1. 66729.003314
    As predicted, the nationalist parties have slightly improved their scores in the European parliamentary elections. Put together, the parties belonging to the European Conservatives & Reformists and Identity & Democracy groups have won 131 seats over the 720 of the European Parliaments, to which we should also add part of the 100 seats earned by non-aligned parties. …
    Found 18 hours, 32 minutes ago on The Archimedean Point
  2. 515486.003677
    In this paper, I stress the need to broaden the scope of diversity in value-laden ideals of science to include geographic diversity. I argue that egalitarian and normic value-laden ideals have conceptual limitations when considering this dimension. While egalitarian frameworks advocate for a placeless science, normic frameworks predominantly locate scientific knowledge within the “Global North,” highlighting the importance of including “non- Western” perspectives from the “Global South.” These limitations have negative and unjust epistemic consequences: they risk perpetuating cultural imperialism, reproducing a colonial epistemic norming of space, and epistemic exoticization towards scientific communities in subaltern regions.
    Found 5 days, 23 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  3. 601237.003702
    Peter Galison 1,2,3,*, Juliusz Doboszewski 1,4,*, Jamee Elder 1,4,* , Niels C. M. Martens 5,4,6,7,* , Abhay Ashtekar , Jonas Enander , Marie Gueguen 10 , Elizabeth A. Kessler 11, Roberto Lalli 12,13, Martin Lesourd , Alexandru Marcoci 14 Luis Reyes-Galindo 19 , Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez 15 , Priyamvada Natarajan 1,16,17, James Nguyen 18, , Sophie Ritson 20 , Mike D. Schneider 21, Emilie Skulberg 22,23, Helene Sorgner 7,24, , Mike D. Schneider 21, Emilie Skulberg 22,23, Helene Sorgner 7,24, Matthew Stanley 25, Ann C. Thresher 26, Jeroen Van Dongen 22,23, James Owen Weatherall 27 , Jingyi Wu 27
    Found 6 days, 23 hours ago on James Owen Weatherall's site
  4. 657592.003743
    From today June 6 to Sunday, June 9, more than 400 million Europeans are invited to vote for European parliamentary elections. As those who have followed these elections even superficially know, far-right parties are predicted to be making significant progress across the continent compared to previous elections. …
    Found 1 week ago on The Archimedean Point
  5. 688795.003761
    A number of philosophers working in values and science have recently called for more attention to the nature of value judgments. Following Douglas (2009) on the history of the value-free ideal, I think contemporary work in values and science can benefit from its history.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  6. 861900.003778
    In this paper, I argue that current attempts at classifying life–mind continuity (LMC) feature several important ambiguities. We can resolve these ambiguities by distinguishing between the extensional, categorical, and systematic relationships that LMC might encompass. In section 1, I begin by introducing the notion of LMC and the theory behind it. In section 2, I show how different ideas of mind shape different approaches to continuity and how to achieve its aim. In section 3, I canvas various canonical formulations and classifications of LMC; I then demonstrate that they retain important ambiguities. Section 4 builds on this by arguing that we must conceive of the extensional and categorical aspects of continuity independently. In section 5, I show further that current literature has underexplored multiple systematic aspects of continuity. I then take a constructive approach in section 6 by providing a classification model for LMC based on extensional and categorical commitments. Here, I comment on aspects of the thesis omitted from the model but essential for a full classification and thorough comparison between various approaches to LMC. All of these arguments lay the foundation for more exhaustively classifying accounts of LMC.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  7. 861932.003794
    In contrast to the history of science and to science and technology studies, the value discourse in the philosophy of science has not provided a thorough analysis of the material culture of science. Instruments in science have a special characteristic, namely that they explicitly and clearly emerge from and remain embedded in social contexts, and are thus imbued with values. We argue that the materials (in most cases they are artifacts) used in science are necessarily influenced by both epistemic and non-epistemic considerations. A consequence of this is that a descriptive term cannot give sufficient information whether an artifact is performing in an acceptable way. Instead of the prevailing descriptive approach, we therefore advocate a normative notion of values in the material culture of science. To this end, we connect the material culture of science to the so-called “new demarcation problem”, in order to lay the foundations for a value-sensitive approach to the analysis of instruments. By assessing the five approaches of demarcation concerning value-influences, it will be shown that they break down at various points if the material aspects of science are taken seriously.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  8. 864608.003813
    Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733), an Anglo-Dutch physician and philosopher, achieved fame through his notorious work The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits. He is most well-known for arguing that economic prosperity depends upon harnessing individuals’ self-interested and even vicious passions, an idea which outraged his contemporaries and has subsequently led to him occupying an important place in the history of economic thought. The Fable of the Bees is a far more wide-ranging work, however, which offers incisive explorations of human nature, the passions, and the origins of moral and social norms.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  9. 902757.003829
    By the power of Gabriel Calzada Álvarez, I’m going to be a visiting professor this summer at the Universidad de las Hespérides in the Canary Islands. I expect it to be a glorious experience for my entire family. …
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on Bet On It
  10. 1092854.003844
    This paper aims to connect the problem of biological individuality with the increasing interest in minimal accounts of biological agency. Generally, the concept of biological agency merely acts as another way to describe the organism and not as an individuality concept in its own right. This paper develops two main claims. (1) We should have an agential account of biological individuality in addition to an evolutionary and an organismal one. (2) This concept of agential individuality comes apart from concepts of the organism (and evolutionary individual), motivated by the case of eusocial insects, like the honey bee Apis mellifera.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  11. 1092887.003865
    This chapter addresses some outstanding historical issues concerning Paul Feyerabend’s positions on realism and relativism in the 1970s. In the Feyerabend literature, there is general agreement that there is a discernible shift in Feyerabend’s philosophical thinking sometime in the mid-1970s (Preston, 1997; Tsou, 2003; Brown, Brown and Kidd, 2016). John Preston (1997b) characterizes this shift as Feyerabend’s ‘retreat from realism to relativism’: after the publication of the first edition of Against Method (1975) Feyerabend shifts away from realism towards a relativist position, as exemplified in Science in a Free Society (1978). Eric Oberheim (2006) contests Preston’s presentation, suggesting that there’s no discontinuity in Feyerabend’s views on the issue of realism. On Oberheim’s reading, Feyerabend consistently defended a pluralist metaphilosophical view (see Kuby 2021a), but this metaphilosophy did not commit Feyerabend to any specific philosophical positions, such as scientific realism. Hasok Chang (2021) also rejects Preston’s narrative, arguing that Feyerabend never abandoned realism in his career. For Chang, Feyerabend began with a narrow view of realism (‘pluralist realism’) and broadened it over time.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  12. 1092918.00389
    Six decades after its original publication, the legacy of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (hereafter, Structure) for analytic philosophy of science remains ambiguous. On the one hand, Structure (SSR-1) was the key work—along with Quine’s “Two Dogma’s of Empiricism” (Quine 1951)—that contributed to the demise of logical empiricism in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, Structure modeled a novel methodological approach for doing philosophy of science, which spearheaded the ‘historical turn’ in philosophy of science and the rise of the history and philosophy of science (HPS) tradition. In terms of legacy, Structure was undoubtedly successful in shifting the methodological assumptions of post-positivist philosophy of science towards historical analyses and away from logical analyses. On the other hand, the methodological assumptions of Structure introduced unclarity regarding how philosophers of science should address normative issues and what kinds of normative questions they should address. Prior to Structure, analytic philosophers of science were preoccupied with addressing normative questions, such as the demarcation problem (e.g., Popper 1935/1959; Carnap 1936, 1937, 1956; Hempel 1950). After the publication of Structure, attention shifted away from such general (‘universalist’) philosophy of science issues and attempts to address normative questions in an ahistorical manner became unfashionable.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  13. 1378437.003907
    Today, Harry Frankfurt would have turned 95. We lost him last year, a couple of months after his 94th birthday. It would be hard to underestimate the impact he made on my career and my life. He was my teacher when I was an undergraduate and the second reader of my undergraduate thesis (expertly and generously advised by Elijah Millgram), which included a chapter dedicated to articles from his then recently published collection, The Importance of What We Care about. …
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PEA Soup
  14. 1491262.003925
    Human psychology seems to drive us to pick a side in conflicts and then go all in. Hence a disappointing number of those observing the Israel-Hamas war even from a safe and comfortable distance argue not only that one side is in the right, but that it can do no wrong and that the other side is entirely evil. …
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on The Philosopher's Beard
  15. 1498846.003948
    Rob Henderson includes support for open borders on his short list of “luxury beliefs”: When an affluent person advocates for drug legalization, or defunding the police, or open borders, or loose sexual norms, or white privilege, they are engaging in a status display. …
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on Bet On It
  16. 1670122.003971
    In this paper, I identify a novel challenge to reasoning about human cognitive evolution. Theorists engaged in producing a causal history of uniquely human psychology often implicitly or explicitly take the perspective of imaginary hominins to reason about a plausible evolutionary sequence. I argue that such speculations only appear plausible because we have employed our evolved cognitive capacities to decide what the imaginary hominin would think or do. Further, I argue that we are likely to continue making this kind of mistake, and so we must continuously contend with it, even in our best approaches to human cognitive evolution.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  17. 1670155.003987
    This paper critically revises the organisational account of teleology, which argues that living systems are first and foremost oriented towards a goal: maintaining their own conditions of existence. It points out some limitations of this account, mainly in the capability to account for the richness and complexity of biological systems and their purposeful behaviours. It identifies the reason of these limitations in the theoretical grounding of this account, specifically in the too narrow notion of closure of constraints, focused on self- production. It proposes to ground an organisational account of biological teleology in the capability of living system not just to produce and replace their parts, but to control their own internal dynamics and behaviours in such a way as to maintain themselves. This theoretical framework has two advantages. It better captures the distinctive features of biological organisations and consequently the richness and active nature of their purposeful behaviours. By doing so, it makes it possible to apply this framework beyond minimal theoretical models to real biological cases.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  18. 1697715.00401
    Brian Goff’s piece on the cost disease is one of my most-read guest posts. Now he’s written some thoughtful commentary on my recent piece on the RCT agenda. Enjoy! Bryan Your post regarding the ideological presuppositions of RCTs is very insightful and important (looking forward to the book). …
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Bet On It
  19. 1723783.004032
    The first aim of this essay is to show that, for the purposes of addressing systemic injustice, we need an understanding of emancipatory attention. The second is to indicate some resources from which this might be built.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  20. 1784922.004053
    Recent analytic-philosophical works in the field of situated cognition have proposed to conceptualize the self as deeply entwined with the environment, and even as constituted by it. A common move has been to characterize the self in narrative terms, and then to argue that the narrative self is partly constituted by narratives about the past that are scaffolded (shaped and maintained) by, or distributed over, a variety of objects that can rekindle episodic memories. While we are sympathetic to these approaches, here we propose a different strategy to situate the self—one which can be seen as complementing the narrative one, and which draws from concepts and ideas central to the phenomenological-existentialist tradition. We suggest, first, that the self has a sense of its past not just via narratives and episodic memories, but in virtue of being embodied and thus, importantly, sedimented (in other words, it has, or rather is, a body memory). Embodiment and sedimentation, in turn, always necessarily imply an environment or a situation, entailing that the self is also inherently situated. Second, we discuss the future-oriented dimension of selfhood, and argue that we understand ourselves as projected into the future, again not necessarily only narratively and reflectively, but also tacitly, in a bodily and inherently situated way.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Giovanna Colombetti's site
  21. 1843203.00407
    Synthetic biology has immense potential to ameliorate widespread environmental damage. The promise of such technology could, however, be argued to potentially risk the public, industry, or governments not curtailing their environmentally damaging behaviour or even worse exploit the possibility of this technology to do further damage. In such cases, there is the risk of a worse outcome than if the technology was not deployed. This risk is often couched as an objection to new technologies, that the technology produces a moral hazard. This paper describes how to navigate a moral hazard argument and mitigate the possibility of a moral hazard. Navigating moral hazard arguments and mitigating the possibility of a moral hazard will improve the public and environmental impact of synthetic biology.
    Found 3 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  22. 1887908.004096
    Is value personal in the sense that what is of value is of value for someone, or is it impersonal in the sense that what is of value, while it pertains to a subject, is of value simpliciter. Ross was a staunch proponent of the view that value is impersonal. I am a proponent of the view that value is personal.
    Found 3 weeks ago on L. Nandi Theunissen's site
  23. 1902994.004129
    Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) of Damascus was a prominent Sunnī religious scholar, activist, and reformer who sought to root out religious innovation and return Islam to the Qurʾān, the practice (sunna) of the Prophet Muḥammad, and the interpretations of the early Muslims (salaf). Ibn Taymiyya is best known today as a major inspiration to the global Salafism movement (Meijer 2009). A few modern scholars have heralded him as a philosopher on account of his nominalism, empiricism, and similarities with the philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198) (Ajhar 2014; Tamer 2013 provides a survey of such views).
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  24. 2010556.004145
    One topic that came up a few times at Peter Singer’s farewell conference was that of replaceability: whether we should be OK with an individual (person or animal) dying so long as a new replacement individual is created to take their place, with a future at least as good as the original otherwise would have had. …
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on Good Thoughts
  25. 2016250.00416
    Research on the role of values in science and objectivity has typically approached trust through its epistemic aspects. Yet, recent work on public trust in science has emphasized the role of non-epistemic values in building and maintaining trust. This paper will use a concept of trust that adds concerns about justice to epistemic conditions to investigate this problem in relation to public health. I will argue that trust-conducive values, particularly justice, are relevant in deciding which value influences are legitimate in scientific decision-making. Drawing on public health ethics, I will provide a consequentialist justification for employing trust-conducive values. While several concepts of justice have been explored in the context of public health, I will further draw on public health ethics, focusing on a view that brings together both distributive and procedural aspects. For illustration, I will use the case of cardiovascular disease prevention, particularly how concerns about justice apply when choosing between population-based and individual-based approaches.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  26. 2043461.004177
    On his Substack, Chris Freiman argues that libertarianism is “liberalism without exceptions.” Basically, liberals (in the European meaning of the word) and libertarians agree that the state ought to prioritize a range of civil liberties (freedom of association, freedom of speech, …) but disagree with respect to the status of property. …
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on The Archimedean Point
  27. 2184116.004193
    Many philosophers hold that generics (i.e., unquantified generalizations) are pervasive in communication and that when they are about social groups, this may offend and polarize people because generics gloss over variations between individuals. Generics about social groups might be particularly common on Twitter (X). This remains unexplored, however. Using machine learning (ML) techniques, we therefore developed an automatic classifier for social generics, applied it to 1.1 million tweets about people, and analyzed the tweets. While it is often suggested that generics are ubiquitous in everyday communication, we found that most tweets (78%) about people contained no generics. However, tweets with generics received more “likes” and retweets. Furthermore, while recent psychological research may lead to the prediction that tweets with generics about political groups are more common than tweets with generics about ethnic groups, we found the opposite. However, consistent with recent claims that political animosity is less constrained by social norms than animosity against gender and ethnic groups, negative tweets with generics about political groups were significantly more prevalent and retweeted than negative tweets about ethnic groups. Our study provides the first ML-based insights into the use and impact of social generics on Twitter.
    Found 3 weeks, 4 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  28. 2189271.00421
    This article distinguishes between two different kinds of biological normativity. One is the ‘objective ’ biological normativity of biological units discussed in anglophone philosophy of biology on the naturalization of such notions as function and pathology. The other is a ‘subjective’ biological normativity of the biological subject discussed in the continental tradition of Canguilhem and Goldstein. The existence of these two distinct kinds of biological normativity calls for a closer philosophical examination of their relationship. The aim of this paper is to address this omission in the literature and to initiate the construction of conceptual bridges that span the gaps between continental, analytic, and naturalist philosophy on biological normativity.
    Found 3 weeks, 4 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  29. 2304719.004229
    We propose an approach to the evolution of joint agency and cooperative behavior that contrasts with views that take joint agency to be a uniquely human trait. We argue that there is huge variation in cooperative behavior and that while much human cooperative behavior may be explained by invoking cognitively rich capacities, there is cooperative behavior that does not require such explanation. On both comparative and theoretical grounds, complex cognition is not necessary for forms of joint agency, or the evolution of cooperation. As a result, promising evolutionary approaches to cooperative behavior should explain how it arises across many contexts.
    Found 3 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  30. 2306801.004247
    Pregnancy and birth can be approached from many philosophical angles, including philosophy of law, philosophy of biology, and mereology. Some authors have focused on ethical issues surrounding abortion and assisted reproduction, others have discussed pregnancy in phenomenological terms, and others have used pregnancy and/or birth as a springboard for more theoretical reflections on the nature of selfhood, care, embodiment, and personal identity (see entries on feminist perspectives on reproduction and the family, parenthood and procreation, and the grounds of moral status for discussions of these and related issues).
    Found 3 weeks, 5 days ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy