1. 170279.881954
    It is often taken for granted that our desires can contribute to what it is rational for us to do. This paper examines an account of desire that promises an explanation of this datum, the guise of the good. I argue that extant guise-of-the-good accounts fail to provide an adequate explanation of how a class of desires—basic desire—contribute to practical rationality. I develop an alternative guise-of-the-good account on which basic desires attune us to our reasons for action in virtue of their biological function. This account emphasises the role of desire as part of our competence to recognise and respond to normative reasons.
    Found 1 day, 23 hours ago on PhilPapers
  2. 183293.882006
    We explore the contribution made by oscillatory, synchronous neural activity to representation in the brain. We closely examine six prominent examples of brain function in which neural oscillations play a central role, and identify two levels of involvement that these oscillations take in the emergence of representations: enabling (when oscillations help to establish a communication channel between sender and receiver, or are causally involved in triggering a representation) and properly representational (when oscillations are a constitutive part of the representation). We show that even an idealized informational sender-receiver account of representation makes the representational status of oscillations a non-trivial matter, which depends on rather minute empirical details.
    Found 2 days, 2 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  3. 323383.882023
    According to the Psychological-Continuity Account of What Matters, you are justified in having special concern for the well-being of a person at a future time if and only if that person will be psychologically continuous with you as you are now. On some versions of the account, the psychological continuity is required to be temporally ordered, whereas, on other versions, it is allowed to be temporally unordered. In this paper, I argue that the account is implausible if the psychological continuity is allowed to be temporally unordered. I also argue that, if the psychological continuity is required to be temporally ordered, it cannot plausibly be purely psychological (in the sense that the psychological continuity is not required to be caused through spatio-temporal continuity of a brain). The upshot is that no plausible version of the Psychological- Continuity Account of What Matters is purely psychological. So, psychological continuity is not what matters in survival.
    Found 3 days, 17 hours ago on Johan E. Gustafsson's site
  4. 548125.882039
    Sharing, downloading, and reusing software is common-place, some of which is carried out legally with open source software. When it is not legal, it is unclear how many infringements have taken place: does an infringement count for the artefact as a whole or for each source file of a computer program? To answer this question, it must first be established whether a computer program should be considered as an integral whole, a collection, or a mere set of distinct files, and why. We argue that a program is a functional whole, availing of, and combining, arguments from mereology, granularity, modularity, unity, and function to substantiate the claim. The argumentation and answer contributes to the ontology of software artefacts, may assist industry in litigation cases, and demonstrates that the notion of unifying relation is operationalisable.
    Found 6 days, 8 hours ago on C. Maria Keet's site
  5. 548240.882053
    It might seem, and has seemed to many, that what I think is up to me. I go about life representing the world with thoughts, and my intrinsic state fixes the content of those thoughts—fixes, that is, what they require of the world in order to be true. Call this idea internalism about mental content (henceforth, internalism). Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne (henceforth, YVH) have written a book that attempts to refute internalism in all its reasonable manifestations. There is much of value in Narrow Content. The central argument, with its protagonist Mirror Man, constitutes a formidable stumbling-block that all future internalists will have to contend with. And the authors have done substantial work to iron out a more precise characterization of the conceptual landscape than existed hitherto. That said, the book is not without frustrations, for reasons both stylistic and substantive. Stylistically, while the authors are admirably clear about defining the views at issue, they’re not always great about explaining why the definitions are as they are, especially in cases where their framework is more complicated than what you might have expected. Substantively (and, I’ll argue, relatedly), the authors largely neglect to address one of the most prominent roles certain philosophers (e.g. Dennett, Stalnaker, and Lewis) have taken content to play, that of explaining and predicting behavior. It’s not clear, so I’ll argue, that the central argument of the book refutes internalists of that kind.
    Found 6 days, 8 hours ago on PhilPapers
  6. 629626.882067
    Multiple ontology languages have been developed over the years, which brings afore two key components: how to select the appropriate language for the task at hand and language design itself. This engineering step entails examining the ontological ‘commitments’ embedded into the language, which, in turn, demands for an insight into what the effects of philosophical viewpoints may be on the design of a representation language. But what are the sort of commitments one should be able to choose from that have an underlying philosophical point of view, and which philosophical stances have a knock-on effect on the specification or selection of an ontology language? In this paper, we provide a first step towards answering these questions. We identify and analyse ontological commitments embedded in logics, or that could be, and show that they have been taken in well-known ontology languages. This contributes to reflecting on the language as enabler or inhibitor to formally characterising an ontology or an ontological investigation, as well as the design of new ontology languages following the proposed design process.
    Found 1 week ago on C. Maria Keet's site
  7. 692193.882081
    Do representational pictures have propositional contents? The current paper argues that the characteristic contents of pictures are predicative rather than propositional: pictures characterise things as looking certain ways, and they thereby express properties of visual perspectives. The paper argues that the characteristic predicative contents of pictures are nonetheless able to feature in fully-fledged propositional contents once they are combined with contents of other suitable sorts. Various facts about communicative uses of pictures are then explained. The paper concludes by considering the bearing of its conclusions upon questions about the relationships between linguistic representation and pictorial representation.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  8. 716517.882095
    This paper discusses modeling from the artifactual perspective. The artifactual approach conceives models as erotetic devices. They are purpose-built systems of dependencies that are constrained in view of answering a pending scientific question, motivated by theoretical or empirical considerations. In treating models as artifacts, the artifactual approach is able to address the various languages of sciences that are overlooked by the traditional accounts that concentrate on the relationship of representation in an abstract and general manner. In contrast, the artifactual approach focuses on epistemic affordances of different kinds of external representational and other tools employed in model construction. In doing so, the artifactual account gives a unified treatment of different model types as it circumvents the tendency of the fictional and other representational approaches to separate model systems from their “model descriptions”.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Tarja Knuuttila's site
  9. 750037.882109
    Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologically independent facts and C is a necessary part of a nomologically sufficient condition for E. The analysis is applied to problems of overdetermination, preemption, trumping, intransitivity, switching, and double prevention. Preventing and allowing are defined and distinguished from causing. The analysis explains the direction of causation in terms of the logical form of dynamic laws. Even in a universe that is deterministic in both temporal directions, not every fact must have a cause and present facts may have no future causes.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  10. 879083.882123
    A novel account of semantic information is proposed. The gist is that structural correspondence, analyzed in terms of similarity, underlies an important kind of semantic information. In contrast to extant accounts of semantic information, it does not rely on correlation, covariation, causation, natural laws, or logical inference. Instead, it relies on structural similarity, defined in terms of correspondence between classifications of tokens into types. This account elucidates many existing uses of the notion of information, for example, in the context of scientific models and structural representations in cognitive science. It is poised to open a new research program concerned with various kinds of semantic information, its functions, and its measurement.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  11. 990089.882143
    “Every Passing Hour”, original artwork by Magdalena AntrobusCases of innocenceIn my previous post I started telling you about epistemic innocence. Some irrational beliefs can have epistemic benefits that would be impossible or difficult to attain by other means. …
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on The Brains Blog
  12. 1040563.882158
    :: Let cognitivism be the view that moral judgments are cognitive mental states and noncognitivism the view that they are noncognitive mental states. Here I argue for moral judgment pluralism: some moral judgments are cognitive states and some are noncognitive states. More specifically, according to my pluralism some judgments are moral because they carry a moral content (e.g., that genocide is wrong) and some are moral because they employ a moral attitude (e.g., indignation, or guilt); the former are the cognitive moral judgments and the latter the noncognitive ones. After explaining and motivating the view, I argue that this kind of pluralism handles quite elegantly several of the core issues that have structured the debate on cognitivism vs. noncognitivism.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilPapers
  13. 1213957.882202
    What is the content of a mental state? This question poses the problem of intentionality: to explain how mental states can be about other things, where being about them is understood as representing them. A framework that integrates predictive coding and signaling systems theories of cognitive processing offers a new perspective on intentionality. On this view, at least some mental states are evaluations, which differ in function, operation, and normativity from representations. A complete naturalistic theory of intentionality must account for both types of intentional state.
