1. 44253.819046
    I wrote 300 issues of a column called This Week’s Finds, where I explained math and physics. In the fall of 2022 I gave ten talks based on these columns. I just finished giving eight more! Now I’m done. …
    Found 12 hours, 17 minutes ago on Azimuth
  2. 92197.819189
    The Border Between Seeing and Thinking is an extraordinary achievement, the result of careful attention (and contribution) to both the science and philosophy of perception. The book offers some bold hypotheses. While the hypotheses themselves are worth the price of entry, Block’s sustained defense of them grants the reader insight into countless fascinating experimental results and philosophical concepts. His unpretentious and accommodating exposition of the science—explaining rather than asserting, digging into specific results in detail rather than making summary judgments and demanding that readers take him at his word—is a model of how philosophers ought to engage with empirical evidence. It is simply not possible to read this book without learning something. It will surely play a foundational role in theoretical work on perception for many years to come.
    Found 1 day, 1 hour ago on PhilPapers
  3. 109423.819201
    Two approaches have emerged to resolve discrepancies between predictions and observations at galactic and cosmological scales: introducing dark matter or modifying the laws of gravity. Practitioners of each approach claim to better satisfy a different explanatory ideal, either unification or simplicity. In this chapter, we take a closer look at the ideals and at the successes of these approaches in achieving them. Not only are these ideals less divisive than assumed, but moreover we argue that the approaches are focusing on different aspects of the same ideal. This realisation opens up the possibility of a more fruitful trading zone between dark matter and modified gravity communities.
    Found 1 day, 6 hours ago on Martin King's site
  4. 207679.819208
    We plead for a fluid margin, or mixed/indeterminate buffer zone, between Physical and Non-Physical Causal Closures, and for a Neutrosophic Causal Closure Principle claiming that the chances of all physical effects are determined by their prior partially physical and partially non-physical causes.
    Found 2 days, 9 hours ago on PhilPapers
  5. 218074.819215
    Imagine that we are on a train playing with some mechanical systems. Why can’t we detect any differences in their behavior when the train is parked versus when it is moving uniformly? The standard answer is that boosts are symmetries of Newtonian systems. In this paper, I use the case of a spring to argue that this answer is problematic because symmetries are neither sufficient nor necessary for preserving its behavior. I also develop a new answer according to which boosts preserve the relational properties on which the behavior of a system depends, even when they are not symmetries.
    Found 2 days, 12 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  6. 265408.819222
    In this paper, I’ll carry on with this philosophical fad. Specifically, I’ll examine some arguments for and against the thesis that composite, extended beings are ultimately composed of monads – simple, unextended substances. The arguments in its favor are those given by Christian Wolff and Emilie Du Châtelet. The arguments against it will be the one given by Euler. I’ll conclude with a possible way forward: The difference between Euler on the one hand and Du Châtelet and Wolff on the other does not lie in their acceptance or denial of a general explicability principle (in other words, of the principle of sufficient reason). Instead, it lies in their endorsement of subsidiary principles. Du Châtelet relies on an explicability principle in which an object’s having a property is not fully explained by citing another object with that same property. Euler rejects this in favor of his own explicability principle: An object’s being extended must always have, as its explanation, an object which is extended. I’ll conclude by arguing that the difference between the two also turns on epistemological differences. First, Euler seems to accord the imagination higher epistemic value than Du Châtelet; and second, he seems to demand explanations not only state that something is the case but how something is the case.
    Found 3 days, 1 hour ago on PhilPapers
  7. 270796.819227
    In this paper, we do two things: first, we offer a metaphysical account of what it is to be an individual person through Hegel’s understanding of the concrete universal; and second, we show how this account of an individual can help in thinking about love. The aim is to show that Hegel’s distinctive account of individuality and universality can do justice to two intuitions about love which appear to be in tension: on the one hand, that love can involve a response to properties that an individual possesses; but on the other hand, what it is to love someone is not just to love their properties, but to love them as the distinct individual they are. We claim that Hegel’s conception of the relation between individuals and their properties, which relies on his account of the concrete universal, can resolve this tension and make sense of this aspect of love.
