1. 1311086.470605
    Here are some things we know about conflicts around the world in April 2024. On 7 October 2023 Hamas killed over 1200 people in Israel and took more than 240 hostage. In response Israel launched an assault on Gaza that has killed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians and displaced millions. Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine continue; since 2022 Russia has repeatedly ignored international humanitarian law, tortured and murdered civilians, and destroyed basic infrastructure in civilian areas. Civil war continues in Sudan, and the country faces imminent famine. Approximately 25 million people in Sudan need humanitarian assistance.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  2. 1320055.47071
    This is the guest post by Bran Haig on July 12, 2019 in response to the “abandon statistical significance” editorial in The American Statistician (TAS) by Wasserstein, Schirm, and Lazar (WSL 2019). In the post it is referred to as ASAII with a note added once we learned that it is actually not a continuation of the 2016 ASA policy statement. …
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  3. 1320542.470724
    There continues to be significant confusion about the goals, scope and nature of modelling practice in neuroeconomics. This paper aims to dispel some such confusion by using one of the most recent critiques of neuroeconomic modelling as a foil. The paper argues for two claims. First, currently, for at least some economic model of choice behaviour, the benefits derivable from neurally-informing an economic model do not involve special tractability costs. Second, modelling in neuroeconomics is best understood within Marr’s three-level of analysis framework and in light of a co-evolutionary research ideology. The first claim is established by elucidating the relationship between the tractability of a model, its descriptive accuracy, and its number of variables. The second claim relies on an explanation of what it can take to neurally-inform an economic model of choice behaviour.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on Matteo Colombo's site
  4. 1321258.470732
    This article proposes an approach to understanding life that overcomes reductionist and dualist approaches. Kant’s analysis of the conditions of knowing an organism shows that attempts to explain its teleology and autopoiesis from the interactions of its components is problematic. Based on an analysis by Van de Vijver and colleagues, a co-constitutive relationship between the cognitive activities of the observer and the living features of the organism is described. Using the example of a developmental series, it is shown that within this active relational process, both autopoiesis and teleology of the organism manifest themselves on the mental level of the observer. The Kantian mode of objectification, which refers to the sensually perceptible appearance of an organism, can be supplemented by an active mode of relational objectification that encompasses the life of the organism. The analysis introduces a phenomenological first-person perspective on the study of life "from within", which enables an empirical investigation of the vital properties of an organism.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilSci Archive
  5. 1324088.470739
    In two recent posts (this and this) I argued that dignity does not arise from value. I think the general point here goes beyond value. Some entities are more apt for being morally concerned about than others. …
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  6. 1324089.470746
    A year ago, I wrote a post lamenting the lack of “cross-camp” engagement in philosophy, and highlighting the challenges I’d most like to see addressed (by non-consequentialists, opponents of effective altruism, and proponents of “neutrality” in population ethics). …
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on Good Thoughts
  7. 1368790.470753
    International regulation of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) is increasingly conceived as an exercise in risk management. This requires a shared approach for assessing the risks of AWS. This paper presents a structured approach to risk assessment and regulation for AWS, adapting a qualitative framework inspired by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It examines the interactions among key risk factors—determinants, drivers, and types—to evaluate the risk magnitude of AWS and establish risk tolerance thresholds through a risk matrix informed by background knowledge of event likelihood and severity. Further, it proposes a methodology to assess community risk appetite, emphasizing that such assessments and resulting tolerance levels should be determined through deliberation in a multistakeholder forum. The paper highlights the complexities of applying risk-based regulations to AWS internationally, particularly the challenge of defining a global community for risk assessment and regulatory legitimization.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  8. 1368821.470759
    Contemporary philosophers have largely neglected Richard Taylor’s design argument. Given that the initial responses to the argument were largely negative, one might be tempted to conclude that the argument is simply philosophically inadequate. This paper rejects that conclusion by showing how Taylor’s argument has been misunderstood by his critics. In defending Taylor, it is shown that the two types of objections levied against him fail to even blemish his design argument, let alone refute it. Consideration is also given to the argument’s historical lineage, along with a proposal for future considerations of the connection between epistemological realism and design.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilPapers
  9. 1378899.470765
    We extend a result by Gallow concerning the impossibility of following two epistemic masters, so that it covers a larger class of pooling methods. We also investigate a few ways of avoiding the issue, such as using nonconvex pooling methods, employing the notion of imperfect trust or moving to higher-order probability spaces. Along the way we suggest a conceptual issue with the conditions used by Gallow: whenever two experts are considered, whether we can trust one of them is decided by the features of the other!
