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34374.266901
Fabian Hundertmark, Bielefeld University
Jakob Roloff, Justus-Liebig-University Gießen
Francesca Bellazzi, University of Oslo, ERC Project Assembling Life (no.101089326)
1. Introduction
In the target post, Dong and Piccinini criticize SE and propose a new goal-contribution account of functions (GCA) (also in Maley, Piccinini 2017; Piccinini, 2020). …
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183651.266992
In the semantic debate about perspectival expressions—predicates of taste, aesthetic and moral terms, epistemic modals, etc.—intuitions about armchair scenarios (e.g., disagreement, retraction) have played a crucial role. More recently, various experimental studies have been conducted, both in relation to disagreement (e.g., Cova, 2012; Foushee and Srinivasan, 2017; Solt, 2018) and retraction (e.g., Knobe and Yalcin, 2014; Khoo, 2018; Beddor and Egan, 2018; Dinges and Zakkou, 2020; Kneer 2021; 2022; Almagro, Bordonaba Plou, and Villanueva, 2023; Marques, 2024), with the aim of establishing a more solid foundation for semantic theorizing. Both these types of data have been used to argue for or against certain views (e.g., contextualism, relativism). In this talk, I discern a common thread in the use of these data and argue for two claims: (i) which perspective is adopted by those judging the armchair scenarios put forward and by the participants in experimental studies crucially matters for the viability of the intended results; (ii) failure to properly attend to this puts recent experimental work at risk. Finally, I consider the case of cross-linguistic disagreement and retraction and assess their importance for the semantic debate about perspectival expressions, as well as for the claim that perspective matters in putting forward the data on which decisions about the right semantic view are made.
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201949.267036
Yesterday I arrived in Santa Clara for the Q2B (Quantum 2 Business) conference, which starts this morning, and where I’ll be speaking Thursday on “Quantum Algorithms in 2024: How Should We Feel?” and also closing the conference via an Ask-Us-Anything session with John Preskill. …
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712569.267061
The application of Noether’s theorem to the exact SU(3) color symmetry of quantum chromodynamics results in the conservation of the color charge current. This current takes values in SU(3)’s Lie algebra, and it is therefore eight-dimensional. But how can this eight-dimensional space be the right mathematical object for the conservation of the three color charges red, blue, and green and their three corresponding anti-colors? We might have expected a six-dimensional space, or perhaps a nine-dimensional one, but eight is surprising. This paper answers this question through explicit construction of the SU(3) adjoint representation from the two fundamental representations of SU(3). This construction generates principled reasons for interpreting elements of the SU(3) Lie algebra as bearing combinations of color and anti-color. In light of this construction, this paper contrasts mathematical and conceptual features of color charge conservation with electric charge conservation, thereby highlighting some of the challenges and subtleties of interpreting non-Abelian gauge theories.
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770330.267092
Imagine huge bats roaring in the clear sky, all swooping and screeching and diving around you. As you’re imagining this scene, you have now an experience of something, you are in an intentional state. Your intentional state is one of imagining, rather than one of perceiving or remembering. If you want to gure out what kind of intentional state you’re having, you don’t have to make any inference or to focus on the content of your experience. Your experience of huge bats roaring around you seems to incorporate a pre-re ective sense of the kind of intentional state you’re having.
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770411.26713
The New Mechanical Philosophy is Stuart Glennan’s most comprehensive treatment of the philosophical worldview he championed well before his audacious title had a recognizable referent. Subsequently, philosophical interest in mechanisms and mechanistic explanation has exploded, in part through Glennan’s e orts, and his knowledgeable and charitable condensation of that literature should be essential reading for would-be mechanists and critics.
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770522.26715
The debate over whether, and to what extent, psychological explanations can be considered to be ‘autonomous’ is an old one, dating back at least to the 1970s. This new volume, edited by David Kaplan, promises not only to reinvigorate that debate, but also to refocus it, by shifting the emphasis away from an abstract dichotomy between autonomy and reduction, and towards analyses of speci c explanatory practices in the mind and brain sciences. This allows for a more nuanced approach, where di erent levels of explanation are neither wholly autonomous nor entirely integrated, but rather exercise mutual constraints upon one another. Each of the contributors to the volume engages with this theme in some way, either by presenting a particular case study (Strevens, Kaplan, and Aizawa), considering speci c ways in which di erent levels of explanation might constrain one another (Woodward, Egan, and Shagrir and Bechtel), or exploring the implications of a non-reductive approach to theoretical integration (Roth and Cummins, Weiskopf, Murphy, Maley, and Piccinini). This is not to say that there is complete agreement amongst the authors. For example, Weiskopf defends the explanatory autonomy of cognitive models, Egan argues for the autonomy of function-theoretic models, and Aizawa considers examples of multiply realizable (and thus partially autonomous) kinds in the science of colour vision. Even in these latter cases though, the tone is generally conciliatory—every chapter of this volume makes an e ort to move the debate forward rather than simply re-treading old ground, and it is perhaps most valuable for the questions it leaves unanswered, providing invitations for future debate and discussion.
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770605.26717
Research on the nature and varieties of the format of cognitive representations in philosophy and cognitive science have been partly shaped by analogies to external, public representations. In this paper, we argue that relying on such analogies contributes to framing the question of cognitive formats in problematic, potentially counterproductive ways. We show that cognitive and public representations differ in many of their central features, making analogies to public representations ill-suited to improving our understanding of cognitive formats. We illustrate these points by examining two case studies in which analogies to public representations may have had a negative impact on research: the 80’s-90’s debate about compositionality and cognitive architecture between symbolicists and connectionists; and contemporary discussions about the nature of visual demonstratives. Finally, we outline an alternative, computational account of formats that does not share the shortcomings of appeal to public representations.
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770634.267197
In the 20th century, the distinction between instinct and learning motivated international debates that reshaped the disciplinary landscape of animal behavior studies. When the dust settled, a new consensus emerged: the development of behavioral traits involves complex interactions between organism, genetic inheritance, and experience with the environment. This insight has spurred some philosophers and scientists to eschew instinct versus learning dichotomies—and instinct concepts in particular—on epistemic grounds. In this paper, I reassess influential 20th century arguments against instinct concepts and instinct vs. learning dichotomies to show that these arguments have limited scope. Then, I use historical case studies to demonstrate the combinatorial flexibility of instinct and learning concepts. Although instinct and learning are often framed as mutually exclusive opposites, scientists continue to combine them in causal physiological accounts of behavior. I conclude by suggesting that instinct concepts help scientists achieve their epistemic aims because of the way they facilitate abductive inferences.
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770669.26723
Though well established in mammals, the cognitive map hypothesis has engendered a decades-long, ongoing debate in insect navigation studies involving many of the field's most prominent researchers. In this paper, I situate the debate within the broader context of 20th century animal behavior research and argue that the debate persists because competing research groups are guided by different constellations of epistemic aims, theoretical commitments, preferred animal subjects, and investigative practices. The expanded history of the cognitive map provided in this paper shows that more is at stake in the cognitive map debate than the truth value of propositions characterizing insect cognition. What is at stake is the future direction of an extraordinarily productive tradition of insect navigation research stretching back to Karl von Frisch. Disciplinary labels like ethology, comparative psychology, and behaviorism became less relevant at the turn of the 21st century, but as I show, the different ways of knowing animals associated with these disciplines continue to motivate debates about animal cognition. This examination of scienti fic disagreement surrounding the cognitive map hypothesis also has significant consequences for philosophers' use of cognitive map research as a case study.
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1059101.267258
Other Minds emphasizes Godfrey-Smith’s rst-hand experience observing and interacting with cephalopods, especially octopuses and cuttle sh. For the general reader this rst-hand experience establishes his expertise, and also allows him a certain kind of intimacy with his subject that invites the reader on his journey. That journey also provides the book with a narrative thread, from his initial encounter with octopuses, into his growing fascination with them, and then on to his study and theorizing about the inner lives of cephalopods. For philosophers and cognitive scientists, this same narrative intimacy will immediately raise red ags. Has Godfrey-Smith turned into one of those animal minds kooks (or pet owners) whose evident a ection for their subjects robs them of critical distance? ‘The plural of anecdote is not data’, some will say.
