1. 25271.51493
    In this paper I develop a concept of behavioural ecological individuality. Using findings from a case study which employed qualitative methods, I argue that individuality in behavioural ecology should be defined as phenotypic and ecological uniqueness, a concept that is operationalised in terms of individual differences such as animal personality and individual specialisation. This account make sense of how the term “individuality” is used in relation to intrapopulation variation in behavioural ecology. The concept of behavioural ecological individuality can sometimes be used to identify individuals. It also shapes research agendas and methodological choices in behavioural ecology, leading researchers to account for individuals as sources of variation. Overall, this paper draws attention to a field that has been largely overlooked in philosophical discussions of biological individuality and highlights the importance of individual differences and uniqueness for individuality in behavioural ecology.
    Found 7 hours, 1 minute ago on PhilSci Archive
  2. 28861.515015
    Accountability is a cornerstone of the governance of artificial intelligence (AI). However, it is often defined too imprecisely because its multifaceted nature and the sociotechnical structure of AI systems imply a variety of values, practices, and measures to which accountability in AI can refer. We address this lack of clarity by defining accountability in terms of answerability, identifying three conditions of possibility (authority recognition, interrogation, and limitation of power), and an architecture of seven features (context, range, agent, forum, standards, process, and implications). We analyse this architecture through four accountability goals (compliance, report, oversight, and enforcement). We argue that these goals can be complementary, and that policy-makers emphasise or prioritise some over others depending on the use of accountability and the missions of AI governance.
    Found 8 hours, 1 minute ago on PhilPapers
  3. 28920.515034
    Many have found it plausible that practical circumstances can affect whether someone is in a position to know or rationally believe a proposition. For example, whether it is rational for a person to believe that the bank will be open tomorrow, can depend not only on the person’s evidence, but also on how practically important it is for the person not to be wrong about the bank being open tomorrow. This supposed phenomenon is known as “pragmatic encroachment” on knowledge and rational belief. Assuming that the phenomenon is real, I ask what explains it. I argue that a variant of instrumentalism about epistemic reasons offers a natural explanation, that at the same time is able avoid commitment to a more radical form of pragmatism.
    Found 8 hours, 2 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  4. 28958.515049
    Your partner Phil has struggled with an alcohol problem for many years, but after promising you he’s done, he has been sober for eight months, a new record for him.
    Found 8 hours, 2 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  5. 87189.515063
    To talk about ethics and the moral life in India, and whether and when Indians misunderstood each other’s views, we must know something about what Indians thought about ethical and moral issues. However, there is a commonly held view among scholars of Indian thought that Indians, and especially their intellectuals, were not really interested in ethical matters (Matilal 1989, 5; Raju 1967, 27; Devaraja 1962, v-vi; Deutsch 1969, 99). This view is false and strange. Understanding how it is that posterity has managed to misunderstand ethics and the moral life in India so profoundly is not something that we can address without thinking about issues pertaining to scholarship, interpretation and translation. Most importantly, studying a culture demands a philosophical engagement with the categories against which one attempts to understand it. If one believes, as many scholars do, that it is a rigorous study of Sanskrit and other classical Indian languages alone that holds the key to understanding classical India, then there is apparently neither need nor room for such reflection. It is this very same failure to engage philosophically with the category of the ethical and its place in translation that has allowed many modern Indians to misunderstand Indians of yore.
    Found 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  6. 102469.515076
    Foundational ontologies are known to have a steep learning curve, which hampers casual use by domain ontology developers to use them for domain ontology development. Foundational ontology developers have not provided methods or tools to lower the barriers of uptake beyond offering, at best, a computational version. We investigate an approach to bridge this gap through the development of a decision diagram for BFO, which offers the modeller a series of questions with closed answer options in order to step-wise arrive at a suitable entity to align the domain entity to. This diagram was implemented in a tool, the BFO Classifier, that keeps track of the question and answer trace and with the click of a button the alignment axiom can be added to the ontology. It was evaluated with two BFO-aligned ontologies, which showed that in at least half of the alignment axioms, a more precise BFO entity could be selected, and a minority corrected.
    Found 1 day, 4 hours ago on C. Maria Keet's site
  7. 107839.51509
    Robustness analysis (RA) is the prescription to consider a diverse range of evidence and only regard a hypothesis as well-supported if all the evidence agrees on it. In contexts like climate science, the evidence in support of a hypothesis often comes from scientific models. This leads to model-based RA (MBRA), whose core notion is that a hypothesis ought to be regarded as well-supported on grounds that a sufficiently diverse set of models agrees on the hypothesis. This chapter, which is the second part of a two-part review of MBRA, addresses the thorny issue of justifying the inferential steps taking us from the premises to the conclusions. We begin by making explicit what exactly the problem is. We then turn to a discussion of two broad families of justificatory strategies, namely top-down and bottom-up justifications. In the latter group we distinguish between the likelihood approach, independence approaches, and the explanatory approach. This discussion leads us to the sober conclusion that multi-model situations raise issues that are not yet fully understood and that the methods and approaches that MBRA has not yet reached a stage of maturity. Important questions remain open, and these will have to be addressed in future research.
    Found 1 day, 5 hours ago on Roman Frigg's site
  8. 107873.515105
    Robustness analysis (RA) is the prescription to consider a diverse range of evidence and only regard a hypothesis as well-supported if all the evidence agrees on it. In contexts like climate science, the evidence in support of a hypothesis often comes in the form of model results. This leads to model-based RA (MBRA), whose core notion is that a hypothesis ought to be regarded as well-supported on grounds that a sufficiently diverse set of models agrees on the hypothesis. This chapter, which is the first part of a two-part review of MBRA, begins by providing a detailed statement of the general structure of MBRA. This statement will make visible the various parts of MBRA and will structure our discussion in the remainder of the chapter. We explicate the core concepts of independence and agreement, and we discuss what they mean in the context of climate modelling. Our statement shows that MBRA is based on three premises, which concern robust properties, common structures, and so-called robust theorems. We analyse what these involve and what problems they raise in the context of climate science. In the next chapter, which is the second part of the review, we analyse how the conclusions of MBRA can be justified.
    Found 1 day, 5 hours ago on Roman Frigg's site
  9. 139852.515119
    Version updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Development of relevant theories 2.1 The simple theory of types TST and TSTU . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Typical ambiguity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2
    Found 1 day, 14 hours ago on M. Randall Holmes's site
  10. 151816.515132
    This paper outlines a defense of hybrid contingentism: that it is contingent which individuals there are, but not contingent what properties there are. Critics pursue two main lines of concern. First, that the hybrid contingentist’s treatment of haecceitistic properties (like being Elvis) is metaphysically mysterious, and second, that hybrid contingentism involves an unjustified asymmetry in the associated modal logic. I suggest that in the setting of higher-order metaphysics these dismissals may be too quick. It is not at all obvious whether and to what extent we should expect particular ‘symmetries’ across the orders, and so whether — as Williamson (2013) argues — “the default preference is for a uniform metaphysics, on which being is contingent at all orders or none.”
    Found 1 day, 18 hours ago on Maegan Fairchild's site
  11. 189567.515146
    This paper examines how Plato’s rejection of the friends of the forms at 248a–249b in the Sophist is continuous with the arguments that he develops shortly after this part of the dialogue for the interrelatedness of the forms. I claim that the interrelatedness of the forms implies that they are changed, and that this explains Plato’s rejection of the friends of the forms. Much here turns on the kind of change that Plato wants to attribute to the forms. I distinguish my view of the sort of change that the forms experience from other kinds of change—such as ‘Cambridge change’—that scholars have believed Plato has in mind in rejecting the friends of the forms. On the view that I advance, a form experiences a change (which I call ‘perfect change’) in its association with another form that distinguishes it as the distinctive being that it is—that is, through its possession of its distinctive properties.
    Found 2 days, 4 hours ago on PhilPapers
  12. 189585.51516
    Many scientists routinely generalize from study samples to larger populations. It is commonly assumed that this cognitive process of scientific induction is a voluntary inference in which researchers assess the generalizability of their data and then draw conclusions accordingly. Here we challenge this view and argue for a novel account. The account describes scientific induction as involving by default a generalization bias that operates automatically and frequently leads researchers to unintentionally generalize their findings without sufficient evidence. The result is unwarranted, overgeneralized conclusions. We support this account of scientific induction by integrating a range of disparate findings from across the cognitive sciences that have until now not been connected to research on the nature of scientific induction. The view that scientific induction involves by default a generalization bias calls for a revision of our current thinking about scientific induction and highlights an overlooked cause of the replication crisis in the sciences. Commonly proposed interventions to tackle scientific overgeneralizations that may feed into this crisis need to be supplemented with cognitive debiasing strategies to most effectively improve science.
    Found 2 days, 4 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  13. 193725.515187
    Science is a cultural practice, and cultural practices tend to change over time via processes of cultural selection and social learning. There is a long history of philosophers of science arguing that scientific theories evolve through a “critical” evolutionary process where new hypotheses are criticized, modified, eliminated, or replaced (Popper 1972; Hull 1988). More recent work has suggested that other features of science such as methodologies, beliefs, and norms may develop likewise. Such features of science exhibit key characteristics that make them suitable for evolutionary analysis. They are reliably transmitted via pedagogy and cultural imitation, and produce non-random variation that leads to differential success in subsequent transmission. For this reason, a new body of work has emerged looking at cultural evolutionary processes in science. This research addresses topics ranging from the persistence of poor statistical practices, to conservatism in science, to the ideal communication structure for scientific communities.
    Found 2 days, 5 hours ago on Cailin O’Connor's site
  14. 202736.515207
    Recently, interest has surged in similarity-based epistemologies of possibility. However, it has been pointed out that the notion of ‘relevant similarity’ is not properly developed in this literature. In this paper, I look at the research done in the field of analogical reasoning, where we find that one of the most promising ways of capturing relevance in similarity reasoning is by relying on the predictive analogy similarity relation. This takes relevant similarity to be based on shared properties that have structural relations to the property of interest. I argue that if we base our epistemology of possibility on similarity reasoning on the predictive analogy similarity relation, we require prior knowledge of the specifics of these structural relations. I discuss a number of possible responses to this on behalf of the similarity theorists given their methodological approach to the epistemology of modality more generally. They could either opt for making explicit the metaphysics underlying these structural relations, in which case they need to spell out how we can come to know these relations. Or they could opt for developing a theory that explains why we do not need to have explicit knowledge of these structural relations; for example by suggesting that we make use of epistemic shortcuts.
    Found 2 days, 8 hours ago on PhilPapers
  15. 208638.515233
    The nature and status of abstract objects of the sort of properties, propositions, and numbers have been at the center of metaphysical debate for a very long time and they form a topic that bears a particular connection to natural language. Philosophers frequently draw on natural language to motivate properties, propositions, and numbers as objects, and it is generally taken for granted that abstract objects of this sort are well-reflected in natural language and in fact that reference to them in natural language is pervasive (Hale 1987, Wetzel 2009).
    Found 2 days, 9 hours ago on Friederike Moltmann's site
  16. 257122.51525
    This article develops a new account of the relation “before” between events. It does so by taking the set of all states of an object, irrespective of any presupposed order, and then ordering it by exploiting a characteristic asymmetry which appears on this set. It is shown that this asymmetry both implies temporal order, and is arguably also necessary for defining it. The upshot is that temporal ordering is a local phenomenon and requires no global temporal structure of spacetime.
    Found 2 days, 23 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  17. 257236.515264
    London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK ‘spontaneous order’, antithetical to design, they now design markets to achieve specific purposes. This paper reconstructs how this change in what markets are and can do came about and considers some consequences. Two decisive developments in economic theory are identified: first, Hurwicz’s view of institutions as mechanisms, which should be designed to align incentives with social goals; and second, the notion of marketplaces – consisting of infrastructure and algorithms – which should be designed to exhibit stable properties. These developments have empowered economists to create marketplaces for specific purposes, by designing appropriate algorithms. I argue that this power to create marketplaces requires a shift in ethical reasoning, from whether markets should reach into certain spheres of life, to how market algorithms should be designed. I exemplify this shift, focusing on bias, and arguing that transparency should become a goal of market design.
    Found 2 days, 23 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  18. 260580.51528
    Meaningful predicates come in two kinds. Predicates of the first kind characterize ways in which objects can resemble each other other; two examples are ‘electron’ and ‘red’. Predicates of the second kind don’t correspond to any real dimension of similarity; two examples are ‘electron or red’ and ‘such that something is red’. Underlying this distinction between predicates is a distinction in reality: predicates of the first kind express natural properties and predicates of the latter express unnatural or gerrymandered properties.
    Found 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  19. 269177.515294
    Higher-order logic augments first-order logic with devices that let us generalize into grammatical positions other than that of a singular term. Some recent metaphysicians have advocated for using these devices to raise and answer questions that bear on many traditional issues in philosophy. In contrast to these ‘higher-order metaphysicians’, traditional metaphysics has often focused on parallel, but importantly different, questions concerning special sorts of abstract objects: propositions, properties and relations. The answers to the higher-order and the property-theoretic questions may coincide sometimes but will often come apart. I argue that when they do, the higher-order questions are closer to the metaphysical action and so it would be better for these debates to proceed in higher-order terms.
    Found 3 days, 2 hours ago on Andrew Bacon's site
  20. 279884.515308
    Taking a pragmatist stance toward the practices and products of science shapes our answers to central philosophical questions53. In this paper, I will explicate how scientists’ conceptual and representational practices work in concert with their observational and experimental ones to stabilize acceptance of scientific realism.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  21. 279889.515322
    Recent historical studies have investigated the first proponents of methodological structuralism in late nineteenth-century mathematics. In this paper, I shall attempt to answer the question of whether Peano can be counted amongst the early structuralists. I shall focus on Peano’s understanding of the primitive notions and axioms of geometry and arithmetic. First, I shall argue that the undefinability of the primitive notions of geometry and arithmetic led Peano to the study of the relational features of the systems of objects that compose these theories. Second, I shall claim that, in the context of independence arguments, Peano developed a schematic understanding of the axioms which, despite diverging in some respects from Dedekind’s construction of arithmetic, should be considered structuralist. From this stance I shall argue that this schematic understanding of the axioms anticipates the basic components of a formal language.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  22. 279894.515338
    Supporters of conceptual engineering often use Haslanger’s ameliorative project as a key example of their methodology. However, at face value, Haslanger’s project is no cause for optimism about conceptual engineering. If we interpret Haslanger as seeking to revise how people in general use and understand words such as ‘woman’, ‘man’, etc., then her project has been unsuccessful. And if we interpret her as seeking to reveal the meaning of those words, then her project does not involve conceptual engineering. I develop and defend an alternative interpretation of Haslanger’s project and argue that, so interpreted, it is a successful conceptual engineering project after all. In so doing, I develop what I call a particularist account of the success conditions for conceptual engineering.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on Mark Pinder's site
  23. 279923.515351
    This paper interprets Sir James Frazer’s The Golden Bough as presenting an objection to diffusionism: the diffusionist theory cannot account for the isolation of the rite Frazer focuses on, in the societies studied by classicists.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on PhilPapers
  24. 279935.515365
    Saudi Arabia recently granted citizenship to a robot.1 The European Parliament is also drafting a form of “electronic personhood” for artificial intelligence.2 Some Iapanese get so attached to their robots that they give robots funerals and bury them after they break irreparably.3 Many commen— tators see these recent developments as confused and even dangerous (Gunkel 2012), so we need to think about whether and why future artificial intelligence could or should ever be granted partial or even full moral status. This chapter will begin by defining moral status and arguing that it comes in degrees on multiple dimensions. Next we will consider which conditions need to be met for an entity to have moral status, and we will argue that artifi— cial intelligence can meet a combination of conditions that are sufficient for partial moral status. Finally, we will consider how much moral status an AI system could have.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on Vincent Conitzer's site
  25. 279943.515379
    A quite recent book casts the anthropologist Elizabeth Colson as a systems skeptic, with Max Gluckman attempting to counter her skepticism. In this paper, I offer clarifications of the skepticism and of the counter.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on PhilPapers
  26. 279956.515393
    In the Appendix to the Treatise and in the first Enquiry, instead of saying that beliefs are phenomenologically vivid ideas, Hume says that they are ideas with a sui generis feeling. This is, I think, a change for the better. The second thoughts expressed in the Appendix mark a transition in his account of causal reasoning. He takes what had been an idiosyncratic account of the vivacity of mental imagery and turns it into a theory of how experiences determine credences in unobserved matters of fact.
    Found 3 days, 5 hours ago on PhilPapers
  27. 285055.515406
    It’s occurred to me that the “might well happen that” operator makes for an interesting modality. It divides into an epistemic and a metaphysical version. In both cases, if it might well happen that p, then p is possible (in the respective sense). …
    Found 3 days, 7 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  28. 373019.51542
    Drawing on the epistemology of logic literature on anti-exceptionalism about logic, we set out to investigate the following metaphilosophical questions empirically: Is philosophy special? Are its methods (dis)continuous with science? More specifically, we test the following metaphilosophical hypotheses empirically: philosophical deductivism, philosophical inductivism, and philosophical abductivism. Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments), we searched through a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 435,703) to find patterns of argumentation. The results of our quantitative, corpus-based study suggest that deductive arguments are significantly more common than abductive arguments and inductive arguments in philosophical texts overall, but they are gradually and steadily giving way to non-deductive (i.e., inductive and abductive) arguments in academic philosophy.
    Found 4 days, 7 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  29. 373055.515435
    Developing tools is a crucial aspect of experimental practice, yet most discussions of scientific change traditionally emphasize theoretical over technological change. To elaborate on the role of tools in scientific change, I offer an account that shows how scientists use tools in exploratory experiments to form novel concepts. I apply this account to two cases in neuroscience and show how tool development and concept formation are often intertwined in episodes of tool-driven change. I support this view by proposing common normative principles that specify when exploratory concept formation and tool development succeed (rather than fail) to initiate scientific change.
    Found 4 days, 7 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  30. 376229.515452
    Hume’s fourth argument for the special unreliability of religious testimony for miracles is usually called the Contrary Miracles Argument in the secondary literature. It runs as follows: in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary; and . . . it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of China should, all of them, be established on any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that system was established; so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other (EHU 10.24).
    Found 4 days, 8 hours ago on PhilPapers