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2070780.684561
There is no doubt that slurs harm . They do so by denigrating their targets, by putting them down, by marginalizing them . This is why in many legislations around the world, the use of slurs has been banned or penalized . But should all uses of slurs be banned? Many uses of slurs seem to be non-derogatory and to have beneficial effects . However, such uses are double-faceted: as both armchair reflection and experimental studies have shown, they are able to produce harm as well . In this paper, I approach the broad question of whether all non-derogatory uses of slurs should be banned . I first present the main uses of slurs that have been considered to be non-derogatory and recent reactions to those . The upshot of this survey is that uses of slurs that have been considered non-derogatory do, in fact, produce harm . I also flag what various authors have recommended in relation to the issue of banning such uses . Against this background, I engage with a recent view put forward by Alba Moreno Zurita and Eduardo Pérez-Navarro, who urge extreme caution with respect to any uses of slurs, due to their potential to normalize derogation . After presenting their view and their main argument, I raise an objection related to their treatment of neutral uses of slurs . I end with pointing out that, while their endeavour has merit in that it pushes the discussion further, it raises certain issues —of both an empirical and a normative nature— that need to be addressed .
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2070801.684647
Over the past decade, there has been a growing interest in dual character concepts (DCCs) . These concepts are defined by their internal structures, which consist of two distinct dimensions: a descriptive and an independent normative dimension . However, a more in-depth exploration of their internal structures is still needed . This article examines the internal structure of one DCC that has garnered significant attention in the literature, scientist . First, I analyze the components of the different dimensions of this concept . Second, I explore the interaction between these two dimensions . To do so, I investigate scientist in the enTenTen20 corpus using Sketch Engine, focusing on the expressions “good scientist” and “true scientist”, as the literature suggests they interact more directly with the descriptive and normative dimensions, respectively . The findings from this investigation offer valuable insights for studying other DCCs, as the results suggest, among others, the following key points: first, that the complexity of the two dimensions of scientist is greater than previously recognized; and second, contrary to what is agreed, both the descriptive and the normative dimension interact with “good” and “true,” which implies that both expressions can be used to make the two types of normative evaluation proper of DCCs .
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2070820.684667
This paper reconstructs Duncan Pritchard’s (2011, pp . 278-284; 2021, pp . 1120-1122; 2025, pp . 56- 58) refutation of epistemic relativism and presents an objection to it . This refutation presupposes that epistemic relativism would be true in case there were rationally irresolvable deep disagreements . Pritchard’s refutation, thus, amounts to an argument purporting to show that all deep disagreements are rationally resolvable . Our objection, in turn, aims to show that the examples of rationally resolvable deep disagreement Pritchard presents have particular features that, while making them rationally resolvable, not all deep disagreement has . In order for these examples to be representative of all deep disagreements we need to accept a particularly strong notion of rationality . Pritchard’s (2011) notion of a truth-seeker presupposes a strong notion of rationality that could play that role . In recent papers, in contrast, Pritchard (2023, pp . 305-308; 2025, p . 53) makes use of a weaker rationality notion in characterizing deep disagreements . Both these alternatives prove to be problematic for Pritchard’s refutation . On the one hand, if the notion of rationality used to characterize deep disagreements secures their rational resolvability, it will already presuppose the falsehood of epistemic relativism . On the other hand, if the refutation treads on a weaker rationality notion, it will simply fail to give reasons to think that all deep disagreements can be rationally resolved . Be that as it may, we claim that Pritchard’s work allows us to identify a subset of deep disagreements that have a particular structure that makes them rationally resolvable .
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2070841.684676
Much effort has been devoted to explaining in what sense models represent their corresponding target systems . This has been considered a pivotal philosophical problem since representational models have been widely assumed to canalize our knowledge and understanding of reality . The aim of the paper is to analytically structure the framework commonly adopted to address the Scientific Representation Problem (SR-P), i .e ., onto-representationalism, and to examine its main problems . Due to its very theoretical conditions, I conclude that onto-representationalism constitutes an inadequate meta-scientific platform to approach SR-P . I locate the problem in the semantic assumption . To materialize these analyses, I examine the main arguments proposed by the main variants of onto-representationalism: classical onto-representationalism and sophisticated onto-representationalism .
