1. 3028.253453
    Michael Weiss and I have been carrying on a dialog on nonstandard models of arithmetic, and after a long break we’re continuing, here: • Michael Weiss and John Baez, Non-standard models of arithmetic (Part 18). …
    Found 50 minutes ago on Azimuth
  2. 10628.253624
    I argue that uniquely human forms of ‘Theory of Mind’ (or ‘ToM’) are a product of cultural evolution. Specifically, propositional attitude psychology is a linguistically constructed folk model of the human mind, invented by our ancestors for a range of tasks and refined over successive generations of users. The construction of these folk models gave humans new tools for thinking and reasoning about mental states—and so imbued us with abilities not shared by non-linguistic species. I also argue that uniquely human forms of ToM are not required for language development, such that an account of the cultural origins of ToM does not jeopardise the explanation of language development. Finally, I sketch a historical model of the cultural evolution of mental state talk.
    Found 2 hours, 57 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  3. 24281.25367
    In this paper, we aim at rethinking the concept of obesity in a way that better captures the connection between underlying medical aspects, on the one hand, and an individual’s developmental history, on the other. Our proposal rests on the idea that obesity is not to be understood as a phenotypic trait or character; rather, obesity represents one of the many possible states of a more complex phenotypic trait that we call ‘energy metabolism.’ We argue that this apparently simple conceptual shift can help solve important theoretical misconceptions regarding the genetics, epigenetics, and development of obesity. In addition, we show that our proposal can be fruitfully paired with the concept of developmental channeling of a trait, which connects to the study of the plasticity and canalization of complex traits. Finally, we discuss the potential impact of our approach on the assessment, treatment, and social narratives of obesity.
    Found 6 hours, 44 minutes ago on Andrea Borghini's site
  4. 37198.253709
    I think that our best physicalist view right now is a functionalism on which mental states are identified with types of computation in a hardware-agnostic way (i.e., whatever the hardware is, as long as the same type of computation is done, the mental states get tokened). …
    Found 10 hours, 19 minutes ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  5. 37199.253746
    This argument is logically valid: Science only explains intersubjective phenomena. Consciousness is subjective and not intersubjective. So, science doesn’t explain consciousness. The obvious thing to attack here is second conjunct in (2). …
    Found 10 hours, 19 minutes ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  6. 46263.25378
    Axiom weakening is a technique that allows for a fine-grained repair of inconsistent ontologies. Its main advantage is that it repairs ontologies by making axioms less restrictive rather than by deleting them, employing the use of refinement operators. In this paper, we build on previously introduced axiom weakening for ALC, and make it much more irresistible by extending its definitions to deal with SROIQ, the expressive and decidable description logic underlying OWL 2 DL. We extend the definitions of refinement operator to deal with SROIQ constructs, in particular with role hierarchies, cardinality constraints and nominals, and illustrate its application. Finally, we discuss the problem of termination of an iterated weakening procedure.
    Found 12 hours, 51 minutes ago on Nicolas Troquard's site
  7. 107469.253817
    In this paper, I provide a new argument in support of a concessive response to the Ravens Paradox. The argument I offer stems from Mark Schroeder’s Gricean explanation for why existential judgments about normative reasons for action are unreliable. In short, I argue that Schroeder’s work suggests that, in the case of the Ravens Paradox, people are running together the issue of what’s assertible (in an ordinary context) about evidence with what’s true about evidence. Once these issues are pulled apart, we have reason to think that the negative existential judgment about evidence that drives the Ravens Paradox is mistaken, and thus that there is in fact no paradox here at all.
    Found 1 day, 5 hours ago on David Plunkett's site
  8. 139359.253857
    This chapter critically discusses the significance of trust and its theoretical cognates – distrust, trustworthiness and distrustworthiness – in social epistemology. Special focus is given to the following issues: (i) knowledge on trust; (ii) the entitlement to expect to be presumed trustworthy; (iii) the normativity of trusting; and the role of defective trust and distrust in cases of (iv) epistemic injustice; and (v) the uptake and spread of conspiracy theories.
    Found 1 day, 14 hours ago on J. Adam Carter's site
  9. 146658.253905
    The finding that intuitions about the reference of proper names vary cross-culturally (Machery et al. Cognition 92: 1–12. 2004) was one of the early milestones in experimental philosophy. Many follow-up studies investigated the scope and magnitude of such cross-cultural effects, but our paper provides the first systematic meta-analysis of studies replicating (Machery et al. Cognition 92: 1–12. 2004). In the light of our results, we assess the existence and significance of cross-cultural effects for intuitions about the reference of proper names.
    Found 1 day, 16 hours ago on Matteo Colombo's site
  10. 174888.253944
    One can conceive the possibility of travelling into the past, avoiding the generation of logical contradictions such as the Grandfather Paradox and the like. In such scenarios, time is radically “split” into the “subjective” time of the timetraveller and the “objective” time of the rest of the universe. In fact this oversimplifies the matter. Think of worldlines (spacetime trajectories) of objects as being parametrized by objective time. Then the worldline of any conscious entity is already “split” into two components: the objective time associated with the objective temporal parameter, and the subjective temporal flow of the entity’s consciousness. In undertaking a journey into the past, the timetraveller’s world-line, formerly directed into the future along with the worldlines of the rest of the objects in the universe, becomes redirected into their past. Yet, supposing the timetraveller’s trip into the past not to be instantaneous, during its trip time will elapse for it in the usual way and will still be split into subjective and objective components. While the subjective component is simply a continuation of the subjective temporal flow of the timetraveller’s consciousness before embarking on its journey into the past, the nature of the objective temporal component is less clear. In travelling into the past, the timetraveller’s world- line has “deviated” from the bundle of worldlines of the rest of the objects in the universe which are still proceeding into their (supposed common) future. It follows that the objective temporal component of the timetraveller’s worldline while undergoing its journey must have a local nature: it is a feature of the timetraveller’s worldline which is not shared by the worldlines of the rest of the objects in the universe travelling into the common future. But, despite its locality, its objectivity is indisputable since, for example, during the trip the timetraveller’s body ages and its chronometer advances.
    Found 2 days ago on John Bell's site
  11. 184195.253983
    I offer an improved version of Bedau’s influential (1997) account of weak emergence in light of insights from information theory. Bedau analyzes weak emergence in terms of the non-derivability of a system’s macrostates from its microstates except by simulation. However, non-derivability alone does not guarantee that a system’s macrostates are weakly emergent. Rather, it is non-derivability plus the algorithmic compressibility of the system’s macrostates that makes them weakly emergent. I argue that the resulting information-theoretic picture provides a metaphysical account of weak emergence rather than a merely epistemic one.
    Found 2 days, 3 hours ago on PhilPapers
  12. 188170.254017
    On revisionist reporting Posted on Saturday, 19 Sep 2020 Friends of singular thought typically assume that in order to have a singular attitude towards an object, one must either stand in a special acquaintance relation to the object, or have a special kind of mental representation for it. …
    Found 2 days, 4 hours ago on wo's weblog
  13. 192139.254053
    It is often suggested that when opinions differ among individuals in a group, the opinions should be aggregated to form a compromise. This paper compares two approaches to aggregating opinions, linear pooling and what I call opinion agglomeration. In evaluating both strategies, I propose a pragmatic criterion, No Regrets, entailing that an aggregation strategy should prevent groups from buying and selling bets on events at prices regretted by their members. I show that only opinion agglomeration is able to satisfy the demand. I then proceed to give normative and empirical arguments in support of the pragmatic criterion for opinion aggregation, and that ultimately favor opinion agglomeration.
    Found 2 days, 5 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  14. 193897.254085
    Nina Holden won the 2021 Maryam Mirzakhani New Frontiers Prize for her work on random surfaces and the mathematics of quantum gravity. I’d like to tell you what she did… but I’m so far behind I’ll just explain a bit of the background. …
    Found 2 days, 5 hours ago on Azimuth
  15. 242190.254122
    The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate over the nature of scientific progress in philosophy of science by taking a quantitative, corpus-based approach. By employing the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, the following philosophical accounts of scientific progress are tested empirically: the semantic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of truth), the epistemic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of knowledge), and the noetic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of understanding). Overall, the results of this quantitative, corpus-based study lend some empirical support to the epistemic and the noetic accounts over the semantic account of scientific progress, for they suggest that practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ significantly more often than the term ‘truth’ when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works. But the results do not favor the epistemic account over the noetic account, or vice versa, for they reveal no significant differences between the frequency with which practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works.
    Found 2 days, 19 hours ago on PhilPapers
  16. 279880.25416
    The question of what emotions are is the most fundamental issue in the philosophy of emotion. In answering this question in different ways we get diverging theories of emotion. Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni have proposed a new theory, the attitudinal theory, which tells us what emotions are. Broadly, the view is that emotions are evaluative attitudes, such that different emotion types are distinct evaluative attitudes. More specifically, emotions are evaluative attitudes towards intentional contents provided by other mental states – their cognitive bases, such as judgements, imaginations, and perceptions. In contrast to Evaluativist views (e.g., Judgementalism and Perceptualism), the relevant contents are claimed to be non-evaluative; thick evaluative properties like the disgusting, dangerous, terrifying, humorous, and admirable – which are connected to the individuation and intelligibility of emotions – are not part of the content of emotional experience.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on PhilPapers
  17. 279886.25419
    The wishes of the dead seem to have normative significance. We take seriously people’s last requests, what they loved, what they valued, even after they have escaped this mortal coil. The law—in a way that seems perfectly normatively upright—takes seriously the wishes of the dead as they concern, for instance, their property, their reproductive material, their image and reputation. But these facts present a philosophical puzzle. Why should we care about the wishes of the dead? Why should the fact that some dead person preferred x to y be a reason to promote x rather than y, especially if there is additiional reason to prefer y to x ? In this paper, I argue that extant solutions to this problem are inadequate, and provide an alternative. I argue that rather than explaining the normative significance of the wishes of the dead in terms of the interests or well-being of the dead, I claim that the ultimate normative explanation is to be provided by the normative demands of friendship. This “Associative Account ”, is explanatory of a number of our practices concerning the wishes of the dead, and can respond plausibly to a number of difficulties for alternatives.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on Dale Dorsey's site
  18. 279926.254236
    One reasons not just in beliefs, but also in intentions, preferences, and other attitudes. For instance, one forms preferences from preferences, or intentions from beliefs and preferences. Formal logic has proved useful for modelling reasoning in beliefs – the formation of beliefs from beliefs. Can logic also model reasoning in multiple attitudes? We identify principled obstacles. Logic can model reasoning about attitudes. But this models the discovery of attitudes of (usually) others, not the formation of one’s own attitudes. Beliefs are special in that reasoning in beliefs can follow logical entailment between belief contents. This makes beliefs the privileged target of logic, when applying logic to psychology.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on PhilPapers
  19. 279938.254276
    Max Deutsch (2020) has recently argued that conceptual engineering is stuck in a dilemma. If it is construed as the activity of revising the semantic meanings of existing terms, then it faces an unsurmountable implementation problem. If, on the other hand, it is construed as the activity of introducing new technical terms, then it becomes trivial. According to Deutsch, this conclusion need not worry us, however, for conceptual engineering is ill-motivated to begin with. This paper responds to Deutsch by arguing, first, that there is a third construal of conceptual engineering, neglected by him, which renders it both implementable and nontrivial, and second, that even the more ambitious project of changing semantic meanings is no less feasible than other normative projects we currently pursue. Lastly, the value of conceptual engineering is defended against Deutsch’s objections.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on PhilPapers
  20. 279941.254315
    One of the defining features of the classical gene was its position (a band in the chromosome). In molecular genetics, positions are defined instead as nucleotide numbers and there is no clear correspondence with its classical counterpart. However, the classical gene position did not simply disappear with the development of the molecular approach, but survived in the lab associated to different genetic practices. The survival of classical gene position would illustrate Waters’ view about the practical persistence of the genetic approach beyond reductionism and anti-reductionist claims. We show instead that at the level of laboratory practices there are also reductive processes, operating through the rise and fall of different techniques. Molecular markers made the concept of classical gene position practically dispensable, leading us to rethink whether it had any causal role or was just a mere heuristic.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on David Teira's site
  21. 279963.254362
    According to the probabilistic relevance account of confirmation, E confirms H relative to background knowledge K just in case P(H/K&E) > P(H/K). This requires an inequality between the rational degree of belief in H determined relative to two bodies of total knowledge which are such that one (K&E) includes the other (K) as a proper part. In this paper, I argue that it is quite plausible that there are no two possible bodies of total knowledge for ideally rational agents meeting this requirement. Hence, the positive relevance account may have to be rejected.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on PhilPapers
  22. 279988.254403
    There's an interesting piece in the NYT warning against hasty FDA approval of a (potentially) suboptimal covid vaccine. I'm especially interested in the third reason they offer:Third, the F.D.A. must consider the impact of an emergency authorization on existing vaccine studies. …
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on Philosophy, et cetera
  23. 280070.254438
    The number of true sentences is infinite. This is why writing philosophy is hard. As if to prove my point to myself, I'm having some trouble choosing this next sentence. With the exception perhaps of fiction, philosophy is the most topically wide open and diversely structured of writing forms. …
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on The Splintered Mind
  24. 280086.254481
    Sebastian Franck commented and translated parts of Agrippa's De Vanitate Scientiarum, confirming that Franck knew at least some of this philosopher’s work. However, there is no detailed research on the influence Agrippa had on Franck—a gap this paper tries to fill. In a comparison of the metaphysical belief systems of both Franck and Agrippa, important parallels concerning the soul and Christology can be found. Notably, Agrippa and Franck were both believers in the Platonic doctrine of the tripartite soul. According to this doctrine, the human being consists of the mind, soul, and body, the spiritual mind being the part that never dies. However, one difference between Agrippa and Franck was that Agrippa had a cosmological perspective that was strongly influenced by Neoplatonism and Hermeticism. In contrast, the Neoplatonic concept of the world soul did not make sense in Franck’s philosophical system of beliefs because Franck denies the idea that the world is conducted by rationality. His pessimistic view of the world and the human being did not blend with this idea of the world soul. There were some similarities between Franck and Agrippa, but ultimately, this investigation shows that Franck only adopted the ideas of the wise “Agrippa” that were compatible with his own philosophy, but the metaphysical concept of both philosophers was still very similar.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on PhilPapers
  25. 280093.254518
    At the intersection of taxonomy and nomenclature lies the scientific practice of typification. This practice occurs in biology with the use of holotypes (type specimens), in geology with the use of stratotypes, and in metrology with the use of measurement prototypes. In this paper I develop the first general definition of a scientific type and outline a new philosophical theory of types inspired by Pierre Duhem. I use this general framework to resolve the necessity-contingency debate about type specimens in philosophy of biology, to advance the debate over the myth of the absolute accuracy of standards in metrology, and to address the definition-correlation debate in geology. I conclude that just as there has been a productive synergy between philosophical accounts of natural kinds and scientific taxonomic practices, so too there is much to be gained from developing a deeper understanding of the practices and philosophy of scientific types.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on Alisa Bokulich's site
  26. 280120.254559
    Economic disparities often translate into disparities in political influence, rendering political liberties less worthy to poor citizens than to wealthier ones. Concerned with this, Rawls advocated that a guarantee of the fair value of political liberties be included in the first principle of justice as fairness, with significant regulatory and distributive implications. He nonetheless supplied little examination of the content and grounding of such guarantee, which we here offer. After examining three uncompelling arguments in its favor, we complete a more promising yet less explored argument that builds on the value of self-respect. We first inspect the conditions and duties that securing self-respect entails. We then look into how uneven allocations of the value of political liberties bear, expressively and due to the power imbalances they yield, on such conditions and duties.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on PhilPapers
  27. 295034.254599
    Affect plays an important but under-theorized role in how institutions involve and engage human agents. The rules, routines and procedures of institutions engender certain modes of affective comportment, while they constrain or exclude other such modes. Institutions also endow and habituate individuals, turning them into institutional affect agents whose actions, skills and tendencies embody institutional principles, sometimes in contradictory or ambivalent ways. In this paper, I undertake a broad-stroked exploration of three main dimensions of institutional affect. These dimensions are institutional space, institutional agents and institutional discourse. For each of these dimensions I will outline in what ways affect is a central conduit for the operation of an institution. Based on a phenomenological and social-diagnostic overview, I will present and discuss steps towards a critical theory of institutional affect, drawing on resources from social philosophy and critical phenomenology.
    Found 3 days, 9 hours ago on Jan Slaby's site
  28. 298367.254639
    Over the week, I have sketched three attempts to answer the questions: What is an expert? and How does someone become an expert? Though I’ve glossed over many details, the accounts point roughly to the following features of expertise:Expertise involves extensive competence in a domain (including extensive tacit or explicit knowledge).Expert competence is acquired through specialized practice, such that expertise has both cognitive and performative dimensions.Specialized practice takes place within and requires social structures that make it possible to enhance competence to the level of expertise.There are notable counterexamples to this consensus (see Hambrick, et al., 2018). …
    Found 3 days, 10 hours ago on The Brains Blog
  29. 300192.254678
    Goodman and Lederman (2020) argue that the traditional Fregean strategy for preserving the validity of Leibniz’s Law of substitution fails when confronted with apparent counterexamples involving proper names embedded under propositional attitude verbs. We argue, on the contrary, that the Fregean strategy succeeds and that Goodman and Lederman’s argument misfires.
    Found 3 days, 11 hours ago on PhilPapers
  30. 300305.254714
    Substructural logics and their application to logical and semantic paradoxes have been extensively studied, but non-reflexive systems have been somewhat neglected. Here, we aim to (at least partly) fill this lacuna, by presenting a non-reflexive logic and theory of naïve consequence (and truth). We also investigate the semantics and the proof-theory of the system. Finally, we develop a compositional theory of truth (and consequence) in our non-reflexive framework.
    Found 3 days, 11 hours ago on PhilPapers