1. 30398.813161
    In his recent book The Value Gap (2021), Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen defends a pluralist view of final goodness and goodness-for, according to which neither concept is analysable in terms of the other. In this paper I defend a specific version of monism, namely so-called ‘Mooreanism’, according to which goodness-for is analysable partly in terms of final goodness. Rønnow-Rasmussen offers three purported counterexamples to Mooreanism. I argue that Mooreanism can accommodate two of them. The third is more problematic, but this is in the end not a decisive objection.
    Found 8 hours, 26 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  2. 30431.81334
    According to David Chalmers, the virtual entities found in Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) environments instantiate virtual properties of a specific kind. It has recently been objected that such a view (i) can’t extend to all types of properties; (ii) leads to a proliferation of property-types; (iii) implausibly ascribes massive errors to VR and AR users; and (iv) faces an analogue of Jackson’s “many-property problem”. My first objective here is to show that advocates of virtual properties can deal with each of these objections. The other goal of this paper is to examine the consequences of Chalmers’ theory in the particular case of AR. If we countenance virtual properties, AR highlights that non-virtual objects can possess both non-virtual and virtual properties. With AR, it also appears that a same non-virtual object can have different and even incompatible properties across augmented environments. Lastly, considering properties in light of AR highlights the risk of an “augmented solipsism”, and calls forth interesting questions about the persistence conditions of non-virtual objects in AR environments.
    Found 8 hours, 27 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  3. 40262.813364
    How one met someone can significantly affect the shape of one’s relationship with them for years to come. Therefore, we can imagine that what reasons convinced one to believe in God can significantly affect the shape of one’s relationship with God. …
    Found 11 hours, 11 minutes ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  4. 40263.813382
    I wrote 300 issues of a column called This Week’s Finds, where I explained math and physics. In the fall of 2022 I gave ten talks based on these columns. I just finished giving eight more! Now I’m done. …
    Found 11 hours, 11 minutes ago on Azimuth
  5. 88207.813399
    The Border Between Seeing and Thinking is an extraordinary achievement, the result of careful attention (and contribution) to both the science and philosophy of perception. The book offers some bold hypotheses. While the hypotheses themselves are worth the price of entry, Block’s sustained defense of them grants the reader insight into countless fascinating experimental results and philosophical concepts. His unpretentious and accommodating exposition of the science—explaining rather than asserting, digging into specific results in detail rather than making summary judgments and demanding that readers take him at his word—is a model of how philosophers ought to engage with empirical evidence. It is simply not possible to read this book without learning something. It will surely play a foundational role in theoretical work on perception for many years to come.
    Found 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  6. 88228.813415
    This paper explores the relationship between the questioning attitude of wondering and a class of attitudes I call epistemic desires. Broadly, these are desires to improve one’s epistemic position on some question. A common example is the attitude of wanting to know the answer to some question. I argue that one can have any kind of epistemic desire towards any question, Q, without necessarily wondering Q, but not conversely. That is, one cannot wonder Q without having at least some epistemic desire directed towards Q. I defend this latter claim from apparent counterexamples due to Friedman (2013) and Drucker (2022), and finish with a proposal on which epistemic desires, particularly the desire for understanding, play an explanatory role in distinguishing wondering from other forms of question-directed thought.
    Found 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  7. 88253.813429
    An influential objection to the epistemic power of the imagination holds that it is uninformative. You cannot get more out of the imagination than you put into it, and therefore learning from the imagination is impossible. This paper argues, against this view, that the imagination is robustly informative. Moreover, it defends a novel account of how the imagination informs, according to which the imagination is informative in virtue of its analog representational format. The core idea is that analog representations represent relations ‘for free,’ and this explains how the imagination can contain more information than is put into it. This account makes important contributions to both philosophy of mind, by showing how the imagination can generate new content that is not represented by a subject’s antecedent mental states, and epistemology, by showing how the imagination can generate new justification that is not conferred by a subject’s antecedent evidence.
    Found 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  8. 91073.813442
    The majority of mammalian genome is transcribed to RNA transcripts, of which only a very small percentage code for proteins . As a result, thousands of RNAs that do not code for proteins are produced in cells, including microRNAs (miRNAs) and long noncoding RNAs (lncRNAs). These noncoding RNAs exert regulatory functions in various physiological and pathological conditions . In addition, numerous noncoding RNAs are expressed in a tissue- and cell-specific manner . Thus, a reporter that faithfully reflects the expression or activity of noncoding regulators of noncoding RNAs, but also for tracking cell fate and disease status. Previously we have designed a miRNA inducible CRISPR-Cas9 platform that can serve as a sensor for miRNA activities . However, designing a reporter for long noncoding RNAs has not been easy due to its untranslatable nature and low expression level. Here, we design an sgRNA precursor in an intron (GRIT) strategy that can monitor the promoter activity of lncRNAs (Fig. 1a). Furthermore, we show that GRIT can be used to track differentiation status of stem cells.