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilSci Archive
  10. 1378924.470771
    This paper explores the concept of "Nothingness" and its connection to Graham Priest's paraconsistent logic, with a critical focus on Heidegger's ontological perspective. Heidegger argues that logic and ontology are incompatible, and truth extends beyond mere propositions, tied to the indescribable experience of "Nothing." He contends that logical rules are not essential for ontological truth, leading to two conceptions of truth: fundamental and propositional. The study delves into this profound examination, considering the implications for understanding truth and the limitations of logic in grasping the elusive aspects of existence.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilSci Archive
  11. 1379026.470778
    A shared narrative in the literature on the evolution of cooperation maintains that social learning evolves early to allow for the transmission of cumulative culture. Social norms, whilst present at the outset, only rise to prominence later on, mainly to stabilise cooperation against the threat of defection.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilSci Archive
  12. 1415311.470784
    It is widely held that if you do wrong in culpable ignorance (ignorance that you are blameworthy for), you are culpable for the wrong you do. I have long though think this is mistaken—instead we should frontload the guilt onto the acts and omissions that made one culpable for the ignorance. …
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  13. 1426568.47079
    Limited aggregationists argue that when deciding between competing claims to aid we are sometimes required and sometimes forbidden from aggregating weaker claims to outweigh stronger claims. Joe Horton presents a ‘fatal dilemma’ for these views. Views that land on the First Horn of his dilemma suggest that a previously losing group strengthened by fewer and weaker claims can be more choice-worthy than the previously winning group strengthened by more and stronger claims. Views that land on the Second Horn suggest that combining two losing groups together and two winning groups together can turn the losing groups into the winning groups and the winning groups into the losing groups. This paper demonstrates that the ‘fatal dilemma’ is neither fatal nor a dilemma. The First Horn is devastating but avoidable and the Second Horn is unavoidable but not devastating. Nevertheless, Horton’s argument does help to narrow down the acceptable range of views.
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  14. 1432849.470796
    This paper has two parts: Part I discusses a problem concerning subjective probabilities. Part II outlines a partial solution to the problem, mainly by defending a kind of “transparency” thesis concerning knowledge of one’s own judgments. Part I will primarily be of interest to those who take seriously the notion of subjective probability. (This need not imply that it is the most important notion, but rather just that it is worthwhile.) Part II will appeal primarily to those interested in knowledge about one’s own mental states. But hopefully, those who are attracted to Part I will be drawn into Part II as well, given that latter bears on the problem from the former. Indeed, the main message will be that the theory of subjective probability can benefit substantially by adopting a transparency view of self-knowledge.
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on T. Parent's site
  15. 1435769.470802
    Part One: A Powerful Problem ............................................................................................. 1 1. A Brief Look at Where We’re Going: The Problem of Horrific Suffering, Two Other Forms of the Problem of Evil, and the Place of Human Free Will in a World Governed by a Wholly Good God ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………1
    Found 2 weeks, 2 days ago on Keith DeRose's site
  16. 1484287.470809
    We, the signatories of this declaration, express our disagreement with the views stated in The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness (NYDAC). First, there is strong philosophical support for the attribution of a confused concept of consciousness to the NYDAC Signatories (NYDACS). Their concept is a derivative of Descartes’ conception of perception, based on his claim that colours, sounds, and other qualities we perceive are in the mind – this mind probably identified by many if not all NYDACS with the brain. Descartes’ reasons were all flawed, and no valid reason has since been provided to support his position or any of its descendants, including the NYDACS’s.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  17. 1484317.470815
    Epistemology has taken a zetetic turn from the study of belief towards the study of inquiry. Several decades ago, theories of bounded rationality took a procedural turn from attitudes towards the processes of inquiry that produce them. What is the relationship between the zetetic and procedural turns? In this paper, I argue that we should treat the zetetic turn in epistemology as part of a broader procedural turn in the study of bounded rationality. I use this claim to motivate and clarify the zetetic turn in epistemology, as well as to reveal the need for a second zetetic turn within practical philosophy.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilPapers
  18. 1533665.470821
    Metric poetry is rhythmic language laid above, and to some degree matching, an underlying pulse. If you do not know where in that pulse you are, you may mangle the verse. In iambic pentameter the pulse is easy: five strong beats, separated by weaker off-beats. …
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on Mostly Aesthetics
  19. 1549204.470827
