1. 155.576985
    Suppose we have a backwards-infinite sequence of asexually reproducing chickens, ..., c−3, c−2, c−1, c0 with cn having a chance pn of producing a new chicken cn + 1 (chicken c0 may or may not have succeeded; the earlier ones have succeeded). …
    Found 2 minutes ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  2. 4343.577098
    In the topic-sensitive theory of the logic of imagination due to Berto [3], the topic of the imaginative output must be contained within the imaginative input. That is, imaginative episodes can never expand what they are about. We argue, with Badura [2], that this constraint is implausible from a psychological point of view, and it wrongly predicts the falsehood of true reports of imagination. Thus the constraint should be relaxed; but how? A number of direct approaches to relaxing the controversial content-inclusion constraint are explored in this paper. The core idea is to consider adding an expansion operator to the mereology of topics. The logic that results depends on the formal constraints placed on topic expansion, the choice of which are subject to philosophical dispute. The first semantics we explore is a topological approach using a closure operator, and we show that the resulting logic is the same as Berto’s own system. The second approach uses an inclusive and monotone increasing operator, and we give a sound and complete axiomatiation for its logic. The third approach uses an inclusive and additive operator, and we show that the associated logic is strictly weaker than the previous two systems, and additivity is not definable in the language. The latter result suggests that involved techniques or a more expressive language is required for a complete axiomatization of the system, which is left as an open question. All three systems are simple tweaks on Berto’s system in that the language remains propositional, and the underlying theory of topics is unchanged.
    Found 1 hour, 12 minutes ago on Aybüke Özgün's site
  3. 11319.577115
    The Quinean criterion for existential commitment is that we incur existential commitment precisely by affirming existentially quantified sentences. But what’s an existential quantifier? The inferentialist answer is that an existential quantifier is anything that behaves logically like an existential quantifier by obeying the rules of inference associated with quantifiers in classical logic. …
    Found 3 hours, 8 minutes ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  4. 71221.577123
    Eliminative structuralist philosophers of mathematics insist that what mathematicians study is structures rather than specific realizations of these structures, like a privileged natural number system would be. …
    Found 19 hours, 47 minutes ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  5. 77618.577129
    A seminal controversy in statistical inference is whether error probabilities associated with an inference method are evidentially relevant once the data are in hand. Frequentist error statisticians say yes; Bayesians say no. …
    Found 21 hours, 33 minutes ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  6. 88289.577137
    This post is free to read, so please ‘like’ it via the heart below and share it widely. The best way to support my work is with a paid subscription. It’s the most predictable thing imaginable: the Trump administration, co-helmed by the rabid pro-natalist Elon Musk and the sadsack pallbearer of patriarchy, J.D. …
    Found 1 day ago on More to Hate
  7. 135508.577142
    Anne Bradstreet was born in England, and raised near Old England’s Boston. In 1630, when she was eighteen, her family crossed the Atlantic on the Arbella, and helped John Winthrop found Puritan New England. …
    Found 1 day, 13 hours ago on Mostly Aesthetics
  8. 145384.577148
    Quarrels and wisecracks are essential features of interpersonal life. Quarrels are conflicts that typically take place only between friends, family, and those with whom we are personally engaged and whose attitudes toward us matter. Wisecracks are bits of improvised wit—banter, teasing, mockery, and ball busting—that also typically take place only in interpersonal life (note the following odd but revealing comment: “I can’t tease her like that; I barely even know her!”). Quarrels and cracks are, though, mutually exclusive. People know their quarrel is basically over once they start being amused by each others’ wisecracks again, and if you’re enjoying wisecracks with each other, it’s very hard, if not impossible, to quarrel at the same time. Why is this and what does it mean for interpersonal conflict? In this paper, I attempt to answer this question via a deep dive into the nature of wisecracking humor to explore the unrecognized—and valuable—role it plays in our interpersonal lives. In particular, there is a type of wisecracking humor that has a distinctive sort of interpersonal power, the power to dissolve the anger in quarrels in a surprising and productive way.