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1059128.267286
The bourgeoning literature on the various aspects of models and modelling has recently spawned book-length studies that also aim to function as introductions to philosophical discussion of modelling (for example, Bailer- Jones [2003]; Morgan [2012]; Weisberg [2013]). Axel Gelfert’s How to Do Science with Models: A Philosophical Primer ts squarely into this group. Like its predecessors, it is much more than a philosophical primer, presenting an original contribution to our understanding of scienti c modelling. In particular, Gelfert pays close attention to the plurality of functions of models and their contexts of application, also highlighting the importance of their construction: ‘what models are is crucially determined by their being the result of a deliberate process of model construction’ (p. 20). Accordingly, Gelfert studies several models at length, in order to identify some ‘middle range’ features and strategies that, although not universal, may nevertheless characterize some recurring patterns in the usage of models across disciplines.
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1117001.267299
In this paper we argue that object perception may be affected by what we call “perceptual frames.” Perceptual frames are adaptations of the perceptual system that guide how perceptual objects are singled out from a sensory environment. These adaptations are caused by perceptual learning and realized through bottom-up functional processes such that sensory information is organized in a subject-dependent way leading to idiosyncratic perceptual object representations. Through domain-specific training, perceptual learning, and the acquisition of object-knowledge, it is possible to modulate the adaptive perceptual system such that its ability to represent becomes bespoke. Different perceivers with different perceptual frames may, therefore, receive the same sensory information and perceive different perceptual objects due to the effects of framing. Consequently, we demonstrate the plausibility of this account by surveying empirical data concerning the functions of (1) multisensory integration, (2) amodal completion, and (3) predictive anticipation. Regarding (1), we argue that the perceptual system’s optimization processes employ perceptual frames to facilitate multisensory feature binding. Regarding (2), we argue that amodal completion can occur with or without the help of mental imagery, yet either instance of amodal completion requires perceptual frames. Regarding (3), we demonstrate that perceptually anticipating an object’s motion involves the implementation of perceptual frames. We conclude that framing effects are a matter of perceptual diversity and highlight the need to accommodate unique perspectives in the philosophy and science of perception.
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1117134.267312
Gualtiero Piccinini’s Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account develops a systematic theory of computing systems. On display throughout are virtues familiar from Piccinini’s previous writings on the topic: an admirably straightforward writing style; a synoptic perspective on computation’s varied aspects, as studied within logic, computer science, arti cial intelligence, cognitive science, engineering, neuroscience, and physics; extensive knowledge of computing practice; and a gift for conveying that knowledge in accessible, non-technical terms.
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1117184.267324
I have a vivid memory from my undergraduate degree in psychology: a short video, no longer than ve seconds long, showing the characteristic ‘pinwheel’ activation of orientation-sensitive cells in the primary visual cortex. These cells (clumped into ‘columns’) respond di erentially to the orientation of light in the visual eld. In the video I watched, this responsiveness was rendered in dramatic fashion: responding to a clockwise rotating stimuli, the activation pattern of the cells rotated in near perfect synchrony.
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1117209.267336
Eric Scerri and Grant Fisher’s edited volume, Essays in the Philosophy of Chemistry boasts a variety of insightful perspectives on the application of philosophy of science to issues of chemical interest and the application of chemistry to broader debates in philosophy of science. The division of the collection’s sixteen essays into their respective sections is occasionally puzzling, and in a few cases a potential for scholarly dialogue between essays is diminished as a result. So, while there are standout contributions in each section, which are discussed in more detail below, the whole does not transcend the sum of its parts.
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1117337.267349
Multiple realization is rather casually thought by many scientists and philosophers to be the saving grace of scienti c autonomy. How else should we make sense of the nature of abstract and seemingly non-reducible items such as depression, preferences, and institutions? More generally, multiple realizability is sometimes understood to be a mandatory commitment if we want to defend the integrity and realism of a particular non-fundamental science—not least, cognitive science and psychology. Thomas Polger and Lawrence Shapiro are in fact psychological ‘realists’ (p. 184), but have long been multiple realization ‘skeptics’ (p. 135). In their highly valuable The Multiple Realization Book, they maintain that reduction is no threat to psychological realism and critically scrutinize the case for multiple realization.