    Found 2 weeks ago on PhilPapers
  14. 1329727.882242
    Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they regard the view as undermining the evident agency we have in action and precluding substantial self-knowledge. In this paper, I defend epiphenomenalism against these objections, and thus against the negative dialectical role that the view plays in philosophy of mind. I argue that nearly in all cases where a theory implies one kind of epiphenomenalism, it is an epiphenomenalism of a non-problematic kind, at least as far as issues about agency and self-knowledge are concerned. There is indeed a problematic version of epiphenomenalism, but that version is not relevant to the debates where its apparent absurdity is invoked.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  15. 1387542.882259
    The paradox of pain refers to the idea that the folk concept of pain is paradoxical, treating pains as simultaneously mental states and bodily states (e.g. Hill 2005, 2017; Borg et al. 2020). By taking a close look at our pain terms, this paper argues that there is no paradox of pain. The air of paradox dissolves once we recognise that pain terms are polysemous and that there are two separate but related concepts of pain rather than one.
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  16. 1424523.882273
    The latter half of Augustine’s De Trinitate is as much a treatise in human cognitive psychology as it is a work in trinitarian theology. Augustine holds that our best (and perhaps only) prospect for understanding something of God’s trinitarian nature is to study its reflection in the human mind.¹ For, on his view, the mind at its deepest (or highest) level possesses a trinitarian structure—one that is likewise manifested in its various episodic cognitive acts. And, while the most adequate represen-tation of the divine trinity has its locus in the higher reaches of human rational activity, traces or quasi-images of the trinity can be found even in the soul’s non-rational, sense-based activities.
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  17. 1503419.882287
    Much of the current debate in philosophy of perception centers on the nature of our perceptual commerce with the world. Recently, the debate has been fueled by the reemergence of naïve realist and relationalist perspectives that reject, on the whole, a mediated access to the objects of perception (e.g. Brewer 2011; Campbell 2002; Fish ; Martin 1997). Call this the “mainstream” debate in philosophy of perception. To a large extent, the mainstream debate has almost exclusively focused on vision, and neglected other sense modalities. This “visuocentrism” is often coupled with the tacit assumption that what is true about vision may be simply transferrable to other sense-modalities as well. (For recent exceptions, see Fulkerson 2013; O’Callaghan ). Taken together, the mainstream interest in the nature of perception and visuo-centrism have led philosophers to neglect an equally important topic of investigation, the structure of perceptual objects, obscuring significant structural differences among the sense-modalities, and the fact that perceptual experiences are frequently multi-modal (e.g. Kubovy and von Valkenburg 2001; O’Callaghan 2012, 2015).
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  18. 1515934.882301
    Most discussions of the reproducibility crisis focus on its epistemic aspect: the fact that the scientific community fails to follow some norms of scientific investigation, which leads to high rates of irreproducibility via a high rate of false positive findings. The purpose of this paper is to argue that there is a heretofore underappreciated and understudied dimension to the reproducibility crisis in experimental psychology and neuroscience that may prove to be at least as important as the epistemic dimension. This is the communication dimension. The link between communication and reproducibility is immediate: independent investigators would not be able to recreate an experiment whose design or implementation were inadequately described. I exploit evidence of a replicability and reproducibility crisis in computational science, as well as research into quality of reporting to support the claim that a widespread failure to adhere to reporting standards, especially the norm of descriptive completeness, is an important contributing factor in the current reproducibility crisis in experimental psychology and neuroscience.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  19. 1555718.882317
    William James expresses a commonplace idea when he writes that: Each of [our] minds keeps its own thoughts to itself…. No thought even comes into direct sight of a thought in another personal consciousness than its own. Absolute insulation… is the law… The breaches between such thoughts are the most absolute breaches in nature. (James 1890, p.226) This idea - that each individual consciousness is absolutely insulated from all others - could be unpacked in a variety of ways, but the strand we wish to focus on here is the denial of what we will call ‘phenomenal sharing’. James says that each mind ‘keeps its own thoughts to itself’: the opposite possibility, that is denied here, would presumably be for one thought to be shared between two minds. As we will discuss, there are a number of contexts where philosophers might feel driven to postulate such a ‘sharing’ of mental particulars, but there are a number of arguments and objections that seem to show it impossible. We believe that none of these arguments are decisive: while we cannot positively establish the possibility or actuality of mental sharing, we hope to show that philosophers who have independent reasons to postulate it in particular cases need not hold back from doing so.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on Philip Goff's site
  20. 1658705.882334
    This paper provides a first-person (me) and a third-person’s experience (colleague) of me while drinking six mugs of beer. It is an attempt to describe the experience commencing with the first sip and ending with the last sip of beer from a first-person (my) perspective and a third-person’s perspective. The third-person’s perspective here is purely based on the observation of my behaviour which has been narrated in third-person by my colleague. The observation of this study indicate that there is a substantial sever between my personal conscious first-person experience when compared to a third-person’s experience of me, that can lead to contradictory conjectures when contrasted.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilPapers
  21. 1779261.88235
    In May 1933 the historian of chemistry He´le`ne Metzger addressed a letter to the renowned historian and philosopher of science E mile Meyerson, a cri de coeur against Meyerson’s patronizing attitude toward her. This recently discovered letter is published and translated here because it is an exceptional human document reflecting the gender power structure of our discipline in interwar France. At the age of forty-three, and with five books to her credit, Metzger was still a junior scholar in the exclusively male community of French historians and philosophers of science. We sketch the institutional setting of higher learning in France at the time, noting the limited openings it offered to would-be femmes savantes, and situate Metzger in this context. We also describe the philosophical differences between Metzger and Meyerson. Though Metzger never managed to obtain a post of her own, in her letter to Meyerson she forcefully lays claim, at least, to a mind of her own.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on PhilPapers
  22. 1793291.88238
    It is generally accepted that sight has the power to give us knowledge about things in the environment in a distinctive way. Seeing the goose puts me in a position to know that it’s there and that it’s, say, brown, large, maybe even that it’s angry. And it does this by, when all goes well, presenting us with these worldly features. One might even think that it’s part of what it is to be a perceptual capacity that it has this kind of epistemological power, such that a capacity that lacked it could not be perceptual.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on PhilPapers
  23. 1838821.882417
    The physics of water is endlessly fascinating. The phase diagram of water at positive temperature and pressure is already remarkably complex, as shown in this diagram by Martin Chaplin: Click for a larger version. …
    Found 3 weeks ago on Azimuth
  24. 2224282.882458
    In particular, we show how to replace the file-metaphor with two theses: one semantic and one metasemantic. We argue that the metaphor of mental files can be cashed out in terms of relational representational facts (​viz.​ facts about the coordination of mental representations) and a metasemantic thesis about the role that information-relations to objects play in grounding coordination.
    Found 3 weeks, 4 days ago on Aidan Gray's site
  25. 2256835.882479
    As the extended mind debate came to maturation, it has conceptualized how cognitive artifacts extend various memory capacities, including working memory, prospective memory, spatial memory, and semantic memory. Surprisingly, the relation between autobiographical memory and artifacts has not received much attention in the extended mind literature. In this paper, I first distinguish between “cognitive artifacts” used for practical cognitive tasks and “evocative objects” used for remembering our personal past. I then go on to describe a number of ways in which evocative objects and our autobiographical memory are integrated into new systemic wholes, allowing us to remember our personal past in a more reliable and detailed manner. After discussing some empirical work on evocative objects and lifelogging technology, I elaborate on the dimension of autobiographical dependency, which is the degree to which we depend on an object to be able to remember a personal experience. When this dependency is strong, we integrate information in the embodied brain and in an object to reconstruct an autobiographical memory. In such cases, the information we use to remember our personal past is distributed across embodied agents and evocative objects.
    Found 3 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilPapers
  26. 2391227.882493
    The longstanding problem to understand if, why, and how objective functioning of the brain gives rise to a subjective perspective has been, in the last few decades, commonly known as the hard problem of consciousness. However, due to the strictly subjective and qualitative character of subjective experience, it is difficult to get a firm grip on the problem itself, which led some philosophers even to deny the very existence of the problem. In this paper, we point to a relation between the quantity of information (i.e. Kolmogorov complexity) and the phenomenon of subjective experience. In a thought experiment that we construct, the amount of information existing subjectively will be significantly higher than the amount of information existing objectively. We argue that such a quantifiable discrepancy clearly identifies one mathematically well-defined aspect of the hard problem which, in turn, makes it at least much harder to deny its existence. If we take a stronger stance, this aspect of the problem further undermines hopes that a satisfactory strictly physicalist explanation of the subjective experience could be ever given.
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  27. 2431925.882507
    Pretense is generally characterized in such a way as to constitutively involve imagination— pretending involves imagining. We argue that this is a mistake. Although pretense often involves imagination (especially among adults and children in the developed world), it need not. And although pretense shares some of the properties of imagination, it isn’t a kind of imagination. Indeed, the core nature of pretense is closer to imitation than it is to imagination, and likely shares some of its motivation with the former. Two main strands of argument are presented for our view. One is anthropological: looking at the forms that pretend play takes in traditional cultures. The other concerns the different ways in which pretense (especially childhood pretense) and imagination interact with one’s evaluative / affective systems.
    Found 4 weeks ago on Peter Carruthers's site
  28. 2503316.882522
    How homogenous are the sources of human motivation? Textbook Humeans hold that every human action is motivated by desire, thus any heterogeneity derives from differing objects of desire. Textbook Kantians hold that although some human actions are motivated by desire, others are motivated by reason. This conflict has no substance until one has settled on an understanding of the key terms—‘desire, ‘reason’, ‘source’, and ‘motivation’—each of which is itself a battleground. One question that has arisen in this vicinity concerns whether there is any overlap between cognitive and conative states, i.e., whether there are states such that to be in one is at once (and indivisibly) to take the world to be a certain way and to be motivated to act. This is the state-question. My question here is different: not whether cognitive and conative states are necessarily distinct, but whether passion and reason constitute fundamentally distinct sources of human motivation. This is the source-question. In what follows. I argue for an affirmative answer to the source-question while remaining neutral on the state-question. I adopt a posture of neutrality not because of any uncertainty as to its answer, but in order to show that recourse to this answer is not required to defend a (broadly) Kantian picture of human motivation.
    Found 4 weeks ago on PhilPapers
  29. 2507536.882535
    Despite attempts to apply the lessons of causal modelling to the observed correlations typical of entangled bipartite quantum systems, Wood and Spekkens argue that any causal model purporting to explain these correlations must be fine tuned; that is, it must violate the assumption of faithfulness. The faithfulness assumption is a principle of parsimony, and the intuition behind it is basic and compelling: when no statistical correlation exists between the occurrences of a pair of events, we have no reason for supposing there to be a causal connection between them. This paper is an attempt to undermine the reasonableness of the assumption of faithfulness in the quantum context. Employing a symmetry relation between an entangled bipartite quantum system and a ‘sideways’ quantum system consisting of a single photon passing sequentially through two polarisers, I argue that Wood and Spekkens’ analysis applies equally to this sideways system. If this is correct, then the consequence endorsed by Wood and Spekkens for an ordinary entangled quantum system amounts to a rejection of a causal explanation in the sideways, single photon system, too. Unless rejecting this causal explanation can be sufficiently justified, then it looks as though the sideways system is fine tuned, and so a violation of faithfulness in the ordinary entangled system may be more tolerable than first thought. Thus extending the classical ‘no fine-tuning’ principle of parsimony to the quantum realm may well be too hasty.
    Found 4 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilSci Archive
  30. 2565494.88255
    The signals in nerve include electrical, mechanical and thermal components and are characterized by the complexity of processes. The modelling of these signals is analyzed from the viewpoint of DeLanda who has demonstrated the possibility to expose the philosophical theories of Deleuze by using the notions from nonlinear dynamics. It is demonstrated that the mathematical modelling of processes in nerves by authors of this paper follows the general ideas of multiplicity and causal interactions described by DeLanda.
    Found 4 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilSci Archive