    Found 1 day, 1 hour ago on Wendy S. Parker's site
  9. 91094.813455
    We find, much to our surprise, that the percentage of mutation or duplication related to the early-onset Alzheimer’s disease (EOAD, the well-established hereditary disease) reported in the World Alzheimer’s Disease Report 2021 seems to fit a certain pattern. According to the report, PSEN1 mutation accounts for the majority of EOAD gene mutations (43%), frequency of APP mutation represents 16%, and those of PSEN2 and APOE4 mutations are 6% and 9.12%, respectively, with an average of 7.56%. The next level is the rare mutations in genes TREM2, SORLI , ABCA7 accounting for 1.17%, 1.42%, 1.33%, respectively1–3, with an average of 1.31%.
    Found 1 day, 1 hour ago on Wendy S. Parker's site
  10. 93543.813467
    In recent decades, Bayesian modeling has achieved extraordinary success within perceptual psychology (Knill and Richards, 1996; Rescorla, 2015; Rescorla, 2020a; Rescorla, 2021). Bayesian models posit that the perceptual system assigns subjective probabilities (or credences) to hypotheses regarding distal conditions (e.g. hypotheses regarding possible shapes, sizes, colors, or speeds of perceived objects). The perceptual system deploys its subjective probabilities to estimate distal conditions based upon proximal sensory input (e.g. retinal stimulations). It does so through computations that are fast, automatic, subpersonal, and inaccessible to conscious introspection.
    Found 1 day, 1 hour ago on Michael Rescorla's site
  11. 93566.813489
    Kolmogorov conditionalization is a strategy for updating credences based on propositions that have initial probability 0. I explore the connection between Kolmogorov conditionalization and Dutch books. Previous discussions of the connection rely crucially upon a factivity assumption: they assume that the agent updates credences based on true propositions. The factivity assumption discounts cases of misplaced certainty, i.e. cases where the agent invests credence 1 in a falsehood. Yet misplaced certainty arises routinely in scientific and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory. I prove a non-factive Dutch book theorem and converse Dutch book theorem for Kolmogorov conditionalization. The theorems do not rely upon the factivity assumption, so they establish that Kolmogorov conditionalization has unique pragmatic virtues that persist even in cases of misplaced certainty.
    Found 1 day, 1 hour ago on Michael Rescorla's site
  12. 93595.813505
    When P(E) > 0, conditional probabilities P(H | E) are given by the ratio formula. An agent engages in ratio conditionalization when she updates her credences using conditional probabilities dictated by the ratio formula. Ratio conditionalization cannot eradicate certainties, including certainties gained through prior exercises of ratio conditionalization. An agent who updates her credences only through ratio conditionalization risks permanent certainty in propositions against which she has overwhelming evidence. To avoid this undesirable consequence, I argue that we should supplement ratio conditionalization with Kolmogorov conditionalization, a strategy for updating credences based on propositions E such that P(E) = 0. Kolmogorov conditionalization can eradicate certainties, including certainties gained through prior exercises of conditionalization. Adducing general theorems and detailed examples, I show that Kolmogorov conditionalization helps us model epistemic defeat across a wide range of circumstances.
    Found 1 day, 1 hour ago on Michael Rescorla's site
  13. 105433.81352
    Two approaches have emerged to resolve discrepancies between predictions and observations at galactic and cosmological scales: introducing dark matter or modifying the laws of gravity. Practitioners of each approach claim to better satisfy a different explanatory ideal, either unification or simplicity. In this chapter, we take a closer look at the ideals and at the successes of these approaches in achieving them. Not only are these ideals less divisive than assumed, but moreover we argue that the approaches are focusing on different aspects of the same ideal. This realisation opens up the possibility of a more fruitful trading zone between dark matter and modified gravity communities.
    Found 1 day, 5 hours ago on Martin King's site
  14. 114936.813535
    I favor a "superficialist" approach to belief (see here and here). "Belief" is best conceptualized not in terms of deep cognitive structure (e.g., stored sentences in the language of thought) but rather in terms of how a person would tend to act and react under various hypothetical conditions -- their overall "dispositional profile". …
    Found 1 day, 7 hours ago on The Splintered Mind
  15. 114936.813551
    In the case of certain kinds of transformational experiences—such as meeting the love of your life—you have the realization that this is something you really needed for flourishing, but didn’t know it. …
    Found 1 day, 7 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  16. 152105.813567
    According to one prominent critique of mainstream epistemology, discoveries about what it takes to know or justifiedly believe that p can’t provide the right kind of intellectual guidance. As Mark Webb puts it, “the kinds of principles that are developed in this tradition are of no use in helping people in their ordinary epistemic practices.” In this paper I defend a certain form of traditional epistemology against this “regulative” critique. Traditional epistemology can provide—and, indeed, can be essential for—intellectual guidance. The reason is that, in many cases, how you should proceed intellectually depends on what you already know or justifiedly believe: how you should treat counterevidence to your beliefs, for example, can depend on whether those beliefs count as knowledge. Therefore, to get guidance on how to proceed intellectually, it will often be essential to be able to figure out what you know or justifiedly believe. And to do that it will often be helpful to try to figure out what it takes to count as knowledge or justified belief in the first place. To do this is precisely to engage in mainstream epistemology.