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1268033.267362
Music can have extrinsic and/or intrinsic meaning. The former is relevant in the case of program music. The latter conforms to pure (absolute) music, i.e. music that can be understood without reference to extrinsic sources. Taking the intrinsic content of music as basic, we must ask about its nature. I propose to identify it with aesthetic emotion. As tonal music is organized by series of chords relative to the context of a tonal scale, the question is how music forms can be mapped onto aesthetic emotions. I propose to ground the analysis on a two-dimensional space of emotions, where one dimension refers to arousal (activity) and the other dimension refers to valence. Relating valence with consonance and arousal with entropic uncertainty leads to an account which directly relates structural and probabilistic aspects of tonal music with its affective content. The present bare-bone semantics of pure music proposes an explicit modeling of the affective response based on an algebraic meaning conception.
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1286992.267371
Some learning strategies that work well when computational considerations are abstracted away from become severely limiting when such considerations are taken into account. We illustrate this phenomenon for agents who attempt to extrapolate patterns in binary data streams chosen from among a countable family of possibilities. If computational constraints are ignored, then two strategies that will always work are learning by enumeration (enumerate the possibilities—in order of simplicity, say—then search for the one earliest in the ordering that agrees with your data and use it to predict the next data point) and Bayesian learning. But there are many types of computable data streams that, although they can be successfully extrapolated by computable agents, cannot be handled by any computable learner by enumeration. And while there is a sense in which Bayesian learning is a fully general strategy for computable learners, the ability to mimic powerful learners comes at a price for Bayesians: they cannot, in general, become highly confident of their predictions in the limit of large data sets and they cannot, in general, use priors that incorporate all relevant background knowledge.
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1290338.267386
Consciousness We Trust o ers a characteristically original and opinionated treatment of the eld. Unusually for a book by a neuroscientist, it draws on and engages extensively with contemporary philosophy. Unusually for an academic monograph, it is a striking admixture of memoir and manifesto. The result is both appealing and accessible. It will be of wide interest to neuroscientists, philosophers, sociologists of science, and simply curious outsiders.
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1290501.267398
This compendium is a ne collection of essays exploring the role of tools in the theory and practice of neuroscience. The book is divided in to ve sections: ‘Research Tools in Relation to Theories’, ‘Research Tools and Epistemology’, ‘Research Tools, Integration, Circuits, and Ontology’, ‘Tools and Integrative Pluralism’, and ‘Tool Use and Development beyond Neuroscience’.
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1290582.26741
This event might strike you as perplexing, but it motivates questions lying at the core of the computational sciences. For example, what does it mean to say that a system like LaMDA computes but a system like the Apennine Mountains does not? Do nervous systems compute? If they do, in virtue of what do they compute? Do they compute in the same way as LaMDA does? And what is the relationship between computing and having a conscious mind?
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1378073.267422
It is well known that Kant distinguishes between two kinds of self-consciousness: transcendental apperception and empirical apperception (or, approximately, inner sense). However, Kant sometimes claims that “I think,” the general expression of transcendental apperception, expresses an indeterminate empirical inner intuition (IEI), which differs in crucial ways from the empirical inner intuition produced by inner sense. Such claims undermine Kant’s conceptual framework and constitute a recalcitrant obstacle to understanding his theory of self-consciousness. This paper analyzes the relevant passages, evaluates the major interpretations of IEI, revisits the notion of pure apperception, and proposes an alternative reading: IEI is a ubiquitous, nonfocal, “obscure,” and empirical inner intuition that is built into all nonintrospective conscious states. This reading can successfully account for the peculiarities of IEI, resolving a major mystery in Kant’s theory of self-consciousness.
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1406057.267433
Paper accepted to the 2024 edition of the Philosophy of Science Association (New Orleans) and for publication in the related special issue in Philosophy of science. This version of the article has been accepted for publication after peer review but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections.
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1461724.267443
Experience, is a valiant attempt to revive the phenomenalist view that physical things are nothing but possibilities for experience. For the phenomenalist, a mountain is a tendency for experiences to occur in certain ways—the ways they do when people perceive a mountain. Pelczar cashes out these experiential tendencies in terms of objective conditional probabilities. Roughly, the existence of the mountain consists in the fact that mountainous experiences are likely to occur conditional on the occurrence of certain other experiences. In Pelczar’s grand vision, everything ultimately reduces to two kinds of facts, phenomenal facts and facts about objective chance. It’s a highly heterodox view that some philosophers may regard as a non-starter, but I share enough of Pelczar’s sensibilities to be in the target audience. I agree that experience is irreducible and that Humean reductive accounts of chance are unpromising. I’ve argued that naive realist conceptions of the physical world might need to be radically revised in light of modern physics (Cutter 2021). I would therefore love to buy what Pelczar claims to be selling: a plausible reductive account of the physical world that takes experience and chance as the sole metaphysical primitives.
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1579258.267457
We defend a new, neurocognitive version of the view that knowing that is a form of knowing how and its manifestation. Specifically, we argue that knowing that P is knowing how to represent the fact that P, ground such a representation in the fact that P, use such a representation to guide action with respect to P when needed, store traces of such representations, and exercising the relevant know-how. More precisely, agents acquire knowledge via their neurocognitive systems and neurocognitive systems control organisms by building internal models of their environments and using such models to guide action. Such internal models implicitly represent how things are. When agents’ implicit internal models are grounded in the fact that P and are usable for guiding action with respect to P, agents have implicit knowledge that P. When agents acquire the additional capacity to manipulate language, they also acquire the capacity to explicitly represent and express that the world is thus-and-so. When agents’ explicit internal models are appropriately grounded in the fact that
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1859543.267475
The Problem of Too Many Thinkers is the result, implied by several “permissive” ontologies, that we spatiotemporally overlap with a number of intrinsically person-like entities. The problem, as usually formulated, leaves open a much-neglected question: do we literally share our mental lives, i.e. each of our mental states, with these person-like entities, or do we instead enjoy mental lives that are qualitatively indistinguishable but numerically distinct from theirs? The latter option raises the worry that there is an additional Problem of Too Many Mental Tokens. This paper argues that there is indeed such a problem, at least in fission cases. In the course of articulating this problem, we will make a number of surprising discoveries about the relationship between personal persistence and the metaphysics of mental entities. We will also see that the Problem of Too Many Mental Tokens has significant epistemological and ethical implications, which will haunt us even once we have addressed the Problem of Too Many Thinkers.
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2018326.267511
This chapter explores the similarities and the differences between delusion and self-deception. Delusion and self-deception are similar in some ways. For that reason, it is reasonable to wonder whether delusions are, perhaps, a type of self-deception or whether, conversely, being self-deceived is simply a way of being deluded. It is tempting, in other words, to consider the possibility that we might be able to subsume one of the two conditions under the other one. In this chapter, I will argue that this temptation should be resisted. First, I offer a rough characterisation of both delusion and self-deception. Then, I highlight the respect in which the two conditions are alike: Both conditions seem to involve beliefs which appear to be unresponsive to evidence. Next, I discuss several respects in which the two conditions are different: Firstly, they have different aetiologies. Also, their social impact and their impact on the subject’s well-being is different. The normative aspects of self-deception and delusion are different as well. And, finally, they have different connections to psychopathology, and to the notion of mental illness. For all these reasons, I conclude, delusion and self-deception should be pulled apart as two separate conditions.
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2068610.267551
Propositional attitudes have an attitude type (belief, desire, etc. ), and a content. A popular idea in the literature on intentionality is that attitude type is determined by functional role and content in some other way. …
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2204018.267602
MeerKAT is an amazing array of 64 radio telescopes in South Africa. Astronomers want to expand this to the Square Kilometer Array, which will actually consist of thousands of telescopes in South Africa and Australia. …