1. 63166.722809
    The concept of wild food does not play a significant role in contemporary nutritional science and it is seldom regarded as a salient feature within standard dietary guidelines. The knowledge systems of wild edible taxa are indeed at risk of disappearing. However, recent scholarship in ethnobotany, field biology, and philosophy demonstrated the crucial role of wild foods for food biodiversity and food security. The knowledge of how to use and consume wild foods is not only a means to deliver high-end culinary offerings, but also a way to foster alternative models of consumption. Our aim in this paper is to provide a conceptual framework for wild foods, which can account for diversified wild food ontologies. In the first section of the paper, we survey the main conception of wild foods provided in the literature, what we call the Nature View. We argue that this view falls short of capturing characteristics that are core to a sound account of wilderness in a culinary sense. In the second part of the paper, we provide the foundation for an improved model of wild food, which can countenance multiple dimensions and degrees characterizing wilderness in the culinary world. In the third part of the paper we argue that thanks to a more nuanced ontological analysis, the gradient framework can serve ethnobiologists, philosophers, scientists, and policymakers to represent and negotiate theoretical conflicts on the nature of wild food.
    Found 17 hours, 32 minutes ago on Andrea Borghini's site
  2. 63269.72301
    When I’m hungry, I try to seek some food, namely an object that is edible and that can feed me and preferably it has to be tasty. It seems a very easy task to find it for there is an alleged natural boundary between what counts as food and what does not. I can naturally pinpoint that boundary. Nevertheless, at a closer inspection, such boundary turns out to be suspicious: a roasted human being is both edible and nutritious, and someone may even find it tasty, and yet it can be hardly considered as food. Likewise, a rotten food item is neither edible, nor nutritious and however it can be sometimes considered as food, such as marcescent cheese. Our aim in this paper is to nail down the different conceptions which regulate our conception of what is a food and then come up with a proper definition. We set forth four different stances: a biological one, i.e., food is what holds certain natural properties, an individual one, i.e., food is what can be eaten by at least one person, an authority one, i.e., food is what is considered so by an authority, and a social one. i.e., food is what is institutionally recognized as food.
    Found 17 hours, 34 minutes ago on Andrea Borghini's site
  3. 65315.723062
    Trust is important, but it is also dangerous. It is important because it allows us to depend on others—for love, for advice, for help with our plumbing, or what have you—especially when we know that no outside force compels them to give us these things. But trust also involves the risk that people we trust will not pull through for us, since if there were some guarantee they would pull through, then we would have no need to trust them.[ 1 ] Trust is therefore dangerous. What we risk while trusting is the loss of valuable things that we entrust to others, including our self-respect perhaps, which can be shattered by the betrayal of our trust.
    Found 18 hours, 8 minutes ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  4. 92913.723097
    My aims in this essay are two. First (§§1-4), I want to get clear on the very idea of a theory of the history of philosophy, the idea of an overarching account of the evolution of philosophical reflection since the inception of written philosophy. And secondly (§§5-8), I want to actually sketch such a global theory of the history of philosophy, which I call the two-streams theory.
    Found 1 day, 1 hour ago on Uriah Kriegel's site
  5. 293221.723127
    The principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ evolved from the notion of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ and is a manifestation of general principles of equity in international law. The principle recognises historical differences in the contributions of developed and developing States to global environmental problems, and differences in their respective economic and technical capacity to tackle these problems. Despite their common responsibilities, important differences exist between the stated responsibilities of developed and developing countries. The Rio Declaration states: “In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.” Similar language exists in the Framework Convention on Climate Change; parties should act to protect the climate system “on the basis of equality and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” The principle of common but differentiated responsibility includes two fundamental elements. The first concerns the common responsibility of States for the protection of the environment, or parts of it, at the national, regional and global levels. The second concerns the need to take into account the different circumstances, particularly each State’s contribution to the evolution of a particular problem and its ability to prevent, reduce and control the threat.
    Found 3 days, 9 hours ago on Benjamin Hale's site
  6. 450234.723158
    I find it surprising that so many people seem to disagree. Maybe we're primed to disagree because it's a convenient excuse for our moral mediocrity. "Gosh," you say, "I do sure wish I could be morally excellent. …
    Found 5 days, 5 hours ago on The Splintered Mind
  7. 614433.723191
    Art works are artefacts and, like all artefacts, are the product of agency. How important is that for our engagement with them? For many artefacts, agency hardly matters. The paperclips on my desk perform their function without me having to think of them as the outputs of agency, though I might on occasion admire their design. But for those artefacts we categorise as works of art, the connection is important: if I treat something as art I need to see how it manifests the choices, preferences, actions and sensibilities of the maker. I am not asked to see it simply as a record of those things. The work is not valuable merely as a conduit to the qualities of the maker; it has final value and not merely instrumental value. Its value depends on its relation to the maker; in Korsgaard’s terms it is value that is final and extrinsic.
    Found 1 week ago on Gregory Currie's site
  8. 614460.723222
    Dishonest signals are displays, calls, or performances that would ordinarily convey certain information about some state of the world, but where the signal being sent does not correspond to the true state. Manipulation is the sending of signals in a way that takes advantage of default receiver responses to such signals, to influence their behavior in ways favorable to the sender. Manipulative signals are often dishonest, and dishonest signals are often manipulative, though this not need be the case. Some theorists have defined signaling in such a way that evolutionarily reinforced signals are essentially manipulative.
    Found 1 week ago on Paul Griffith's site
  9. 614482.723252
    Games are a distinctive form of art — and very different from many traditional arts. Games work in the medium of agency. Game designers don’t just tell stories or create environments. They tell us what our abilities will be in the game. They set our motivations, by setting the scoring system and specifying the win-conditions. Game designers sculpt temporary agencies for us to occupy. And when we play games, we adopt these designed agencies, submerging ourselves in them, and taking on their specified ends for a while.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  10. 634147.72328
    This paper develops Richard Wollheim’s claim that the proper appreciation of a picture involves not only enjoying a seeing-in experience but also abiding by a standard of correctness. While scholars have so far focused on what fixes the standard, thereby discussing the alternative between intentions and causal mechanisms, the paper focuses on what the standard does, that is, establishing which kinds, individuals, features and standpoints are relevant to the understanding of pictures. It is argued that, while standards concerning kinds, individuals and features can be relevant also to ordinary perception, standards concerning standpoints are specific to pictorial experience. Drawing on all this, the paper proposes an ontology of depiction according to which a picture is constituted by both its visual appearance and its standard of correctness.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  11. 675472.72331
    Proclus of Athens (*412–485 C.E.) was the most authoritative philosopher of late antiquity and played a crucial role in the transmission of Platonic philosophy from antiquity to the Middle Ages. For almost fifty years, he was head or ‘successor’ (diadochos, sc. of Plato) of the Platonic ‘Academy’ in Athens. Being an exceptionally productive writer, he composed commentaries on Aristotle, Euclid and Plato, systematic treatises in all disciplines of philosophy as it was at that time (metaphysics and theology, physics, astronomy, mathematics, ethics) and exegetical works on traditions of religious wisdom (Orphism and Chaldaean Oracles).
    Found 1 week ago on Wes Morriston's site
  12. 750167.723353
    I argue that in addressing worries about the validity and reliability of implicit measures of social cognition, theorists should draw on research concerning “entitativity perception.” In brief, an aggregate of people is perceived as highly “entitative” when its members exhibit a certain sort of unity. For example, think of the difference between the aggregate of people waiting in line at a bank versus a tight-knit group of friends: the latter seems more “groupy” than the former. I start by arguing that entitativity perception modulates the activation of implicit biases and stereotypes. I then argue that recognizing this modulatory role will help researchers to address concerns surrounding the validity and reliability of implicit measures.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  13. 750235.723383
    6. We desire love as a function of the relational nature of our being. Ontologically, we are not complete or sufficient unto ourselves. We do not and cannot provide the 'space' (both physical and emotional) we must occupy in order to be what and as we are.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  14. 767448.723413
    This article sheds light on a response to experimental philosophy that has not yet received enough attention: the reflection defense. According to proponents of this defense, judgments about philosophical cases are relevant only when they are the product of careful, nuanced, and conceptually rigorous reflection. We argue that the reflection defense is misguided: We present five studies (N>1800) showing that people make the same judgments when they are primed to engage in careful reflection as they do in the conditions standardly used by experimental philosophers.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Markus Kneer's site
  15. 788883.723456
    This paper argues that while the classical, essentialist conception of identity is appealing due to its simplicity, it does not adequately capture the complexity of professional or individual identity. The appeal to essentialism in librarianship contributes to some serious problems for the profession, such as exclusion and homogeneity in the workplace, high attrition rates of minority librarians, exploitation and alienation of an underrepresented workforce, as well as stereotyping. This paper examines the theoretical landscape with regard to the identity question and proposes a more fitting alternative to essentialism, namely the relational conception of identity, and engages in a philosophical argument for the adoption of the relational account as a theoretical grounding for an understanding of the complex, fluid, and emergent nature of librarian identity within our dynamic profession.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  16. 810057.72349
    Comparative psychology came into its own as a science of animal minds, so a standard story goes, when it abandoned anecdotes in favor of experimental methods. However, pragmatic constraints significantly limit the number of individual animals included in laboratories experiments. Studies are often published with sample sizes in the single digits, and sometimes samples of one animal. With such small samples, comparative psychology has arguably not actually moved on from its anecdotal roots. Replication failures in other branches of psychology have received substantial attention, but have only recently been addressed in comparative psychology, and have not received serious attention in the attending philosophical literature. I focus on the question of how to interpret findings from experiments with small samples, and whether they can be generalized to other members of the tested species. As a first step, I argue that we should view studies with extreme small sample sizes as anecdotal experiments, lying somewhere between traditional experiments and traditional anecdotes in evidential weight and generalizability.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  17. 873063.723523
    This article addresses three questions concerning Kant's views on non-rational animals: do they intuit spatio-temporal particulars, do they perceive objects, and do they have intentional states? My aim is to explore the relationship between these questions and to clarify certain pervasive ambiguities in how they have been understood. I first disambiguate various nonequivalent notions of objecthood and intentionality: I then look closely at several models of objectivity present in Kant's work, and at recent discussions of representational and relational theories of intentionality. I argue ultimately that, given the relevant disambiguations, the answers to all three questions will likely be positive. These results both support what has become known as the nonconceptualist reading of Kant, and make clearer the price the conceptualist must pay to sustain his or her position.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on Sacha Golob's site
  18. 923753.723557
    I argue that the science of the soul only covers sublunary living things. Aristotle cannot properly ascribe ψυχή to unmoved movers since they do not have any capacities that are distinct from their activities or any matter to be structured. Heavenly bodies do not have souls in the way that mortal living things do, because their matter is not subject to alteration or generation. These beings do not fit into the hierarchy of soul powers that Aristotle relies on to provide unity to ψυχή. Their living consists in their activities, not in having a capacity for activity.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  19. 941329.723587
    Have you ever disagreed with your government’s stance about some significant social, political, economic, or even philosophical issue? For example: Healthcare policy? Response to a pandemic? Gender inequality? Structural racism? Drilling in the Arctic? Fracking? Approving or vetoing a military intervention in a foreign country? Transgender rights? Exiting some multi-national political alliance (for instance, the European Union)? The building of a 20 billion dollar wall? We’re guessing the answer is most likely ’yes’.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on J. Adam Carter's site
  20. 944773.72362
    Morality can often seem pretty diverse. There are moral rules governing our physical and sexual interactions with other human beings; there are moral rules relating to how we treat and respect property; there are moral rules concerning the behaviour of officials in government office; and, according to some religions, there are even moral rules for how we prepare and eat food. …
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on John Danaher's blog
  21. 1068510.723653
    This post about epistemic in justice and implicit bias by Kathy Puddifoot and Jules Holroyd is the fourth and final post of this week’s series on An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind (Routledge, 2020). …
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on The Brains Blog
  22. 1091434.723682
    The movement toward scientific literacy aims to cultivate a public able to make informed decisions about science in their own lives (e.g., personal health, sustainable practices, &c.) and their support of social policies for themselves, rather than passively accepting information they are given. Many people continue learning about science — its discoveries, nature, ramifications on society, and so on — through generalist media sources such as newspapers. What are they apt to learn from such sources? This paper examines the ways in which print journalism (sampled from three prominent newspapers) in the 2010s presents science — investigating, in particular, to what extent these sources attend to the methodology or the social–institutional processes by which particular results come about. We make a case for the significance of this question in connection with the public’s understanding and trust of science.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on M. H. Slater's site
  23. 1098634.723718
    Both scientists and philosophers of science have recently emphasized the importance of promoting transparency in science. For scientists, transparency is a way to promote reproducibility, progress, and trust in research. For philosophers of science, transparency can help address the value-ladenness of scientific research in a responsible way. Nevertheless, the concept of transparency is a complex one. Scientists can be transparent about many different things, for many different reasons, on behalf of many different stakeholders. This paper proposes a taxonomy that clarifies the major dimensions along which approaches to transparency can vary. By doing so, it provides several insights that philosophers and other science-studies scholars can pursue. In particular, it helps address common objections to pursuing transparency in science, it clarifies major forms of transparency, and it suggests avenues for further research on this topic.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  24. 1098692.723748
    Philosophers of science are increasingly interested in engaging with scientific communities, policymakers, and members of the public; however, the nature of this engagement has not been systematically examined. Instead of delineating a specific kind of engaged philosophy of science, as previous accounts have done, this paper draws on literature from outside the discipline to develop a framework for analyzing different forms of broadly engaged philosophy of science according to two key dimensions: social interaction and epistemic integration. Clarifying the many forms of engagement available to philosophers of science can advance future scholarship on engagement and promote more strategic engagement efforts.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  25. 1102114.723781
    This post about epistemic in justice and implicit bias by Susanna Siegel is the third post of this week’s series on An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind (Routledge, 2020). …
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on The Brains Blog
  26. 1104420.72386
    This paper is a clarification and development of my interpretation of Sartre’s theory of bad faith in response to Ronald Santoni’s sophisticated critique, published in the same issue. Santoni rightly points out that the central claim of my interpretation is that bad faith is a fundamental project manifested in all our other projects. This paper therefore begins with a clarification of Sartre’s conception of a project, followed by an explanation of his claim that one project is fundamental, grounding an elucidation of the idea that bad faith is a fundamental project. The paper then uses this to address the central themes of Santoni’s critique of my interpretation. I argue that Sartre does not consider us to be ontologically and congenitally disposed to bad faith. The prevalence of bad faith is explained, on my reading of Sartre, by the social pressure to conform to it, which is inherent in the project itself. Santoni is right that this cannot really explain the prevalence of bad faith, but this is a problem with Sartre’s theory, not a problem for my interpretation of it. I then defend my claim that Sartre’s notion of seriousness is merely a strategy of bad faith by outlining an alternative strategy that Sartre does not consider. Finally, I argue that Sartre is right to deny that bad faith is an inherently cynical project, even though it is manipulative and self-serving, and even though it can be cynically motivated.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Jonathan Webber's site
  27. 1128708.723897
    This post about embodied cognition and implicit bias by Céline Leboeuf is the second post of this week’s series on An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind (Routledge, 2020). …
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on The Brains Blog
  28. 1128728.723932
    In this paper, I explore and probe Joseph Carens’ remarks, in his recent book The Ethics of Immigration, on the immigration status of foreign convicted criminals who have served their sentence, and who wish either to immigrate into our country or who are already here. Carens rejects deportation when it is not called for by considerations of national security, and agrees that considerations of public order can justify barring convicted foreign criminals from entering the country. I broadly agree with his arguments against deportation: my remarks in this respect are clarificatory and exploratory as much as anything else. But (I argue) both his argument for open borders and his scepticism with respect to radical cosmopolitanism are in tension with his claim that past criminal convictions can act as a bar to entry.
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Cecile Fabre's site
  29. 1193988.723974
    This chapter offers an account of the role and place of jus post bellum within just war theory and highlights avenues of inquiry on the aftermath of war that have been largely ignored. The author discusses recent arguments to the effect that jus ad bellum and jus in bello exhaust just war theory and that jus post bellum, far from being a key member of the family, in fact does much better as an outsider. The author claims, on the contrary, that there is ample space for jus post bellum within just war theory; in partial agreement with those arguments, however, the author agrees that a full account of the ethics of war’s aftermath must also draw on other fields of normative inquiry and fleshes out in greater details connections and disconnections between jus post bellum on the one hand and the other two jura on the other.
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Cecile Fabre's site
  30. 1202673.724011
    Martin Buber (1878–1965) was a prolific author, scholar, literary translator, and political activist whose writings—mostly in German and Hebrew—ranged from Jewish mysticism to social philosophy, biblical studies, religious phenomenology, philosophical anthropology, education, politics, and art. Most famous among his philosophical writings is the short but powerful book I and Thou (1923) where our relation to others is considered as twofold. The I-it relation prevails between subjects and objects of thought and action; the I-Thou relation, on the other hand, obtains in encounters between subjects that exceed the range of the Cartesian subject-object relation.
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on Wes Morriston's site