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2070861.684685
Investigation of Indigenous concepts and their meanings is highly inspirational for contemporary science because they represent adaptive solutions in various environmental and social milieus. Past research has shown that the conceptualisations of consciousness can vary widely between cultural groups from different geographical regions. The present study explores variability among a few of the thousands of Indigenous cultural understandings of consciousness. Indigenous concepts of consciousness are often relational and inseparable from environmental and religious concepts. Furthermore, this exploration of variability reveals the layers with which some Indigenous peoples understand the conscious experience of the world. Surprisingly, the Indigenous understandings of global consciousness was found not to stay in opposition to local consciousness. The final concluding section of this study discusses the usability of Indigenous concepts and meanings for recent scientific debates regarding the nature of consciousness. Issues such as material versus non-material sources of consciousness, the energy component of consciousness, or the interconnection of consciousness with the environment arose from the in-depth exploration of Indigenous concepts and their meanings.
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2070883.684695
Scientific models often contain assumptions known not to be true. Despite being false representations, models provide us with a key understanding of phenomena. What is more, the falsehoods that figure in models are in many cases central to them, and there is no available alternative to their use. If falsehoods play such an irreplaceable role in our understanding of phenomena, it would seem that truth is not a key concern of scientific modeling. In this paper, I assess the prospects and challenges of reconciling truth and understanding in scientific modeling. More specifically, I review a thesis recently emerging in the literature, what I shall call the Derivation Thesis (DT), according to which we use models to derive true information. First, I examine different versions of the thesis and develop what I take to be its most promising formulation (what I call the generalized DT). Second, I discuss a serious challenge to the generalized DT. I consider a thought experiment in which an unreliable astrological model gives true explanations by fluke. This scenario challenges the idea that models can provide genuine understanding by generating truths. In response, I argue that genuine scientific models also fulfill a specific normative role that epistemically lucky models lack (what I call the normative generalized DT). I test this hypothesis by analysing how the Ideal Gas Law advances scientific understanding of real gases.
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2081640.684704
My paper ‘Preference and Prevention: A New Paradox of Deontology’ has just been published in the inaugural issue of the open access journal Free & Equal.1 As is often the case with ambitious papers, finding a good home took several years and tens of thousands of words of revisions and responses to referees, but I’m very happy with how it turned out in the end!2 I’m especially delighted that it’s open access—and I hope my paper helps contribute to a good start for Free & Equal.3
Overview
The paper undertakes three main tasks. …
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2081641.684712
The Oort cloud is a huge region of icy objects surrounding our Sun. We’re not sure it exists, but we think it’s where comets come from. I’ve often seen the Oort cloud drawn as a vague round blob. But recently some people simulated it—and discovered that tidal forces from the Milky Way may pull it into a much more interesting shape:
• David Nesvorný, Luke Dones, David Vokrouhlický, Hal F. Levison, Cristian Beaugé, Jacqueline Faherty, Carter Emmart, and Jon P. Parker, A spiral structure in the inner Oort cloud, The Astrophysical Journal 983 (2025). …
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2172574.684719
Could you be a brain in a vat, with all your experiences of people, plants, pebbles, planets and more being generated solely by computer inputs? It might seem difficult to know that you aren’t, since everything in the world would still appear just as it is. In his 1981 book, Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam argues that if you were in such a predicament, your statement ‘I am a brain in a vat”, would be false since, as an envatted brain, your word ‘vat’ would refer to the vats you encounter in your experienced reality, and in your experienced reality, you are not in one of those but are instead a full-bodied human being with head, torso, arms, and legs living in the wide open world. The following extended thought experiment is intended to illustrate that, contrary to Putnam’s view, you, as an envatted brain, could truthfully believe that you are a brain in a vat.
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2183138.684729
The inferentialist answer is that an existential quantifier is any symbol that has the syntactic features of a one-place quantifier and obeys the same logical rules of an existential quantifier (we can precisely specify both the syntax and logic, of course). …
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2184778.684737
Mind uploading promises us a digital afterlife. Critics believe that this promise is void, since we are not the type of thing that could be transmitted as data from one location to another. In this paper, I shall make the case that even if the critics are right and we cannot be uploaded, much of uploading’s appeal can be maintained. I will argue for Parfitian Transhumanism, a view that comprises two claims. First, it maintains that our minds can be uploaded, even if we cannot. Second, uploading our minds preserves what matters in survival.
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2186228.684748
This paper examines the physical meaning of the wave function in Bohmian mechanics (BM), addressing the debate between causal and nomological interpretations. While BM postulates particles with definite trajectories guided by the wave function, the ontological status of the wave function itself remains contested. Critics of the causal interpretation argue that the wave function’s high-dimensionality and lack of back-reaction disqualify it as a physical entity. Proponents of the nomological interpretation, drawing parallels to the classical Hamiltonian, propose that the wave function is a “law-like” entity. However, this view faces challenges, including reliance on speculative quantum gravity frameworks (e.g., the Wheeler-DeWitt equation) and conceptual ambiguities about the nature of “nomological entities”. By systematically comparing BM to Hamilton- Jacobi theory, this paper highlights disanalogies between the wave function and the classical action function. These differences—particularly the wave function’s dynamical necessity and irreducibility—support a sui generis interpretation, where the wave function represents a novel ontological category unique to quantum theory. The paper concludes that the wave function’s role in BM resists classical analogies, demanding a metaphysical framework that accommodates its non-local, high-dimensional, and dynamically irreducible nature.
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2186257.684756
This paper introduces the concept of regulatory kinds — socially constructed classifications that come to function epistemically like natural kinds through recursive uptake across institutional domains. These kinds do not reflect causal unity or semantic precision, but they acquire stability, portability, and predictive utility by being embedded in the inferential routines of medicine, law, policy, and science. I develop the notion of simulated kindhood to explain how such classifications support explanation and coordination despite lacking metaphysical integrity. Race serves as the central case: a contested and heterogeneous category that nonetheless endures as a diagnostic tool, a policy metric, and a risk factor. By treating race as a regulatory kind, the paper reframes classificatory persistence as an institutional phenomenon, rather than a cognitive or conceptual error. The account challenges traditional views of kindhood, highlights the epistemic logic of infrastructural classification, and raises ethical concerns about the reification of simulated categories.
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2243950.684764
We develop a classification of general Carrollian structures, permitting affine connections with both torsion and non-metricity. We compare with a recent classification of general Galilean structures in order to present a unified perspective on both. Moreover, we demonstrate how both sets of structures emerge from the most general possible Lorentzian structures in their respective limits, and we highlight the role of global hyperbolicity in constraining both structures. We then leverage this work in order to construct for the first time an ultra-relativistic geometric trinity of gravitational theories, and consider connections which are simultaneously compatible with Galilean and Carrollian structures. We close by outlining a number of open questions and future prospects.
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2243973.684771
The study of molecular structure has played a central role in the debate around chemistry’s reduction to quantum physics. So far, this case has been invoked to support the non-reducibility of chemistry. However, recent papers claim that there might not be any structure to be assigned to isolated molecules, thus prompting a deeper investigation of the nature of molecular structure. To this end, this paper explores two alternative accounts of structure: the relational and dispositional accounts. Each metaphysical account has interesting implications for the reduction debate and opens news ways of arguing for (but also against) the reducibility of chemistry. The aim is to show that the debate around chemistry’s reduction needs to be radically reframed so as to include a rigorous metaphysical analysis of the nature of molecular structure.
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2243994.684781
Two forms of chemical reaction statements are standardly found in the chemical corpus. First, individual reactions statements describe reactions that occur between specific chemical substances, leading to the production of specific substances. Secondly, general reactions statements describe chemical transformations between groups of substances. Both forms of statements track regularities in nature and are thus warranted to be viewed as representing causal relations. However, a convincing analysis in terms of causation also requires spelling out the metaphysical relation between individual and general reactions. This is because their relation prompts concerns regarding causal priority and causal overdetermination. I present these concerns and address them by arguing that we should view individual and general reactions in the context of the determinate/determinable distinction.
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2244015.684796
The two times problem, where time as experienced seems to have distinctive features different than those found in fundamental physics, appears to be more intractable than necessary, I argue, because the two times are marked out from the positions furthest apart: neuroscience and physics. I offer causation as exactly the kind of bridge between these two times that authors like Buonomano and Rovelli (forthcoming) are seeking. It is a historical contingency from philosophical discussions around phenomenology, and methodological artefact from neuroscience, that most studies of temporal features of experience require subjects to be sufficiently still that their engagement with affordances in the environment can be at best tested in artificial and highly constrained ways. Physics does not offer an account of causation, but accounts of causation are tied to or grounded in physics in ways that can be clearly delineated. Causation then serves as a bridge that coordinates time as experienced, via interaction with affordances in the environment, with time in physics as it constrains causal relationships. I conclude by showing how an information-theoretic account of causation fits neatly into and extends the information gathering and utilizing system (IGUS) of Gruber et al (2022).
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2244037.684805
This article offers a hybrid account of regulatory kinds and subjective fit to explain why the oft-invoked analogy between gender transition and so-called race transition fails both conceptually and normatively. The argument—recently circulated in popular commentary and endorsed by figures such as Richard Dawkins—suggests that if gender transition is legitimate on the basis of social construction, then racial transition should be equally so. Yet since racial transition is generally regarded as illegitimate, the analogy concludes that gender transition must be suspect. I argue that this inference rests on a category error: it conflates social construction with norm-governed intelligibility.
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2244059.684812
In a reliabilist epistemology of algorithms, a high frequency of accurate output representations is indicative of the algorithm’s reliability. Recently, Humphreys challenged this assumption, arguing that reliability depends not only on frequency but also on the quality of outputs. Specifically, he contends that radical and egregious misrepresentations have a distinct epistemic impact on our assessment of an algorithm’s reliability, regardless of the frequency of their occurrence. He terms these statistically insignificant but serious errors (SIS-Errors) and maintains that their occurrence warrants revoking our epistemic attitude towards the algorithm’s reliability. This article seeks to defend reliabilist epistemologies of algorithms against the challenge posed by SIS-Errors. To this end, I draw upon computational reliabilism as a foundational framework and articulate epistemological conditions designed to prevent SIS-Errors and thus preserve algorithmic reliability.
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2244080.684819
– In opposition to traditional approaches in metaphysics of science, Entity Realism proposes to extract ontological commitments from experimental practice instead of abstract theories, using an inference from manipulability to existence that would be continuous with everyday inferences regarding ordinary objects. A problem is that most accounts of ordinary artefacts make them mind-dependent or language-dependent, and so not real by philosophical standards. Furthermore, the functional kinds of biology and chemistry are not necessarily compatible with mind-independence either. It follows that Entity Realism is better understood within a pragmatist or deflationary alternative to standard metaphysics. The approach is beneficial for responding to sceptical arguments.
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2244103.684828
This article analyzes some of the methodological tensions that can be observed in the regulation of science and technology, and that often manifest themselves as controversies. We offer a three-way classification of such tensions. The latter can arise from: 1) external (non-cognitive) factors that are specific to a particular regulation; 2) external (non-cognitive) factors of wider societal importance that are not related to any particular regulatory process; and 3) internal (non-cognitive, as well as cognitive) factors related to the cognitive, as well as practical limitations of a particular scientific methodology in the context of regulatory decision making. We analyze case studies of regulation of, among other, pharmaceuticals, chemical products, health claims on foods, as well as genetically modified organisms. The analysis shows that most often such methodological tensions are driven, directly or indirectly, by different stances with respect to non-cognitive factors that underlie the fundamental choices of methods and standards, and therefore the data that underpin regulatory decisions. Our paper makes clear an important feature of regulatory science: cognitive factors (like improved scientific data or accepted best practices), that in academic science facilitate the resolution of debates, in regulatory science do not suffice for achieving closure with respect to such tensions. Any attempt at closure has to deal primarily with the relevant non-cognitive factors.
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2244125.684836
Advances in animal sentience research, neural organoids, and artificial intelligence reinforce the relevance of justifying attributions of consciousness to non-standard systems. Clarifying the argumentative structure behind these attributions is important for evaluating their validity. This paper addresses this issue, concluding that analogical abduction – a form of reasoning combining analogical and abductive elements – is the strongest method for extrapolating consciousness from humans to non-standard systems. We argue that the argument from analogy and inference to the best explanation, individually taken, do not meet the criteria for successful extrapolations, while analogical abduction offers a promising approach despite limitations in current consciousness science.
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2359097.684844
Suppose that the right way to combine epistemic utilities or scores across individuals is averaging, and I am an epistemic act expected-utility utilitarian—I act for the sake of expected overall epistemic utility. …
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2359098.684852
An infinitely long life of repetition of a session meaningful pleasure followed by a memory wipe. A closed time loop involving one session of the meaningful pleasure followed by a memory wipe. Scenario (1) involves infinitely many sessions of the meaningful pleasure. …
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2359420.684859
Patterns and pattern ontologies are a powerful way for pragmatists to address metaphysical issues by rejecting a false dichotomy between pluralism and realism. However, there is a common misconception about patterns that I call the philosophically perverse patterns (PPP) problem. Here, critics of patterns invent perverse examples that meet the metaphysical criteria to count as patterns. I defuse this concern by showing how PPP misunderstands what the pragmatist metaphysics of patterns is supposed to accomplish: the bare definition should not rule out, or in, substantive examples of patterns that instead should involve methodological considerations. I use this response to the PPP problem to show how the metaphysical definition of 'pattern' allows the pragmatist to capture the rich intricacies of ontologies in the sciences and yields two illustrative norms by which methodology can be guided in developing or refining ontologies: cohesion and coherence.
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2359477.684866
Recent work in quantum gravity (QG) suggests that spacetime is not fundamental. Rather, spacetime emerges from an underlying non-spatiotemporal reality. Spacetime functionalism has been proposed as one way to make sense of the emergence of spacetime. However, spacetime functionalism faces a ‘collapse’ problem. The functionalist analysis seems to force spacetime into the (more) fundamental ontology of QG, thereby conflicting with—rather than elucidating—spacetime emergence. In this paper, I show how to resolve the collapse problem. The solution is to differentiate between physical and metaphysical notions of (relative) fundamentality. With this distinction in hand, we can see that spacetime functionalism does not after all force spacetime into the (more) fundamental ontology of QG in any troubling sense. A side benefit of the paper is that it provides a sharpened characterisation of various notions of (relative) fundamentality.
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2359521.684873
This paper proposes that relational ontology, which defines existence through relations, serves as a bridge between scientific realism and empiricism by offering a structural criterion for scientific explanation. Through case studies in quantum mechanics and thermodynamics, we illustrate how relationality grounds scientific theories in empirical interactions while supporting realist commitments to unobservable structures. Engaging with philosophy of science debates—realism, reductionism, and demarcation—and drawing on thinkers such as Lakatos, Kuhn, Cartwright, van Fraassen, and contemporary authors like Ladyman and Chakravartty, this work examines the explanatory limits of relational ontology in addressing consciousness and contrasts scientific explanations with non-scientific accounts. Its original contribution lies in demonstrating how relational ontology unifies these perspectives through a rigorous structural criterion, advancing our understanding of scientific explanation within the philosophy of science.
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2359581.684881
Ecosystems are increasingly being represented as marketplaces that produce goods for humanity, and because of this, economic metaphors for increasing efficiency have been introduced into conservation. A powerful model for economic growth is the globalised free market and some are implicitly deploying it to suggest changes in conservation practice. Ecological globalisation is the position that we should not control the free movement of species and re-wilding occurs most efficiently through non-intervention. When species can move and interact with new ecological systems, they create novel ecosystems. These novel arrangements create experimental markets in nature's economy, providing opportunities for the efficient production of goods for humans, also known as ecosystem services. When invasive species supersede local populations, it indicates previous biotic systems were inefficient, which is why they were replaced, and therefore it is wrong to protect indigenous ‘losers’ from extinction. Those who defend indigenous species are accused of being xenophobic against recent biotic migrants. This position is flawed both empirically and morally as there is a disconnect between these economic and political arguments when applied to human economies and nature's economy.
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2404950.684891
The dialogical stance on meaning in the Lorenzen-Lorenz tradition is dynamic, as it is based on interaction between players, and contextual, as meaning depends on the set of rules adopted for the dialogical justification of claims including those implicit in linguistic practice. Grasping the meaning of an expression or an action amounts to identifying the rationale behind our verbal and behavioural practices. This knowledge is informed by the collective intelligence embodied within public criticism Different aspects of meaning are made explicit within the game rules: particle rules for the meaning of logical constants, the Socratic rule for non-logical constants and structural rules that set contextual meaning by shaping the development of a play. The level of plays is governed by these meaning-determining rules, and validity (or proof) is built from the plays. The result is a framework that grounds language and logic in the dynamics of dialogical meaning, and which has proven fruitful for studying frameworks for the logical analysis of language, modern and ancient.
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2408049.684897
Our adversarial system of international relations poses substantial risks of violent catastrophe and impedes morally urgent initiatives and reform collaborations. The domestic politics of more evolved societies provide guidance toward a better world governed by just rules, which ensure that basic human needs are met, inequalities constrained, and weapons and wealth marginalized as tools for influencing political and judicial outcomes. Impartial administration, adjudication, and enforcement of just rules require a strong normative expectation on officials and citizens to fully subordinate their personal and national loyalties to their shared commitment to the just and fair functioning of the global order. As we have fought nepotism within states, we must fight nepotism on behalf of states to overcome humanity’s great common challenges. To moralize international relations, states can plausibly begin with reforming the world economy toward ending severe poverty, thereby building the trust and respect needed for more difficult reforms.