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2340.827047
It is overwhelmingly plausible that part of what gives individuals their particular legal or institutional statuses is the fact that there are general laws or other policies in place that specify the conditions under which something is to have those statuses. For instance, particular acts are illegal partly in virtue of the existence and content of applicable law. But problems for this apparently plausible view have recently come to light. The problems afflict both attempts to ground legal statuses in general laws and an analogous view concerning the role of general moral principles in grounding moral statuses. Here I argue that these problems can be solved. The solution in the legal case is to recognize an element of self-reference in the law’s specification of what gives things their legal statuses. The relevant kind of self-reference is a familiar part of the legal and procedural world. It is immanent in at least some familiar legal or broadly conventional, procedural practices. The lessons of this discussion of legal statuses can then be applied to the meta-ethical debate over moral statuses, yielding a view on which moral principles also incorporate an element of self-reference.
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38340.827286
Abortion is the intentional termination of a pregnancy, either via
surgery or via the taking of medication. Ordinary people disagree
about abortion: many people think abortion is deeply morally wrong,
while many others think abortion is morally permissible. Philosophy
has much to contribute to this discussion, by distinguishing and
clarifying different arguments against abortion, distinguishing and
clarifying different responses to those arguments, offering novel
arguments against abortion, offering novel defenses of abortion, and
offering novel views about the relevant issues at stake. This entry’s central question is: is abortion morally wrong?
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65986.827298
This paper challenges a false dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity in understanding the nature of human social relationships. I argue that social relationships are composed of both subjective and objective components, which are inherently interdependent. They are influenced by biological properties and subject to evolutionary processes, yet they cannot be reduced to them. I use emerging research on kinship as an example that showcases the appeal of this integrated approach. This paper takes a step in the direction of a unified account of sociality, contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of human social behavior.
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239009.827306
This paper argues that the lack of a shared evidence base in the policy debate around alcohol control, and the failure to acknowledge this fact, creates a tendency to dismiss key bodies of evidence as irrelevant, to the detriment of public health approaches. Using examples from three policy processes, it shows that proponents of opposed positions deploy rival conceptualizations of “problem alcohol use” as the object of policy intervention. Using analytic tools from the philosophy of science, it argues that these conceptualizations correspond to distinct bodies of evidence, which are treated as incompatible. Finally, it points to institutional mechanisms through which the problem can be mitigated.
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415306.827314
Very short summary: In this essay, I discuss various recent controversial cases in Europe where political institutions have been criticized for making “undemocratic” decisions (Romania, Germany, France) to ask under which conditions the median voter’s views should rule. …
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486363.827321
Given a time t and a world w, possible or not, say that w is t-possible if and only if there is a possible world wt that matches w in all atemporal respects as well as with respect to all that happens up to and including time t. For instance, a world just like ours but where in 2027 a square circle appears is 2026-possible but not 2028-possible. …
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743510.827328
I don’t usually offer recipes on my Substack, but I am giving you one today. 1. Be a woman, who is hence not supposed to ask for much of anything—much less people’s money and time and attention;
2. Violate a minor—and largely arbitrary—social norm, such as the norm that you don’t go paid straightaway on Substack;
3. …
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967647.827335
The natural right to liberty surely includes the right to bring children into this world, and to raise them as your own. If you do so, it’s your business, and (barring abuse or neglect) interference by others, or the state, is illegitimate; nor do you need a justification for your act. …
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978536.827342
In ‘Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline’, Bernard Williams argued that philosophy has a distinctive relationship with history, and not just the history of philosophy. He had in mind, especially, moral and political theory. For Williams, changes in ethical outlook are typically driven by social and cultural forces distinct from the power of rational argument. When an ethical idea prevails over time, holders of the outlook it supplants often have ‘have [no] reason to recognize the transition as an improvement’ (Williams 2000, p. 486). By their lights, the arguments for change are question-begging, In this respect, Williams believed, the history of ethics is unlike the history of modern science, whose telling typically vindicates later scientists on terms compelling to their predecessors.
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1041107.827349
I made a joke, last year, about philosophy’s failure as a pedagogy of death: if it was meant to teach me how to reconcile with mortality, it doesn’t seem to have done its job. Not that philosophers haven’t tried. …
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1076907.827356
Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777), also known by his
courtesy name Dai Dongyuan 戴東原, was a highly
accomplished scholar of the Qianlong-Jiaqing era of the Qing dynasty. His expertise encompassed a wide range of fields, including philology,
phonology, mathematics, astronomy, ancient institutions, geography,
chorography, and philosophy. Although his contributions to other
disciplines were recognized during his lifetime, his philosophy was
not widely acknowledged. Despite this, his ideas significantly
influenced philosophically-minded interpreters of the Confucian
Analects and the Mencius, notably Jiao Xun
焦循 (1763–1820), who frequently referenced
Dai’s works in his influential book, Mengzi
Zhengyi
孟子正義 (The Correct Meaning of the
Mencius).
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1250075.827362
It is a pleasure to read and respond to Professor Orr’s learned statement of a conservatism, one that is both rooted in tradition and updated to the contemporary. Conservatism’s top values, we learn, are order, hierarchy, a sense of belonging to a particular community in a particular time and place, a deference to tradition, and a resistance to changes that are too sweeping or too quick. Simultaneously, conservatism is distrustful of abstract definitions, eschews commitments to universal principles and certainties, preferring the empirical, the particular, and the pragmatic. Professor Orr devotes a paragraph or two to explicating further each of those core concepts.
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1250109.827369
The most direct route to political fundamentals is to ask: What should governments do? The different ‘isms’—liberalism, socialism, fascism, and so on—answer that question based on their most cherished values, holding that the purpose of government is to achieve those values. Yet societies are complex and we create many kinds of social institutions—businesses, schools, friendships and families, sports teams, churches/synagogues/mosques/temples, associations dedicated to artistic and scientific pursuits, governments, and so on—to achieve our important values.
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1250133.827376
It is difficult to overstate the extent to which contemporary political debates fail to address the underlying philosophical arguments that inform the way we govern our societies and the leaders we elected to do so. It is therefore with tremendous pleasure that I hosted a set of both written and in-person discussions between two of the great minds of modern political and philosophical thought. As you will see, Dr. James Orr, a friend and regular guest on my show, sets out with tremendous clarity and skill the arguments for the conservative worldview. He is ably challenged by Professor Stephen R. C. Hicks, another friend and favourite interviewee of mine, who argues for liberalism as the correct orientation towards the world. The debate is hugely informative, productive, and, I hope, of use to the reader—it certainly has been to me.
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1378766.827391
The work of George Eliot (1819–1880) challenges any strong
disjunction between philosophy and art. Her deepest philosophical
interests were in ethics, aesthetics, and the relation between them. Indebted above all to Spinozism and Romanticism, she developed her
thinking in sustained dialogue with the European philosophical
tradition, both before and after she began to write fiction under the
pseudonym “George Eliot” in 1857. She wrote novels,
shorter stories, poetry, and review essays, and throughout her career
she experimented with literary form. Through her bestselling novels,
her engagements with philosophy and with contemporary questions about
morality, art, politics, feminism, religion and science reached wide
readerships.
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1522190.827398
This post is free to read, so please ‘like’ it via the heart below and share it widely. The best way to support my work is with a paid subscription. It’s the most predictable thing imaginable: the Trump administration, co-helmed by the rabid pro-natalist Elon Musk and the sadsack pallbearer of patriarchy, J.D. …
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1579285.827405
Quarrels and wisecracks are essential features of interpersonal life. Quarrels are conflicts that typically take place only between friends, family, and those with whom we are personally engaged and whose attitudes toward us matter. Wisecracks are bits of improvised wit—banter, teasing, mockery, and ball busting—that also typically take place only in interpersonal life (note the following odd but revealing comment: “I can’t tease her like that; I barely even know her!”). Quarrels and cracks are, though, mutually exclusive. People know their quarrel is basically over once they start being amused by each others’ wisecracks again, and if you’re enjoying wisecracks with each other, it’s very hard, if not impossible, to quarrel at the same time. Why is this and what does it mean for interpersonal conflict? In this paper, I attempt to answer this question via a deep dive into the nature of wisecracking humor to explore the unrecognized—and valuable—role it plays in our interpersonal lives. In particular, there is a type of wisecracking humor that has a distinctive sort of interpersonal power, the power to dissolve the anger in quarrels in a surprising and productive way.
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1694309.827418
It has been argued that adult humans are absolutely time biased towards the future, at least as far as purely hedonic experiences (pain/pleasure) are concerned. What this means is that they assign zero value to them once they are in the past. Recent empirical studies have cast doubt on this claim, suggesting that while adults hold asymmetrical hedonic preferences – preferring painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future – these preferences are not absolute and are often abandoned when the quantity of pain or pleasure under consideration is greater in the past than in the future. Research has also examined whether such preferences might be affected by the utility people assign to experiential memories, since the recollection of past events can itself be pleasurable or aversive. We extend this line of research, investigating the utility people assign to experiential memories regardless of tense, and provide – to our knowledge – the first quantitative attempt at directly comparing the relative subjective weightings given to ‘primary’ experiences (i.e., living through the event first-hand) and ‘secondary’ (i.e., recollective or anticipatory) experiences. We find that when painful events are located in the past, the importance of the memory of the pain appears to be enhanced relative to its importance when they are located in the future. We also find extensive individual differences in hedonic preferences, reasons to adopt them, and willingness to trade them off. This research allows for a clearer picture of the utility people assign to the consumption of recollective experiences and of how this contributes to, or perhaps masks, time biases.
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1840344.827426
[Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Klaas Kraay replaces the
former entry on this topic by the previous author.]
The topic of divine freedom concerns the extent to which a divine
being — in particular, the supreme divine being, God — can
be free. There are, of course, many different conceptions of who or
what God is. This entry will focus on one enormously important and
influential model, according to which God is a personal being who
exists necessarily, who is essentially omnipotent, omniscient,
perfectly good, and perfectly rational, and who is the creator and
sustainer of all that contingently
exists.[ 1 ]
(For more discussion of these attributes, see the entries on
omnipotence,
omniscience,
perfect goodness,
and
creation and conservation.)
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2042871.827432
Philosophers interested in medicine and healthcare research should focus on the choice of health concepts. Conceptual choice is akin to conceptual engineering but, in addition to assessing whether a concept suits an objective, or offering a better one, it evaluates objectives, ranks them, and discusses stakeholders’ entitlement. To show the importance of choosing health concepts, I summarize the internal debate in medicine, showcasing definitions, constructs, and scales. To argue it is a philosophical task, I analyze the medical controversy over health as adaptation and self-management. I conclude with a to-do list of conceptual choice tasks, generalizable beyond medicine.
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2042891.827439
Since Andrew Jameton first introduced the concept of moral distress, a growing theoretical literature has attempted to identify its distinctive features. This theoretical work has overlooked a central feature of morally distressing situations: disempowerment. My aim is to correct this neglect by arguing for a new test for theories of moral distress. I call this the disempowerment requirement: a theory of moral distress ought to accommodate the disempowerment of morally distressing situations. I argue for the disempowerment requirement and illustrate how to apply it by showing that recent responsibility-based theories of moral distress fail to pass the test.
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2047131.827445
I wrote these words about 20 years ago. They seem especially apt these days. Leaders have been known to inspire blind faith. Michels (1962: 93) refers to "the belief so frequent among the people that their leaders belong to a higher order of humanity than themselves" evidenced by "the tone of veneration in which the idol's name is pronounced, the perfect docility with which the least of his signs is obeyed, and the indignation which is aroused by any critical attack on his personality." …
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2244400.827452
Very short summary: This essay reflects on how the state and its bureaucratic machinery can shape social reality. The state is unique among human institutions for its performative power. This power is however not unlimited and its use can have adverse consequences. …
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2499525.827459
I’m on holidays this week, spending some time in Cracow (Poland) and Slovakia. Today’s post is a bit off-topic compared to what I’m used to publish here, but still I hope you will enjoy it! If not the case already, do not hesitate to subscribe to receive for free essays on economics, philosophy, and liberal politics in your mailbox! …
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2560188.827465
Every week, I tell myself I won’t do yet another post about the asteroid striking American academia, and then every week events force my hand otherwise. No one on earth—certainly no one who reads this blog—could call me blasé about the issue of antisemitism at US universities. …
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2565933.827472
Standardized testing is glorious, but many standardized tests royally suck. The worst prominent test is almost surely the Graduate Record Exam (GRE). About 9% of test-takers get a perfect score of 170 on the Quantitative part of the exam. …
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2654656.827478
A friend and I were discussing whether there’s anything I could possibly say, on this blog, in 2025, that wouldn’t provoke an outraged reaction from my commenters. So I started jotting down ideas. Let’s see how I did. …
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3000154.827485
Bet On It reader Ian Fillmore recently sent me a very insightful email on natalism, which I encouraged him to expand upon. In fact, I’ll put it squarely in the obvious-once-you-think-about-it category. …
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3018509.827491
In a recent essay, I explained that the right to exit is often given great importance in liberal thought. In some cases, it is almost as if nothing else matters than the guarantee that individuals can —in principle or effectively— exit a group, a community, or a society. …
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3062952.827498
Karl Marx rejected the ideal of equality as bourgeois. And yet, the most significant attempt in recent years to distinguish socialist theory from liberal egalitarian theory, G.A. Cohen's critique of John Rawls, relies almost entirely on an egalitarian principle. Although Cohen’s critique often seems to have a great deal of intuitive force, a number of Rawls’ defenders have argued, quite convincingly, that Cohen’s critique is unsuccessful. For those of us attracted to broadly socialist ideals, there does seem to be something importantly right about Cohen’s criticisms of Rawls, and more substantively, something deeply problematic in the kinds of market-based leveraging of productive abilities that would be permitted in a fully just Rawlsian society. My diagnosis is that Cohen has the right target, but the wrong fundamental value. I develop an alternative to these liberal egalitarian approaches in contemporary socialist ethics, building on the famous slogan: ‘from each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs.’ This alternative ideal of Caring Solidarity draws on rich socialist, Christian, and feminist traditions, and emphasizes the importance of care, recognition, and solidarity in political and economic organisation. This alternative approach leaves a certain amount of inequality legitimately in place, whilst providing a moral framework for a radical reorganisation of production.