is the subject of an ongoing debate. On the one hand, many maintain that it is required to address the problem of causal exclusion and take it to capture a crucial aspect of causation. On the other hand, many object that it renders accounts of causation implausibly restrictive and often reject the principle wholesale. I argue that there is exaggeration on both sides. While one half of the principle is overly demanding, the other half is unobjectionable. And while the unobjectionable half does not block exclusion arguments on its own, it provides a nuanced picture of higher-level causation, fits with recent developments in philosophy of causation, and motivates adjustments to standard difference-making accounts of causation. I conclude that at least half of the proportionality principle is worth taking seriously.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilSci Archive
  26. 1978386.25698
    Gluck & Bower, 1988), stages of learning (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1987), and, in more recent work patterns, in categorization of individuals with autism spectrum disorder (Dovgopoly & Mercado, 2013). Recent work on deep learning, involving ANNs with many layers, shows that there are interesting connections between cognitive processing and the representations formed at various depth in ANNs (Guest & Love, 2019). Most importantly for the present purposes, connectionism predicts a correlation between the effort required to learn a category by ANNs and by humans (Bartos, 2002; Kruschke, 1991).
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Jakub Szymanik's site
  27. 2103807.257002
    This paper aims to outline, and argue for, an approach to episodic memory broadly in the spirit of knowledge-first epistemology. I discuss a group of influential views of epsiodic memory that I characterize as ‘two-factor accounts’, which have both proved popular historically (e.g., in the work of Hume, 1739-40; Locke 1690; and Russell 1921) and have also seen a resurgence in recent work on the philosophy of memory (see, e.g., Dokic 2014; Michaelian, 2016; Owens, 1996). What is common to them is that they try to give an account of the nature of episodic memory in which the concept of knowledge plays no explanatory role. I highlight some parallels between these two-factor accounts and attempts to give a reductive definition of knowledge itself. I then discuss some problems two-factor accounts of episodic memory face in explaining the distinctive sense in which episodic recollection involves remembering personally experienced past events, before sketching an alternative approach to episodic memory, which takes as basic the idea that episodic memory involves the retention of knowledge. I argue that we can give an exhaustive constitutive account of what episodic memory is, and how it differs from other types of mental states, by considering what particular type of knowledge is retained in episodic memory, and what exactly having that knowledge consists in.
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  28. 2112420.257022
    • Hardcastle (1995) claims that “information processing theories … maintain that consciousness is a centralized processor that we use when processing novel or complex stimuli” (p. 89)
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on Manolo Martínez's site
  29. 2112455.257042
    In some situations, we attribute intentional mental states to a person despite their inability to articulate the contents in question: these are implicit mental states. Attributions of implicit mental states raise certain philosophical challenges related to rationality, concept possession, and privileged access. In the philosophical literature, there are two distinct strategies for addressing these challenges, depending on whether the content attributions are personal-level or subpersonal-level. This paper explores the difference between personal-level and subpersonal-level approaches to implicit mental state attribution and investigates the relationship between the two approaches. It concludes by highlighting the methodological and metaphilosophical commitments which can result in different perspectives on the relative priority of personal-level and subpersonal-level theories.
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on Zoe Drayson's site
  30. 2117551.257068
    Tables are widely used for storing, retrieving, communicating, and processing information, but in the literature on the study of representations they are still somewhat neglected. The strong structural constraints on tables allow for a clear identification of their characteristic features and the roles these play in the use of tables as representational and cognitive tools. After introducing syntactic, spatial, and semantic features of tables, we give an account of how these affect our perception and cognition on the basis of fundamental principles of Gestalt psychology. Next are discussed the ways in which these features of tables support their uses in providing a global access to information, retrieving information, and visualizing relational structure and patterns. The latter is particularly important, because it shows how tables can contribute to the generation of new knowledge. In addition, tables also provide efficient means for manipulating information in general and in structured notations. In sum, tables are powerful and efficient representational tools.
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on Dirk Schlimm's site