1. 265393.797999
    How to serve two epistemic masters Posted on Thursday, 23 May 2019 In this 2018 paper, J. Dmitri Gallow shows that it is difficult to combine multiple deference principles. The argument is a little complicated, but the basic idea is surprisingly simple. …
    Found 3 days, 1 hour ago on wo's weblog
  2. 528329.798081
    I am delighted to announce the next symposium in our series on articles from Neuroscience of Consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness is an interdisciplinary journal focused on the philosophy and science of consciousness, and gladly accepts submissions from both philosophers and scientists working in this fascinating field.We have two types of symposia. …
    Found 6 days, 2 hours ago on The Brains Blog
  3. 789270.798132
    The combination of panpsychism and priority monism leads to priority cosmopsychism, the view that the consciousness of individual sentient creatures is derivative of an underlying cosmic consciousness. It has been suggested that contemporary priority cosmopsychism parallels central ideas in the Advaita Vedānta tradition. The paper offers a critical evaluation of this claim. It argues that the Advaitic account of consciousness cannot be characterized as an instance of priority cosmopsychism, points out the differences between the two views, and suggests an alternative positioning of the Advaitic canon within the contemporary debate on monism and panpsychism.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  4. 916564.798209
    We argue that comparative psychologists have been too quick to jump to metacognitive interpretations of their data. We examine two such cases in some detail. One concerns so-called “uncertainty monitoring” behavior, which we show to be better explained in terms for first-order estimates of risk. The other concerns informational search, which we argue is better explained in terms of a first-order curiosity-like motivation that directs questions at the environment.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on Peter Carruthers's site
  5. 1010744.798238
    We demonstrate how deep and shallow embeddings of functional programs can coexist in the Coq proof assistant using meta-programming facilities of MetaCoq. While deep embeddings are useful for proving meta-theoretical properties of a language, shallow embeddings allow for reasoning about the functional correctness of programs.
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on Bas Spitters's site
  6. 1273839.798262
    In this paper, I develop and defend a new adverbial theory of perception. I first present a semantics for direct-object perceptual reports that treats their object-positions as supplying adverbial modifiers, and I show how this semantics definitively solves the many-property problem for adverbialism. My solution is distinctive in that it articulates adverbialism from within a well-established formal semantic framework and ties adverbialism to a plausible semantics for perceptual reports in English. I then go on to present adverbialism as a theory of the metaphysics of perception. The metaphysics I develop treats adverbial perception as a directed activity: it is an activity with success conditions. When perception is successful, the agent bears a relation to a concrete particular, but perception need not be successful; this allows perception to be fundamentally non-relational. The result is a novel formulation of adverbialism that eliminates the need for representational contents, but also treats successful and unsuccessful perceptual events as having a fundamental common factor.
    Found 2 weeks ago on PhilPapers
  7. 1331010.798286
    Suppose something bad happens to my friend, and while I am properly motivated in the right degree to alleviate the bad, I just don’t feel bad about it (nor do I feel good about). Common sense says I am morally defective. …
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  8. 1676285.798316
    There is conflicting experimental evidence about whether the “stakes” or importance of being wrong affect judgments about whether a subject knows a proposition. To date, judgments about stakes effects on knowledge have been investigated using binary paradigms: responses to “low” stakes cases are compared with responses to “high stakes” cases. However, stakes or importance are not binary properties—they are scalar: whether a situation is “high” or “low” stakes is a matter of degree. So far, no experimental work has investigated the scalar nature of stakes effects on knowledge: do stakes effects increase as the stakes get higher? Do stakes effects only appear once a certain threshold of stakes has been crossed? Does the effect plateau at a certain point? To address these questions, we conducted experiments that probe for the scalarity of stakes effects using several experimental approaches. We found evidence of scalar stakes effects using an “evidence-seeking” experimental design, but no evidence of scalar effects using a traditional “evidence-fixed” experimental design. In addition, using the evidence-seeking design, we uncovered a large, but previously unnoticed framing effect on whether participants are skeptical about whether someone can know something, no matter how much evidence they have. The rate of skeptical responses and the rate at which participants were willing to attribute “lazy knowledge”—that someone can know something without having to check— were themselves subject to a stakes effect: participants were more skeptical when the stakes were higher, and more prone to attribute lazy knowledge when the stakes were lower. We argue that the novel skeptical stakes effect provides resources to respond to criticisms of the evidence-seeking approach that argue that it does not target knowledge.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilPapers
  9. 1676305.798344
