1. 685458.48571
    Among the various attempts to formulate a theory of quantum gravity, a class of approaches suggests that spacetime, as modeled by general relativity, is destined to fade away. A major issue becomes then to identify which structures may inhabit the more fundamental, non-spatiotemporal environment, as well as to explain the relationship with the higher-level spatiotemporal physics. Recently, it has been suggested that a certain understanding of functionalism is the proper tool to suitably account for the recovery of spacetime. Here the viability and usefulness of such a conceptual strategy is explored, by looking at the various levels of spacetime emergence a theory of quantum gravity is expected to deal with. Our conclusion will be that, while its viability is clear also in a quantum gravity context, the import of spacetime functionalism remains rather unsettled.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  2. 685487.485803
    ABSTRACT: While there is considerable disagreement on the precise nature of material objecthood, it is standardly assumed that material objects must be spatial. In this paper, I provide two arguments against this assumption. The first argument is made from largely a priori considerations about modal plenitude. The possibility of non-spatial material objects follows from commitment to certain plausible principles governing material objecthood and plausible principles regarding modal plenitude. The second argument draws from current philosophical discussions regarding theories of quantum gravity and the emergence of spacetime. When it is appreciated what possible worlds these current theories commit us to, the possibility of non-spatial material objects will follow. Thus, either route will lead us to the possibility of non-spatial material objects. The significance of this result is that we need to revise our accounts of material objecthood to both accommodate these possibilities and the theories that lead to them.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  3. 686621.485825
    Tsongkhapa Losang Drakpa (1357–1419) is a well-known Tibetan religious philosopher and one of the most influential and innovative scholars and practitioners in the history of Tibetan Buddhism. He added to the Tibetan Buddhist traditions more globally by setting a paradigm to integrate theory and practice while maintaining focus on ethics, monastic discipline, and the traditions of scholarship and meditation within the esoteric Buddhist tradition. His main contribution to Buddhist philosophy was to show how to develop a robust realism about the conventional world, and how to make sense of epistemology and the possibility of knowledge in the context of global illusion.
  4. 696028.48584
    On June 1, 2019, I posted portions of an article [i],“There is Still a Place for Significance Testing in Clinical Trials,” in Clinical Trials responding to the 2019 call to abandon significance. I reblog it here. …
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  5. 730612.485863
    On desire-fulfillment (DF) theories of wellbeing, cases of fulfilled desire are an increment to utility. What about cases of unfulfilled desire? On DF theories, we have a choice point. We could say that unfulfilled desires don’t count at all—it’s just that one doesn’t get the increment from the desire being fulfilled—or that they are a decrement. …
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  6. 730860.48588
    The main message of Neuroethics is that neuroscience forces us to reconceptualize human agency as marvelously diverse and flexible. Free will can arise from unconscious brain processes. Individuals with mental disorders, including addiction and psychopathy, exhibit more agency than is often recognized. Brain interventions should be embraced with cautious optimism. Our moral intuitions, which arise from entangled reason and emotion, can generally be trusted. Nevertheless, we can and should safely enhance our brain chemistry, partly because motivated reasoning crops up in everyday life and in the practice of neuroscience itself. Despite serious limitations, brain science can be useful in the courtroom and marketplace. Recognizing all this nuance leaves little room for anxious alarmism or overhype and urges an emphasis on neurodiversity. The result is a highly opinionated tour of neuroethics as an exciting field full of implications for philosophy, science, medicine, law, and public policy.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Josh May's site
  7. 733588.485895
    In the first part I argued that the primary form of Kripkenstein’s skeptical challenge is to explain what it is for an expression to have a particular meaning in a speaker’s idiolect (rather than another) (Kripke 1982: 11, Reiland 2023c). Having presented the challenge, Kripkenstein goes through and criticizes answers in terms of explicit instructions, dispositions to use, simplicity, experiential states, taking the state to be primitive, and Fregean sense, and concludes that it can’t be answered.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  8. 738439.485909
    Let “phenomenal dogmatism” be the thesis that some experiences provide some beliefs with immediate justification, and do so purely in virtue of their phenomenal character. A basic question-mark looms over phenomenal dogmatism: Why should the fact that a person is visited by some phenomenal feel suggest the likely truth of a belief? In this paper, I press this challenge, arguing that perceptually justified beliefs are justified not purely by perceptual experiences’ phenomenology, but also because we have justified second-order background beliefs to the effect that the occurrence of certain perceptual experiences is indicative of the likely truth of certain corresponding beliefs. To bring this out, I contrast “perceptual dogmatism” with “moral dogmatism”: the thesis that some emotional experiences provide some moral beliefs with immediate justification, and do so purely in virtue of their phenomenal character. I argue that moral dogmatism is much less antecedently appealing, precisely because the counterpart second-order beliefs here are much less plausible.