    Found 1 day, 18 hours ago on Jeremy Fantl's site
  17. 152128.813582
    We argue that knowledge doesn‘t require any of truth, justification, or belief. This is so for four primary reasons. First, each of the three conditions has been subject to convincing counterexamples. In addition, the resultant account explains the value of knowledge, manifests important theoretical virtues (in particular, simplicity), and avoids commitment to skepticism.
    Found 1 day, 18 hours ago on Jeremy Fantl's site
  18. 189556.813599
    In working on a post for tomorrow on whether Large Language Models like GPT-4 and Bard-2 have beliefs, I asked GPT-4 what I thought would be a not-too-hard question about chemistry: "What element is two to the right of manganese on the periodic table?" …
    Found 2 days, 4 hours ago on The Splintered Mind
  19. 202227.813615
    In a recent post I argued that in Aristotelian substantial change, given special relativity, the resultant substance starts as basically a point—it is arbitrarily small. I think the argument doesn’t actually require much in the way of Aristotelian assumptions, but works for any caused extended substance, or at least any ordinary one. …
    Found 2 days, 8 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  20. 203689.813629
    We plead for a fluid margin, or mixed/indeterminate buffer zone, between Physical and Non-Physical Causal Closures, and for a Neutrosophic Causal Closure Principle claiming that the chances of all physical effects are determined by their prior partially physical and partially non-physical causes.
    Found 2 days, 8 hours ago on PhilPapers
  21. 203730.813643
    An influential version of the Consequence argument, the most famous argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism, goes as follows: For an agent to be able to do otherwise, there has to be a possible world with the same laws and the same past as her actual world in which she does otherwise. However, if the actual world is deterministic, there is no such world. Hence, no agent in a deterministic world can ever do otherwise. In this paper, I discuss a recent version of this argument due to Christopher Franklin: the ‘No Opportunity argument’. I argue that the No Opportunity argument overgeneralizes. If its premises were true, things would be obstacles to doing otherwise that have nothing to do with determinism and that intuitively are not obstacles.
    Found 2 days, 8 hours ago on PhilPapers
  22. 203751.813656
    According to the Desiderative Lockean Thesis, there are necessary and sufficient conditions, stated in the terms of decision theory, for when one is truly said to want. I advance a new Desiderative Lockean view. My view is distinctive in being doubly context-sensitive. What a person is truly said to want varies by context, a fact that others attempt to capture by positing a single context-sensitive parameter to evaluate want ascriptions; I posit two. Only with a doubly context-sensitive view can we explain a range of facts that go unexplained by all other Desiderative Lockean views.
    Found 2 days, 8 hours ago on PhilPapers
  23. 214084.813669
    Imagine that we are on a train playing with some mechanical systems. Why can’t we detect any differences in their behavior when the train is parked versus when it is moving uniformly? The standard answer is that boosts are symmetries of Newtonian systems. In this paper, I use the case of a spring to argue that this answer is problematic because symmetries are neither sufficient nor necessary for preserving its behavior. I also develop a new answer according to which boosts preserve the relational properties on which the behavior of a system depends, even when they are not symmetries.
    Found 2 days, 11 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  24. 261418.813684
    In this paper, I’ll carry on with this philosophical fad. Specifically, I’ll examine some arguments for and against the thesis that composite, extended beings are ultimately composed of monads – simple, unextended substances. The arguments in its favor are those given by Christian Wolff and Emilie Du Châtelet. The arguments against it will be the one given by Euler. I’ll conclude with a possible way forward: The difference between Euler on the one hand and Du Châtelet and Wolff on the other does not lie in their acceptance or denial of a general explicability principle (in other words, of the principle of sufficient reason). Instead, it lies in their endorsement of subsidiary principles. Du Châtelet relies on an explicability principle in which an object’s having a property is not fully explained by citing another object with that same property. Euler rejects this in favor of his own explicability principle: An object’s being extended must always have, as its explanation, an object which is extended. I’ll conclude by arguing that the difference between the two also turns on epistemological differences. First, Euler seems to accord the imagination higher epistemic value than Du Châtelet; and second, he seems to demand explanations not only state that something is the case but how something is the case.
    Found 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  25. 261440.813698
    According to First-Person Realism, one's own first-person perspective on the world is metaphysically privileged in some way. After clarifying First-Person Realism by reference to parallel debates in the metaphysics of modality and time, I survey eight different arguments in favor of First-Person Realism.
    Found 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  26. 261464.813711
    There are two ways to characterize symmetric relations. One is intensional: necessarily, Rxy iff Ryx. In some discussions of relations, however, what is important is whether or not a relation gives rise to the same completion of a given type (fact, state of affairs, or proposition) for each of its possible applications to some fixed relata. Kit Fine calls relations that do ‘strictly symmetric’. Is there is a difference between the notions of necessary and strict symmetry that would prevent them from being used interchangeably in such discussions? I show that there is. While the notions coincide assuming an intensional account of relations and their completions, according to which relations/completions are identical if they are necessarily coinstantiated/equivalent, they come apart assuming a hyperintensional account, which individuates relations and completions more finely on the basis of relations’ real definitions. I establish this by identifying two definable relations, each of which is necessarily symmetric but nonetheless results in distinct facts when it applies to the same objects in opposite orders. In each case, I argue that these facts are distinct because they have different grounds.
    Found 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  27. 261487.813725
    Inspired by the early Wittgenstein’s concept of nonsense (meaning that which lies beyond the limits of language), we define two different, yet complementary, types of nonsense: formal nonsense and pragmatic nonsense. The simpler notion of formal nonsense is initially defined within Tarski’s semantic theory of truth; the notion of pragmatic nonsense, by its turn, is formulated within the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, also known as quasi-truth, as formalized by da Costa and his collaborators. While an expression will be considered formally nonsensical if the formal criteria required for the assignment of any truth-value (whether true, false, pragmatically true, or pragmatically false) to such sentence are not met, a (well-formed) formula will be considered pragmatically nonsensical if the pragmatic criteria (inscribed within the context of scientific practice) required for the assignment of any truth-value to such sentence are not met. Thus, in the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, any (well-formed) formula of a formal language interpreted on a simple pragmatic structure will be considered pragmatically nonsensical if the set of primary sentences of such structure is not well-built, that is, if it does not include the relevant observational data and/or theoretical results, or if it does include sentences that are inconsistent with such data.
    Found 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  28. 266724.813738
    It has been argued that moral assertions involve the possession, on the part of the speaker, of appropriate non-cognitive attitudes. Thus, uttering ‘murder is wrong’ invites an inference that the speaker disapproves of murder. In this paper, we present the result of 4 empirical studies concerning this phenomenon. We assess the acceptability of constructions in which that inference is explicitly canceled, such as ‘murder is wrong but I don’t disapprove of it’; and we compare them to similar constructions involving ‘think’ instead of ‘disapprove’—that is, Moore paradoxes (‘murder is wrong but I don’t think that it is wrong’). Our results indicate that the former type of constructions are largely infelicitous, although not as infelicitous as their Moorean counterparts.
    Found 3 days, 2 hours ago on Ergo
  29. 266749.813752
    In The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard argues for what can be called “The Universality of Humanity Claim” (UHC), according to which valuing humanity in one’s own person entails valuing it in that of others. However, Korsgaard’s reliance on the claim that reasons are essentially public in her attempt to demonstrate the truth of UHC has been repeatedly criticized. I offer a sentimentalist defense, based on Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, of a qualified, albeit adequate, version of UHC. In particular, valuing my humanity, understood as (my awareness of) my perspective and the reasons determined from within it, entails valuing your humanity, understood as (your awareness of) your perspective and the reasons determined from within it. Given Korsgaard’s emphasis on the publicity of reasons in her argument for UHC, I also discuss the role of reasons in my account. I argue that the relative weights of at least some of an agent’s reasons are determined from within a shared evaluative point of view, namely, the standpoint of what Smith calls “the impartial spectator.” These reasons have normative authority over and constrain the agent’s private reasons, that is, those that are determined from within her own particular evaluative point of view.
    Found 3 days, 2 hours ago on Ergo
  30. 266806.813767
    In this paper, we do two things: first, we offer a metaphysical account of what it is to be an individual person through Hegel’s understanding of the concrete universal; and second, we show how this account of an individual can help in thinking about love. The aim is to show that Hegel’s distinctive account of individuality and universality can do justice to two intuitions about love which appear to be in tension: on the one hand, that love can involve a response to properties that an individual possesses; but on the other hand, what it is to love someone is not just to love their properties, but to love them as the distinct individual they are. We claim that Hegel’s conception of the relation between individuals and their properties, which relies on his account of the concrete universal, can resolve this tension and make sense of this aspect of love.
    Found 3 days, 2 hours ago on Ergo