    Found 1 day, 16 hours ago on David Shoemaker's site
  9. 147464.577154
    Novel tools have allowed researchers to intervene into circuits at the mesoscale. The results of these interventions are often explained by appeal to functions. How are functions ascribed to circuit parts experimentally? I identify two kinds of function ascription practices in circuit interventions. Analysis of these practices shows us that function ascriptions are challenging due to a lack of interventive control and insufficient constraints on the class of candidate functions to discriminate in practice. One kind of function ascription practice— subtractive analysis—fares better at addressing these challenges.
    Found 1 day, 16 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  10. 260408.57716
    It has been argued that adult humans are absolutely time biased towards the future, at least as far as purely hedonic experiences (pain/pleasure) are concerned. What this means is that they assign zero value to them once they are in the past. Recent empirical studies have cast doubt on this claim, suggesting that while adults hold asymmetrical hedonic preferences – preferring painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future – these preferences are not absolute and are often abandoned when the quantity of pain or pleasure under consideration is greater in the past than in the future. Research has also examined whether such preferences might be affected by the utility people assign to experiential memories, since the recollection of past events can itself be pleasurable or aversive. We extend this line of research, investigating the utility people assign to experiential memories regardless of tense, and provide – to our knowledge – the first quantitative attempt at directly comparing the relative subjective weightings given to ‘primary’ experiences (i.e., living through the event first-hand) and ‘secondary’ (i.e., recollective or anticipatory) experiences. We find that when painful events are located in the past, the importance of the memory of the pain appears to be enhanced relative to its importance when they are located in the future. We also find extensive individual differences in hedonic preferences, reasons to adopt them, and willingness to trade them off. This research allows for a clearer picture of the utility people assign to the consumption of recollective experiences and of how this contributes to, or perhaps masks, time biases.
    Found 3 days ago on None
  11. 262801.577166
    The interpretation of quantum measurements presents a fundamental challenge in quantum mechanics, with concepts such as the Copenhagen Interpretation (CI), Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI), and Bohmian Mechanics (BM) offering distinct perspectives. We propose the Branched Hilbert Subspace Interpretation (BHSI), which describes measurement as branching the local Hilbert space of a system into parallel subspaces. We formalize the mathematical framework of BHSI using branching and the engaging and disengaging unitary operators to relationally and causally update the states of observers. Unlike the MWI, BHSI avoids the ontological proliferation of worlds and copies of observers, realizing the Born rule based on branch weights. Unlike the CI, BHSI retains the essential features of the MWI: unitary evolution and no wavefunction collapse. Unlike the BM, BHSI does not depend on a nonlocal structure, which may conflict with relativity. We apply BHSI to examples such as the double-slit experiment, the Bell test, Wigner and his friend, and the black hole information paradox. In addition, we explore whether recohering branches can be achieved in BHSI. Compared to the CI and MWI, BHSI provides a minimalist, unitarity-preserving, collapse-free, and probabilistically inherent alternative interpretation of quantum measurements.
    Found 3 days, 1 hour ago on PhilSci Archive
  12. 262822.577171
    Recent results have shown that singularities can be avoided from the general relativistic standpoint in Lorentzian-Euclidean black holes by means of the transition from a Lorentzian to an Euclidean region where time loses its physical meaning and becomes imaginary. This dynamical mechanism, dubbed “atemporality”, prevents the emergence of black hole singularities and the violation of conservation laws. In this paper, the notion of atemporality together with a detailed discussion of its implications is presented from a philosophical perspective. The main result consists in showing that atemporality is naturally related to conservation laws.
    Found 3 days, 1 hour ago on PhilSci Archive
  13. 262878.577187
    This chapter addresses the development of tests for consciousness (C-tests), defined as any protocol or methodology devised to detect specific properties that, if present, would justify higher credence in the belief that the system under test is phenomenally conscious. Though inherently defeasible, C-tests are vital for reducing epistemic uncertainty, balancing ethical and practical considerations regarding the attribution of consciousness to systems like patients with disorders of consciousness, non-human animals, and artificial systems. In this chapter, we first present a taxonomy of current available C-tests, describing how they rely on specific neural and/or psychological properties to reduce uncertainty about the presence of consciousness in various target systems. Second, we clarify the notion of phenomenal consciousness as the target of C-tests, delineating the limits of C- tests in being able to capture it. Third, we address the question of whether a well-established theory of consciousness and/or pre-theoretical intuitions are necessary for validation of C-tests. Fourth, we evaluate several inferential strategies to justify extrapolations of consciousness from consensus to non-consensus cases. Finally, we conclude by describing the iterative natural kind approach as a multidimensional method that integrates multiple tests with weighted evidence. This model would provide probabilistic assessments of consciousness across different populations, offering a more reliable framework for addressing non-consensus cases and providing a valuable aid for practical decision-making.
    Found 3 days, 1 hour ago on PhilSci Archive
  14. 262902.577193
    This paper aims to offer an alternative account for understanding scientific models based on metaphors. To accomplish this, we analyze Darwin’s use of metaphors, such as the notion of powerful Being and Struggle for Existence, in order to represent part of the process taking place in natural selection. The proposal emerges from two provocative issues. First, that the use of metaphors in philosophical and scientific literature is a form of approach that together with other “linguistic tropes in science dies hard” (Bailer-Jones 2002a; Keller 2002, p.117). Second, there are still unsolved problems in the literature of scientific models and debates using metaphors in science as the main epistemological approach.
    Found 3 days, 1 hour ago on PhilSci Archive
  15. 320585.577199
    Marletto and Vedral [Phys. Rev. Lett. 125, 040401 (2020)] propose that the Aharonov-Bohm (AB) phase is locally mediated by entanglement between a charged particle and the quantized electromagnetic field, asserting gauge independence for non-closed paths. Using quantum electrodynamics (QED), we critically analyze their model and demonstrate that the AB phase arises from the interaction with the vector potential A, not from entanglement, which is merely a byproduct of the QED framework. We show that their field-based energy formulation, intended to reflect local electromagnetic interactions, is mathematically flawed due to an incorrect prefactor and involves fields inside the solenoid, failing to support local mediation of the phase. Its equivalence to qv · A holds only in the Coulomb gauge, undermining their claim of a gauge-independent local mechanism. Furthermore, we confirm that the AB phase is gauge-dependent for non-closed paths, contradicting their assertion. Our analysis reaffirms the semi-classical interpretation, where the AB phase is driven by the vector potential A, with entanglement playing no causal role in its generation.
    Found 3 days, 17 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  16. 320614.577205
    This paper reconsiders the metaphysical implication of Einstein algebras, prompted by the recent objections of Chen (2024) on Rosenstock et al. (2015)’s conclusion. Rosenstock et al.’s duality theorem of smooth manifolds and smooth algebras supports a conventional wisdom which states that the Einstein algebra formalism is not more “relationalist” than the standard manifold formalism. Nevertheless, as Chen points out, smooth algebras are different from the relevant algebraic structure of an Einstein algebra. It is therefore questionable if Rosenstock et al.’s duality theorem can support the conventional wisdom. After a re-visit of John Earman’s classic works on the program of Leibniz algebras, I formalize the program in category theory and propose a new formal criterion to determine whether an algebraic formalism is more “relationalist” than the standard manifold formalism or not. Based on the new formal criterion, I show that the conventional wisdom is still true, though supported by a new technical result. I also show that Rosenstock et al. (2015)’s insight can be re-casted as a corollary of the new result. Finally, I provide a justification of the new formal criterion with a discussion of Sikorski algebras and differential spaces. The paper therefore provides a new perspective for formally investigating the metaphysical implication of an algebraic formalism for the theory of space and time.
    Found 3 days, 17 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  17. 320631.57721
    This dissertation defends Causal Decision Theory(CDT) against a recent (alleged) counterexample. In Dicing with Death (2014), Arif Ahmed devises a decision scenario where the recommendation given by CDT apparently contradicts our intuitive course of action. Similar to many other alleged counterexamples to CDT, Ahmed’s story features an adversary with fantastic predictive power—Death himself, in this story. Unlike many other alleged counterexamples, however, Ahmed explicitly includes the use of a costly randomization device as a possible action for the agent. I critically assess these two features of Ahmed’s story. I argue that Death’s fantastic predictive power cannot be readily reconciled with the use of randomization device. In order to sustain Dicing with Death as a coherent decision scenario, background explanations must be given about the nature of Death’s fantastic predictive power. After considering a few such explanations, however, it becomes unclear if the initial intuition which CDT apparently contradicts still holds up. Finally, I consider two contrasting decision scenarios to illustrate why Ahmed’s intuition in this case is ultimately false. I conclude that biting the bullet can perhaps be a legitimate response from CDT to many similar cases where evidentially correlated but causally isolated acts seem to force CDT to give counterintuitive recommendations.
    Found 3 days, 17 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  18. 320650.577236
    This paper critically examines Ian Hacking’s account of looping effects and human kinds, focusing on three related arguments defended by Hacking: (1) the looping effects of human science classifications render their objects of classification inherently unstable, (2) looping effects preclude the possibility of generating stable projectable inferences (i.e., reliable predictions) based on human kind terms, and (3) looping effects can demarcate human science classifications from natural science classifications. Contra-Hacking, I argue that: (1) some objects of human science classifications (viz., biological kinds) remain stable despite the feedback generated by their classifications, (2), human science classifications that individuate biological kinds yield stable projectable inferences, and (3) looping effects are a problematic criterion for distinguishing human science classifications from natural science classifications.
    Found 3 days, 17 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  19. 320671.577243
    This paper aims to resolve the incompatibility between two extant gauge-invariant accounts of the Abelian Higgs mechanism: the first account uses global gauge symmetry breaking, and the second eliminates spontaneous symmetry breaking entirely. We resolve this incompatibility by using the constrained Hamiltonian formalism in symplectic geometry. First we argue that, unlike their local counterparts, global gauge symmetries are physical. The symmetries that are spontaneously broken by the Higgs mechanism are then the global ones. Second, we explain how the dressing field method singles out the Coulomb gauge as a preferred gauge for a gauge-invariant account of the Abelian Higgs mechanism. Based on the existence of this group of global gauge symmetries that are physical, we resolve the incompatibility between the two accounts by arguing that the correct way to carry out the second method is to eliminate only the redundant gauge symmetries, i.e. those local gauge symmetries which are not global. We extend our analysis to quantum field theory, where we show that the Abelian Higgs mechanism can be understood as spontaneous global U(1) symmetry breaking in the C -algebraic sense.
    Found 3 days, 17 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  20. 372849.577249
    Some authors maintain that we can use causal Bayes nets to infer whether X → Y or X ← Y by consulting a probability distribution defined over some exogenous source of variation for X or Y . We raise a problem for this approach. Specifically, we point out that there are cases where an exogenous cause of X (Ex) has no probabilistic influence on Y no matter the direction of causation — namely, cases where Ex → X → Y and Ex → X ← Y are probabilistically indistinguishable. We then assess the philosophical significance of this problem and discuss some potential solutions.
    Found 4 days, 7 hours ago on Reuben Stern's site
  21. 373763.577258
    Very short summary: I discuss Cass Sunstein’s recent article on the “AI calculation debate.” I agree with Sunstein that an omniscient AI is impossible, but I nonetheless argue that a “society of AIs” with a division of cognitive labor would probably be better at tackling the knowledge problem than humans. …
    Found 4 days, 7 hours ago on The Archimedean Point
  22. 406443.577264
    [Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Klaas Kraay replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author.] The topic of divine freedom concerns the extent to which a divine being — in particular, the supreme divine being, God — can be free. There are, of course, many different conceptions of who or what God is. This entry will focus on one enormously important and influential model, according to which God is a personal being who exists necessarily, who is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and perfectly rational, and who is the creator and sustainer of all that contingently exists.[ 1 ] (For more discussion of these attributes, see the entries on omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, and creation and conservation.)
    Found 4 days, 16 hours ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  23. 416246.57727
    The paper argues for a non-disjunctivist account of reference in episodic memory. Our account provides a uniform theory of reference for episodic memories that root in veridical and non-veridical experiences. It is independent from the particular mechanisms that subserve the respective source experiences. We reject both relationalist and intentionalist analyses of memory and build our approach on Werning and Liefke’s theory of referential parasitism and Werning’s theory of trace minimalism. The motivation for our non-disjunctivist account is the assumption that perceptual and non-perceptual memories with an episodic character share a uniform underlying causal mechanism and thus make up one and the same natural kind.
    Found 4 days, 19 hours ago on Markus Werning's site
  24. 428030.577275
    Say that a structure N that has a distinguished element 0, a unary function S, and binary operations + and ⋅ is a causal Robinson Arithmetic (CRA) structure iff: The structure N satisfies the axioms of Robinson Arithmetic, and For all objects x and y in N, x is a partial cause of the object x + Sy. …
    Found 4 days, 22 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  25. 430403.577281
    Canonical is a solver for type inhabitation in dependent type theory, that is, the problem of producing a term of a given type. We present a Lean tactic which invokes Canonical to generate proof terms and synthesize programs. The tactic supports higher-order and dependently-typed goals, structural recursion over indexed inductive types, and definitional equality. Canonical finds proofs for 84% of Natural Number Game problems in 51 seconds total.
    Found 4 days, 23 hours ago on Jeremy Avigad's site
  26. 434458.577286
    Suppose human beings are deterministic systems. Then quite likely there are many cases where the complex play of associations combined with a specific sensory input deterministically results in a behavior in a way where the connection to the input doesn’t make rational sense. …
    Found 5 days ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  27. 440237.577292
    Suppose the U.S. Constitution mandated unilateral free trade with no exceptions. Much could go wrong. A pessimist could fairly ask all of the following: What if other countries take advantage of our unilateralism to drastically raise their tariffs? …
    Found 5 days, 2 hours ago on Bet On It
  28. 484618.577297
    Visual illusions provide a means of investigating the rules and principles through which approximate number representations are formed. Here, we investigated the developmental trajectory of an important numerical illusion – the connectedness illusion, wherein connecting pairs of items with thin lines reduces perceived number without altering continuous attributes of the collections. We found that children as young as 5 years of age showed susceptibility to the illusion and that the magnitude of the effect increased into adulthood. Moreover, individuals with greater numerical acuity exhibited stronger connectedness illusions after controlling for age. Overall, these results suggest the approximate number system expects to enumerate over bounded wholes and doing so is a signature of its optimal functioning.
    Found 5 days, 14 hours ago on Sam Clarke's page
  29. 486743.577304
    Common sense tells us that biological systems are goal-directed, and yet the concept remains philosophically problematic. We propose a novel characterization of goal-directed activities as a basis for hypothesizing about and investigating explanatory mechanisms. We focus on survival goals such as providing adequate nutrition to body tissues, highlighting two key features—normativity and action. These are closely linked inasmuch as goal-directed actions must meet normative requirements such as that they occur when required and not at other times. We illustrate how goal-directed actions are initiated and terminated not by environmental features and goals themselves, but by markers for them. For example, timely blood clotting is the essential response to injury, but platelet activation, required for clotting, is initiated not by the injury itself but by a short sequence of amino acids (GPO) that provides a reliable marker for it. We then make the case that the operation of markers is a prerequisite for common biological phenomena such as mistake-proneness and mimicry. We go on to identify properties of markers in general, including those that are genetically determined and those that can be acquired through associative learning. Both provide the basis for matching actions to changing environments and hence adaptive goal-directedness. We describe how goal-directed activities such as bird nest construction and birdsong learning, completed in anticipation of actions in the environment, have to be evaluated and practiced against a standard of correctness. This characterization of goal-directedness is sufficiently detailed to provide a basis for the scientific study of mechanisms.
    Found 5 days, 15 hours ago on David S. Oderberg's site
  30. 506496.57731
    The causal exclusion argument requires us to deny that there is systematic overdetermination between mental and physical causes. But it is interesting to note that in the real world there is systematic overdetermination of physical movements. …
    Found 5 days, 20 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog