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91270.875847
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking is an extraordinary achievement, the result of careful attention (and contribution) to both the science and philosophy of perception. The book offers some bold hypotheses. While the hypotheses themselves are worth the price of entry, Block’s sustained defense of them grants the reader insight into countless fascinating experimental results and philosophical concepts. His unpretentious and accommodating exposition of the science—explaining rather than asserting, digging into specific results in detail rather than making summary judgments and demanding that readers take him at his word—is a model of how philosophers ought to engage with empirical evidence. It is simply not possible to read this book without learning something. It will surely play a foundational role in theoretical work on perception for many years to come.
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269812.876147
In The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard argues for what can be called “The Universality of Humanity Claim” (UHC), according to which valuing humanity in one’s own person entails valuing it in that of others. However, Korsgaard’s reliance on the claim that reasons are essentially public in her attempt to demonstrate the truth of UHC has been repeatedly criticized. I offer a sentimentalist defense, based on Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, of a qualified, albeit adequate, version of UHC. In particular, valuing my humanity, understood as (my awareness of) my perspective and the reasons determined from within it, entails valuing your humanity, understood as (your awareness of) your perspective and the reasons determined from within it. Given Korsgaard’s emphasis on the publicity of reasons in her argument for UHC, I also discuss the role of reasons in my account. I argue that the relative weights of at least some of an agent’s reasons are determined from within a shared evaluative point of view, namely, the standpoint of what Smith calls “the impartial spectator.” These reasons have normative authority over and constrain the agent’s private reasons, that is, those that are determined from within her own particular evaluative point of view.
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269869.876172
In this paper, we do two things: first, we offer a metaphysical account of what it is to be an individual person through Hegel’s understanding of the concrete universal; and second, we show how this account of an individual can help in thinking about love. The aim is to show that Hegel’s distinctive account of individuality and universality can do justice to two intuitions about love which appear to be in tension: on the one hand, that love can involve a response to properties that an individual possesses; but on the other hand, what it is to love someone is not just to love their properties, but to love them as the distinct individual they are. We claim that Hegel’s conception of the relation between individuals and their properties, which relies on his account of the concrete universal, can resolve this tension and make sense of this aspect of love.
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397056.876188
Atomic and close-to-atomic scale manufacturing (ACSM) is the core competence of Manufacturing III. Unlike other conceptions or terminologies that only focus on the atomic level precision, ACSM defines a new realm of manufacturing where quantum mechanics plays the dominant role in the atom/molecule addition, migration and removal, considering the uncertainty principle and the discrete nature of particles. As ACSM is still in its infant stage, only little has been systematically elaborated at the core proposition of ACSM by now, hence there is a need to understand its concept and vision. This article elucidates the development of ACSM and clarifies its proposition, which aims to achieve a clearer understanding on ACSM and direct more effective efforts toward this promising area.
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427759.876202
For the many friends who’ve asked me to comment on the OpenAI drama: while there are many things I can’t say in public, I can say I feel relieved and happy that OpenAI still exists. This is simply because, when I think of what a world-leading AI effort could look like, many of the plausible alternatives strike me as much worse than OpenAI, a company full of thoughtful, earnest people who are at least asking the right questions about the ethics of their creations, and who—the real proof that they’re my kind of people—are racked with self-doubts (as the world has now spectacularly witnessed). …
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437632.876215
This is an English translation of the records of Lu Cheng (Lu Cheng lu 陸澄錄) in the first volume (juan shang 卷上) of the Record of Instructions for Practice (Chuan xi lu 傳習錄). Wang Yangming’s followers kept records of statements he made and conversations he held when discussing his Ruist learning with them. During and after his lifetime, these records were compiled in one or more volumes and titled Record of Instructions for Practice (or something similar). Many versions, each with different content, were published over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Some editions included a volume with a compilation of important correspondence and pedagogical writings. Among these, the three-juan version included in the
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437683.876228
The evolution of complex life forms, such as multicellular organisms, is the result of a number of evolutionary transitions in individuality (ETIs). Several attempts have been made to explain their origins, many of which have been internalist (i.e., based largely on internal properties of these life form’s ancestors). Here, we show how an externalist perspective, via the ecological scaffolding model in which properties of complex life forms arise from an external scaffold, can shed new light on the question of ETIs. Ultimately, we anticipate progress in the field will occur by recognizing the importance of both the internalist and externalist modes of explanation for ETIs. We illustrate this by considering an extension of the ecological scaffolding model by niche construction in which particles modify the environment which later becomes the scaffold giving rise to collective-level individuality.
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437726.87624
In the first volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973, Chaps. 1 and 2), F.A. Hayek exposes his famous criticism of the constructivist (or rationalist) approach to human history. As Hayek puts it, the latter approach assumes that humans are fully rational and thus can construct perfect social institutions because reason can advise them on how to impeccably do so. In this regard, Hayek (1973, Chap. 1, p. 12) writes: “Complete rationality of action in the Cartesian sense demands complete knowledge of all the relevant facts. A designer or engineer needs all the data and full power to control or manipulate them if he is to organize the material objects to produce the intended result. But the success of action in society depends on more particular facts than anyone can possibly know. And our whole civilization in consequences rests, and must rest, on our believing much that we cannot know [Hayek’s italics] to be true in the Cartesian sense.”
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482523.876253
Conflict over who belongs in womenonly spaces is now part of mainstream political debate. Some think womenonly spaces should exclude on the basis of sex, and others think they should exclude on the basis of a person’s selfdetermined gender identity. Many who take the latter view appear to believe that the only reason for taking the former view could be antipathy towards men who identify as women. In this paper, we’ll revisit the secondwave feminist literature on separatism, in order to uncover the reasons for womenonly spaces as feminists originally conceived them. Once these reasons are understood, those participating in debates over womenonly spaces will be in a better position to adjudicate on whether shifting from sex to gender identity puts any significant interests at stake.
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495445.876266
The alienation constraint on theories of well-being has been influentially expressed thus: ‘what is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a connection with what he would find in some degree compelling or attractive …. It would be an intolerably alienated conception of someone’s good to imagine that it might fail in any such way to engage him’ (Railton 1986: 9). Many agree this claim expresses something true, but there is little consensus on how exactly the constraint is to be understood. Here, I clarify the sense in which the quote offers a basic constraint on theories of well-being—a constraint that should be adopted by (e.g.) hedonists, desire satisfactionists, and objective list theorists alike. This constraint focuses on affective engagement, or positive affective stances in connection with a proposed good. I show that the constraint explains a near-universal intuition, and rules out a number of well-known theories of well-being.
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580264.876279
Well-being, happiness, and quality of life are now established objects of social and medical research. Does this science produce knowledge that is properly about well-being? I call this The Question of Value-Aptness and over the course of the book, Alexandrova 2017, defend the following answers to this question.
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580371.876307
Two types of formal models—landscape search tasks and two-armed bandit models—are often used to study the effects that various social factors have on epistemic performance. I argue that they can be understood within a single framework. In this unified framework, I develop a model that may be used to understand the effects of functional and demographic diversity and their interaction. Using the unified model, I find that the benefit of demographic diversity is most pronounced in a functionally homogeneous group, and decreases with the increase of functional diversity.
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580433.87632
Philosophical analyses of the works of Jean-Paul Sartre usually focus on his theoretical writings, with his literary fiction treated as merely popularizing ideas whose full articulation can be found in those theoretical works. It is certainly true that Sartre wanted to use novels, plays, and films to bring his philosophy to a mass audience. But that is compatible with developing some ideas through those media. Indeed, his regular reliance on miniature stories to articulate and substantiate philosophical claims in his theoretical writings suggests that he found fiction especially conducive to this purpose. His strong emphasis on dialogue and character interaction in his plays and screenplays matches the formal structures of those vignettes in his theoretical works. Using drama in this way would allow him to develop an idea through a range of situations without being constrained by any theoretical formulation of that idea, while reaching a wider audience than would read his theoretical writings.
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720939.876336
There is an ethics of blaming the person who deserves blame. The Christian scriptures imply the following no-vengeance condition: a person should not vengefully overtly blame a wrongdoer even if she gives the wrongdoer the exact negative treatment that he deserves. I explicate and defend this novel condition and argue that it demands a revolution in our blaming practices. First, I explain the no-vengeance condition. Second, I argue that the no-vengeance condition is often violated. The most common species of blame involves anger; anger conceptually includes a desire for vengeance; and there are many pleasures in payback. Third, I clarify that it is possible to blame non-vengefully in anger and highlight three good uses for anger in non-vengeful blame. Fourth, I offer two reasons that justify the divine command prohibiting vengeance, and I note that the Christian God is merely sufficient to make non-vengeance morally obligatory. Fifth, I defend the no-vengeance condition against four biblical objections.
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726222.876355
This paper explores the potential of integrating ancient educational principles from diverse eastern cultures into modern AI ethics curricula. It draws on the rich educational traditions of ancient China, India, Arabia, Persia, Japan, Tibet, Mongolia, and Korea, highlighting their emphasis on philosophy, ethics, holistic development, and critical thinking. By examining these historical educational systems, the paper establishes a correlation with modern AI ethics principles, advocating for the inclusion of these ancient teachings in current AI development and education. The proposed integration aims to provide a comprehensive education that not only encompasses foundational knowledge but also advanced learning, thereby equipping future AI professionals with the necessary tools to develop AI systems that are ethically responsible, culturally aware, and aligned with human values such as fairness, safety, transparency, and collaboration. This approach not only addresses the AI alignment problem but also fosters cultural harmony and global understanding, which are crucial in an increasingly interconnected world. The paper posits that the wisdom of ancient educational systems, when harmonized with modern AI ethics, can guide the development of AI technologies that are beneficial for humanity, ensuring these advancements are not just technologically sound but also ethically and culturally informed.
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726257.876367
In his article Banicki proposes a universal model for all forms of philosophical therapy. He is guided by works of Martha Nussbaum, who in turn makes recourse to Aristotle. As compared to Nussbaum’s approach, Banicki’s model is more medical and less based on ethical argument. He mentions Foucault’s vision to apply the same theoretical analysis for the ailments of the body and the soul and to use the same kind of approach in treating and curing them. In his interpretation of philosophical therapy, there are, however, some controversial issues, to which we would like to call attention: Is restoring health by a philosophical method of treatment – health understood as a person’s ability to reach his/her vital goals – a convincing explication of philosophical therapy in general? In order to answer this question, it may be useful to look at Plato. It is not only Platonism (and especially Neo-platonism since Plotinus) that questions the idea that therapy is necessarily connected with „vital goals“. Buddhist and Gnostic philosophies are questioning „the vital“ in general. The immense effort in the history of philosophy to liberate the mind from the body casts doubt on the project to explain philosophical therapy solely in analogy to medical therapy.
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780630.87638
The phenomenon of interactive human kinds, namely kinds of people that undergo change in reaction to being studied or theorised about, matters not only for the reliability of scientific claims, but also for its wider, sometimes harmful effects at the group or societal level, such as contributing to negative stigmas or reinforcing existing inequalities. This paper focuses on the latter aspect of interactivity and argues that scientists studying interactive human kinds are responsible for foreseeing harmful effects of their research and for devising ways of mitigating them.
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884496.876393
With the release of GPT-3 and ChatGPT, large language models (LLMs) have been a hyped topic of international public and scientific debates. In this paper, we investigate the status of artificial systems in human-machine interactions by addressing the question of what we are doing when we interact with LLMs. Are we just playing with an interesting tool? Do we somehow enjoy a strange way of talking to ourselves? Or are we, in any sense, acting jointly with a collaborator when chatting with machines? Those questions lead us to the controversy about the classification of interactions with LLMs or other artificial systems. Assuming that current or future AI technology might contribute to the emergence of phenomena that can neither be classified as mere tool-use nor as proper social interactions, we explore conceptual frameworks that can characterize in-between phenomena. We discuss the pros and cons of ascribing some form of quasi-social agency to LLMs so they can at least participate in asymmetric joint actions.
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909108.876407
We re-examine the old question to what extent mathematics may be compared to a game. Under the spell of Wittgenstein, we propose that the more refined object of comparison is a “motley of language games”, the nature of which was (implicitly) clarified by Hilbert: via different language games, axiomatization lies at the basis of both the rigour and the applicability of mathematics. In the “formalist” game, mathematics resembles chess via a clear conceptual dictionary. Accepting this resemblance: like positions in chess, mathematical sentences cannot be true or false; true statements in mathematics are about sentences, namely that they are theorems (if they are). In principle, the certainty of mathematics resides in proofs, but to this end, in practice these must be “surveyable”. Hilbert and Wittgenstein proposed almost oppositie criteria for surveyability; we try to overcome their difference by invoking computer-verified proofs. The “applied” language game is based on Hilbert’s axiomatization program for physics (and other scientific disciplines), refined by Wittgenstein’s idea that theorems are yardsticks to which empirical phenomena may be compared, and further improved by invoking elements of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. From this perspective, in an appendix we also briefly review the varying roles and structures of axioms, definitions, and proofs in mathematics. Our view is not meant as a philosophy of mathematics by itself, but as a coat rack analogous to category theory, onto which various (traditional and new) philosophies of mathematics (such as formalism, intuitionism, structuralism, deductivism, and the philosophy of mathematical practice) may be attached and may even peacefully support each other.