    The quarantine model, recently proposed by Pereboom and Caruso, is one of the most influential models developed to date in the context of criminal justice. The quarantine model challenges the very idea of criminal punishment and asserts that nobody deserves punishment on a fundamental level. Instead, in order to deal with offenders, it proposes a series of incapacitation measures based on public safety concerns. In this article, we examine several objections to the quarantine model that demonstrate how, in our view, it can be improved. These mainly pertain to (2.1) the difficulty of reliably identifying dangerous individuals and consequently the need to base confinement decisions on probability, and (2.2) the potential for the quarantine model not to properly deter certain crimes. Three additional objections are raised with respect to (3.1) the rights that are potentially suppressed in the quarantine model; (3.2) the role of “genetic justice”; and (3.3) the difficulty it faces accommodating reasons-responsiveness. Whereas these objections do not constitute knock-down arguments against the quarantine model, they highlight issues that invite closer scrutiny, at least if it is to be considered as a credible framework for the development of viable policies in criminal justice.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on Mirko Farina's site
  20. 1551944.47085
    This paper does two things. First, it reviews the recent debate between Halvorson and Manchak (2022) and Menon and Read (2024), looking for a reading of the former that is sympathetic to the concerns of the latter. Second, it considers whether there is a notion of determinism for spacetime theories that is adequate for the purposes of (Halvorson & Manchak, 2022); it concludes that there is not, but that we learn much of interest by considering the question.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  21. 1551968.470857
    I apply Dennett’s ‘real patterns’ idea to the ontology of physics, and specifically to the puzzle of how to relate the very different ontologies one finds at different scales in physics (e.g. particles vs continua, or fields vs particles). I argue that real patterns provide part but not all of the answer to the puzzle, and locate the rest of the answer in the structural-realist idea that ontology in general is secondary to (mathematically-presented) structure. I make some suggestions for the application of these ideas outside physics, including in the philosophy of mind context that motivated Dennett’s original proposal.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  22. 1551994.470863
    I show that frequentism, as an explanation of probability in classical statistical mechanics, can be extended in a natural way to a decoherent quantum history space, the analogue of a classical phase space. The result is further a form of finite frequentism, in which Gibbs’ concept of an infinite ensemble of gases is replaced by the total quantum state expressed in terms of the decoherence basis, as defined by the history space. It is a form of finite and actual frequentism (as opposed to hypothetical frequentism), insofar as all the microstates exist, in keeping with the decoherence-based Everett interpretation, and some versions of pilot-wave theory.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  23. 1552021.470869
    We discuss the challenges that the standard (Humean and non-Humean) accounts of laws face within the framework of quantum gravity where space and time may not be fundamental. This paper identifies core (meta)physical features that cut across a number of quantum gravity approaches and formalisms and that provide seeds for articulating updated conceptions that could account for QG laws not involving any spatio-temporal notions. To this aim, we will in particular highlight the constitutive roles of quantum entanglement, quantum transition amplitudes and quantum causal histories. These features also stress the fruitful overlap between quantum gravity and quantum information theory. Keywords: spacetime, laws of nature, quantum gravity, quantum entanglement, transition amplitude, quantum causal histories.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  24. 1552102.470875
    Chronostratigraphy is the subfield of geology that studies the relative age of rock strata and that aims at producing a hierarchical classification of (global) divisions of the historical time-rock record. The ‘golden spike’ or ‘GSSP’ approach is the cornerstone of contemporary chronostratigraphic methodology. It is also perplexing. Chronostratigraphers define each global time-rock boundary extremely locally, often by driving a gold-colored pin into an exposed rock section at a particular level. Moreover, they usually avoid rock sections that show any meaningful sign of paleontological disruption or geological discontinuity: the less obvious the boundary, the better. It has been argued that we can make sense of this practice of marking boundaries by comparing the status and function of golden spikes to that of other concrete, particular reference standards from other sciences: holotypes from biological taxonomy and measurement prototypes from the metrology of weight and measures. Alisa Bokulich (2020b) has argued that these ‘scientific types’ are in an important sense one of a kind: they have a common status and function. I will argue that this picture of high-level conceptual unity is mistaken and fails to consider the diversity of aims and purposes of standardization and classification across the sciences. I develop an alternative, disunified account of scientific types that shows how differences in ontological attitudes and epistemic aims inform scientists’ choices between different kinds of scientific types. This perspective on scientific types helps to make sense of an intriguing mid-twentieth-century debate among chronostratigraphers about the very nature of their enterprise. Should chronostratigraphers conventionally make boundaries by designating golden spikes, or should they attempt to mark pre-existing ‘natural’ boundaries with the help of a different kind of scientific type?
