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21114.83587
While Locke is remembered for his numerous contributions to a wide
range of fields—philosophy, political theory, economics,
religious exegesis, education and psychology—and while he took
on numerous roles in his career—academic, diplomat, secretary,
tutor, advisor and civil servant—it is easy to forget that he
was a trained and qualified professional. Locke spent a good part of
his career—at least a decade—studying, training, writing,
apprenticing and eventually practicing as a physician. He worked
closely with a number of leading researchers on a range of
contemporary medical, physiological and related subjects, taking
hundred of notes, and authoring several extended reflections on
medical matters.
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40236.836195
Works by (Humberstone 1981, 2011), van Benthem (1981, 2016), Holliday 2014, forthcoming, and Ding & Holliday 2020 attempt to develop a semantics of modal logic in terms of “possibilities”, i.e., “less determinate entities than possible worlds” (Edgington 1985). These works take possibilities as semantically primitive entities, stipulate a number of semantic principles that govern these entities (namely, Ordering, Persistence, Refinement, Cofinality, Negation, and Conjunction), and then interpret a modal language via this semantic structure. In this paper, we define possibilities in object theory (OT), and derive, as theorems, the semantic principles stipulated in the works cited. We then raise a concern for the semantic investigation of possibilities without a modal operator, and show that no such concerns the metaphysics of possibilities as developed in OT.
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43643.836242
David Hume is perhaps most celebrated for his analysis of causation and of inductive causal reasoning. Moreover, his quest to understand causal power and necessity played a central role in his philosophy and was arguably the primary stimulus behind his Treatise of Human Nature (Millican 2016, 86–93).
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43799.836266
Since the influential work of Norman Kemp Smith, it has become standard to interpret and debate Hume’s philosophy in terms of the broad themes of “scepticism” and “naturalism”. This has been particularly popular with scholars – notably Peter Strawson – who favour a relatively consistent narrative, whereby Hume’s “naturalism” is understood as providing some general response – or even a resolution – to the sceptical problems (and some related issues) that he raises. My aim here is to challenge this sort of narrative, by drawing distinctions within both scepticism and naturalism, and showing how Hume’s attitudes and responses to his most prominent philosophical challenges are importantly different, while the idea that he employs a broadly consistent “naturalist” strategy to address them is also misguided when examined in detail.
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43818.836287
Hume’s argument against the credibility of testimony for miracles – in Section 10 of his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding – is one of the most famous in the philosophical canon. Yet both its interpretation and its assessment are highly controversial. I have discussed the most common interpretative issues elsewhere, and will mainly pass over these here (with references to those previous discussions in case readers wish to follow them up). My main aim now is to focus instead on the cogency and force of Hume’s argument, and how it relates to his more general scepticism about theism as manifested in his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. So this is primarily a philosophical rather than interpretative investigation.
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44474.836308
This article attempts to identify certain shortcomings in analytic philosophy as practised today. First, it identifies a disconnect between the darker aspects of the human condition and philosophers’ inability to engage with them. Second, it locates this inability in a certain logic of detachment, explored by Peter Strawson. Third, it points out problems with Strawson’s analysis, which it then tries to overcome, using Constantin Noica’s account of the Platonising attitude philosophers are perennially tempted by – one of several ways in which humans try to overcome their fallen condition. This is contrasted with Thomas Nagel’s valuable but still deficient discussion of the “cosmic question”. This brings us, finally, to a reconsideration of an older tradition in philosophy, which focused more explicitly on human fallenness. Petrarch’s Secretum meum is used as an example to show that while the failure of analytic philosophers has deep existential roots, it is not commendable. Philosophers must learn, again, to reflect on the darkness of the human soul – their own darkness.
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51492.836328
Paraphrase is relevant to the existence of properties because there are apparently true claims that apparently entail the existence of properties. This gives us good reason to think there are properties, unless it can be plausibly argued that at least one of those appearances is misleading. In typical (perhaps all) cases, this will involve giving a paraphrase of the apparently true claims—a less misleading restatement—that plausibly doesn’t entail the existence of properties (see, e.g., Jackson 1977 and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 2005).
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60473.836346
Some people think that simplicity of laws of nature is a guide to truth, and some think beauty of laws of nature is. One might ask: Is the beauty of laws of nature a guide that goes beyond simplicity? …
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60474.836374
Suppose we have a full conditional probability P(A∣B) defined for all pairs of events (stipulating that P(A∣⌀) = 1 if we wish). Two methods have been proposed for defining a probability comparison using conditional probabilities:
Pruss: A ⪅ B iff P(A∣A∪B) ≤ P(B∣A∪B). …
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97501.836399
There is now extensive discussion in normative philosophy about personal relationships— from older debates about their nature and value, to more recent discussions of their implications for institutional design and freedom of association. The literature is primarily focused on dyads: close relationships between two people, such as romantic partnerships, two-person friendships, or parent-child relationships, and their perhaps distinctive contributions to our lives.
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98451.836433
Last time, I wrote, somewhat despairingly, about finding a black tie dress to wear to the National Book Award ceremony where Unshrinking is a finalist in non-fiction. Talk about champagne problems, especially given my current levels of body privilege as a small fat or perhaps even borderline fat woman. …
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137648.836464
In nearly twenty years of blogging, I’ve unfortunately felt more and more isolated and embattled. It now feels like anything I post earns severe blowback, from ridicule on Twitter, to pseudonymous comment trolls, to scary and aggressive email bullying campaigns. …
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147155.836482
[I posted this before, but Substack didn’t send out notifications for some reason, so I am trying again. —mh]
Here, I continue my discussion of ethical vegetarianism. *
[ *Based on: “Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism,” Between the Species 22 (2018): 20-135. …
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148497.836512
It has been suggested that the following three theses are incompatible: Moral Realism, Epistemicism about vagueness, and the claim that moral terms are vague. If this is so, (at least) one these three must be rejected. This paper explores the possibility of resolving this trilemma by rejecting Moral Vagueness.
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171645.836549
In this article I introduce a distinction between two types of reparametrization invariant models and I argue that while both suffer from a problem of time at the time of applying canonical quantization methods to quantize them, its severity depends greatly on the type of model. Deparametrizable models are models that have time as a configuration or phase space variable and this makes it the case that the problem of time can be solved. In the case of non-deparametrizable models, we cannot find time in the configuration or phase space of the model, and hence the techniques that allow solving the problem in the deparametrizable case do not apply. This seems to signal that the canonical quantization techniques fail to give a satisfactory quantization of non-deparametrizable models. As I argue that general relativity is nondeparametrizable, this implies that the canonical quantization of this theory may fail to provide a successful theory of quantum gravity.
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171667.836568
This paper examines the development of causal perturbation theory, a reformulation of perturbative quantum field theory (QFT) starting from a causality condition rather than a time-evolution equation. We situate this program alongside other causality-based reformulations of relativistic quantum theory which flourished in the post-war period, contrasting it in particular with axiomatic QFT. Whereas the axiomatic QFT tradition tried to move beyond the perturbative expansion, causal perturbation theory can be thought of as a foundational investigation of this approximation method itself. Unearthing this largely forgotten research program helps clarify questions of contemporary philosophical interest, for instance about the interpretative significance of the ultraviolet divergences which appear in the series expansion, but also help us understand why causality conditions became so ubiquitous in post-war high-energy theory.
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171689.8366
This paper aims to map the different theoretical options related to the Precautionary Principle (PP). Great part of the literature on it can be systematized by answering to three different questions: is there a basic structure in the PP? If so, in which interpretation of the PP does this structure express itself? Finally, are its damage or knowledge conditions fixed or adjustable? The first question separates realist from non-realist approaches. The second question allows us to discriminate monist, dualist, or pluralist positions in relation to the three interpretations of the PP: decision rule, procedural requirement, or epistemic rule. Finally, the third question distinguishes rigid from non-rigid formulations of the principle. Based on this mapping, one can not only navigate through the different formulations of the PP present both in official documents and in specialized literature, but also deflect some of its common objections, and understand Hans Jonas’ eventual connection with PP. Notwithstanding, this mapping does not capture other important themes attached to PP, which motivates a final distinction between narrow and broader forms of PP.
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171711.836612
We propose an explication of conceptual coherence in terms of the covariational structure of concepts or how clusters of properties systematically co-occur across category exemplars. Using the theory of conceptual spaces combined with ideas from Principal Component Analysis, we show that a concept’s perceived coherence relates to how easily its attribute structure can be reduced to simpler representations. Our approach contrasts with previous accounts that ground coherence in similarity or intuitive theories. We discuss the relationship between coherence, uncertainty, and induction and apply our framework to the conjunction fallacy.
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200690.836623
Active inference, then, effectively appears to be an exercise in self-fulfilling prophesying. Crudely speaking, agents keep sampling until they acquire evidence for their beliefs about their expected states. If you ‘prophesy’ that you will be drinking coffee, then the possession of that prophecy induces a prediction error since you are not currently drinking coffee, and you then cast around sampling until the prediction error is quashed by observations of a hot cup of coffee in your hand.
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210032.836636
Readers: I gave the Neyman Seminar at Berkeley last Wednesday, October 9, and had been so busy preparing it that I did not update my leisurely cruise for October. This is the second stop. I will shortly post remarks on the the panel discussion that followed my Neyman talk (with panelists, Ben Recht, Philip Stark, Bin Yu, and Snow Zhang), which was quite illuminating. …
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210032.836646
Expertise slows the progress of knowledge, some say. First, it delays arrival at the cutting edge: if you must master everything that came before, you may not begin original research until your 30s, when your brain is a rigid fossil and retirement is already near. …
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285606.836657
Disciplinary manifestos typically propose grand reconceptions or reorientations of the field. The work is not what we believe it to be; or if it is, it should be radically transformed. I tend to be impatient with philosophers who operate in this mode. …
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340726.836677
[#3 in my series of excerpts from Questioning Beneficence: Four Philosophers on Effective Altruism and Doing Good.] Charity and volunteering involve an element of self-sacrifice. Does that make these acts more virtuous than improving the world via other means (such as one’s career)? …
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344718.836689
Felix reaches up to catch a high line drive to left field and fires the ball off to Benji at home plate, who then tags the runner trying to score. For Felix to catch the ball and transfer it from his glove to his throwing hand, he needs to have a sense of where his hands are relative to one another and the rest of his body. This sort of information is subconsciously tracked in the body schema (or postural schema), a representation of the current bodily posture that is updated on the basis of proprioceptive inputs (Head 1920; Pallaird 1999; Gallagher 1998). While the existence of the body schema in not in dispute, its origin is. After reviewing the competing proposals (§1), I introduce the conceptual tools needed to move the debate forward (§2) and apply them to the question of the extent to which the body schema could be learned from perceptual input in utero (§3-§4). I argue that it could give rise to something recognizable as the body schema, though not quite rising to the level of the mature body schema. After considering the implications for further research on the origins of the body schema, I show how these results apply to other body representations, helping clarify the vexing question of the number, nature, and interactions among body representations in the brain. This theoretical work also promises to advance our understanding and treatment protocols for disorders affecting such body representations (e.g., anorexia nervosa) (§5).
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344778.8367
I suggest that the current situation in quantum field theory (QFT) provides some reason to question the universal validity of ontological reductionism. I argue that the renormalization group flow is reversible except at fixed points, which makes the relation between large and small distance scales quite symmetric in QFT, opening up at least the technical possibility of a non-reductionist approach to QFT. I suggest that some conceptual problems encountered within QFT may potentially be mitigated by moving to an alternative picture in which it is no longer the case that the large supervenes on the small. Finally, I explore some specific models in which a form of non-reductionism might be implemented, and consider the prospects for future development of these models.
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344798.83671
The current paper examines how a commitment to a principle, adhered to by an individual agent, becomes an accepted standard of an epistemic community. Addressing this question requires three steps: first, to define the terms used throughout the paper, and especially the characteristics of commitments to a principle. The second step is to find a mechanism through which such epistemic commitments are introduced to an epistemic community and in certain cases are adopted as the standard by the community. While there could be several such mechanisms, the current paper focuses on the practice of model formulation. The third step is to demonstrate the analytical framework developed in the first two steps in a case study. The case study chosen for this paper is the unique approach to feedback analysis adopted by the ecologist and population geneticist Richard Levins. In what follows I will show that part of the features that made Levins’ approach unique was his Marxist commitments, and his attempt to embody those commitments in feedback analysis by formally representing them as modeling assumptions.
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344822.836726
In this paper I raise a worry about the most extended resolutions of the problem of time of canonical quantizations of general relativity. The reason for this is that these resolutions are based on analogies with deparametrizable models for which the problem can be solved, while I argue in this paper that there are good reasons for doubting about these resolutions when the theory is not deparametrizable, which is the case of general relativity. I introduce an example of a non-deparametrizable model, a double harmonic oscillator system expressed by its Jacobi action, and argue that the problem of time for this model is not solvable, in the sense that its canonical quantization doesn’t lead to the quantum theory of two harmonic oscillators and the standard resolutions of the problem of time don’t work for this case. I argue that as general relativity is strongly analogous to this model, one should take seriously the view that the canonical quantization of general relativity doesn’t lead to a meaningful quantum theory. Finally, I comment that this has an impact on the foundations of different approaches to quantum gravity.
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344844.83676
In this paper I introduce the idea of geometrogenesis as suggested in the group field theory (GFT) literature, and I offer a criticism of it. Geometrogenesis in the context of GFT is the idea that what we observe as the big bang is nothing else but a phase transition from a nongeometric phase of the universe to a geometric one, which is the one we live in and the one to which the spacetime concepts apply. GFT offers the machinery to speak about geometric and nongeometric phases, but I argue that there are serious conceptual issues that threaten the viability of the idea. Some of these issues are directly related to the foundations of GFT and are concerned with the fact that it isn’t clear what GFT amounts to and how to understand it. The other main source of trouble has to do with geometrogenesis itself and its conceptual underpinnings, as it is unclear whether it requires the addition of an extra temporal or quasitemporal dimension, which is unwanted and problematic.
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344867.836788
In this paper I offer an introduction to group field theory (GFT) and to some of the issues affecting the foundations of this approach to quantum gravity. I first introduce covariant GFT as the theory that one obtains by interpreting the amplitudes of certain spin foam models as Feynman amplitudes in a perturbative expansion. However, I argue that it is unclear that this definition of GFTs amounts to something beyond a computational rule for finding these transition amplitudes and that GFT doesn’t seem able to offer any new insight into the foundations of quantum gravity. Then, I move to another formulation of GFT which I call canonical GFT and which uses the standard structures of quantum mechanics. This formulation is of extended use in cosmological applications of GFT, but I argue that it is only heuristically connected with the covariant version and spin foam models. Moreover, I argue that this approach is affected by a version of the problem of time which raises worries about its viability. Therefore, I conclude that there are serious concerns about the justification and interpretation of GFT in either version of it.
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344890.836816
In this paper, I consider a recent controversy about whether first-class constraints generate gauge transformations in the case of electromagnetism. I argue that there is a notion of gauge transformation, the extended notion, which is different from the original gauge transformation of electromagnetism, but at the same time not trivial, which allows the making of that claim. I further argue that one can expect that this claim can be extended to more general theories, and that Dirac’s conjecture may be true for some physically reasonable theories and only in this sense of gauge transformation. Finally, I argue that the extended notion of gauge transformation seems unnatural from the point of view of classical theories, but that it nicely fits with the way quantum versions of gauge theories are constructed.