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922376.87642
Introduction: Koro is a delusion whereby a man believes his penis is shrinking into his abdomen and this may result in his death. This socially-transmitted non-neuropsychological delusional belief occurs (in epidemic form) in South-East and South Asia. We investigated whether the two-factor theory of delusion could be applied to epidemic Koro.
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966834.876438
In the social epistemology of scientific knowledge, it is largely accepted that relationships of trust, not just reliance, are necessary in contemporary collaborative science characterised by relationships of opaque epistemic dependence. Such relationships of trust are taken to be possible only between agents who can be held accountable for their actions. But today, knowledge production in many fields makes use of AI applications that are epistemically opaque in an essential manner. This creates a problem for the social epistemology of scientific knowledge, as scientists are now epistemically dependent on AI applications that are not agents, and therefore not appropriate candidates for trust.
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1073141.876455
Experiences of urges, impulses or inclinations are among the most basic elements in the practical life of conscious agents. This paper develops a theory of urges and their epistemology. I motivate a framework that distinguishes urges, conscious experiences of urges and exercises of capacities we have to control our urges. I argue that experiences of urges and exercises of control over urges play coordinate roles in providing one with knowledge of one’s urges.
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1073166.876467
Philosophers have started to theorize the concept of ‘affective injustice’ to make sense of certain ways in which people’s affective lives are significantly marked by injustice. This new research has offered important insights into people’s lived experiences under oppression. But it is not immediately clear how the concept ‘affective injustice’ picks out something different from the closely related phenomenon of ‘psychological oppression.’ This paper considers the question of why we might need new theories of affective injustice in light of the well-established cross-disciplinary literature on psychological oppression. I suggest that, whereas psychological oppression is found in the hearts and minds of people who are oppressed, affective injustice is most fruitfully understood as a structural phenomenon. It operates primarily outside of us: in affective norms, practices, and relationships that are embedded in social conditions of injustice. The account I offer is tentative and incomplete. But my hope is that it will help show how theorizing affective injustice has the potential to enrich existing theories of justice and theories of psychological oppression.
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1130601.87648
Assuring the well-being of children has emerged over the past several decades as an important goal for health and social policymakers. Although the concept of child well-being has been operationalized and measured in different ways by different child-serving entities, there are few unifying theories that could undergird and inform these various conceptual and measurement efforts. In this paper, we attempt to construct a theory of child well-being. We first review the social and policy history of the concept of child well-being, and briefly review its measurement based on these conceptualizations. We then examine three types of theories of well-being extant in philosophy – mental states theories, desire-based theories and needs-based theories – and investigate their suitability to serve as prototypes of a theory of child well-being. We develop a constraint that child well-being is important in and of itself and not merely as a way station to future adult well-being (we call this a non-reduction constraint). Using this constraint, we identify the limitations of each of the three sets of theories to serve as a basis for a theory of child well-being. Based on a developmentalist approach, we then articulate a theory of child well-being that contains two conditions. First, a child’s stage-appropriate capacities that equip her for successful adulthood, given her environment; and, second, an engagement with the world in child-appropriate ways. We conclude by reviewing seven implications of this theoretical approach for the measurement of child well-being.
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1130724.876496
Anna Alexandrova has written a very important book about the philosophy and science of well-being. Many parts are illuminating, but I shall concentrate on what she has to say about philosophy. Alexandrova is highly critical of philosophy of well-being. Yet perhaps surprisingly (because I am a philosopher of well-being), I am generally sympathetic to her concerns. My qualms are with some of the stronger conclusions she draws from philosophy’s failings, conclusions that seem insufficiently motivated. I shall focus exclusively on her discussion of language and concepts in Chapter 1, where she argues that the language of well-being is not nearly as unified or coherent as philosophers assume, and where she ultimately defends what she calls a contextualist account of the meaning of well-being terms.
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1185960.876512
In this paper, we introduce a distinctive kind of psychological abuse we call Tightlacing. We begin by presenting four examples and argue that there is a distinctive form of abuse in these examples that cannot be captured by our existing moral categories. We then outline our diagnosis of this distinctive form of abuse. Tightlacing consists in inducing a mistaken self-conception in others that licenses overburdening demands on them such that victims apply those demands to themselves. We discuss typical Tightlacing strategies and argue that Tightlacing typically is manipulative. Typical tightlacers will be motivated by a strong desire to suppress a kind of behaviour on the victim’s part. We will then differentiate Tightlacing from a related and widely discussed form of psychological abuse, Gaslighting. While Gaslighting focuses on the victim’s epistemic capacities and typically serves to insulate the abuser from potential dissent, Tightlacing focuses on the kind of person the victim is and typically serves to insulate the abuser from confronting ways of behaviour they cannot cope with. While Gaslighting targets the victim’s epistemic self-trust, Tightlacing targets their basic sense of who they are and their sense of entitlement to conduct themselves as who they really are. We finish by diagnosing the wrong-making features of Tightlacing, arguing that Tightlacing, among many secondary wrongs, makes the victim complicit in a denial of their rights as well as an erasure of who they are.
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1192044.876525
Kant claims that love ‘is a matter of feeling,’ which has led many of his interpreters to argue that he conceives of love as solely a matter of feeling, that is, as a purely pathological state. In this paper I challenge this reading by taking another one of Kant’s claims seriously, namely that all love is either benevolence or complacence and that both are rational. I place Kant’s distinction between benevolence and complacence next to the historical inspiration for it, namely Francis Hutcheson’s very similar distinction, in order to argue that love is rational, for Kant, in that it requires certain rational capacities on the part of the agent. I conclude by illustrating that this has important implications for how we understand Kant’s conception of love more generally.
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1192119.876539
in order to discover what might explain and justify our concepts, ideas or practices ( Queloz 2021). It arguably originated with Hume, but its most prominent practitioners are Edward Craig and Bernard Williams.1 Each of these thinkers takes a target concept: property rights, knowledge and truthfulness respectively, and shows how the concept could have developed in the context of a heavily idealized human-like society, the so-called ‘state of nature’. Members of the society are portrayed as adopting the new concept because it solves an important problem for them. The second stage of this method involves noting the relevant structural similarities between our own society and the idealized model society: we use basically the same concept, we face basically the same problems. Then, the crucial inference arrives: given these similarities, we may conclude that we use the concept for basically the same reasons, and therefore that we have corresponding practical reasons to continue to do so. This is because we understand, in Craig’s words, “what the concept does for us, what its role in our life might be” (Craig 1990 2).
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1192231.876552
Much of the popular debate that surrounds no platforming centres on its putatively corrosive impact on free speech. This is apt to give a misleading picture of the particular puzzle that no platforming presents. Focusing on the university specifically, I contend that no platforming is distinctively objectionable not because it necessarily runs counter to general free speech values but when and because it is inconsistent with principles of academic freedom. This is because it conflicts with the status of members of the academy as those with the legitimacy to determine the appropriate bounds of free inquiry within the university. No platforming is objectionable insofar as it undercuts the authority of academic faculty in determining which speech, and by whom, is consistent with its purpose as an academic institution. Existing debates over no platforming have been too focused on which views are (or are not) given a platform and insufficiently attentive to the question of who decides who or what to platform. On the view defended here, no platforming by students is objectionable because, under principles of academic freedom, they should not be included in the constituency with the right to constrain the platforming of others.
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1192337.876565
Aesthetic evaluations of human bodies have important implications for moral recognition and for individuals’ access to social and material goods. Unfortunately, there is a widespread aesthetic disregard for non-white bodies. Aesthetic evaluations depend on the aesthetic properties we regard objects as having. And it is widely agreed that aesthetic properties are directly accessed in our experience of aesthetic objects. How, then, might we explain aesthetic evaluations that systematically favour features associated with white identity? Critical race philosophers, like Alia Al-Saji, Mariana Ortega, Paul C. Taylor, and George Yancy, argue that this is because the perception of racialized bodies is affected by the social structures in which they are appreciated. The aim of this paper is to propose how social structures can affect aesthetic perception. I argue that mental imagery acquired through the interaction with aesthetic phenomena structures the perception of non-aesthetic properties of bodies, so that aesthetic properties consistent with racist stereotypes are attributed to individuals.