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  25. 1552143.470881
    The early history of string theory is marked by a shift from strong interaction physics to quantum gravity. The first string models and associated theoretical framework were formulated in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the context of the S-matrix program for the strong interactions. In the mid-1970s, the models were reinterpreted as a potential theory unifying the four fundamental forces. This paper provides a historical analysis of how string theory was developed out of S-matrix physics, aiming to clarify how modern string theory, as a theory detached from experimental data, grew out of an S-matrix program that was strongly dependent upon observable quantities. Surprisingly, the theoretical practice of physicists already turned away from experiment before string theory was recast as a potential unified quantum gravity theory. With the formulation of dual resonance models (the hadronic string theory ), physicists were able to determine almost all of the models parameters on the basis of theoretical reasoning. It was this commitment to non-arbitrariness , i.e., a lack of free parameters in the theory, that initially drove string theorists away from experimental input, and not the practical inaccessibility of experimental data in the context of quantum gravity physics. This is an important observation when assessing the role of experimental data in string theory.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  26. 1555924.470891
    One of the most common fallacies in applied ethics and public policy is to reason from “X is good” to “Doing Y without X should be prohibited”. Presumably the implicit thought is that by prohibiting not-X, you’ll get more X. …
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on Good Thoughts
  27. 1571263.470897
    While effective altruists (EAs) spend a lot of time researching which ways to do good are the most effective, historically many have assumed, with relatively little argument, that the benchmark for membership in the movement is a commitment to donate 10% of your earnings. This points to an asymmetry between the two halves of effective altruism: EAs tend to have relatively restricted standards for effectiveness (where to give), but they have much looser standards for altruism (how much to give). I investigate explanations for this asymmetry. While some possible justifications may work (pending empirical support), others look flimsier. I conclude that this means EA likely is, or anyway ought to be, more demanding than some of its proponents currently claim.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on Amy Berg's site
  28. 1580926.470905
    In thought insertion, patients claim to have thoughts which are not their own. I offer an account of the thought insertion delusion by utilising the notion of commitment, that is, the experience of a conscious state as being appropriate or fitting. The proposed explanation of thought insertion relies on two main tenets. One is that the experience of a thought as being one's own is the experience of regarding that thought as being correct. The other is that patients with thought insertion do not experience being committed to the thoughts that they disown. I extend this account to the case of patient RB, who disowns some of his conscious memories, and to the case of anarchic hand syndrome, in which patients disown some of their conscious actions.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on Jordi Fernández's site
  29. 1611494.470911
    Legend has it that Damion Searls learnt Norwegian in order to translate Jon Fosse, whom he had read in German and identified as a genius. Searls’ translations of Fosse are, by all accounts, superb. So it is intriguing to learn that he has now translated Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, joining other post-centenary interpreters, Michael Beaney, a historian of early analytic philosophy, and Alexander Booth, a poet. …
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on Under the Net
  30. 1657458.470917
    This is an original manuscript of an article published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2339470. John Maier’s Options and Agency is an excellent book. It is brimming with insights and original ideas; in just about 160 pages of text, it provides the reader with an entirely novel perspective on different issues in metaphysics, semantics, and the philosophy of action. It is lucidly written and a joy to read. While we disagree with some core points (to be elaborated below), we highly recommend the book to anyone interested in agency, modality, and the intersection between the two. Maier voices an attractive ambition: we should work towards a philosophy of agency that emphasises the possible and the future, not a philosophy of action that privileges the actual and the past. To understand agency, Maier argues, we must start from the plurality of options that agents face at every stage of their lives. These options are practically indispensable, analytically irreducible, and key to explaining how human (and perhaps also other) beings can have free will.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilPapers