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88577.125884
This post is free to read, so please ‘like’ it via the heart below and share it widely. The best way to support my work is with a paid subscription. It’s the most predictable thing imaginable: the Trump administration, co-helmed by the rabid pro-natalist Elon Musk and the sadsack pallbearer of patriarchy, J.D. …
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145672.126106
Quarrels and wisecracks are essential features of interpersonal life. Quarrels are conflicts that typically take place only between friends, family, and those with whom we are personally engaged and whose attitudes toward us matter. Wisecracks are bits of improvised wit—banter, teasing, mockery, and ball busting—that also typically take place only in interpersonal life (note the following odd but revealing comment: “I can’t tease her like that; I barely even know her!”). Quarrels and cracks are, though, mutually exclusive. People know their quarrel is basically over once they start being amused by each others’ wisecracks again, and if you’re enjoying wisecracks with each other, it’s very hard, if not impossible, to quarrel at the same time. Why is this and what does it mean for interpersonal conflict? In this paper, I attempt to answer this question via a deep dive into the nature of wisecracking humor to explore the unrecognized—and valuable—role it plays in our interpersonal lives. In particular, there is a type of wisecracking humor that has a distinctive sort of interpersonal power, the power to dissolve the anger in quarrels in a surprising and productive way.
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260696.126125
It has been argued that adult humans are absolutely time biased towards the future, at least as far as purely hedonic experiences (pain/pleasure) are concerned. What this means is that they assign zero value to them once they are in the past. Recent empirical studies have cast doubt on this claim, suggesting that while adults hold asymmetrical hedonic preferences – preferring painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future – these preferences are not absolute and are often abandoned when the quantity of pain or pleasure under consideration is greater in the past than in the future. Research has also examined whether such preferences might be affected by the utility people assign to experiential memories, since the recollection of past events can itself be pleasurable or aversive. We extend this line of research, investigating the utility people assign to experiential memories regardless of tense, and provide – to our knowledge – the first quantitative attempt at directly comparing the relative subjective weightings given to ‘primary’ experiences (i.e., living through the event first-hand) and ‘secondary’ (i.e., recollective or anticipatory) experiences. We find that when painful events are located in the past, the importance of the memory of the pain appears to be enhanced relative to its importance when they are located in the future. We also find extensive individual differences in hedonic preferences, reasons to adopt them, and willingness to trade them off. This research allows for a clearer picture of the utility people assign to the consumption of recollective experiences and of how this contributes to, or perhaps masks, time biases.
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263166.126132
This chapter addresses the development of tests for consciousness (C-tests), defined as any protocol or methodology devised to detect specific properties that, if present, would justify higher credence in the belief that the system under test is phenomenally conscious. Though inherently defeasible, C-tests are vital for reducing epistemic uncertainty, balancing ethical and practical considerations regarding the attribution of consciousness to systems like patients with disorders of consciousness, non-human animals, and artificial systems. In this chapter, we first present a taxonomy of current available C-tests, describing how they rely on specific neural and/or psychological properties to reduce uncertainty about the presence of consciousness in various target systems. Second, we clarify the notion of phenomenal consciousness as the target of C-tests, delineating the limits of C- tests in being able to capture it. Third, we address the question of whether a well-established theory of consciousness and/or pre-theoretical intuitions are necessary for validation of C-tests. Fourth, we evaluate several inferential strategies to justify extrapolations of consciousness from consensus to non-consensus cases. Finally, we conclude by describing the iterative natural kind approach as a multidimensional method that integrates multiple tests with weighted evidence. This model would provide probabilistic assessments of consciousness across different populations, offering a more reliable framework for addressing non-consensus cases and providing a valuable aid for practical decision-making.
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487031.126138
Common sense tells us that biological systems are goal-directed, and yet the concept remains philosophically problematic. We propose a novel characterization of goal-directed activities as a basis for hypothesizing about and investigating explanatory mechanisms. We focus on survival goals such as providing adequate nutrition to body tissues, highlighting two key features—normativity and action. These are closely linked inasmuch as goal-directed actions must meet normative requirements such as that they occur when required and not at other times. We illustrate how goal-directed actions are initiated and terminated not by environmental features and goals themselves, but by markers for them. For example, timely blood clotting is the essential response to injury, but platelet activation, required for clotting, is initiated not by the injury itself but by a short sequence of amino acids (GPO) that provides a reliable marker for it. We then make the case that the operation of markers is a prerequisite for common biological phenomena such as mistake-proneness and mimicry. We go on to identify properties of markers in general, including those that are genetically determined and those that can be acquired through associative learning. Both provide the basis for matching actions to changing environments and hence adaptive goal-directedness. We describe how goal-directed activities such as bird nest construction and birdsong learning, completed in anticipation of actions in the environment, have to be evaluated and practiced against a standard of correctness. This characterization of goal-directedness is sufficiently detailed to provide a basis for the scientific study of mechanisms.
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522060.126144
Given the extreme importance that Wittgenstein attached to the
aesthetic dimension of life, it is in one sense surprising that he
wrote so little on the subject. It is true that we have the notes
assembled from his lectures on aesthetics given to a small group of
students in private rooms in Cambridge in the summer of 1938
(Wittgenstein 1966, henceforth LA) and we have G. E. Moore’s
record of some of Wittgenstein’s lectures in the period
1930–33 (Moore 1972). Of Wittgenstein’s own writings, we
find remarks on literature, poetry, architecture, the visual arts, and
especially music and the philosophy of culture more broadly scattered
throughout his writings on the philosophies of language, mind,
mathematics, and philosophical method, as well as in his more personal
notebooks; a number of these are collected in Culture and
Value (Wittgenstein 1980a).
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609258.126149
Philosophers interested in medicine and healthcare research should focus on the choice of health concepts. Conceptual choice is akin to conceptual engineering but, in addition to assessing whether a concept suits an objective, or offering a better one, it evaluates objectives, ranks them, and discusses stakeholders’ entitlement. To show the importance of choosing health concepts, I summarize the internal debate in medicine, showcasing definitions, constructs, and scales. To argue it is a philosophical task, I analyze the medical controversy over health as adaptation and self-management. I conclude with a to-do list of conceptual choice tasks, generalizable beyond medicine.
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609278.126154
Since Andrew Jameton first introduced the concept of moral distress, a growing theoretical literature has attempted to identify its distinctive features. This theoretical work has overlooked a central feature of morally distressing situations: disempowerment. My aim is to correct this neglect by arguing for a new test for theories of moral distress. I call this the disempowerment requirement: a theory of moral distress ought to accommodate the disempowerment of morally distressing situations. I argue for the disempowerment requirement and illustrate how to apply it by showing that recent responsibility-based theories of moral distress fail to pass the test.
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613518.12616
I wrote these words about 20 years ago. They seem especially apt these days. Leaders have been known to inspire blind faith. Michels (1962: 93) refers to "the belief so frequent among the people that their leaders belong to a higher order of humanity than themselves" evidenced by "the tone of veneration in which the idol's name is pronounced, the perfect docility with which the least of his signs is obeyed, and the indignation which is aroused by any critical attack on his personality." …
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752729.126165
Chinese Daoism is a Chinese philosophy of natural practice structured
around a normative focus on dào (道 path, way). This naturalist philosophical project treated dào as a
structure of natural possibility for living beings. Unlike similar
Western naturalisms, e.g., pragmatism, Daoism’s foil was
contemporary: the Confucian-Mohist (Ru-Mo) dialectic about
human (人 rén human, social)
dào. Daoism’s critique of Ru-Mo debate
concerns the role of natural (天 tiān
sky-nature) dào vs human dào (socially
constructed guidance). Daoism’s founding
personages[ 1 ]
( Laozi and
Zhuangzi)
did not coin their “-ism.” The two Classical texts,
credited to their titled masters (子 zǐ
son), emerged during the Classical period (5th to
3rd C. BC).
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817654.12617
A nameless delivery boy in a nameless city, a refugee from a nameless country, fleeing a nameless Strongman, indentured to a nameless Supervisor, dispatched to nameless customers with unmarked packages, not knowing, yet, the rules of the system, and the language, in which he is trapped—a story told, though we do not know it yet, by a nameless narrator in a nameless city, a refugee from a nameless country, fleeing a nameless Strongman. …
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839986.126178
The nineteenth-century distinction between the nomothetic and the idiographic approach to scientific inquiry can provide valuable insight into the epistemic challenges faced in contemporary earth modelling. However, as it stands, the nomothetic-idiographic dichotomy does not fully encompass the range of modelling commitments and trade-offs that geoscientists need to navigate in their practice. Adopting a historical epistemology perspective, I propose to further spell out this dichotomy as a set of modelling decisions concerning historicity, model complexity, scale, and closure. Then, I suggest that, to address the challenges posed by these decisions, a pluralist stance towards the cognitive aims of earth modelling should be endorsed, especially beyond predictive aims.
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840006.126184
This is an introduction to a collection of articles on the conceptual history of epigenesis, from Aristotle to Harvey, Cavendish, Kant and Erasmus Darwin, moving into nineteenth-century biology with Wolff, Blumenbach and His, and onto the twentieth century and current issues, with Waddington and epigenetics. The purpose of the topical collection is to emphasize how epigenesis marks the point of intersection of a theory of biological development and a (philosophical) theory of active matter. We also wish to show that the concept of epigenesis existed prior to biological theorization and that it continues to permeate thinking about development in recent biological debates.
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1065912.126193
I’m on holidays this week, spending some time in Cracow (Poland) and Slovakia. Today’s post is a bit off-topic compared to what I’m used to publish here, but still I hope you will enjoy it! If not the case already, do not hesitate to subscribe to receive for free essays on economics, philosophy, and liberal politics in your mailbox! …
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1128285.12621
In interactions characterized by agential epistemic injustice, the interpreter avoids engaging with the speaker’s perspective and challenges or distorts the speaker’s contribution before taking time to explore it. Where the success of the interaction depends on a genuine knowledge exchange between interpreters and speakers, epistemic injustice compromises the success of the interaction. Building on recent qualitative work on communication in youth mental health, I argue that clinical interactions are less likely to achieve their aims when practitioners fail to engage with the perspective of the person seeking support, and challenge or distort the person’s contribution before taking time to explore it.
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1128303.126219
This paper argues that biostatistical theory (BST) cannot categorically exclude pregnancy from pathology. Common harmful conditions in typical pregnancies are integral to the notion of pregnancy per se. Given this definition, there are two potential ways to classify pregnancy as non-pathological within the BST: (i) most common conditions in pregnancy are not pathological within the appropriate reference class; or (ii) pregnancy’s reproductive value counterbalances its pathological survival harms, rendering it non-pathological. I challenge both views, arguing that non-pregnant women of the same age should be the reference class, making pregnancy a survival pathology that cannot be offset by reproductive value.
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1186197.126225
This paper examines the historical split of microbiology into the fields of medicine and ecology from a feminist perspective, using Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism and her onto-epistemic view of interactions. Examining microbial interactions is interesting for two reasons, one is ontological as microbial metabolic interactions constitute the bio-geo-chemical cycles that are the driving force of life on Earth. The second reason is epistemic, involving our conceptual challenges in understanding microbial traits and classification, as their activities and ability to evolve are, for the most part, driven by their interactions. I follow the work and methodology of Sergei Vinogradskii (1856-1953) and Robert Koch (1843-1910), as two main founders each of a different microbiology field. Koch focused on medicine, developing pure mass cultures and the Koch postulates. Vinogradskii focused on soil microbiology and ecosystem ecology, developing the elective culture technique, and is known for the Winogradsky Column. I use contextual empiricism to discuss their methodological differences in classification and cultivation and reflect on their position regarding microbial individuality and interactions. For instance, Vinogradskii’s research focused on metabolic interactions and microbial life cycles, considering individual microbes as part of their environment and never in isolation. This view emphasizes the individual, the interactions, and the environment as equally focal in causal explanations.
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1221043.126231
A friend and I were discussing whether there’s anything I could possibly say, on this blog, in 2025, that wouldn’t provoke an outraged reaction from my commenters. So I started jotting down ideas. Let’s see how I did. …
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1235577.126236
The View from Everywhere is now available for those with an Oxford Scholarship Online subscription; hardcopies ship next month (but you can preorder now). I’ll probably write more about it as the print publication date approaches. …
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1566541.126241
Bet On It reader Ian Fillmore recently sent me a very insightful email on natalism, which I encouraged him to expand upon. In fact, I’ll put it squarely in the obvious-once-you-think-about-it category. …
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1584896.126246
In a recent essay, I explained that the right to exit is often given great importance in liberal thought. In some cases, it is almost as if nothing else matters than the guarantee that individuals can —in principle or effectively— exit a group, a community, or a society. …
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1629339.126251
Karl Marx rejected the ideal of equality as bourgeois. And yet, the most significant attempt in recent years to distinguish socialist theory from liberal egalitarian theory, G.A. Cohen's critique of John Rawls, relies almost entirely on an egalitarian principle. Although Cohen’s critique often seems to have a great deal of intuitive force, a number of Rawls’ defenders have argued, quite convincingly, that Cohen’s critique is unsuccessful. For those of us attracted to broadly socialist ideals, there does seem to be something importantly right about Cohen’s criticisms of Rawls, and more substantively, something deeply problematic in the kinds of market-based leveraging of productive abilities that would be permitted in a fully just Rawlsian society. My diagnosis is that Cohen has the right target, but the wrong fundamental value. I develop an alternative to these liberal egalitarian approaches in contemporary socialist ethics, building on the famous slogan: ‘from each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs.’ This alternative ideal of Caring Solidarity draws on rich socialist, Christian, and feminist traditions, and emphasizes the importance of care, recognition, and solidarity in political and economic organisation. This alternative approach leaves a certain amount of inequality legitimately in place, whilst providing a moral framework for a radical reorganisation of production.
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1651039.126257
On my flight back from Spain, I watched Subservience, yet another a cautionary tale of artificial general intelligence. I kept laughing at its many absurdities. If Robin Hanson viewed it, I fear that his head might explode in social scientific outrage. …
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1791078.126263
This entry takes as its focal point the philosophical contributions of
Anna Julia Cooper with an emphasis on her scholarship and some
attention to her commitments as an educator and activist. Authoring
one of the earliest book-length analyses of the unique situation of
Black women in the United States, Cooper offers clearly articulated
insights about racialized sexism and sexualized racism without
ignoring the significance of class and labor, education and
intellectual development, and conceptions of democracy and
citizenship.[ 1 ]
With an academic training deeply rooted in the history of Western
philosophy and the classics, Cooper’s philosophical significance
also lies in her foundational contributions to feminist philosophy,
standpoint theory, and epistemology, as well as critical philosophy of
race and African-American philosophy (including African American
political philosophy).
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1820496.126268
Pseudo-consciousness bridges the gap between rigid, task-driven AI and the elusive dream of true artificial general intelligence (AGI). While modern AI excels in pattern recognition, strategic reasoning, and multimodal integration, it remains fundamentally devoid of subjective experience. Yet, emerging architectures are displaying behaviors that look intentional—adapting, self-monitoring, and making complex decisions in ways that mimic conscious cognition. If these systems can integrate information globally, reflect on their own processes, and operate with apparent goal-directed behavior, do they qualify as functionally conscious? This paper introduces pseudo-consciousness as a new conceptual category, distinct from both narrow AI and AGI. It presents a five-condition framework that defines AI capable of consciousness-like functionality without true sentience. By drawing on insights from computational theory of mind, functionalism, and neuroscientific models—such as Global Workspace Theory and Recurrent Processing Theory—we argue that intelligence and experience can be decoupled. The implications are profound. As AI systems become more autonomous and embedded in critical domains like healthcare, governance, and warfare, their ability to simulate awareness raises urgent ethical and regulatory concerns. Could a pseudo-conscious AI be trusted? Would it manipulate human perception? How do we prevent society from anthropomorphizing machines that only imitate cognition? By redefining the boundaries of intelligence and agency, this study lays the foundation for evaluating, designing, and governing AI that seems aware—without ever truly being so.
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1820534.126273
Despite widespread scientific agreement that human biological diversity is real, the question of whether “race” corresponds to a natural kind remains deeply contested. While some philosophers and scientists continue to explore ways of biologically grounding racial categories, this paper argues that the project of racial naturalism—whether in its essentialist or reformulated variants—remains conceptually, empirically, and metaphysically untenable. Yet this is not a rejection of the reality of race. Rather, I contend that race is a real and powerful social construct, historically forged and materially entrenched, but not a natural kind in the biological or taxonomic sense.
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1823698.126279
This paper argues that lockdown was racist. The terms are broad, but the task of definition is not random, and in §2 we motivate certain definitions as appropriate. In brief: “lockdown” refers to regulatory responses to the Covid-19 (C-19) pandemic involving significant restrictions on leaving the home and on activities outside the home, historically situated in the pandemic and widely known as “lockdowns”; and “racist” indicates what we call negligent racism, a type of racism which we define. Negligent racism does not require intent, but beyond this constraint, we do not endorse any definition of racism in general. With definitions in hand, in §3 we argue that lockdown was harmful in Africa, causing great human suffering that was not offset by benefits and amounted to net harm, far greater than in the circumstances in which most White people live. Since 1.4
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1823715.126284
This paper argues against the view, proposed in Langland-Hassan (2020), that attitudinal imaginings are reducible to basic folk-psychological attitudes such as judgments, beliefs, desires, decisions, or combinations thereof. The proposed reduction fails because attitudinal imaginings, though similar to basic attitudes in certain respects, function differently than basic attitudes. I demonstrate this by exploring two types of cases: spontaneous imaginings, and imaginings that arise in response to fiction, showing that in these cases, imaginings cannot be identified with basic attitudes. I conclude that imagining is a distinct attitude: it enables us to freely conjure up scenarios without being bound by the restrictions that govern basic folk-psychological attitudes.
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1823731.126289
According to the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare, something is good for me to the extent that I desire it. This theory faces the “scope problem”: many of the things I desire, intuitively, lie beyond the scope of my welfare. Here, I argue that a simple solution to this problem is available. First, I suggest that it is a general feature of desires that they can differ not only in their objects but also in their “targets,” or for the sake of whom one has the desire. For example, I can desire that my child win an award either for their sake or for my own sake. Second, I show that we can use this idea to solve the scope problem by holding that something is good for me to the extent that I desire it for my own sake. Despite first appearances, this solution is not ad hoc, incomplete, or circular.
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1823786.126294
I argue that there are Kantian grounds to endorse a Universal Basic Income (UBI) and that Kant’s practical philosophy can contribute to current debates about the ethics of UBI. I will make two points that mutually support each other. Firstly, there is a pro tanto argument for Kantians to work towards a UBI. A UBI, more so than conditional welfare schemes, enables agents to live up to their duty to be a useful member of the world. This should be conceptualized as an indirect duty to implement a UBI. Secondly, Kant’s ethics suggests a way to tackle the most pressing ethical objection against a UBI, the unfairness or surfer objection. The requirement that agents be useful for others is ethical and thus cannot be enforced externally. Yet, there is rational pressure on agents to do their part. Kant and UBI advocates can learn a great deal from each other.