    Metaphysical orthodoxy holds that a privileged minority of properties carve reality at its joints. These are the so-called fundamental properties. This thesis concerns the contemporary philosophical debate about the nature of fundamental properties. In particular, it aims to answer two questions: (1) What is the most adequate conception of fundamental properties? (2) What is the “big picture” world-view that emerges by adopting such a conception? I argue that a satisfactory answer to both questions requires us to embrace a novel conception of powerful qualities, according to which properties are at once dispositional and qualitative. By adopting the proposed conception of powerful qualities, an original theory of fundamental properties comes to light. I call it Dual-Aspect Account. In this thesis, I defend the Dual-Aspect Account and its superiority with respect to rival views of fundamental properties. I illustrate this claim by examining Dispositionalism, the view defended among others by Alexander Bird and Stephen Mumford, Categoricalism, which has been advocated notably by David Lewis and David Armstrong, and the Identity Theory of powerful qualities, primarily championed by C. B. Martin and John Heil. The latter is the standard conception of powerful qualities. However, in the literature, the Identity Theory faces the charge of contradiction. A preliminary task is therefore to show that a conception of powerful qualities is coherent. To accomplish this aim, I introduce the notion of an aspect of a property. On this interpretation, powerful qualities can be thought of as having dispositional and qualitative aspects. I show that such a conception allows us to disambiguate the claim that a property’s dispositionality is identical with its qualitativity, and evade the charge of contradiction. Aspects bring us other theoretical benefits. I illustrate this claim by showing how the Dual-Aspect Account offers us a promising theory of resemblance. I then compare its merits with David Armstrong’s theory of partial identity. The conclusion of this thesis is that the Dual-Aspect Account is better suited to capturing the world as we find it in everyday life and scientific investigation as compared to the theoretical positions examined.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilPapers
  10. 1917928.798371
    In this paper I claim that perceptual discriminatory skills rely on a suitable type of environment as an enabling condition for their exercise. This is because of the constitutive connection between environment and perceptual discriminatory skills, inasmuch as such connection is construed from an ecological approach. The exercise of a discriminatory skill yields knowledge of affordances of objects, properties, or events in the surrounding environment. This is practical knowledge in the first-person perspective. An organism learns to perceive an object by becoming sensitized to its affordances. I call this position ecological disjunctivism. A corollary of this position is that a case of perception and its corresponding case of hallucination—which is similar to the former only in some respects—are different in nature. I show then how the distinguishability problem is addressed by ecological disjunctivism.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  11. 1925721.798396
    Several treatments of the Shooting Room Paradox have failed to recognize the crucial role played by its involving a number of players unbounded in expectation. We indicate Reflection violations and other vulnerabilities in extant proposals, then show that the paradox does not arise when the expected number of participants is finite; the Shooting Room thus takes its place in the growing list of puzzles that have been shown to require infinite expectation. Recognizing this fact, we conclude that prospects for a “straight solution” are dim.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilSci Archive
  12. 2028350.798421
    Imagined interactions (IIs) occur when individuals recall past conversations with others as well as anticipate future ones. IIs intersect with the concept of inner speech, yet little is known about what elements IIs and inner speech share as well as how they differ. Information is offered about both Imagined Interaction Theory and inner speech, followed by a discussion pertaining to how they interact with other inner experiences. Results based on self-reported inner speech using a Thought Listing procedure are also presented. Two main conclusions are reached: (1) IIs constitute mental activities that do include one type of inner speech but which recruit additional components absent in the latter. (2) Inner speech includes IIs, but also encompasses many other topics and functions not present in, or served by, IIs. Consequently, inner speech and IIs ought not to be equated.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on Alain Morin's site
  13. 2073927.798446
    Yesterday, I was rereading Philip Pettit's 2018 article "Consciousness Incorporated". Due to some vocabulary mismatch, I find his exact commitments on group phenomenal consciousness not entirely clear [note 1]. …
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on The Splintered Mind
  14. 2150089.798476
    Games may seem like a waste of time, where we struggle under artificial rules for arbitrary goals. I suggest that the rules and goals of games are not arbitrary at all. They are a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form. Game designers designate goals and abilities for the player; they shape the agential skeleton which the player will inhabit during the game. Game designers work in the medium of agency. Game-playing, then, illuminates a distinctive human capacity. We can take on ends temporarily for the sake of the experience of pursuing them. Game-play shows that our agency is significantly more modular and more fluid than we might have thought. It also demonstrates our capacity to take on an inverted motivational structure. Sometimes we can take on an end for the sake of the activity of pursuing that end.
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  15. 2157733.7985
    The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental ap-perception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. To begin with, what exactly does Kant mean when he states that I is a simple and empty representation? Secondly, can the features of the representation I and the correlative transcendental designation explain the indexical nature of the I? Thirdly, do the Kantian considerations on indexicality anticipate any of the semantic elements or, if nothing else, the spirit of the direct reference theory? KEYWOrDS: Kant; I think; transcendental apperception; transcendental designation; indexicality; direct reference theory.
    Found 3 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  16. 2297466.798526
    An adequate explication of miscomputation should do justice to the practices involved in the computational sciences. As relevant practices outside computer science have been overlooked, I begin to fill this gap by distinguishing different notions of miscomputation in computational psychiatry. I argue that a satisfactory explication of miscomputation in computational psychiatry should be grounded in the semantic view of computation, rather than in the mechanistic view. To the extent my argument is convincing, we should reconsider the adequacy of the mechanistic view of computation for illuminating some methodological and explanatory practices in computational cognitive neuroscience, as well as for individuating biological computing systems.
    Found 3 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  17. 2412674.798551
    According to a certain kind of naïve or folk understanding of physical matter, everyday ‘solid’ objects are composed of a homogeneous, gap-less substance, with sharply defined boundaries, which wholly fills the space they occupy. A further claim is that our perceptual experience of the environment represents or indicates that the objects around us conform to this sort of conception of physical matter. Were this further claim correct, it would mean that the way that the world appears to us in experience conflicts with the deliverances of our best current scientific theories in the following respect: perceptual experience would be intrinsically misleading concerning the structure of physical matter. I argue against this further claim. Experience in itself is not committed to, nor does it provide evidence for, any such conception of the nature of physical matter. The naïve/folk conception of matter in question cannot simply be ‘read-off’ from perceptual appearances.
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on PhilPapers
  18. 2582141.798574
    Short-term memory in vision is typically thought to divide into at least two memory stores: a short, fragile, high-capacity store known as iconic memory, and a longer, durable, capacity-limited store known as visual working memory (VWM). This paper argues that iconic memory stores icons, i.e., image-like perceptual representations. The iconicity of iconic memory has significant consequences for understanding consciousness, nonconceptual content, and the perception–cognition border. Steven Gross and Jonathan Flombaum have recently challenged the division between iconic memory and VWM by arguing against the idea of capacity limits in favor of a flexible resource-based model of short-term memory. I argue that, while VWM capacity is probably governed by flexible resources rather than a sharp limit, the two memory stores should still be distinguished by their representational formats. Iconic memory stores icons, while VWM stores discursive (i.e., language-like) representations. I conclude by arguing that this format-based distinction between memory stores entails that prominent views about consciousness and the perception–cognition border will likely have to be revised.
    Found 4 weeks, 1 day ago on Jake Quilty-Dunn's site
  19. 2648657.798607
    Timothy Williamson has argued that our capacity for metaphysical modal judgement comes along with our capacity for counterfactual judgement. This passage gives a flavour of his view: Humans evolved under no pressure to do philosophy. …
    Found 1 month ago on Tristan Haze's blog
  20. 2737216.798633
    We compare three theoretical frameworks for pursuing explanatory integration in psychiatry: a new dimensional framework grounded in the notion of computational phenotype, a mechanistic framework, and a network of symptoms framework. Considering the phenomenon of alcoholism, we argue that the dimensional framework is the best for effectively integrating computational and mechanistic explanations with phenomenological analyses.
    Found 1 month ago on Matteo Colombo's site
  21. 2739010.798662
    mundane and supramundane, even life and death. O’Halloran is gone from this world. Aoki is elderly in Japan. Morton is still learning to enjoy life in this world. They will not meet in this world, and yet they have already met here in these pages, and we are invited to join their stories of oneness. What kind of “oneness” is that? CHAPTER 8
    Found 1 month ago on Bradford Cokelet's site
  22. 3211137.798685
    When one looks at philosophical theories of perception one can see three broad classes of theoretical approaches. These are sometimes known as ‘relationalism’ and ‘representationalism’ (and ‘disjunctivism’). …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Richard Brown's blog
  23. 3392188.798713
    Work in both animals and humans has demonstrates that the brain specifically tracks the space near the body—the so-called peripersonal space (PPS). These representations appear to be multimodal and expressed in body-centered coordinates. They also play an important role in defense of the body from threat, manual action within PPS, and the use of tools—the latter, notably, ‘extending’ PPS to encompass the tool itself. Yet different authors disagree about important aspects of these representations, including how many there are. I suggest that the questions about the nature and number of PPS representations cannot be separated from the question of the mathematical basis of the corresponding representational spaces. I distinguish cartographic from functional bases for representation, suggesting that the latter is both a plausible account and supports a single-representation view. I conclude with reflections on functional bases and what they show about representation in cognitive science.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Colin Klein's site
  24. 3395095.798738
    In the previous post, I have remarked that the existing forms of SR do not use the full capacity of their logical frameworks to account for a substantial relation between the structure of the scientific theories and reality. …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on The Brains Blog
  25. 3431438.798763
    In a recent paper (Synthese, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229- 019-02101-3), Oldofredi presents a critical analysis of my mentalistic formulation of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. Here I answer these criticisms, and explain more clearly why the formulation is helpful to understand and solve the measurement problem.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  26. 3526674.798787
    There are different ways to formalise roughly the same knowledge, which negatively affects ontology reuse and alignment and other tasks such as formalising competency questions automatically. We aim to shed light on, and make more precise, the intuitive notion of such ‘representation styles’ through characterising their inherent features and the dimensions by which a style may differ. This has led to a total of 28 different traits that are partitioned over 10 dimensions. The operationalisability was assessed through an evaluation of 30 ontologies on those dimensions and applicable values. It showed that it is feasible to use the dimensions and values and resulting in three easily recognisable types of ontologies. Most ontologies had clearly one or the other trait, whereas some were inherently mixed due to inclusion of different and conflicting design decisions.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on C. Maria Keet's site
  27. 3855627.798812
    The fully entangled “Schrodinger’s cat state” (|A1>|B1> + |A2>| B2>)/√2 obtained immediately upon measurement of a superposed 2-state quantum system A by a detector B is often said to paradoxically predict macroscopically different outcomes, B1 and B2, simultaneously. However, non-local interferometry experiments and their accompanying quantum-theoretical analyses, testing momentum-entangled photon pairs over the full range of phases, demonstrate that the cat state does not fit this description. This state instead represents two non-locally coherent (i.e. dependent on a non-local phase) correlations between its sub-systems A and B. That is, entanglement means that A1 is coherently correlated with B1, and A2 with B2. Even if B is a cat, this state is not paradoxical. Furthermore, standard quantum theory correctly predicts the experimentally-observed non-paradoxical outcomes. Thus both quantum theory and quantum experiments show there is no “Schrodinger’s cat paradox” associated with measurement. This resolves the problem of definite outcomes and, with it, the measurement problem: upon entanglement with a detector, superpositions collapse non-locally and unitarily to one definite macroscopic outcome. No special collapse postulate is needed.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  28. 4002143.798837
    Timothy Williamson is mainly right, I think. He defends armchair philosophy as a variety of armchair science, like mathematics, or computer modeling in evolutionary theory, economics, statistics, and I agree that this is precisely what philosophy is, at its best: working out the assumptions and implications of any serious body of thought, helping everyone formulate the best questions to ask, and then leaving the empirical work to the other sciences. Philosophy—at its best—is to other inquiries roughly as theoretical physics is to experimental physics. You can do it in the armchair, but you need to know a lot about the phenomena with which the inquiry deals.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on Daniel Dennett's site
  29. 4012013.798863
    De ira is, as Seneca states in the beginning, a treatise on how to alleviate anger. While other emotions may still have something calm about them, anger, according to Seneca, is all excitement, raging towards vengeance (1.1.1). The idea that we should aim at getting rid of anger is tied to the theoretical discussion of anger: once we understand what we actively do when we experience anger, we can stop short of getting angry. De ira stands within a Stoic tradition of discussing the therapy of the emotions. Seneca’s concern with anger is not only in line with the general Stoic conviction that emotions are irrational, but also with a more widespread ancient interest in anger as a particularly violent emotion. However, in spite of the particular attention that is devoted to anger, it seems that, of all emotions, anger is surprisingly difficult to understand within the Stoic framework.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on Katja Maria Vogt's site
  30. 4164186.798893
    Consciousness is widely thought to be important, particularly from an ethical perspective. It is hard to find widespread agreement in ethics, but one relatively uncontroversial ethical fact is that pain is intrinsically bad and pleasure is intrinsically good. …
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on John Danaher's blog