    Found 3 days, 3 hours ago on Ergo
  8. 323153.819233
    Aristotle’s definition of syllogism in his Prior Analytics is usually charged of being too vague and, more specifically, of not being adequate for its supposed definiendum. Aristotle is supposed to define the stricter notion of “syllogism” (a sort of argument in which the premises are an appropriate pair of sentences formulated in predicative form, in which the conclusion is a different sentence in predicative form) but he seems to produce a definition for some broader notion of valid argument or deduction in general. 1 I believe that this charge, however likely, is not correct. Aristotle’s definition of syllogism is far from being clear, since it is phrased in his jargon and with his usual laconism. However, once we are in a better position to understand what he means with his peculiar phrasing, we can see that the definition he offers is appropriate for the very notion of syllogism. I mean that Aristotle is really defining that form of argument in which the conclusion is a predicative (or categorical) form attained by means of a premise-pair of the appropriate sort (with a middle term relating to each extreme in each premise ).
    Found 3 days, 17 hours ago on PhilPapers
  9. 333325.819239
    Perturbative expansions have played a peculiarly central role in quantum field theory, not only in extracting empirical predictions but also in investigations of the theory’s mathematical and conceptual foundations. This paper brings the special status of QFT perturbative expansions into focus by tracing the history of mathematical physics work on perturbative QFT and situating a contemporary approach, perturbative algebraic QFT, within this historical context. Highlighting the role that perturbative expansions have played in foundational investigations helps to clarify the relationships between the formulations of QFT developed in mathematical physics and high-energy phenomenology.
    Found 3 days, 20 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  10. 341126.819249
    In his recent The Parmenidean Ascent, Michael Della Rocca develops a regress-theoretic case, reminiscent of F.H. Bradley’s famous argument in Appearance and Reality, against the intelligibility of relations and in favor of a monistic conception of reality. I argue that Della Rocca illicitly supposes that “internal” relations – in one sense of that word – lead to a “chain” regress, a regress of relations relating relations and relata. In contrast, I contend that if “internal” or grounded relations lead to a regress at all, it is a kind of “fission” regress within the relata themselves, and that a chain regress for relations only arises, if at all, for so-called “external” relations, relations not grounded in their relata. In this way, I contend that Della Rocca pursues a regress for so-called “internal” or grounded relations that only arises, if at all, for so-called “external” relations, relations not grounded in their relata. I compare Della Rocca’s case against relations with Bradley’s reasoning in Appearance and Reality, and suggest in this context that Bradley may, perhaps, have the upper hand.
    Found 3 days, 22 hours ago on Kevin Morris's site
  11. 347876.819264
    In the last couple of decades, the most prominent argument from evil is base on the idea that God couldn’t allow a gratuitous evil. Here is one way to define a gratuitous evil, paraphrasing Rowe: - E is gratuitous if and only if there is no greater or equal good G that is only obtainable by God if God permits E or something equal or worse. …
    Found 4 days ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  12. 397983.819271
    Atomic and close-to-atomic scale manufacturing (ACSM) is the core competence of Manufacturing III. Unlike other conceptions or terminologies that only focus on the atomic level precision, ACSM defines a new realm of manufacturing where quantum mechanics plays the dominant role in the atom/molecule addition, migration and removal, considering the uncertainty principle and the discrete nature of particles. As ACSM is still in its infant stage, only little has been systematically elaborated at the core proposition of ACSM by now, hence there is a need to understand its concept and vision. This article elucidates the development of ACSM and clarifies its proposition, which aims to achieve a clearer understanding on ACSM and direct more effective efforts toward this promising area.
    Found 4 days, 14 hours ago on Wendy S. Parker's site
  13. 438559.819277
    This is an English translation of the records of Lu Cheng (Lu Cheng lu 陸澄錄) in the first volume (juan shang 卷上) of the Record of Instructions for Practice (Chuan xi lu 傳習錄). Wang Yangming’s followers kept records of statements he made and conversations he held when discussing his Ruist learning with them. During and after his lifetime, these records were compiled in one or more volumes and titled Record of Instructions for Practice (or something similar). Many versions, each with different content, were published over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Some editions included a volume with a compilation of important correspondence and pedagogical writings. Among these, the three-juan version included in the
    Found 5 days, 1 hour ago on PhilPapers
  14. 438653.819282
    In the first volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973, Chaps. 1 and 2), F.A. Hayek exposes his famous criticism of the constructivist (or rationalist) approach to human history. As Hayek puts it, the latter approach assumes that humans are fully rational and thus can construct perfect social institutions because reason can advise them on how to impeccably do so. In this regard, Hayek (1973, Chap. 1, p. 12) writes: “Complete rationality of action in the Cartesian sense demands complete knowledge of all the relevant facts. A designer or engineer needs all the data and full power to control or manipulate them if he is to organize the material objects to produce the intended result. But the success of action in society depends on more particular facts than anyone can possibly know. And our whole civilization in consequences rests, and must rest, on our believing much that we cannot know [Hayek’s italics] to be true in the Cartesian sense.”
    Found 5 days, 1 hour ago on PhilPapers
  15. 483450.819288
    Conflict over who belongs in women­only spaces is now part of mainstream political debate. Some think women­only spaces should exclude on the basis of sex, and others think they should exclude on the basis of a person’s self­determined gender identity. Many who take the latter view appear to believe that the only reason for taking the former view could be antipathy towards men who identify as women. In this paper, we’ll revisit the second­wave feminist literature on separatism, in order to uncover the reasons for women­only spaces as feminists originally conceived them. Once these reasons are understood, those participating in debates over women­only spaces will be in a better position to adjudicate on whether shifting from sex to gender identity puts any significant interests at stake.
    Found 5 days, 14 hours ago on Holly Lawford-Smith's site
  16. 581360.819294
    Philosophical analyses of the works of Jean-Paul Sartre usually focus on his theoretical writings, with his literary fiction treated as merely popularizing ideas whose full articulation can be found in those theoretical works. It is certainly true that Sartre wanted to use novels, plays, and films to bring his philosophy to a mass audience. But that is compatible with developing some ideas through those media. Indeed, his regular reliance on miniature stories to articulate and substantiate philosophical claims in his theoretical writings suggests that he found fiction especially conducive to this purpose. His strong emphasis on dialogue and character interaction in his plays and screenplays matches the formal structures of those vignettes in his theoretical works. Using drama in this way would allow him to develop an idea through a range of situations without being constrained by any theoretical formulation of that idea, while reaching a wider audience than would read his theoretical writings.
    Found 6 days, 17 hours ago on Jonathan Webber's site
  17. 721866.819301
    There is an ethics of blaming the person who deserves blame. The Christian scriptures imply the following no-vengeance condition: a person should not vengefully overtly blame a wrongdoer even if she gives the wrongdoer the exact negative treatment that he deserves. I explicate and defend this novel condition and argue that it demands a revolution in our blaming practices. First, I explain the no-vengeance condition. Second, I argue that the no-vengeance condition is often violated. The most common species of blame involves anger; anger conceptually includes a desire for vengeance; and there are many pleasures in payback. Third, I clarify that it is possible to blame non-vengefully in anger and highlight three good uses for anger in non-vengeful blame. Fourth, I offer two reasons that justify the divine command prohibiting vengeance, and I note that the Christian God is merely sufficient to make non-vengeance morally obligatory. Fifth, I defend the no-vengeance condition against four biblical objections.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Robert J. Hartman's site
  18. 727149.819309
    This paper explores the potential of integrating ancient educational principles from diverse eastern cultures into modern AI ethics curricula. It draws on the rich educational traditions of ancient China, India, Arabia, Persia, Japan, Tibet, Mongolia, and Korea, highlighting their emphasis on philosophy, ethics, holistic development, and critical thinking. By examining these historical educational systems, the paper establishes a correlation with modern AI ethics principles, advocating for the inclusion of these ancient teachings in current AI development and education. The proposed integration aims to provide a comprehensive education that not only encompasses foundational knowledge but also advanced learning, thereby equipping future AI professionals with the necessary tools to develop AI systems that are ethically responsible, culturally aware, and aligned with human values such as fairness, safety, transparency, and collaboration. This approach not only addresses the AI alignment problem but also fosters cultural harmony and global understanding, which are crucial in an increasingly interconnected world. The paper posits that the wisdom of ancient educational systems, when harmonized with modern AI ethics, can guide the development of AI technologies that are beneficial for humanity, ensuring these advancements are not just technologically sound but also ethically and culturally informed.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  19. 727184.819315
    In his article Banicki proposes a universal model for all forms of philosophical therapy. He is guided by works of Martha Nussbaum, who in turn makes recourse to Aristotle. As compared to Nussbaum’s approach, Banicki’s model is more medical and less based on ethical argument. He mentions Foucault’s vision to apply the same theoretical analysis for the ailments of the body and the soul and to use the same kind of approach in treating and curing them. In his interpretation of philosophical therapy, there are, however, some controversial issues, to which we would like to call attention: Is restoring health by a philosophical method of treatment – health understood as a person’s ability to reach his/her vital goals – a convincing explication of philosophical therapy in general? In order to answer this question, it may be useful to look at Plato. It is not only Platonism (and especially Neo-platonism since Plotinus) that questions the idea that therapy is necessarily connected with „vital goals“. Buddhist and Gnostic philosophies are questioning „the vital“ in general. The immense effort in the history of philosophy to liberate the mind from the body casts doubt on the project to explain philosophical therapy solely in analogy to medical therapy.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  20. 727207.81932
    Monists and pluralists disagree concerning how many ordinary objects there are in a single situation. For instance, pluralists argue that a statue and the clay it is made of have different properties, and thereby are different. The standard monist’s response is to hold that there is just a single object, and that, under the description “being a statue”, this object is, e.g., aesthetically valuable, and that, under the description “being a piece of clay”, it is not aesthetically valuable. However, Fine provided an ontological reading of the expression “an object under a description”: the theory of rigid embodiments. The debate between monists and pluralists reduplicates in the domain of ordinary occurrences, like walks and conferences.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  21. 737040.819326
    The neuroscience of consciousness is undergoing a significant empirical acceleration thanks to several adversarial collaborations that intend to test different predictions of rival theories of consciousness. In this context, it is important to pair consciousness science with confirmation theory, the philosophical discipline that explores the interaction between evidence and hypotheses, in order to understand how exactly, and to what extent, specific experiments are challenging or validating theories of consciousness.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on PhilSci Archive
  22. 737060.819333
    Three accounts of effective realism (ER) have been advanced in this journal to solve three problems for scientific realism: Fraser and Vickers ([forthcoming]) develop a version of ER about non-relativistic quantum mechanics that they argue is compatible with all the main realist versions (‘interpretations’) of quantum mechanics avoiding the problem of underde-termination among them; Williams ([2019]) and Fraser ([2020b]) propose ER about quantum field theory as a response to the problems facing realist interpretations; Robertson and Wilson ([forthcoming]) propose ER to deal with the dubious ontological status of the entities belonging to superseded theories. This paper argues for the unification of these proposals based on realism about modal structure and the idea of scale relativity of ontology developed by ontic structural realists. This solves problems some or all the accounts of ER face, especially that of making explicit in what way they are realist. Furthermore, we respond to a recent critique that has been raised against the ontic structural realist account of quantum mechanics that we employ.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on PhilSci Archive
  23. 910035.819339
    We re-examine the old question to what extent mathematics may be compared to a game. Under the spell of Wittgenstein, we propose that the more refined object of comparison is a “motley of language games”, the nature of which was (implicitly) clarified by Hilbert: via different language games, axiomatization lies at the basis of both the rigour and the applicability of mathematics. In the “formalist” game, mathematics resembles chess via a clear conceptual dictionary. Accepting this resemblance: like positions in chess, mathematical sentences cannot be true or false; true statements in mathematics are about sentences, namely that they are theorems (if they are). In principle, the certainty of mathematics resides in proofs, but to this end, in practice these must be “surveyable”. Hilbert and Wittgenstein proposed almost oppositie criteria for surveyability; we try to overcome their difference by invoking computer-verified proofs. The “applied” language game is based on Hilbert’s axiomatization program for physics (and other scientific disciplines), refined by Wittgenstein’s idea that theorems are yardsticks to which empirical phenomena may be compared, and further improved by invoking elements of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. From this perspective, in an appendix we also briefly review the varying roles and structures of axioms, definitions, and proofs in mathematics. Our view is not meant as a philosophy of mathematics by itself, but as a coat rack analogous to category theory, onto which various (traditional and new) philosophies of mathematics (such as formalism, intuitionism, structuralism, deductivism, and the philosophy of mathematical practice) may be attached and may even peacefully support each other.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  24. 958179.819345
    This paper aims to determine whether we can locate temporal passage in a non-dynamical (block universe) world. In particular, we seek to determine both whether temporal passage can be located somewhere in our world if it is non-dynamical, and also to home in on where in such a world temporal passage can be located, if it can be located anywhere. We investigate this question by seeking to determine, across three experiments, whether the folk concept of temporal passage can be satisfied in our world if it is non-dynamical, and, if it can, what sort of thing in our world satisfies that concept. In particular, we focus on the question of whether that concept (if satisfied) is satisfied by something mind-dependent or something mind-independent. In other words, we ask, is temporal passage something that is at least partially in the mind, or is it entirely external to the mind? We find, contrary to what is often assumed by dynamists and non-dynamists alike, that the folk concept of temporal passage is satisfied in our world conditional on it being non-dynamical, and that the concept is satisfied by something mind-independent. This provides further ammunition for recent deflationary accounts of temporal passage that attempt to locate passage somewhere in our non-dynamical world.
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on PhilPapers
  25. 967761.81935
    In the social epistemology of scientific knowledge, it is largely accepted that relationships of trust, not just reliance, are necessary in contemporary collaborative science characterised by relationships of opaque epistemic dependence. Such relationships of trust are taken to be possible only between agents who can be held accountable for their actions. But today, knowledge production in many fields makes use of AI applications that are epistemically opaque in an essential manner. This creates a problem for the social epistemology of scientific knowledge, as scientists are now epistemically dependent on AI applications that are not agents, and therefore not appropriate candidates for trust.
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  26. 1074068.819358
    Experiences of urges, impulses or inclinations are among the most basic elements in the practical life of conscious agents. This paper develops a theory of urges and their epistemology. I motivate a framework that distinguishes urges, conscious experiences of urges and exercises of capacities we have to control our urges. I argue that experiences of urges and exercises of control over urges play coordinate roles in providing one with knowledge of one’s urges.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilPapers
  27. 1074093.819363
    Philosophers have started to theorize the concept of ‘affective injustice’ to make sense of certain ways in which people’s affective lives are significantly marked by injustice. This new research has offered important insights into people’s lived experiences under oppression. But it is not immediately clear how the concept ‘affective injustice’ picks out something different from the closely related phenomenon of ‘psychological oppression.’ This paper considers the question of why we might need new theories of affective injustice in light of the well-established cross-disciplinary literature on psychological oppression. I suggest that, whereas psychological oppression is found in the hearts and minds of people who are oppressed, affective injustice is most fruitfully understood as a structural phenomenon. It operates primarily outside of us: in affective norms, practices, and relationships that are embedded in social conditions of injustice. The account I offer is tentative and incomplete. But my hope is that it will help show how theorizing affective injustice has the potential to enrich existing theories of justice and theories of psychological oppression.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilPapers
  28. 1192971.819369
    Kant claims that love ‘is a matter of feeling,’ which has led many of his interpreters to argue that he conceives of love as solely a matter of feeling, that is, as a purely pathological state. In this paper I challenge this reading by taking another one of Kant’s claims seriously, namely that all love is either benevolence or complacence and that both are rational. I place Kant’s distinction between benevolence and complacence next to the historical inspiration for it, namely Francis Hutcheson’s very similar distinction, in order to argue that love is rational, for Kant, in that it requires certain rational capacities on the part of the agent. I conclude by illustrating that this has important implications for how we understand Kant’s conception of love more generally.
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Ergo
  29. 1193046.819375
    in order to discover what might explain and justify our concepts, ideas or practices ( Queloz 2021). It arguably originated with Hume, but its most prominent practitioners are Edward Craig and Bernard Williams.1 Each of these thinkers takes a target concept: property rights, knowledge and truthfulness respectively, and shows how the concept could have developed in the context of a heavily idealized human-like society, the so-called ‘state of nature’. Members of the society are portrayed as adopting the new concept because it solves an important problem for them. The second stage of this method involves noting the relevant structural similarities between our own society and the idealized model society: we use basically the same concept, we face basically the same problems. Then, the crucial inference arrives: given these similarities, we may conclude that we use the concept for basically the same reasons, and therefore that we have corresponding practical reasons to continue to do so. This is because we understand, in Craig’s words, “what the concept does for us, what its role in our life might be” (Craig 1990 2).
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Ergo
  30. 1193158.819381
    Much of the popular debate that surrounds no platforming centres on its putatively corrosive impact on free speech. This is apt to give a misleading picture of the particular puzzle that no platforming presents. Focusing on the university specifically, I contend that no platforming is distinctively objectionable not because it necessarily runs counter to general free speech values but when and because it is inconsistent with principles of academic freedom. This is because it conflicts with the status of members of the academy as those with the legitimacy to determine the appropriate bounds of free inquiry within the university. No platforming is objectionable insofar as it undercuts the authority of academic faculty in determining which speech, and by whom, is consistent with its purpose as an academic institution. Existing debates over no platforming have been too focused on which views are (or are not) given a platform and insufficiently attentive to the question of who decides who or what to platform. On the view defended here, no platforming by students is objectionable because, under principles of academic freedom, they should not be included in the constituency with the right to constrain the platforming of others.
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Ergo