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Uriah Kriegel's site
  9. 745921.485923
    In 2005, I debated my then-colleague Larry Iannaccone on the economics of religion. The turnout — around 300 people at GMU back when it was clearly a commuter school — surprised me and totally shocked Larry. …
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Bet On It
  10. 791346.485937
    At several key points throughout his Treatise, Hume refers to certain “general rules” which, he claims, we are “mightily addicted to”, and which frequently make us “carry our maxims beyond those reasons, which first induc’d us to establish them” (T 3.2.9.3). As Michael Gill (2006, 221) observes, Hume typically italicizes the term ‘general rules’, thus seemingly referring to “a specific, well-defined piece of his technical apparatus”. Unfortunately, Hume never explains what he means by the term. Nevertheless, he clearly thinks that general rules influence many of our beliefs, passions, and moral judgments. It is therefore important to understand exactly how Hume understands them. This is my aim in this paper.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  11. 791378.485951
    Maximize Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) is a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty. It says that we ought to handle moral uncertainty in the way that Expected Value Theory (EVT) handles descriptive uncertainty. MEC inherits from EVT the problem of fanaticism. Roughly, a decision theory is fanatical when it requires our decision-making to be dominated by low-probability, high-payo options. Proponents of MEC have o ered two main lines of response. The rst is that MEC should simply import whatever are the best solutions to fanaticism on o er in decision theory. The second is to propose statistical normalization as a novel solution on behalf of MEC. This paper argues that the rst response is open to serious doubt and that the second response fails. As a result, MEC appears signi cantly less plausible when compared to competing accounts of decision-making under moral uncertainty, which are not fanatical.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  12. 793222.485965
    If it can be reasonable for a typical innocent human being to save lions from extinction at the expense of the human’s own life, then the life of a typical human being is not of greater value than that of all the lion species. …
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  13. 794784.48598
    GeneBcally complete yet authorless artworks seem possible, yet it’s hard to understand how they might really be possible. A natural way to try to resolve this puzzle is by construcBng an account of artwork compleBon on the model of accounts of artwork meaning that are compaBble with meaningful yet authorless artworks. I argue, however, that such an account of artwork compleBon is implausible. So, I leave the puzzle unresolved.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Kelly Trogdon's site
  14. 800768.485995
    Within the context of general relativity, Leibnizian metaphysics seems to demand that worlds are “maximal” with respect to a variety of space-time properties (Geroch 1970; Earman 1995). Here, we explore maximal worlds with respect to the “Heraclitus” asymmetry property which demands that of no pair of spacetime events have the same structure (Manchak and Barrett 2023). First, we show that Heraclitus-maximal worlds exist and that every Heraclitus world is contained in some Heraclitus-maximal world. This amounts to a type of compatibility between the Leibnizian and Heraclitian demands. Next, we consider the notion of “observationally indistinguishable” worlds (Glymour 1972, 1977; Malament 1977). We know that, modulo modest assumptions, any world is observationally indistinguishable from some other (non-isomorphic) world (Manchak 2009). But here we show a way out of this general epistemic predicament: if attention is restricted to Heraclitus-maximal worlds, then worlds are observationally indistinguishable if and only if they are isomorphic. Finally, we show a sense in which cosmic underdetermination can still arise for individual observers even if the Leibnizian and Heraclitian demands are met.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  15. 800803.486009
    This paper presents a novel sense in which theoretical structure has been preserved across the transition from classical to quantum physics. I import mathematical tools from category theory that have been used for structural comparisons in the context of theoretical equivalence and apply these tools to new situations involving theory change. The structural preservation takes the form of a categorical equivalence between categories of models of classical and quantum physics. I situate the significance of this structural preservation in terms of prospects for theory construction in quantum physics.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  16. 800834.486027
    It is plausible that the models of our scientific theories correspond to possibilities. But exactly which models of which scientific theories stand in this correspondence? The answers to this question hinted at so far in the literature are too restrictive: they don’t support the idea that the models of many of our best scientific theories correspond to physical possibilities. The paper thus provides a novel proposal for guiding belief about physical possibilities based on physics. The proposal draws on the notion of an effective theory: a theory that applies very well to a particular, restricted domain. We argue that it is the models of effective theories that we should believe correspond, at least in part, to physical possibilities. It is thus effective theories that should guide modal reasoning in science.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  17. 800864.486041
    Philosophers and physicists often claim that the ‘privileged coordinates’ of a physical theory provide a window into its structure. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether this is the case. We show that there are general relativistic spacetimes that admit the same privileged coordinates but have different structure, and we infer from this that privileged coordinates do not provide a perfect guide to underlying structure. We conclude by isolating the conditions under which privileged coordinates do perfectly reflect structure.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  18. 800891.486055
    Stephen Hawking’s derivation of Hawking radiation relied on one particular spacetime model, that of a star collapsing into a black hole which then remains in existence forever. He then argued that Hawking radiation implies this model should be thrown away in favour of a different model, that of an evaporating black hole. This aspect of Hawking’s argument is an example of an idealization that is pervasive in the literature on black hole thermodynamics, but which has not yet been widely discussed by philosophers. The aim of this paper is to clarify the nature of Hawking’s idealization, and to show a sense in which it leads to a paradox. After identifying this idealization paradox in classic derivations of Hawking radiation, I go on to show how various research programmes in black hole thermodynamics can be viewed as possible resolutions to the paradox. I give an initial analysis of the prospects for success of these various resolutions, and show how they shed light on both the philosophical foundations of both Hawking radiation on the nature of idealizations in physics.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  19. 812862.486071
    Last time I presented a class of agent-based models where agents hop around a graph in a stochastic way. Each vertex of the graph is some ‘state’ agents can be in, and each edge is called a ‘transition’. …
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Azimuth
  20. 824798.486086
    For those who don’t yet know from their other social media: a week ago the cryptographer Yilei Chen posted a preprint, eprint.iacr.org/2024/555, claiming to give a polynomial-time quantum algorithm to solve lattice problems. …
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Scott Aaronson's blog
  21. 832934.486099
    It would be nice if my papers and lecture notes were available in HTML, I thought. Let's start with my lecture notes on modal logic (PDF) I thought. I'll need to convert them from LaTeX to HTML, but surely there are tools for that. …
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on wo's weblog
  22. 832934.486112
    Years ago, I read a clever argument against physician assisted suicide that held that medical procedures need informed consent, and informed consent requires that one be given relevant scientific data on what will happen to one after a procedure. …
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  23. 836428.486127
    I’ve been thinking how best to define computationalism about the mind, while remaining fairly agnostic about how the brain computes. Here is my best attempt to formulate computationalism: - If a Turing machine with sufficiently large memory simulates the functioning of a normal adult human being with sufficient accuracy, then given an appropriate mapping of inputs and outputs but without any ontological addition of a nonphysical property or part, (a) the simulated body dispositionally will behave like the simulated one at the level of macroscopic observation, and (b) the simulation will exhibit mental states analogous to those the simulated human would have. …
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  24. 836429.486142
    If physician assisted suicide is permissible, then it would have been permissible for early Christians facing being tortured to death by the Romans to kill themselves less painfully. It would not have been permissible for early Christians facing being tortured to death by the Romans to kill themselves less painfully. …
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  25. 859630.486159
    The culture of the Akan people of West Africa dates from before the 13th century. Like other long-established cultures the world over, the Akan have developed a rich conceptual system complete with metaphysical, moral, and epistemological aspects. Of particular interest is the Akan conception of persons, a conception that informs a variety of social institutions, practices, and judgments about personal identity, moral responsibility, and the proper relationship both among individuals and between individuals and community. This overview presents the Akan conception of persons as seen by two major contemporary Akan philosophers, Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  26. 897738.486173
    To a large extent, the evidential base of claims in the philosophy of science has switched from thought experiments to case studies. We argue that abandoning thought experiments was a wrong turn, since they can effectively complement case studies. We make our argument via an analogy with the relationship between experiments and observations within science. Just as experiments and ‘natural’ observations can together evidence claims in science, each mitigating the downsides of the other, so too can thought experiments and case studies be mutually supporting. After presenting the main argument, we look at potential concerns about thought experiments, suggesting that a judiciously applied mixed-methods approach can overcome them.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on Adrian Currie's site
  27. 900459.486187
    It turns out I’ve blogged rather a lot of philosophy over the years! I like to find ways to categorize and refer back to the more valuable of those old posts, so they aren’t entirely lost to the ages. …
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on Good Thoughts
  28. 906814.4862
    Emotional hardcore and other music genres featuring screamed vocals are puzzling for the appreciator. The typical fan attaches appreciative value to musical screams of emotional pain all the while acknowledging it would be inappropriate to hold similar attitudes towards their sonically similar everyday counterpart: actual human screaming. Call this the screamed vocals problem. To solve the problem, I argue we must attend to the anti-sublimating aims that get expressed in the emotional hardcore vocalist’s choice to scream the lyrics. Screamed vocals help us see the value in rejecting (a) restrictive social norms of emotional expressiveness and (b) restrictive artistic norms about how one ought to express or represent pain in art, namely that if one is going to do so they must ensure the pain has been ‘beautified’. In developing this second point I argue that emotional hardcore is well-suited (though not individually so) for putting pressure on longstanding views in the history of aesthetics about the formal relationship between art and human pain.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  29. 918783.486214
    Welcome to our newest PEA Soup Blog Ethics discussion! This discussion focuses on David Estlund‘s recent paper ‘What’s Unjust About Structural Injustice?‘. To begin, we will pass things over to Peter de Marneffe for a critical précis. …
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on PEA Soup
  30. 926970.486231
    A typical feature that is singled out in characterizations of the “open society” or the “great society” is its impersonal nature. Karl Popper characterizes the relationships taking place in the open society as “abstract” and “depersonalized”: “As a consequence of its loss of organic character, an open society may become, by degrees, what I should like to term an ‘abstract society.’ It may, to a considerable extent, lose the character of a concrete or real group of men, or of a system of such real groups. …
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on The Archimedean Point