1. 32621.062751
    Quantum entanglement is a physical resource, like energy, associated with the peculiar nonclassical correlations that are possible between separated quantum systems. Entanglement can be measured, transformed, and purified. A pair of quantum systems in an entangled state can be used as a quantum information channel to perform computational and cryptographic tasks that are impossible for classical systems. The general study of the information-processing capabilities of quantum systems is the subject of quantum information theory.
    Found 9 hours, 3 minutes ago on Wes Morriston's site
  2. 44279.062834
    It is common to claim that: The fact that everything is F is partially grounded in the fact that a1 is F and in the fact that a2 is F and so on, for all the objects ai in the world. But this can’t be right if partial grounds are parts of full grounds. …
    Found 12 hours, 17 minutes ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  3. 56741.062876
    It is tempting to conflate what is worth desiring with what is worth pursuing. But there seem to be cases where things are worth desiring but not worth pursuing: Having a surprising good happen to you completely gratuitously—i.e., without your having done anything to invite it—seems worth desiring but the pursuit of it doesn’t seem to make sense. …
    Found 15 hours, 45 minutes ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  4. 98171.062921
    R.A. Fisher: February 17, 1890 – July 29, 1962 Continuing with posts in recognition of R.A. Fisher’s birthday, I post one from a few years ago on a topic that had previously not been discussed on this blog: Fisher’s fiducial probability. …
    Found 1 day, 3 hours ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  5. 142275.062966
    I develop an account of naturalness (that is, approximately: lack of extreme fine-tuning) in physics which demonstrates that naturalness assumptions are not restricted to narrow cases in high-energy physics but are a ubiquitous part of inter-level relations are derived in physics. After exploring how and to what extent we might justify such assumptions on methodological grounds or through appeal to speculative future physics, I consider the apparent failure of naturalness in cosmology and in the Standard Model. I argue that any such naturalness failure threatens to undermine the entire structure of our understanding of inter-theoretic reduction, and so risks a much larger crisis in physics than is sometimes suggested; I briefly review some currently-popular strategies that might avoid that crisis.
    Found 1 day, 15 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  6. 142298.063002
    The thermal time hypothesis (TTH) is a proposed solution to the problem of time: a coarse-grained, statistical state determines a thermal dynamics according to which it is in equilibrium, and this dynamics is identified as the flow of physical time in generally covariant quantum theories. This paper raises a series of objections to the TTH as developed by Connes and Rovelli (1994). Two technical challenges concern the relationship between thermal time and proper time conjectured by the TTH and the implementation of the TTH in the classical limit. Three conceptual problems concern the flow of time in non-equilibrium states and the extent to which the TTH is background independent and gauge-invariant. While there are potentially viable strategies for addressing the two technical challenges, the three conceptual problems present a tougher hurdle for the defender of the TTH.
    Found 1 day, 15 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  7. 142312.063038
    Bayesian inference is limited in scope because it cannot be applied in idealized contexts where none of the hypotheses under consideration is true and because it is committed to always using the likelihood as a measure of evidential favoring, even when that is inappropriate. The purpose of this paper is to study inductive inference in a very general setting where finding the truth is not necessarily the goal and where the measure of evidential favoring is not necessarily the likelihood. I use an accuracy argument to argue for probabilism and I develop a new kind of argument to argue for two general updating rules, both of which are reasonable in different contexts. One of the updating rules has standard Bayesian updating, Bissiri et al.’s (2016) general Bayesian updating, and Vassend’s (2019a) quasi-Bayesian updating as special cases. The other updating rule is novel.
    Found 1 day, 15 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  8. 149038.063081
    Ned was nice enough to point out that the proofs of his response to us are available online. I want to thank him for his engagement but there is a lot I don’t agree with. I want to say something about each section but first I wanted to address his claim that the argument from Inattention Inflation is question begging. …
    Found 1 day, 17 hours ago on Richard Brown's blog
  9. 151782.063123
    Relativism and absolutism in deontic logic Posted on Thursday, 21 Feb 2019 Consider a world where eating doughnuts is illegal and where everyone thinks it is OK to torture animals for fun. Suppose Norman at w is eating doughnuts while torturing his pet kittens. …
    Found 1 day, 18 hours ago on wo's weblog
  10. 205620.063156
    The concepts of mental disorder, or illness, are ascribed to deviations from normal thoughts, reasoning, feelings, attitudes, and actions that are by their subjects, or by others, considered socially or personally dysfunctional and apt for treatment. Schizophrenia, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, substance abuse, and mania are examples. The concept of mental disorder or illness plays a role in many domains, including medicine, social sciences such as psychology and anthropology, and the humanities, including literature and philosophy. Philosophical discussions are the primary focus of the present entry, which differs from the entry on Philosophy of Psychiatry in noting several different approaches—not only those of the philosophy of science and mind, but also those arising from phenomenological and social theory traditions.
    Found 2 days, 9 hours ago on Wes Morriston's site
  11. 229612.063186
    I am finding myself frustrated trying to figure out whether the fundamental bearers of aesthetic properties are mental states or things out in the world. When I think about the fact that there does not seem to be any significant difference between the beauty of music that one actually listens to with one’s ears versus “music” that is directly piped to the auditory center of the brain, that makes me think that the fundamental bearers of aesthetic properties are mental states. …
    Found 2 days, 15 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  12. 294730.063217
    I’m talking about carbon dioxide scrubbers. This post will just be an extended quote from an excellent book, which is free online: • David McKay, Sustainable Energy: Without the Hot Air. It will help us begin to understand the economics. …
    Found 3 days, 9 hours ago on Azimuth
  13. 303745.063248
    This paper discusses the relevance of supertask computation for the determinacy of arithmetic. Recent work in the philosophy of physics has made plausible the possibility of supertask computers, capable of running through infinitely many individual computations in a finite time. A natural thought is that, if true, this implies that arithmetical truth is determinate (at least for e.g. sentences saying that every number has a certain decidable property). In this paper we argue, via a careful analysis of putative arguments from supertask computations to determinacy, that this natural thought is mistaken: supertasks are of no help in explaining arithmetical determinacy.
    Found 3 days, 12 hours ago on Daniel Waxman's site
  14. 309512.063273
    Suppose we have a group of perfect Bayesian agents with the same evidence who nonetheless disagree. By definition of “perfect Bayesian agent”, the disagreement must be rooted in differences in priors between these peers. …
    Found 3 days, 13 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  15. 315197.0633
    Gao (2017) presents a new mentalistic reformulation of the well-known measurement problem affecting the standard formulation of quantum mechanics. According to this author, it is essentially a determinate-experience problem, namely a problem about the compatibility between the linearity of the Schrödinger’s equation, the fundamental law of quantum theory, and definite experiences perceived by conscious observers. In this essay I aim to clarify (i) that the well-known measurement problem is a mathematical consequence of quantum theory’s formalism, and that (ii) its mentalistic variant does not grasp the relevant causes which are responsible for this puzzling issue. The first part of this paper will be concluded claiming that the “physical” formulation of the measurement problem cannot be reduced to its mentalistic version. In the second part of this work it will be shown that, contrary to the case of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and GRW theories provide clear explanations of the physical processes responsible for the definite localization of macroscopic objects and, consequently, for well-defined perceptions of measurement outcomes by conscious observers. More precisely, the macro-objectification of states of experimental devices is obtained exclusively in virtue of their clear ontologies and dynamical laws without any intervention of human observers. Hence, it will be argued that in these theoretical frameworks the measurement problem and the determinate-experience problem are logically distinct issues.
    Found 3 days, 15 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  16. 351614.063328
    I continue a week of Fisherian posts begun on his birthday (Feb 17). This is his contribution to the “Triad”–an exchange between  Fisher, Neyman and Pearson 20 years after the Fisher-Neyman break-up. The other two are below. …
    Found 4 days, 1 hour ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  17. 372887.063383
    Biological market theory has in recent years become an important part of the social evolutionist’s toolkit. This article discusses the explanatory potential and pitfalls of biological market theory in the context of big picture accounts of the evolution of human cooperation and morality. I begin by assessing an influential account that presents biological market dynamics as a key driver of the evolution of fairness norms in humans. I argue that this account is problematic for theoretical, empirical, and conceptual reasons. After mapping the evidential and explanatory limits of biological market theory, I suggest that it can nevertheless fill a lacuna in an alternative account of hominin evolution. Trade on a biological marketplace can help explain why norm-based cooperation did not break down when our late-Pleistocene ancestors entered new, challenging social and economic environments.
    Found 4 days, 7 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  18. 372924.06342
    De Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjective school of probability. He held that probabilities are subjective, coherent degrees of expectation, and he argued that none of the objective interpretations of probability make sense. While his theory has been influential in science and philosophy, it has encountered various objections. I argue that these objections overlook central aspects of de Finetti’s philosophy of probability and are largely unfounded. I propose a new interpretation of de Finetti’s theory that highlights these aspects and explains how they are an integral part of de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability. I conclude by drawing an analogy between misconceptions about de Finetti’s philosophy of probability and common misconceptions about instrumentalism.
    Found 4 days, 7 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  19. 384737.063455
    Commenting on my 'Right Wrong-Makers' draft, Doug Portmore suggested to me that (i) virtuous agents should care about what ultimately matters, and (ii) this is not the same as any feature of actions, and so in particular isn't the same thing as an action's right- (or wrong-)making features. …
    Found 4 days, 10 hours ago on Philosophy, et cetera
  20. 417154.063491
    One avenue for questioning theories that posit moral facts is to argue that we lack the ability to know those facts. If it could be shown that the assumptions the theories involve, for example about the nature of moral facts, leave no room for moral knowledge then that is commonly seen as a reductio. This line of reasoning helps explain why moral diversity is given such a central role in meta-ethics, since the extensive disagreement that occurs over moral issues is often taken to reinforce the worries about our ability to know moral truths even assuming that they exist.
    Found 4 days, 19 hours ago on PhilPapers
  21. 446843.063521
    . As part of the week of posts on R.A.Fisher (February 17, 1890 – July 29, 1962), I reblog a guest post by Stephen Senn from 2012, and 2017. See especially the comments from Feb 2017. ‘Fisher’s alternative to the alternative’ By: Stephen Senn [2012 marked] the 50th anniversary of RA Fisher’s death. …
    Found 5 days, 4 hours ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  22. 531952.063551
    17 February 1890–29 July 1962 Today is R.A. Fisher’s birthday. I will post some Fisherian items this week in honor of it*. This paper comes just before the conflicts with Neyman and Pearson erupted. Fisher links his tests and sufficiency, to the Neyman and Pearson lemma in terms of power. …
    Found 6 days, 3 hours ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  23. 544748.063581
    This article describes some recent work on ‘direct air capture’ of carbon dioxide—essentially, sucking it out of the air: • Jon Gerntner, The tiny Swiss company that thinks it can help stop climate change, New York Times Magazine, 12 February 2019. …
    Found 6 days, 7 hours ago on Azimuth
  24. 597430.063607
    A key gizmo in Gibbard’s formal model of normative judgment is the thing he used to call a “complete system of norms” (Gibbard [1986, 1990]), and which, by around Gibbard [2003], evolved into the hyperplan. In this paper I want to ask what hyperplans are, and ask how best to use them in modeling normative thinking. One part of this paper is exegetical. There is perhaps less than universal agreement in the literature on how Gibbard’s systematizing with hyperplans works exactly. I offer a take. The other part is exploratory. I think there is a way of theorizing with hyperplans that is not quite Gibbard’s way, but which is also expressivistic, and which is worth looking at. I have tried to say so in Yalcin [2012, ], but here I offer a more focused development. I will call (my take on) Gibbard’s package of views about how to model with hyperplans Plan A. I spend the first section of the paper setting Plan A out. The alternative I will set out, Plan B, is the topic of the sections after that. Even if you don’t leave the paper preferring Plan B to Plan A, I hope you’ll find the contrast clarifying. In separating these two ways of theorizing with hyperplans, really I’m trying bring out two rather different ways of conceptualizing expressivism.
    Found 6 days, 21 hours ago on Seth Yalcin's site
  25. 648437.063636
    This paper is an attempt to articulate and defend a new imperative, Auschwitz survivor Charlotte Delbo’s Il faut donner à voir: “They must be made to see.” Assuming the ‘they’ in Delbo’s imperative is ‘us’ gives rise to three questions: (1) what must we see? (2) can we see it? and (3) why is it that we must? I maintain that what we must see is the reality of evil; that we are by and large unwilling, and often unable, to see the reality of evil; and that if there is to be comprehension of—to say nothing of justice for—the survivors of evil, we nonetheless must.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  26. 648557.063661
    Consider the following three claims. (i) There are no truths of the form ‘p and ~p’. (ii) No one holds a belief of the form ‘p and ~p’. (iii) No one holds any pairs of beliefs of the form {p, ~p}. Irad Kimhi has recently argued, in effect, that each of these claims holds and holds with metaphysical necessity. Furthermore, he maintains that they are ultimately not distinct claims at all, but the same claim formulated in different ways. I find his argument suggestive, if not entirely transparent. I do think there is at least an important kernel of truth even in (iii), and that (i) ultimately explains what’s right about the other two. Consciousness of an impossibility makes belief in the obtaining of the corresponding state of affairs an impossibility. Interestingly, an appreciation of this fact brings into view a novel conception of inference, according to which it consists in the consciousness of necessity. This essay outlines and defends this position. A central element of the defense is that it reveals how reasoners satisfy what Paul Boghossian the Taking Condition and do so without engendering regress.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  27. 648657.063686
    Is it appropriate to honour artists who have created great works but who have also acted immorally? In this paper, after arguing that honouring involves picking out a person as someone we ought to admire, we present three moral reasons against honouring immoral artists. First, we argue that honouring can serve to condone their behaviour, through the mediums of emotional prioritization and exemplar identification. Second, we argue that honouring immoral artists can generate undue epistemic credibility for the artists, which can lead to an indirect form of testimonial injustice for the artists’ victims. Third, we argue, building on the first two reasons, that honouring immoral artists can also serve to silence their victims. We end by considering how we might respond to these reasons.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  28. 662149.06371
    Aristotelian natural law approaches provide an attractive middle road between objectivist and subjectivist answers to various normative questions: the answers to the questions are relative to the kind of entity that they concern, but not to the particular particular entity. …
    Found 1 week ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  29. 662151.063737
    Problem: It seems that if God necessarily exists, then the moral automatically supervenes on the non-moral. For, any two worlds that differ in moral facts also differ in what God believes about moral facts, and presumably belief facts are non-moral. …
    Found 1 week ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  30. 666655.063763
    The logical analysis of agency and games—for an expository introduction to the field see van der Hoek and Pauly’s overview paper 2007—has boomed in the last two decades giving rise to a plethora of different logics in particular within the multi-agent systems field. At the heart of these logics are always representations of the possible choices (or actions) of groups of players (or agents) and their powers to force specific outcomes of the game. Some logics take the former as primitives, like STIT (the logic of seeing to it that, [Bel-nap et al., 2001; Horty, 2001]), some take the latter like CL (coalition logic, [Pauly, 2002; Goranko et al., 2013]) and ATL (alternating-time temporal logic, [Alur et al., 2002]). In these formalisms the power of players is modeled in terms of the notion of effectivity. In a strategic game, the α-effectivity of a group of players consists of those sets of outcomes of the game for which the players have some collective action which forces the outcome of the game to end up in that set, no matter what the other players do [Moulin and Peleg, 1982]. So, if a set of outcomes X belongs to the α-effectivity of a set of players J , there exists an individual action for each agent in J such that, for all actions of the other players, the outcome of the game will be contained in X. If we keep the actions of the other agents fixed, then the selection of an individual action for each agent in J corresponds to a choice of J under the assumption that the other agents stick to their choices.
    Found 1 week ago on Davide Grossi's site